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Abstracts 
We feel gratitude—a positive emotion upon receiving an undeserved 
benefit which is attributable to the givers’ benevolent intent (Watkins, 2007, 
2014). Meanwhile, indebtedness symbolises an unpleasant mental state which 
is also triggered by benefit receipts (Greenberg, 1980). Theories and empirical 
evidence in the literature have highlighted how gratitude and indebtedness each 
relates to prosociality (or sanctioning), and importantly, how via different 
routes these two constructs will elicit cooperativeness. Nonetheless, there is still 
a gap in the literature on how gratitude and indebtedness will contribute to 
prosociality and sanctioning in economic exchanges (Leung, 2011).  
Thus via three economic games (i.e. Experiments 1 to 3, presented in 
Chapters 2 to 5) I endeavour to thoroughly examine how gratitude (and 
indebtedness) would relate to prosociality or sanctioning in a Behavioural 
Economics context. In so doing I intend to combine Psychometrics and 
Experimental Economics in the examination of the gratitude (and 
indebtedness)-prosociality association. Additionally, via meta-analysing (i.e. 
Chapter 2) over three decades of research on the gratitude-prosociality link I 
intend to offer i) a comprehensive quantitative synthesis of the findings and, ii) 
a systematic exploration of moderators, which are both absent in the literature.   
The present thesis also features a series of extensive follow-up analyses 
on an interesting economic observation from Experiment 1— i.e. the cheap-
rider problem (Cornes & Sandler, 1984). While Experiment 2 entails a more 
focused scrutiny (via a one-shot game) over the occurrences and motives 
behind cheap-riding, Experiment 3 builds on that by testing how cheap-riding 
may be used to enforce normative fairness in an iterated exchange context.   
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Results of the meta-analysis revealed a moderate positive link between 
gratitude and prosociality. The moderator analyses showed that this link is 
stronger when, a) state rather than trait gratitude was measured, b) direct 
instead of indirect or non-reciprocal outcomes was examined, and c) benefit-
triggered instead of generalized gratitude (Lambert et al., 2009) was examined.  
Meanwhile, results of Experiment 1 built upon the above by showing 
how the gratitude-reciprocity link will be subject to helper intent attribution, 
and how the injunctive fairness norm (Elster, 2006) could influence this 
attribution and thereby shaped recipients’ feeling of gratitude (or indebtedness) 
throughout the episode, and ultimately his/her urge to directly reciprocate. 
Additionally, a noticeable degree of cheap-riding was observed when unfairly 
treated participants were granted an avenue to sanction their helpers.  
The data of Experiment 2 revealed a pattern of cheap-riding that 
corresponded not only to that of Experiment 1 but also to the reality. Crucially, 
the analyses of the motives behind repayment allowed the disentanglement of 
the psychology between that of the cheap-riders, cooperators, and free-riders.  
Lastly, analyses of Experiment 3 revealed three main findings. They 
included, a) people’s preference for an ‘optimal’ platform for cheap-riding to 
better serve its norm-enforcing function, although its actual efficacy in 
promoting mutual compliance to normative fairness is still questionable; b) how 
the Relative Rank Model of Gratitude (Wood, Brown, & Maltby, 2011) will 
supersede the injunctive fairness norm in guiding the recipients’ benefit 
appraisals, experienced gratitude, and eventual direct reciprocal acts toward 
the helpers; and c) how gratitude and indebtedness were both predictive of 
more trustworthiness and generosity in an iterated, variant of Trust Game.  
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1.0. Overall Objective of the Current Thesis 
The current thesis concerns the detailed role of gratitude—an emotion 
that arises when people receive an undeserved benefit (Bertocci & Millard, 
1963) attributable to someone else’s benign intent (Emmons, 2004; Watkins, 
2007)—in relation to prosociality and sanctioning in a behavioural economics 
(i.e. BE hereafter) context. In particular, I examined—via an iterated and two 
one-shot variant of Trust Game—how gratitude, as a transitory state or as an 
enduring disposition, will facilitate people’s reciprocal (as opposed to 
sanctioning) decisions in situations under which pursuit of self-gain will clash 
with maximization of collective benefits (Allison, Beggan, & Midgley, 1996).  
Another objective of the current thesis is to dissociate the mechanisms 
through which gratitude and indebtedness—an unpleasant mental state 
triggered by benefit receipts (Goei & Boster, 2005; Greenberg, 1980)—prompts 
positive and negative reciprocity (Fehr & Falk, 1999) in a BE context. I also 
examined the importance of intention and injunctive norm on fostering gratitude 
or indebtedness, and how these may eventually contribute to one’s economic 
decision making. Furthermore, a meta-analytic review over the link between 
gratitude and prosociality was included. Via this review I aimed to provide an 
overall estimate on how strongly gratitude relates to prosociality, and also what 
other issues might mould the strength of this association.     
Leung (2011) argued that there is a paucity of empirical works which 
specifically investigated how gratitude engenders cooperation in economic 
exchanges. Indeed, despite a plethora of psychological research (e.g. Froh et al, 
2014; Halali, Kogut, & Ritov, 2016; Krumrei-Mancuso, 2016) on the gratitude-
prosociality link, only a few had outright examined prosociality in an economic 
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exchange (e.g. Desteno, Bartlett, Baumann, Williams, & Dickens, 2010; Exline 
& Hill, 2012; Rubin, 2012). Even worse, indebtedness is an overlooked topic in 
the BE literature despite its theoretical connectedness with direct reciprocity 
(Greenberg & Shapiro, 1971; Watkins, Scheer, Ovnicek, & Kolts, 2006) and 
sanctioning (e.g. Fisher, Nadler, & Whitcher-Alagna, 1983; Greenberg & 
Westcott, 1983; Hatfield & Sprecher, 1983). To date, there is still a total 
absence of published articles which directly scrutinised the effect of 
indebtedness—as an aversive psychological state or a disposition (Mathews & 
Green, 2010; Mathews & Shook, 2013)—in economic exchanges. Thus, one 
intended major contribution of the current thesis is to combine psychometrics 
and Behavioural Economics in scrutinising the role of gratitude and 
indebtedness in nurturing (or undermining) cooperation and sanctioning. 
Meanwhile, an injunctive norm represents a cluster of expectations on 
what a typical person should do in a given situation to warrant social approval 
(Burger et al., 2010; Cialdini, Kallgren, & Reno, 1990; Perkins, 2003). 
Bicchieri (2006) argued that when evaluating someone else’s intent people will 
base their judgment upon whether the injunctive norm was upheld. Thus, 
injunctive norm forms the basis of fairness judgment and this notion has been 
evidenced in the social psychology, social cooperation, and social learning 
literature (e.g. Hoffman, McCabe, & Smith, 1996; Irving & Simpson, 2013; 
Kazemi, Eek, & Gärling, 2016). Nevertheless, it still remains unaddressed as of 
how such a norm-based judgment would tamper with people’s experience of 
gratitude, or indebtedness, and crucially, how these might contribute to one’s 
actual decisions to reciprocate or to sanction in an economic interaction. 
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Moreover, in spite of the host of empirical (e.g. Tsang, 2006a, 2007) 
and theoretical evidence (e.g. Algoe, Haidt, & Gable, 2008; McCullough, 
Kilpatrick, Emmons, & Larson, 2001; McCullough & Tsang, 2004; Roberts, 
2004) for gratitude-prosociality link, there is still a lack of a comprehensive 
quantitative review of these findings. Given the overarching aim of this thesis 
concerns the analyses of how gratitude will enhance prosociality in a specific 
context (i.e. a BE setting), it is of utmost importance to examine if there is a 
reliable and consistent association between gratitude and prosociality for 
starters, and also what methodological or theoretical factors may account for 
any inconsistencies of the effect estimates across the sampled studies.  
Taken together, I believe that the current thesis should bridge a gap in 
the literature by illustrating 1) how gratitude and indebtedness, would—
potentially in a different fashion (See Schaumberg and Flynn (2009) for a 
review)—influence one’s intention or actual cooperation or sanctioning  in a 
BE context; 2) how the injunctive norm, and its effect on fairness perception, 
will affect one’s gratitude or indebtedness and consequently guide that 
individual’s decision to cooperate or sanction; and lastly, 3) how gratitude 
relates to prosociality and what other factors could have moderated this link.  
Below (i.e. Section 1.1) I discuss the theoretical build-ups of the present 
thesis. That includes a range of theories and models of cooperation and 
altruism, so as the role of positive and negative emotions in these cooperation 
(or sanctioning) models. Section 1.1 also entails a review of the evidence in the 
Social Psychology and Experimental Economics literature that pertains to the 
gratitude-prosociality association. The present chapter is at last wrapped up by 
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a few basic predictions and hypotheses, which are then followed by a preview 
of Chapters 2 to 5 which present the meta-analysis and Experiments 1 to 3.  
1.1. Cooperation and Altruism Revisited 
1.1.1. Sanctioning and Cooperation 
The effect of sanctioning on cooperation maintenance is well 
documented in the experimental economics literature (See Fehr and 
Rockenbach (2004) for a review). Particularly, it is argued that to enforce the 
norm of cooperation it is imperative that one should penalise norm violators for 
victimising a third party (Bendor & Swistak, 2001), i.e., altruistic ‘third-party’ 
punishment (Landman & Hess, 2016; Nelissen & Zeelenberg, 2009).  
Indeed, data of Fehr and Fischbacher’s (2004) third-party punishment 
game illustrated that 55% of the spectators would punish, in spite of a cost to 
themselves, people for refusing to apportion a fair share of endowment to their 
co-players. Also, nearly 80% of participants will anticipate the third-parties (i.e. 
the spectators) to intervene via sanctioning their partners if they were not 
playing fair. These implied that there should be a consensus of zero tolerance 
toward norm violators, and crucially, an expectation of these perpetrators to get 
their comeuppances even if punishing them may not be utterly cost-free.  
Additionally, Gürerk, Irlenbusch, and Rockenbach (2004, 2006) 
demonstrated, via their iterated public goods game, that there was a shift in 
preference from a sanctioning-free (SFI hereafter) to a sanctioning institution 
(SI hereafter) as the game proceeded. Participants will decide before the start of 
each trial whether they preferred the SFI—in which players could not penalise 
one another, or the SI— in which sanctioning non-cooperation was feasible.  
Chapter 1   6 
 
 
 
Indeed, not only had their data revealed a near extinction of preferences 
for SFI in the later experimental phases, Gürerk et al. (2006) also showed that 
the contributions were significantly larger among players who picked the SI. 
Thus, the results of Gürerk et al. (2004, 2006) again pointed to the fact that 
people do subscribe to the idea that sanctioning (or the threat of which) is 
instrumental in safeguarding mutual cooperation, and importantly, the data 
further corroborated the potency of sanctioning in nurturing cooperation.  
Nevertheless, a few questions remain unanswered: Does sanctioning 
alone already suffice to guarantee mutual cooperation? What other factors may 
as well influence the efficacy of sanctioning in preventing defection?  
1.1.2. Intent Attribution, Reciprocity Model, and Emotion 
1.1.2.1. Sanctioning No Panacea to Maintenance of Cooperation 
To address the above questions Fehr and associates (Fehr & 
Rockenbach, 2003; Fehr & List, 2004) examined the downside of unfair, 
unreasonable sanctioning on cooperation maintenance via a series of modified 
Trust Games (i.e. TG hereafter). In these modified TGs Fehr and associates had 
granted a portion of the investors the option to fine their trustees for back-
transfers (BTs) that fell short of the investors’ ‘desired BTs’ (i.e. the ‘Incentive 
Condition’). Investors could hand-pick their own ‘desired BTs’ and were under 
no pressure to impose any fine if they deemed unnecessary. As such, the 
experimenters examined if a selfishly-driven sanctioning arrangement, in which 
an investor demanded an unreasonably high back-transfer while threatened to 
sanction, would rather encourage (but not undermine) non-cooperation.  
The data confirmed this hypothesis by showing that unfair sanctioning 
overall haunted a trustee’s compliance. Specifically, unfairly treated trustees 
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would rather pay the penalty charges than complying with their investors’ 
selfish demands. By contrast, trustees whose investors chose not resort to the 
punishment threat—even when they could—demonstrated more trustworthiness 
(in the form of proportionately higher BTs), than trustees i) who were 
threatened to not under-repay; and those ii) whose trustors could not penalise. 
These showed that when one decides whether to cooperate he/she does not just 
reflexively respond to the sanctioning parameters, he/she also ponders over 
whether the arrangement comprises moral legitimacy or it reflects malicious 
intent on behalf of the enforcers (Fehr & Rockenbach, 2003). In short, a lack of 
perceived negativity (e.g. unfairness and animosity), or the presence of 
perceived kindness (e.g. trust and respect), is also instrumental in the 
preservation of mutual cooperation (McCabe, Rigdon & Smith, 2003).   
1.1.2.2. Intent Perception and Reciprocities 
Fehr and colleagues’ observations are indeed consistent with the Theory 
of Reciprocity (Falk & Fischbacher, 2006) which asserts that reciprocation (or 
retaliation) will depend on a recipient’s evaluation of helper’s intent. Charness 
and Levine (2007) even argued that intent perception could override actual 
distributive outcomes in predicting positive or negative reciprocity, as their data 
showed that when individuals decided whether to remunerate or to sanction 
they tend to prioritise the evaluation of the intentionality of the outcomes.  
Fehr and Falk (1999) argued that reciprocity comprises both cooperation 
and sanctioning. While Positive Reciprocity arises from an urge to ‘reward 
actions perceived as generous, kind or fair (pp.109)’, Negative Reciprocity is 
driven by a desire to sanction behaviours deemed ‘hostile or unfair (pp.109).’ 
Additionally, Greenberg and Westcott (1983) suggested that emotion may 
Chapter 1   8 
 
 
 
mediate the link between intent attribution and reciprocation. They argued that 
a prosocial gesture which communicates good intentions—on the benefactor’s 
behalf—should elicit positive emotions such as gratitude (Komter, 2004; 
Nadler, 2012), and these positive emotions should be conducive to 
reciprocation (Fredrickson, 2004a; McCullough et al., 2001; Tsang, 2007). 
Nowak and Roch (2007) highlighted the role of positive affects—while 
emphasising gratitude—in triggering and sustaining both the direct and indirect 
reciprocation. This resonates with Fredrickson’s (2004a) Broaden-And-Build 
Theory in which gratitude could propel a beneficiary to act ‘prosocially 
oneself , either towards one’s benefactor, towards others, or both. (pp.150)’  
By contrast, a maliciously-intentioned act of ingratiation should elicit 
negative emotions such as indebtedness and annoyance in the recipients 
(Greenberg & Shapiro, 1971; Hatfield & Sprecher, 1983; Lazarus & Lazarus, 
1996), and these negative emotions have been well-documented to foster non-
cooperation or even sanctioning (Ma et al., 2012; Xiao & Houser, 2005).  
Taken together, the above underlines the role of emotion in 
transforming intent attributions to the subsequent behavioural retaliation and 
reciprocation. Section 1.1.3 further highlights how cooperation (or 
prosociality), thanks to its evolutionary origin, would depend upon emotions.  
1.1.3. Cooperation as an Intuition 
Rand, Greene, and Nowak (2012) had referred to the Dual-process 
framework (Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 2006; Kahneman, 2011)—which 
theorises one’s social decision making as an outcome of interaction between 
Intuition (System 1) and Reflection (System 2)—to account for the observed 
pattern of cooperation in various one-shot economic games (such as the PGs). 
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Their results identified a causal, direct link between processing speed and 
cooperation which suggests that one’s ‘automatic first response (pp.429)’ is 
cooperation, and that selfishness only creeps into one’s mind once that person 
can afford to be deliberative. As a result, Rand et al. (2012) argued that humans 
are predisposed to prosociality whereas rationality results from self-control.  
Rand et al. (2012) further theorised that human beings develop the 
cooperative instinct in daily lives under which cooperation is advantageous; as 
the key interactions are repeated (Fudenberg & Maskin, 1986) and that 
cooperation are critical in reputation management (Pfeiffer, Tran, Krumme, & 
Rand, 2012; Rockenbach & Milinski, 2006; Milinski, 2016). These participants, 
when cornered into acting fast, might therefore just act on their altruistic 
‘defaults’ even in a context in which cooperation is anything but advantageous 
(e.g. one-off exchanges with anonymous co-players in a laboratory). However, 
as the time pressure dissipates (which implies more room for reflection), people 
can adapt to the context and therefore make a more calculated decision as they 
suppress their cooperative heuristics (Rand et al., 2014; Jordan et al., 2014).  
Meanwhile, it is well documented (e.g. Kahneman, 2003, 2011) that the 
System 1 is characterised by automaticity, and more importantly, susceptibility 
to emotions. System 2, on the other hand, epitomises consciousness and 
emotionlessness. Taken together, the intuitive nature of prosociality should by 
default render cooperation an emotionally dependent concept. Indeed, the 
current thesis will particularly examine how emotions gratitude and 
indebtedness will relate to prosociality in the realm of economic exchanges.   
1.2. Emotion, Altruism and Sanctioning Revisited 
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Section 1.1.2 discussed the importance of intent attributions and 
emotions from the recipients’ perspective in shaping the two-part exchange—
i.e. initial favour followed by reciprocation or retaliation—between a 
benefactor and a recipient. Indeed, the emotional reactions of recipients used to 
be a scarcely researched topic in the Altruism literature until the 80s (See 
Fisher, Nadler, & DePaulo, 1983; Gross & McMullen, 1983 for a review).  
Fisher (1983) attributed such an oversight to the oversimplified 
construal of a helper-recipient relationship. That is, all helping relationships 
were presumed to function uniformly and mechanistically insofar as the helpers 
deliver the needed resources, with little to none regards to recipients’ reactions. 
As such, researchers were prone to take a helper-centred perspective when 
analysing a helper-recipient relationship (Fisher, 1983). In the following, I 
discuss three helper-centred models that theorised the different roles of a 
helper’s positive and negative emotions will play in inciting prosociality.  
1.2.1. Empathy-Altruism Hypothesis (i.e. EAH hereafter)  
Batson and associates (e.g. Batson et al., 1989; Batson, Bolen, Cross, & 
Neuringerbenefiel, 1986; Batson & Weeks, 1996) theorised that empathic 
concern is the source of altruistic motivation. According to EAH, after 
witnessing the suffering of a needy person an empathic spectator would identify 
with the former and also vicariously experience that suffering (Batson, 1991). 
Consequently, to relieve that sufferer of his/her misery—via helping—will 
become the top priority for the prospective helper because he/she feels for the 
former (Batson, 1990, 2010; Batson, Eklund, Chermok, Hoyt, & Ortiz, 2007).  
Nonetheless, it is important to note that this empathy-driven helping 
should have no association with self-gains such as avoidance of disapproval or 
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desire for social acclaim (Batson et al., 1988), considering that the helper’s 
primary concern is to benefit the person toward whom empathy was felt 
(Batson et al., 1986; Batson et al., 1989). Indeed, the EAH epitomises what 
altruism comprises by definition: an unselfish or unconditional concern for 
others (Fehr & Schmidt, 2006), and an intention to enhance others’ welfare 
without expecting any extrinsic rewards (Bar-Tal, 1986). The EAH had 
received extensive empirical support (e.g. Batson et al., 1988; Batson & Weeks, 
1996; Fultz, Batson, Fortenbach, McCarthy, & Varney, 1986; Schroeder, 
Dovidio, Sibicky, Matthews, & Allen, 1988) despite the presence of a rival 
model—i.e. Negative State Relief Model (i.e. NSRM hereafter) which argued 
that negative mood management is what truly underlies helping (Cialdini et al., 
1987; Cialdini & Fultz, 1990). Section 1.2.2 offers an overview of the NRSM. 
1.2.2. Negative State Relief Model (NSRM) 
Despite acknowledging the importance of perspective-taking in 
inspiring helping, Cialdini and colleagues (e.g. Cialdini, Brown, Lewis, Luce, 
& Neuberg, 1997; Cialdini, Darby, & Vincent, 1973;) asserted that there is no 
such thing as a ‘selfless’ helping. That is, people, having witnessed the victim’s 
suffering, are motivated to help by an egoistic objective to eradicate their own 
negative state. This Mood Management perspective of helping has been, for 
instance, evidenced in Cialdini et al.’s (1973) observed decline in helping 
among people who were given an alternative means to salvage their mood.  
Cialdini and colleagues (Cialdini et al. 1997; Goldstein & Cialdini, 
2007; Maner et al. 2002) further questioned the EAH by stating that helping 
someone with whom one has a sense of merged identity hardly qualifies a 
‘selfless’ demeanour. A helper who empathises with recipient prospective 
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recipient is expected to have cultivated a sense of ‘oneness’ between the pair 
(Maner et al., 2002). Therefore, it is illogical to claim whatever attempts to help 
as genuinely selfless as the helper considers him/herself and the victim as a 
single entity. In particular, Maner et al. (2002) revealed that once non-altruistic 
factors such as the helper’s negative state and sense of merged identity with the 
victim had been controlled for, empathic concern was no longer correlated with 
helping. Nonetheless, the paths of 1) perceived merged identity and helping, 
and 2) negative state and helping both remained statistically significant, thereby 
further endorsing the NRSM and meanwhile dismissing the EAH.  
1.2.3. Impure Altruism and Warm-Glow Giving—the Integrative Model 
While EAH and NSRM constitute the polar opposites in the ‘Egoism-
Altruism debate’ (Batson, Ahmad, Lisner, & Tsang, 2002; Batson & Shaw, 
1991), Andreoni’s (1989, 1990, 1993) concept of Impure Altruism appeared to 
fall somewhere between these two extremes. An impure altruist (i.e. IA 
hereafter), according to Andreoni (1989, 1990), derives a joy of giving (Abel & 
Warshawsky, 1987; Ribar & Wilhelm, 2002) from 1) the fact that his/her 
altruistic act had contributed to the betterment of others, and crucially, 2) the 
sheer act of giving. Thus, apart from the benevolent concerns for the needy, 
impure altruists acquire a sense of ‘warm-glow’ (i.e. an internal satisfaction) 
(Beccheti & Degli Antoni, 2010; Harbaugh, 1998) via their prosocial acts.  
By contrast, a pure altruist (i.e. PA hereafter) helps purely out of their 
concern for others’ welfare (Becker, 1974; Rose-Ackerman, 1997). This is 
indeed consistent with what EAH theorises as the primary motivator of helping 
(See Section 1.2.1).  As such, PAs should be apathetic to the sources of help as 
long as the needy are taken care of, as PAs do not help out of the ‘warm-glow’ 
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feeling. To verify whether prosociality, especially in the form of charitable 
donations, is accountable by pure or impure altruism researchers examined a 
phenomenon termed ‘crowding-out’ (e.g. Kingma, 1989; Payne 1998, 2001).  
Crowding-out occurs when a donor reduces his/her contribution to a 
charity knowing that every dollar he/she donates will be matched with an 
equivalent withdrawal by an external agency (Abrams & Schmitz, 1984). Since 
PAs, by definition, should only be concerned about the total contribution, one 
should expect a complete crowding out whereby a dollar increase in external 
funding should induce exactly a dollar’s drop in the private donation (Konow, 
2010). On the contrary, an incomplete crowding-out can be anticipated from the 
impure altruists as their very act of generosity already brings them warm-glow 
(Andreoni, 1990; Ferguson & Flynn, 2016). Thus, impure altruists may not be 
that concerned about the efficacy of their donations unlike the pure altruists  
Findings from both lab and field experiments (e.g. Khanna, Posnett, & 
Sandler, 1995; Manzoor & Straub, 2005; Okten & Weisbrod, 2000) overall 
favoured the IA, which constitutes an integrated perspective of egoism and 
altruism, in explaining charitable giving. In fact, the notion of ‘Warm-Glow’ 
giving has gathered extensive support from various economic experiments (e.g. 
Carpenter, Connolly, & Myers, 2008; Palfrey & Prisbrey, 1997), particularly 
the Charity Dictator Game in which a dictator was deprived of any altruistic 
motivation to make any donations (See Crumpler & Grossman, 2008).  
All in all, the EAH, NSRM and the IA models had acknowledged the 
role of positive (i.e. empathy for EAH; ‘warm-glow’ for IA) and negative 
emotions (i.e. negative state relief in NSRM) in cultivating prosociality, despite 
the fact that each model had theorised a unique mechanism through which a 
Chapter 1   14 
 
 
 
specific emotion will foster prosociality. However, as mentioned previously all 
these models had adopted a helper-centred perspective in examining 
prosociality (Fisher, 1983). As a result, little attention was placed on 1) how a 
recipient may react emotionally to that help, for instance, a wounded self-
esteem (Nadler, Peri, & Chemerinski, 1985; Nadler & Mayseless, 1983;) or 
gratitude (Lazarus & Lazarus, 1996; McCullough et al., 2001); and 2) how such 
a reaction (e.g. to demonise the helper (Hatfield & Sprecher, 1983) or to 
gratefully reciprocate (Ma, Tunney, & Ferguson, 2014)) will contribute to any 
future, ongoing helper-recipient interactions (Fisher, 1983; Fisher et al., 1983).  
Therefore, one principal objective of the current thesis is to examine the 
effect of recipients’ positive and negative emotions on their cooperative or 
sanctioning behaviours. Particularly, present thesis primarily focuses on how 
gratitude, i.e. a typical positive benefit-triggered affect (Lambert, Graham, & 
Fincham, 2009; Lambert & Fincham, 2011), would facilitate the recipient’s 
reciprocal or sanctioning decision in a behavioural economics context. 
Meanwhile, the thesis also sheds light on how indebtedness, a negatively-
valenced affective state triggered via a favour acceptance (Goei & Boster, 
2005; Peebles, 2010), contributes to people’s economic decisions. The current 
thesis entails also the scrutiny over how dispositional gratitude (Adler & 
Fagley, 2005; McCullough, Emmons, & Tsang, 2002; Watkins, Woodward, 
Stone, & Kolts, 2003) and indebtedness (Mathews & Shook, 2013; Solom, 
Watkins, McCurrach, & Scheibe, 2016; Watkins, 2014) might shape people’s 
prosociality or sanctioning. Below (i.e. Section 1.3) I review the evidence on 
the associations of gratitude and indebtedness to prosociality or sanctioning.   
1.3. Gratitude, Indebtedness and Prosociality  
Chapter 1   15 
 
 
 
1.3.1. What Gratitude Constitutes? 
Roman philosopher Marcus Cicero (106 BC – 43 BC) once proclaimed 
that ‘Gratitude is not only the greatest of virtues, but the parent of all the 
others.’ Clearly, gratitude has always been held in high regard (Fitzgerald, 
1998) whereby the expression of such, when it is due, draws approval whereas 
a failure to acknowledge (or appreciate) others’ benevolence is egregious 
(Amato, 1982; Emmons & Shelton, 2002; McCullough et al., 2001).  
In addition to an emotional acknowledgement of someone else’s 
generosity, gratitude is also conceptualised as a trait that encapsulates a ‘life 
orientation toward noticing and appreciating the positives in life (pp.891)’ 
(Wood, Froh, & Geraghty, 2010). McCullough et al. (2002) contended that such 
a worldview is what motivates a grateful person to not take any positives for 
granted and therefore recognises other people’s contribution to his/her well-
being. Consequently, these people are more capable of reaping the benefits, e.g. 
subjective happiness, from their positive life encounters (Weiner, 1985). This 
resonates with the notion whereby gratitude constitutes an essential part to a 
quality life (Peterson & Seligman, 2004; Watkins et al., 2003; Watkins, 2007). 
1.3.2. Emotional Gratitude and Prosociality 
In addition to the betterment of one’s emotional well-being, 
McCullough and colleagues (McCullough et al., 2001; McCullough, Kimeldorf, 
& Cohen, 2008) argued that gratitude as an emotion is integral to one’s social 
functioning. They theorised that gratitude, thanks to its three inbuilt moral 
functions, promotes and perpetuates prosocial interactions between a giver and 
a recipient (Watkins, 2007). The below delves into these three functions and 
how each of them relates to the facilitation and maintenance of prosociality. 
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1.3.2.1. Gratitude the Moral Barometer 
First, the Moral Barometer hypothesis argues that gratitude would 
function as a benefit detector (McCullough et al., 2001; McCullough et al., 
2008) as it informs a recipient if someone had benefited him/her, and crucially, 
whether that benefit was worth feeling gratitude for. People only experience 
gratitude when they sense that someone was being benevolent to them and that 
generosity should, in no circumstances, originate from any selfish or deceitful 
intent on behalf of the benefactors (Heider, 1958; Simmons, 1979).  
As such, the experience of gratitude entails social cognition (See 
Steindl-Rast, 2004; Wood, Maltby, Stewart, Linley, & Joseph, 2008). In 
particular, McCullough et al. (2001) outlined four social-cognitive factors 
recipients typically attend to when evaluating whether a benefit is worthy of 
their gratitude. They included, 1) whether that benefit was valuable; 2) whether 
the givers incurred a material cost amid the conferment of that benefit; 3) 
whether that benefit was delivered intentionally (or by chance); and 4) whether 
that benefit was rendered because of the benefactor’s role-based obligations.   
1.3.2.2. Gratitude as a Moral Motive 
Meanwhile, the moral motive hypothesis stipulates that gratitude also 
serves to motivate recipients to repay their benefactors via ‘contributing to their 
welfare in the future (pp.252)’ and to also refrain from acting ‘destructively 
toward the benefactor (pp.252)’ (McCullough et al., 2001). That is, in addition 
to celebrating an undeserved although welcomed kindness (Steindl-Rast, 2004), 
gratitude also prompts a beneficiary to return this kindness (Komter, 2004).  
Nonetheless, such a return of generosity should by not be likened to as 
an act of debt settlement. Gratitude is characterised by (or at least closely linked 
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to) a feeling of warmth (Wood, Joseph, & Maltby, 2008), compassion (Horberg, 
Oveis, & Keltner, 2011), and key among those, a desire for social proximity to 
one’s benefactor (Mayer, Salovey, Gomberg-Kaufman, & Blainey, 1991). Thus, 
a grateful recipient’s endeavour to reciprocate should be deemed more of a 
stepping stone to establishing social closeness with the helper (Fitzgerald, 
1998). This gratitude-driven reciprocity perspective resonates with the Impure 
Altruism model (See Andreoni, 1989, 1990) in that a prosocial gesture (i.e. 
reciprocation) is driven by both altruistic (i.e. to contribute to benefactor’s 
welfare) and egoistic (i.e. to acquire social proximity to helper) motives.  
1.3.2.3. Gratitude as a Moral Reinforcer 
McCullough et al. (2001) stated that gratitude functions also as a moral 
reinforcer as its expression symbolises recognition for the helpers’ initial 
kindness. Such a recognition will encourage the same helper to continue to be 
generous in the future (Grant & Gino, 2010) and hence strengthens the existing 
helper-recipient rapport (Fitzgerald, 1998). Indeed, the robust association 
between the frequency of expressing gratitude and the relationship quality in 
intimate relationships, which is well-documented in the literature (e.g. Algoe, 
Gable, & Maisel, 2010; Chang, Li, Teng, Berki, & Chen, 2013; Gordon, Impett, 
Kogan, Oveis, & Keltner, 2012; Kubacka, Finkenauer, Rusbult, & Keijser, 
2011), best attests to the hypothesis of gratitude as a moral reinforcer.  
To conclude, the above three moral functions of gratitude outlined the 
mechanism through which a recipient develops an urge to reciprocate rather 
than to ‘bite the hand that feeds’. The above hypotheses also underlined the 
conceptual discrepancy between the gratitude-motivated reciprocity with the act 
of debt settlement from a rapport-building perspective. In other words, 
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gratitude inspires a ‘want to (pp. 111)’ form of reciprocity (Schaumberg & 
Flynn, 2009) and in so doing prompts a recipient to establish a social affiliation 
with the benefactor (Bartlett, Condon, Cruz, Baumann & Desteno, 2012).       
1.3.3. Dispositional Gratitude and its Indirect Link to Prosociality 
While the above underscored how gratitude as a transitory state could 
motivate and sustain prosociality, the Social-Cognitive Model of Gratitude (i.e. 
SCMG hereafter; Wood et al., 2008) outlined how gratitude as a trait may 
indirectly prompt prosociality via a particular chain of attributional and 
emotional processing. In particular, the SCMG argued that what makes a 
dispositionally grateful recipient more capable of experiencing gratitude—
following a benefit receipt—is the manner he/she appraises the benefit.  
Wood et al. (2008) theorised that a grateful recipient is more likely to 
interpret the benefit he/she received as i) propelled by the giver’s benevolence; 
ii) costly to the giver; and ii) valuable to oneself. Such an overall favourable 
appraisal thus elicits more intense experience of gratitude (Wood et al., 2008), 
with this heightened feeling of gratitude being well-documented to predict 
reciprocity or prosociality from the recipient (Tsang, 2007, Tsang et al., 2012). 
Overall, the SCMG hinted a possible indirect role of dispositional gratitude in 
fostering positive reciprocity by somewhat ‘distorting’ the perception of the 
benefice and the ensuing feeling of gratefulness toward one’s benefactor.  
1.3.4. Gratitude and Prosociality in the Behavioural Economics Literature 
Interestingly, despite the strong theoretical link between gratitude and 
cooperation (or sanctioning) gratitude still remains an under-researched domain 
in the experimental economics literature (Leung, 2011). Nonetheless, there is 
no shortage of evidence in the BE literature for the link between perceived 
Chapter 1   19 
 
 
 
kindness (and fairness) and decisions to sanction (or reciprocate) (e.g. 
Camerer, 2003; Charness & Rabin, 2002; Güney & Newell, 2013). Indeed, the 
link between intent attribution (i.e. kindness and fairness) and gratitude is also 
well documented in the Social Psychology literature (Emmons, 2004; Pruyser, 
1976). Taken together, it is conceivable that the kindness-driven reciprocity 
may be attributable to gratitude. However, to date there is only one published 
article which examined how the direct manipulation of state gratitude will 
contribute to cooperative economic decision-making (i.e. Desteno et al., 2010). 
As such, one primary contribution of the present thesis entails the combination 
of Experimental Economics and Psychometrics in the analyses of the role of 
gratitude in nurturing prosociality. The below two sub-sections (i.e. Sub-
sections 1.3.4.1 and 1.3.4.2.) entail a brief review of Desteno et al’s (2010) 
work and a discussion of how that paper relates to the current investigation.    
1.3.4.1. Brief Review of Desteno et al.’s (2010) Paper 
Desteno et al. (2010) employed the ‘Give-Some Dilemma Game (i.e. 
GSDG hereafter)’ in which a player decides whether to be selfish (i.e. to retain 
all the endowment) or trustful (i.e. to entrust their endowment to a co-player 
and runs the risk of being taken advantage of) (Nelissen, Dijker, & deVries, 
2007; Parise, Kiesler, Sproull, & Waters, 1999). Prior to the GSDG, a portion 
of participants (i.e. the ‘Gratitude condition’) were induced to feel gratitude 
toward the confederates following a benefit receipt (See Bartlett & Desteno, 
2006). Desteno et al. (2010) also manipulated the partner identities in the 
GSDG: some participants were partnered with strangers (i.e. ‘Stranger’ 
condition) while others played alongside the confederates who helped them 
during the gratitude induction phase (i.e. ‘Benefactor’ condition).  
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Gratitude was overall demonstrated to predict trustfulness in the GSDG. 
Interestingly, Desteno et al. (2010) showed no evidence that whether a 
participant played with his/her benefactor or a stranger had tampered with their 
prosociality (or lack thereof) in the GSDG. In other words, gratitude-inspired 
reciprocities are not confined to direct reciprocation (Nowak & Roch, 2007; 
Nowak & Sigmund, 2005), as it also entails a ‘pay-it-forward’ variant via which 
a recipient passes on the benevolence of the helper to a third party (Chang, Lin, 
& Chen, 2012; Gray, Ward, & Norton, 2014; Schaumberg & Flynn, 2009).  
Desteno et al’s (2010) findings resonated with Nowak and Roch’s 
(2007) argument in relation to the critical role of gratitude in inciting (and also 
perpetuating) both direct and indirect reciprocations. The data also gave 
credence to Fredrickson’s (2004a) Broaden-and-Build perspective on how 
gratitude nurtures indirect and direct reciprocities. In particular, Fredrickson 
(2004b) theorised that gratitude could add to the creativity of a recipient thanks 
to its ‘perspective-broadening’ property as a typical positive affect. This 
increased creativity thus enables that recipient to not religiously stick with the 
traditional ‘tit-for-tat’ restitution of the helpers’ kindness, but to adopt an 
alternative approach such as directing such a generosity to an ‘innocent’ other.   
1.3.4.2. What was lacking in Desteno et al. (2010)?  
While Desteno et al. (2010) had pioneered the scrutiny of gratitude in 
the realm of economic exchanges; there are certain glaring methodological 
issues which may have undermined the validity in their analyses. Examining the 
method through which Desteno et al. (2010) induced gratitude, that is, to 
subject the participants to a bogus computer failure and then the confederates 
came to their ‘rescue’, it is conceivable that these ‘victims’ may feel indebted 
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apart from grateful toward their ‘saviours’. Given the supposedly ‘breakdown’ 
took place when the participants were working on their cover task, the 
participants may have held themselves responsible for that mishap and therefore 
felt guilty for having bothered their helpers for starters (Naito & Sakata, 2010). 
Indeed, Greenberg and Shapiro (1971) argued that indebtedness is 
characterised by a sentiment of guilt which originates the receipt of an 
undeserved kindness. Therefore, as highlighted in the Negative-State Relief 
Model (Cialdini et al., 1973; Cialdini et al., 1987) these indebted participants 
(in Desteno et al (2010)) may behave prosocially later on with the aim to 
salvage their moods. However, neither had Desteno et al. (2010) even explicitly 
mentioned nor implied, let alone addressed this alternative explanation 
throughout their paper. As a result, I believe this should leave the door open for 
the present thesis to a) explore how indebtedness could affect people’s 
cooperation or sanctioning in an economic game; and to b) discern the 
mechanisms through which indebtedness and gratitude prompt sanctioning or 
reciprocities. Below (i.e. Sub-sections 1.3.5 to 1.3.7) I review indebtedness as a 
psychological concept and how it relates to the scope of the current thesis.  
1.3.5. What Indebtedness Constitutes? 
German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche once described that ‘Great 
indebtedness does not make men grateful, but vengeful; and if a little charity is 
not forgotten, it turns into a gnawing worm’. Indeed, indebtedness represents an 
unpleasant mental and physiological state as triggered by an urge to repay a 
benefactor (Greenberg, 1980; Greenberg & Frisch, 1972). Unlike gratitude, 
state indebtedness is often accompanied by negative feelings such as perceived 
inferiority to the helper (Homans, 1961) and inequity (Adams, 1963, 1965).  
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Meanwhile, indebtedness as a disposition, that is, the ‘creditor 
personality’ (Greenberg & Westcott, 1983), is characterised by, a) a religious 
adherence to the reciprocity principles (Gouldner, 1960); b) intense discomfort 
being a receiver in an exchange; c) an urge to immediately settle any 
outstanding debts; and interestingly, d) a tendency to keep his/her beneficiaries 
indebted via shunning their endeavours to repay (Greenberg & Westcott, 1983).  
1.3.6. Indebtedness, Reciprocity and Sanctioning 
1.3.6.1. State Indebtedness, Reciprocity and Sanctioning 
Schaumberg and Flynn (2009) noted that despite the differences in 
motivation, indebtedness, just like gratitude, also prompts a return of 
benefactor’s kindness. However, this motivation to make restitutions stems 
from the urge to escape from the unpleasant feeling of owing (Gergen, 
Ellsworth, Maslach, & Seipel, 1975) or to eradicate the perceived inequity (i.e. 
being ‘over-benefited’, See Hatfield & Sprecher, 1983). Greenberg, Block and 
Silverman (1971) even added that an indebted person would normally feel 
apprehension at the prospects of a lack of avenue to make restitutions.  
Therefore, contrary to what Empathy-Altruism Hypothesis (Batson et 
al., 1981) and the Impure Altruism model (Andreoni, 1989, 1990) suggest, 
indebtedness-inspired reciprocity may not stem from any altruistic motives. In 
fact, such a viewpoint has been recapitulated by Greenberg and Westcott (1983) 
who argued that to assure the window of reciprocation is open an indebted 
person may go as far to sabotage a third party’s efforts to help the initial helper. 
Thus, unlike gratitude-inspired reciprocity, indebtedness-inspired reciprocity 
leans more towards the Negative State Relief Model (Cialdini et al., 1987) 
whereby a person engages in prosociality for the sole purpose of mood 
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management (i.e. to escape from the psychological shackle of being in debt). 
All in all, indebtedness as an emotion should, resembling gratitude, also possess 
a capacity to incite reciprocity in an economic exchange, although it is well 
documented that the two constructs will operate on two distinct mechanisms in 
necessitating reciprocity (Schaumberg & Flynn, 2009; Watkins et al., 2006).  
Nevertheless, Greenberg (1980) argued that other than reciprocation 
Cognitive Restructuring also constitutes a ‘major mode of indebtedness 
reduction (pp.95)’. Cognitive Restructuring (i.e. CR) entails a re-assessment 
and hence a restructuring of the cognition that dictates the initial experience of 
indebtedness (Greenberg & Westcott, 1983). Specifically, a recipient would re-
consider factors such as 1) whether the helper was that benevolent as originally 
interpreted, or 2) whether the benefit was intentional or just a fluke. These 
restructuring efforts will downplay a recipient’s feeling of obligation and more 
importantly, his/her perceived necessity to reciprocate (Greenberg & Westcott, 
1983). Nonetheless, when applying CR the recipient also runs the risk of 
distorting the reality (Folkman & Lazarus, 1991), and thereby earns disapproval 
from others. This is especially the case when there are witnesses, particularly 
the benefactor, to the exchange episode (Greenberg & Westcott, 1983).  
As such, a recipient would only prefer Cognitive Restructuring when 
certain parameters are met (Greenberg, 1980). They include, first, the lack of 
witnesses to the initial helping episode(s), second, a perceived lack of 
opportunity to reciprocate; and finally, recipients expecting minimal future 
exchanges with the benefactors (or the witnesses). Indeed, all these parameters 
constitute a typical economic game context. That is, a one-shot, double-blind 
game which disincentivises reputation building (Güney & Newell, 2013) while 
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preserves players’ anonymity (e.g. Eckel & Grossman, 1996a). Building upon 
this logic, it should be no surprise that players in such economic games may 
resort to Cognitive Restructuring to mitigate their experienced indebtedness.  
1.3.6.2. Dispositional Indebtedness and Economic Decision-making 
 Indebtedness as a disposition could also influence people’s sanctioning 
or reciprocal decisions in an economic exchange. As discussed above, a 
dispositionally indebted individual has ‘low threshold’ toward the concepts of 
owing and being owed, coupled with a distaste to be on the recipient side of an 
exchange (Greenberg & Westcott, 1983). These attributes should account for a 
‘trait creditor’s’ reluctance to accept favours, and their urge to immediately 
reciprocate following their futile endeavours to ‘say no’ to the favours. 
Meanwhile, another hallmark of a trait creditor entails the preference to be 
under-benefited in an interaction (Hatfield & Sprecher, 1983). Dispositionally 
indebted individuals fancy putting others in their debt and would even strive to 
sabotage their debtors’ efforts to repay (Greenberg & Westcott, 1983).  
Taken together, one should expect the following observations from a 
dispositionally indebted participant in an economic game. They include, a) 
benefit rejections, b) reciprocity (or a lack of defaulting), and c) generous 
giving (should the participant assumes the role of a prospective helper).      
1.3.7. Indebtedness in the Behavioural Economics Literature  
Despite the above inferences and theoretical evidence pertaining to the 
link between indebtedness and reciprocity, indebtedness is still an unexplored 
domain in the behavioural economics literature. To date, I am yet to locate any 
published, empirical study on how indebtedness contributes to people’s 
sanctioning or reciprocal decisions in the realm of economic exchanges.  
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Meanwhile, there is a strong evidence base for the role of negative 
emotion in inciting retaliations in economic games. For instance, Xiao and 
Houser (2005) revealed, via the ultimatum game (i.e. UGs hereafter), how 
recipients may exercise costly retaliation to vent out their fury sparked by their 
unfair treatment. Yamagishi et al. (2009) further theorised that the refusal to 
cooperate, after being subjected to an unfair treatment in the UGs (i.e. unequal 
split in endowment), symbolises an emotional reaction to other’s exploitations. 
As discussed in Section 1.3.6.1, an indebted recipient may resort to 
Cognitive Restructuring to get over their feeling of indebtedness (Greenberg, 
1980). It is, therefore, theoretically intriguing to examine whether these 
restructuring efforts would not only downplay a recipient’s desire to 
reciprocate, but to also lead to sanctioning when opportunity beckons. For 
instance, an indebted recipient, following a secondary assessment of the whole 
episode of benefit conferment, may infer more cynicism and ill intent from the 
helper’s initial ingratiating gesture (e.g. ‘He/she is helping me because he/she 
has a ‘benevolent’ image to maintain. God knows what he/she would have done 
otherwise had there been no one else watching!’). This perceived cynical intent 
may well induce sanctions or retaliations (Falk & Fischbacher, 2006). Taken 
together, via the current thesis I intend to also examine whether this Cognitive 
Restructuring (Greenberg, 1980; Greenberg & Westcott, 1983) route does 
encapsulate how the construct indebtedness will relate to reciprocity or 
sanctioning in economic exchanges—which remains a gap in the literature.  
1.4. Basic Predictions or Hypotheses 
First, I hypothesised that gratitude should predict more cooperation (in 
the form of positive reciprocity) and less sanctioning in the series of economic 
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games. This prediction indeed echoes the Moral Motive functional hypothesis 
of gratitude (McCullough et al, 2001) as discussed above (i.e. Section 1.3.2.2). 
Second, with reference to the Social Cognitive Model of Gratitude (Wood et al., 
2008) I hypothesise an indirect effect of dispositional gratitude on one’s 
sanctioning or reciprocal decisions. Specifically, I predict the path between trait 
gratitude and reciprocation to be serially mediated by 1) benefit appraisal (e.g. 
perceived value in the benefit and helpers’ intent etc.) and 2) state gratitude.  
While indebtedness could invoke reciprocation out of a drive-reduction 
motive (Greenberg & Shapiro, 1971), it may also prompt a recipient to re-assess 
the whole episode of benefit receipt (Greenberg & Westcott, 1983). Greenberg 
(1980) argued that such a re-assessment may result in denigration of the 
benefactors which ultimately prompts sanctioning. Since the three economic 
games (details to be discussed in Chapters 3 to 5) at present all entail the 
‘ingredients’ for Cognitive Restructuring (Greenberg & Westcott, 1983), 
namely, a) a double-blind design, b) a lack of repeated interactions; and c) the 
lack of witnesses to the whole sequence of benefit exchanges, there is no reason 
to not expect individuals to favour re-construing their entire episode of being 
benefited over reciprocation as to get over their emotional indebtedness.  
Additionally, I predicted dispositional indebtedness to prompt benefit 
rejections (if possible), as dispositionally indebted people typically loathe being 
in a position to receive (Greenberg & Westcott, 1983). I anticipate dispositional 
indebtedness to also prompt benevolent or even ‘over-generous’ economic 
decisions, such as surrendering resources unconditionally to an unacquainted 
co-player (Gergen et al., 1975), since a ‘trait creditor’ will relish the feeling of 
someone in their debt (Mathews & Green, 2010; Mathews & Shook, 2013).  
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1.5. An Overview of the Empirical Chapters (i.e. Chapters 2 to 5) 
In this thesis an aggregate of three economic games, which involved 390 
participants, were conducted to primarily examine how gratitude relate to 
cooperation or sanctioning in an economic exchange context. Various sets of 
parameters (e.g. cost of helping, repeated or iterated design etc.) were 
manipulated throughout the three experiments. Additionally, a meta-analysis 
was conducted to examine the overall strength of the gratitude-prosociality 
link. The meta-analysis and the three experimental studies are presented in four 
separate but related empirical chapters (i.e. Chapters 2 to 5). The following sub-
sections (i.e. 1.5.1 to 1.5.4) present an overview of each empirical chapter.  
1.5.1. Chapter 2: The Meta-analysis on Gratitude and Prosociality 
Chapter 2 presents the findings of the meta-analytic review. Via meta-
analysing over a hundred studies—conducted in the past three decades—I 
intended to achieve two objectives. First, I aimed to provide an estimate on how 
strong the gratitude-prosociality association is based on the existing empirical 
studies. Since the overarching aim of the current thesis concerns the analysis 
over how gratitude relates to prosociality in a specific context, it is, therefore, 
crucial to ascertain that there is at least a reliable association the two constructs.  
Second, I scrutinised what methodological and/or theoretical 
moderators may have moderated the overall effect estimates. This moderator 
analysis would examine study features such as the type of prosociality under 
scrutiny (e.g. reciprocal or non-reciprocal measures, actual behaviours or 
intentions etc.), the method via which gratitude was induced. This moderator 
analysis should have both theoretical (e.g. how the gratitude is different from 
other positive affects in its link with prosociality) and practical implications 
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(e.g. what aspects of the current gratitude intervention regime (See Wood et al. 
(2010) for a review) the practitioners to modify as to boost its much doubted 
efficacy in enhancing well-being (Davis et al., 2016; Wood et al., 2010).      
1.5.2. Chapter 3: Experiment 1 
The meta-analysis revealed that gratitude is more strongly linked to 
prosociality among studies which measured i) direct reciprocal outcomes and 
ii) gratitude as a state. Hence, via Experiment 1 (which is presented in Chapter 
3) I examined the state gratitude- direct reciprocity in a one-off economic 
context. In so doing I conducted a one-shot, variant of trust game played by 61 
dyads. 
Experiment 1 entails as well the scrutiny of how the injunctive norm 
will contribute to the gratitude-reciprocity link. Specifically, I examined how 
normative fairness (Elster, 2006), which is well-documented to affect intent 
attribution (See Bicchieri, 2006), would ultimately contribute to a recipient’s 
experience of gratitude and his/her desire (and actual decisions) to reciprocate.  
An injunctive fairness norm delineates what an average fair person 
ought to behave in a given context (Kazemi et al., 2016; Paddock, 2005). The 
injunctive norm under scrutiny in Experiment 1 was—‘people should help for 
free when that help is easy to implement, and when the helpers’ potency as a 
prospective helper was assigned but not earned (See Frey & Bohnet, 1995).’ 
Participants were subjected to a dyadic game in which all of them had to 
roll a die should they intended to win additional money. Each dyad would 
comprise a loser and a winner. The losers (N=61) —who were later on the 
prospective recipients, were led to believe that the winners —who were later on 
the potential helpers, had won the game by better fortune. On the other hand, 
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the ‘winners’ (N= 61) also knew their partners were losing—and therefore 
missed out the bonus money—thanks to poor fortune. The ‘losers’ thus all 
warranted a ‘donation’ (i.e. a transfer of money-equivalent ‘bonus points’) from 
their victorious partners to be eligible to earn the bonus money.  
Since the winners here were practically ‘assigned’ (via chances) to a 
victorious position instead of having earned that (Frey & Bohnet, 1995; 
Hoffman & Spitzer, 1985; Hoffman et al., 1994), the injunctive norm would 
demand an average fair winner (i.e. P1s hereafter) to help a struggling partner 
(i.e. P2s hereafter) by making a ‘free’ donation (i.e. to share the proceeds with 
the latter equally, See Elster, 2006). All P1s first decided whether to help, and 
should they did they were then inquired whether they would demand some 
repayment. Thus, P1s decided whether to help fairly (i.e. no repayment needed) 
or unfairly (i.e. repayment-bound offers) from a normative standpoint.    
Meanwhile, P2s reserved the rights to accept or decline their offers. 
Crucially, P2s were kept unaware of the list of ‘helping options’ available the 
P1s. That is, P2s had no idea their P1 partners could decide whether to help 
with or without the imposition of a repayment clause. As such, P2s here were 
put in a position where they could only infer the fairness of their help (if they 
were given any) by whether that help was conditional or unconditional.   
I examined whether an injunctively unfair offer (i.e. the conditional 
offers) would lead to a less desirable giver intent attribution, thus lead to 
reduced gratitude (and greater indebtedness) and ultimately a lower desire to 
reciprocate. Additionally, these recipients were given an avenue to sanction 
their helpers by under-repaying. P2s who accepted their conditional offers, after 
being reminded of their obligated repayment, were inquired how much they 
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would repay (i.e. to repay fully, nothing, or partially). Only P2s who accepted 
the conditional offers were aware of this ‘defaulting option’. This set-up should 
enable the author to use this de facto ‘voluntary’ repayment as a behavioural 
indicator of how the acceptors a) valued their unfair offers and accordingly, b) 
responded to their partners’ belittlement with normative fairness.  
In summary, in Experiment 1 I created a context in which people were 
bound to rely on the injunctive norm to judge whether they had been fairly 
treated. In so doing I examined how this evaluation would foster a favourable 
(negative) interpretation of the donor’s intent, and consequently contributed to 
an elevated gratitude (indebtedness) by the recipient. I also explored whether 
this chain of attributions would constitute a similar effect on a recipient’s state 
indebtedness, and subsequently tampered with ones’ reciprocal or sanctioning 
decisions. Importantly, Experiment 1 permits the analyses of whether people 
would resort to normative fairness to guide their economic decisions; and if yes, 
how such a fairness inference will affect the gratitude-prosociality link.   
1.5.3. Chapter 4: Experiment 2 
Chapter 4 presents the second laboratory study which was a one-shot 
game via which I attempted to address an interesting phenomenon—i.e. Cheap-
riding. Cheap-riding is conceptualised in the wider literature as a member’s 
attempts to piggyback on the high contribution of his/her groupmates by giving 
as little as possible (Asch, Gigliotti, & Polito, 1993; Thompson, 1987).    
Analysing the repayment data from Experiment 1, nearly 40% (i.e.38%; 
N=8) of recipients (of conditional offers) had taken advantage of their 
defaulting options by either under-repaying fully or partially. Interestingly, 
scrutiny of these defaulters’ responses only revealed one instance of zero back-
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transfer (i.e. free-riding), while the rest of the defectors (N=7) overall still 
repaid 58% of their expected repayment. I interpret such a partial repayment as 
cheap-riding as it evidently involves the exploitation of others’ giving amidst 
own non-zero contributions (Bchir & Willinger, 2013; Cornes & Sandler, 
1984).    
Despite the existing coverage in the wider literature (e.g. 
Krishnamurthy, 2000; Olson & Perl, 2005; Scherer, 1993) it remains 
unexamined in regards the psychological correlates of cheap-riding. 
Specifically, to date there is still an absence of empirical assessment of the role 
of emotions in inciting (and potentially sustaining) or restraining cheap-riding. 
While speculations had been made—e.g., giving ‘just deserts’ (Darley, 2001; 
Santos & Rivera, 2015; Wenzel & Thielmann, 2006)—in Chapter 3 in relation 
to the possible psychological correlates on why people may cheap-ride, none 
were empirically examined in Experiment 1. Thus to date there is still a gap in 
the literature on the role of emotion in cheap-riding.  As a result, in order to fill 
this gap Experiment 2 was set out to explore the psychological (e.g. state 
gratitude, indebtedness, just deserts, or even Experienced Warm-glow 
(Ferguson & Flynn, 2016)) and situational (e.g. the conditionality of offers) 
correlates of cheap-riding. 
  Furthermore, small proportion of recipients i) being ‘eligible’ to (i.e. 
21/ 61= 34%; N = 21), and ii) subsequently deciding to (i.e. 8/61= 13.1%; N = 
8), under-repay (cheap- or free-ride) their conditional offers in Experiment 1 
would no doubt warrant a relatively less under-sampled (N= 135) and more 
focused follow-up investigation in Experiment 2. Hence, via a slightly modified 
game I aimed to examine i) the ‘baseline’ response (i.e. to fully repay 
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(‘cooperate’), utterly not repay (‘free-ride’), or just partially repay (‘cheap-
ride’) to a ‘non-free’ conditional offer (Ma et al., 2014),  ii) whether the offer-
triggered emotions such as gratitude or indebtedness would be predictive of 
cheap-riding, and finally, iii) the motives (e.g. warm-glow, just deserts) behind 
recipients’ repayment—which should allow the disambiguation between the 
psychological profiles of the cheap-riders, free-riders and that of cooperators .  
In Experiment 2 each participant played in pairs with an anonymous, in 
reality fictitious, ‘partner’. Unlike Experiment 1, all participants (N =135) were 
pre-programmed to ‘lose out’ on the dice-rolling and were accordingly entitled 
to zero bonus. Participants then received an offer from their ‘fortunate’, 
victorious partners. All these offers were conditional, as recipients learned that 
upon acceptance they all undertook an obligation to repay. Participants, 
depending on their assigned conditions, would be due to receive a) an ‘Interest-
free’ (N = 32), or b) a ’12.5%-Interest’ (N = 33), or c) ‘25%-Interest (N = 34)’, 
or d) a ‘50%-Interest (N= 36)’ offer. Via this manipulation of the interest 
charges I subjected participants to varying extent of normative unfairness.  
Similar to Experiment 1, the ‘winners’ should have no moral legitimacy 
to expect any repayment from their unlucky partners (Elster, 2006), as the 
former had not earned the property right to that victory (Fahr & Irlenbusch, 
2000; Frey & Bohnet, 1995). Thus the very fact that the offer was rendered 
conditional (repayment-bound) should already represent normative unfairness 
(Ma et al., 2014). Participants were again blind to the range of offers they could 
have received.  Acceptors (N = 87) were then allowed to decide whether to a) 
repay in full (i.e. ‘cooperating’, N = 59), b) to ‘cheap-ride’ via just giving back 
partially (N = 17); or c) to entirely not repay (i.e. ‘free-riding’, N = 11). 
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Experiment 2 was concluded by participants filling out surveys that examined 
their motives to repay (See Chapter 4 for the items in use) and dispositional 
gratitude (i.e. Gratitude-Questionnaire VI, McCullough et al., 2002).  
1.5.4. Chapter 5: Experiment 3 
Chapter 5 presents the third experimental study which was an iterated 
game. The key objective of Experiment 3 is to resolve a few unaddressed issues 
in Experiments 1 and 2, and in so doing I endeavoured to complement the 
robustness of the present investigation of gratitude-induced prosociality. 
Particularly, in Experiment 3 a few new design features—which are 
summarised below— were incorporated to help tackle certain unaddressed 
issues in Experiments 1 and 2 (which would be expanded upon in Chapter 5).    
First, as opposed to Experiments 1 and 2, recipients in Experiment 3 
were no longer naïve to the fact that they could have been treated more 
generously or harshly by their helpers. This was achieved by having the 133 
participants played both roles as a prospective helper and recipient in the 
current game. Specifically, participants played as a potential helper in the first 
and the tenth trial, and the eight trials in between during which participants 
played as a recipient (i.e. the ‘Recipient Trials’) were sandwiched by these two 
‘Helper Trials’. Thus, the opening trial should notify the players of the choice 
sets of a helper prior to them playing as a recipient (i.e. Trials 2 to 9). Such a 
transparency of helpers’ options should accordingly allow recipients to appraise 
their offer receipts not only based on what they actually received, but also on 
what they could have been given instead (Charness & Levine, 2007). 
Another crucial revised feature of Experiment 3 entails recipients’ 
awareness of the ‘options’ to under-repay prior to their acceptance (or rejection) 
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decisions. This new feature was brought in to tackle a possible flaw in 
Experiments 1 and 2 that might have arguably contributed to the surprisingly 
high rate of offer rejections (i.e. 36%) in Experiment 2. As previewed above 
(i.e. Sections 1.5.2 and 1.5.3), recipients in Experiments 1 and 2 only came to 
realise the feasibility of them under-repaying after they accepted their 
conditional offers. Therefore, it is not illogical to argue that acceptors in either 
Experiments 1 or 2 may have assumed and possibly agreed to the binding 
nature of the repayment contract upon indicating acceptances.  
The corollary of this argument is that those who disapproved of the 
arrangement (i.e. being treated unfairly normatively speaking) may have 
jumped on the very first chance to quit the arrangement. Indeed, evidence in the 
Impunity Game (IG) literature had well evidenced the feasibility of people 
‘irrationally’ rejecting a financially advantageous arrangement out of perceived 
infringement of social fairness (See Horita & Yamagishi, 2007; Ma et al., 2012; 
Yamagishi et al., 2012). As such, it might be problematic to refer to the 
repayment (or the lack thereof) in Experiment 2 as the behavioural index of 
how people ‘valued’ being unfairly treated, considering that those who were 
disgusted by the offer would have been filtered before even being ‘eligible’ to 
showcase their discontent. Therefore, via this modified feature I intended to 
rectify this potential methodological loophole, and in so doing added to the 
validity of the repayment metrics as the behavioural (alongside the existing 
emotional) index of reciprocal or sanctioning decisions in Experiment 3.        
Meanwhile, the third key modification enables Experiment 3 to examine 
an interesting question: does the experience of being ‘cheap-rode’ prompt more 
fair plays from the victims? Throughout the present thesis I have drawn 
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parallels between the mechanisms of cheap-riding and that of altruistic 
punishment (Egas & Riedl, 2008; Nelissen & Zeelenberg, 2009). That is, by 
incurring a cost (despite not having to) a cheap-rider endeavours to warn his/her 
victim against treating others ungenerously in the future. Nonetheless, it 
remains to be seen whether cheap-riding does serve that function, and even if 
so, how well it ‘emulates’ altruistic punishment in preserving cooperation in the 
long-run (Barclay, 2006; Fowler, 2005; Jordan, McAuliffe, & Rand, 2015)    
Therefore, in Experiment 3 I manipulated partners’ repayment among players 
who gave conditional offers in Trial 1(i.e. the initial ‘Helper Trial’). 
Participants were randomly assigned to one out of three conditions in which 
their conditional offers yielded different repayment. These conditions included, 
first, a ‘Fairness’ condition (N = 44) in which the ‘partners’ repaid fully; 
second, a ‘Cheap-riding’ condition (N = 44) in which they received part of their 
obligated repayment. Alternatively, a participant could end up in the ‘Free-
riding’ condition (N = 45) in which he/she was subjected to a full-blown free-
riding (i.e. no repayment at all) at the hands of his/her ‘partner’. All in all, via 
this new feature I intended to assess the efficacy of cheap-riding in fostering 
future cooperative decisions in the later phase of the game (i.e. Trials 2 to 10). 
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A version of Chapter 2 has been re-submitted to the Psychological Bulletin for 
publication (manuscript number: BUL-2016-0614R, currently under review): 
Ma, L.K., Tunney, R.J., & Ferguson, E. (2016). Does Gratitude Enhance 
Prosociality: A Meta-Analytic Review. Unpublished manuscript, School of 
Psychology, University of Nottingham, Nottingham, The United Kingdom. 
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2.0. Overview of Chapter 2 
 As previewed in Chapter 1, this chapter presents a meta-analysis on how 
gratitude relates to prosociality. Theoretical models (e.g. the Moral Functional 
Hypotheses of Gratitude (McCullough et al., 2001; McCullough et al., 2008); 
Social-Cognitive Model of Gratitude (Wood et al., 2008)) suggest that gratitude 
is linked to increased prosociality. To date, however, there is a lack of a 
comprehensive quantitative synthesis of results to support this claim, in spite of 
a host of empirical (e.g. Bartlett et al., 2012; Goei, Roberto, Meyer, & Carlyle, 
2007; Halali et al., 2016) and theoretical evidence (e.g. Emmons, 2004; 
Frederickson, 2004a; McCullough & Tsang, 2004) pointing to this link.  
 Given the recurring theme of this thesis pertains to how gratitude 
nurtures prosociality (or cooperativeness) in the realm of economic exchanges; 
it is of paramount importance that I ensure these two constructs are reliably 
associated in the wider literature. From a theoretical standpoint, it is also 
crucial to examine whether the gratitude-prosociality link is moderated by 
whether the type of interaction concerned involves reciprocity. And if so, is 
gratitude more conducive to the direct ‘tit-for-tat’ (Boyd & Richerson, 1989; 
Brown, 1996; Milinski, 1987) or the indirect ‘pay-it-forward’ (Chang et al., 
2012; Gray et al., 2014; Schaumberg & Flynn, 2009) kind of reciprocity? 
 Hence, via this meta-analysis I endeavoured to 1) examine the overall 
strength of the association between gratitude and prosociality, and to 2) identify 
the theoretical and methodological variables that moderate this link. Two-
hundred and fifty-two effect sizes from 91 studies across 65 papers—(Total N = 
18,342 participants)—were identified and included in the present review. 
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 The findings revealed a statistically significant, and moderate positive 
correlation between gratitude and prosociality (r = 0.374). This association was 
significantly larger among studies that assessed reciprocal outcomes relative to 
non-reciprocal outcomes, and in particular among studies examining direct—
compared to indirect—reciprocity. Studies that examined gratitude as an 
affective state reported significantly larger effect size studies assessing gratitude 
as a disposition. Further the results revealed that studies that examined benefit-
triggered gratitude (in response to other’s kindness) had a stronger effect that 
generalized gratitude that focuses on the appreciation of what is valued and 
cherished in life (See Lambert et al., 2009; Lambert & Fincham, 2011). 
 Overall, apart from the main effect estimates which practically confirms 
the existence of a reliable relationship between gratitude and prosociality, the 
present chapter also shed light upon a few methodological and theoretical 
attributes that could account for the inconsistencies in the effect sizes as 
reported from the range of sampled studies. Both theoretical and practical 
significance of the present findings will be described and discussed in detail.  
2.1. Introduction 
2.1.1. Gratitude Revisited 
The Latin root of gratitude, ‘gratia’, translates to include the idea of 
being thankful. This, thankfulness, can be directed either at others for their help 
or at events (a beautiful day). Consistent with this gratitude is conceptualized in 
the scientific literature as either an emotional response to other’s kindness 
(benefit-triggered gratitude), a mood referred to as generalized gratitude that 
focuses on the appreciation of what is valued and cherished in life (e.g., a 
beautiful day or good friends) (Lambert et al., 2009; McCullough et al., 2002), 
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or as a disposition reflecting a wider life orientation towards appreciating others 
and the world we live in (Adler & Fagley, 2005; Wood et al., 2010). Although, 
gratitude has been conceptualized in a variety of ways it has been frequently 
associated with a variety of social and personal benefits including improved 
physical and mental health (Lavelock et al., 2016; Ware, Kosinski, & Keller, 
1996), general well-being (Froh et al., 2011;Wood, Joseph, & Linley, 2007), 
and prosociality (Emmons, 2004; Frederickson, 2004a; Steindl-Rast, 2004).  
Although the literature linking gratitude to health and well-being has 
been reviewed (see Lavelock  et al., 2016; Wood et al., 2010) there is no 
systematic review of the link with prosociality. A systematic review and 
synthesis of this link is important for two main reasons.  First, gratitude is key 
to understanding mechanisms (e.g., reciprocity) that underlie the survival of 
altruism in the population (Nowak, 2006; Nowak & Sigmund, 2005). Thus, 
exploring the sensitivity of the gratitude-prosociality link to key theoretical 
distinction (e.g., direct vs. indirect reciprocity) will provide valuable theoretical 
insights. Second, given both the individual (better health) and societal 
(increased prosociality) benefits of gratitude, interventions are increasingly 
been designed to enhance gratitude (see Emmons and McCullough, 2003). 
However, recently the effectiveness of such intervention had been questioned 
(Davis et al., 2016; Renshaw & Olinger Steeves, 2016; Wood et al., 2010). One 
potential explanation for this low efficacy is a lack of understanding about 
which theoretical factors are most likely to enhance gratitude-outcome links. 
Should interventions for example highlight direct or indirect reciprocity? Thus, 
this meta-analysis will offer insights into ways of enhancing gratitude 
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interventions to increase prosociality, which also is known to enhance well-
being (Weinstein, DeHaan, & Ryan, 2010; Weinstein & Ryan, 2010).  
2.1.2. Gratitude and Prosociality 
Drawing on the conceptual and theoretical overlaps in the way 
prosociality has been defined previously prosociality is defined here as a broad 
range of behaviours, effort or intentions designed to benefit, promote or protect 
the well-being of another individual, group, organization or society (Bolino & 
Grant, 2016; Dovidio, Piliavin, Schroeder, & Penner, 2006; George & Brief, 
1992; Martin & Olson, 2015; Penner, Dovidio, Piliavin, & Schroeder, 2005). 
There are a number of potential theoretical mechanisms proposed to explain the 
gratitude-prosociality link and these are discussed below. 
First, gratitude may act as a moral motivator that underlies direct and 
indirect reciprocity (Fredrickson, 2004a, 2004b; McCullough et al., 2008; 
Nowak & Roch, 2007). The principle of reciprocity is fundamental to 
explaining the survival of altruism in the population (Nowak, 2006). 
Reciprocity can be divided into direct and indirect reciprocity. Direct 
reciprocity occurs when the helper (A) is directly repaid by the recipient (B) at 
some later date (A helps B, B repays A). Thus, both parties benefit, leading to 
sustained prosociality. Direct reciprocity is only effective, however, when the 
helper and recipient are known to each other and can meet subsequently. When 
this is not possible indirect reciprocity offers another mechanism for the 
survival of prosociality (Nowak, 2006). Indirect reciprocity comes in two 
flavours: downstream and upstream (Sigmund, 2010). Downstream indirect 
reciprocity occurs when the helper (A) gains reputation from helping a 
recipient (B) and this reputation gain increases the probability that they (A) will 
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be helped by others (C) in the future (Nakamura & Masuda, 2011). Upstream 
indirect reciprocity occurs when the recipient to help (B) from a benefactor (A) 
goes on to help someone else (C) (A helps B, then B helps C) (Nowak & Roch, 
2007; Nowak & Sigmund, 2005). Gratitude as a moral motivator is a potential 
mechanism in all three forms of reciprocity (direct, downstream and upstream), 
but in particular upstream indirect reciprocity (Nowak & Roch, 2007; Nowak & 
Sigmund, 2005). McCullough and associates (McCullough et al., 2001; 
McCullough et al., 2008; McCullough & Tsang, 2004; McCullough, Tsang, & 
Roberts, 2004) argued that gratitude operates to promote prosociality via three 
moral functions: barometer, motivator and reinforcer. As a moral barometer 
gratitude highlights to the recipients that they have been helped and, as a moral 
motivator it motivates the recipient to act prosocially toward either their 
benefactor (direct reciprocity) or other people (upstream indirect reciprocity). 
Indeed, Nowak and Roch (2007) explicitly link the two, suggesting that 
upstream indirect reciprocity ‘hitchhikes’ on the back of direct reciprocity, with 
direct reciprocity acting as the main mechanism for the evolution of 
prosociality (cooperation in their model). Finally, as a moral reinforcer, 
gratitude encourages continued generosity. It is less clear how gratitude 
operates for downstream indirect reciprocity, where reputation building is the 
main mechanism. However, Ferguson (2015) argues that gratitude can still 
operate here when the prosocial act is towards a group or organisation (e.g., 
charity). Consistent with the above, gratitude as an emotion has been shown to 
promote all 3 forms of reciprocity: (1) upstream indirect reciprocity (e.g. Chang 
et al., 2012; Halali et al., 2016), (2) direct reciprocity (e.g. Hendrickson & 
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Goei, 2009; Tsang, Schulwitz, & Carlisle, 2012), and (3) downstream indirect 
reciprocity (e.g. Langan & Kumar, 2015; Romani, Grappi, & Bagozzi, 2013). 
Second, Fredrickson’s (2004b) Broaden-and-Build Theory of positive 
emotions postulates that positive emotions (e.g., gratitude) broaden an 
individual’s momentary repertoire of cognitions and actions which promote 
enhanced social bonds and help the individual to build personal physical and 
mental resources. Following this reasoning, gratitude may function to enhance 
social ties and resources that people can subsequently rely on for help when 
experiencing difficulty (Emmons & Mishra, 2011). As such, gratitude that is 
triggered by others, as opposed to generalized gratitude about what is 
personally valued (Lambert et al., 2009; Lambert & Fincham, 2011) should 
show a stronger association with prosociality. That is, the prosocial response to 
others is likely to strengthen close social bonds (direct reciprocity) or indicate 
that the person is worthy of help in the future (indirect reciprocity). 
Third, cultural norms are known to play a major role in the expression of 
prosocial behaviour (Gächter & Schulz, 2016) and emotions (Kim & Sasaki, 
2014). One important cultural norm with respect to gratitude-prosociality is 
collectivism. Higher levels of collectivism are linked to greater levels of 
prosociality (Lampridis & Papastylianou, 2014) and gratitude is linked to 
collectivist ideals that emphasise the maintenance of group harmony and 
reciprocity (Kee, Tsai, & Chen, 2008). It follows that in more collectivist 
cultures people should be more likely to experience and respond to gratitude 
with prosocial acts. Thus, a stronger gratitude-prosociality association should 
be expected in more collectivist cultures. 
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Fourth, cultural norms of religiosity may offer another explanation of 
the strength of gratitude-prosociality link. There is evidence that gratitude is 
associated with higher levels of religiosity (see Emmons & Mishra, 2011; Li & 
Chow, 2015) and religious observance is associated with prosociality (Henrich 
et al., 2010). Thus, at an individual level religiosity should mediate the 
gratitude-prosociality link. As many world religions endorse doctrines that 
support both gratitude, reciprocity and helping via Golden Rules (e.g. “do unto 
others as you would have them do unto you” Mathew, 7:12, New International 
Version), one may also expect that the gratitude-prosociality will be more 
culturally embedded for countries where religiosity is higher. Therefore, from 
the perspective of cultural norms of religiosity the gratitude-prosociality 
association should be stronger in countries with higher levels of religiosity.  
Fifth, gratitude may be linked to prosociality via a third variable, with 
other prosocial dispositions (e.g., Agreeableness) known to be associated with 
prosociality (Zhao & Smillie, 2015) a strong candidate third variable. Indeed, 
while gratitude has been shown to be associated with other prosocial traits 
including empathy (Kruger, 2011; McCullough et al., 2002) and forgiveness 
(Carlisle & Tsang, 2013; Satici, Uysal, & Akin, 2014), there is no systematic 
evaluation of the strength of the association between gratitude and prosocial 
disposition in general. Showing that gratitude is linked to other prosocial traits 
will offer some initial evidence that, at least for the trait gratitude-prosociality 
link, other prosocial dispositions may act as a confounder linking the two. 
Despite evidence supporting the link between gratitude and 
prosociality, and the theoretical reasons outlined above, there is considerable 
inconsistency regarding the strength of the association. For instance, Soscia 
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(2007) reports a strong correlation between customer perceived gratitude and 
their propensity to recommend the store to friends (r = 0.78, p <.01), while 
Watkins and colleagues (2006) report a more modest association (r = 0.34, p 
<.05) between gratitude and direct reciprocity. These differences may reflect 
both different types of prosociality as well as different domains (i.e. 
commercial and general). To date, there is no comprehensive quantitative 
review of the findings of how gratitude and prosociality are related to one 
another and what the salient moderator(s) of this association might be. 
2.1.3. Gratitude and the Other Prosocial Emotions 
Although this review focuses primarily on gratitude and its moderators, 
it is acknowledged that gratitude is not the only pro-social emotion. Nowak and 
Roch (2007) contend that other positive emotions can also evolve to support 
cooperation, but gratitude has particular theoretical importance for reciprocity. 
Furthermore, McCullough et al. (2008) suggest that gratitude has a wider 
impact on prosociality than other emotions as it supports high-cost helping. As 
such, gratitude should have a larger overall effect size (as it contributes more to 
all forms of prosociality – low and high cost) than other prosocial emotions. 
Thus, I intend to compare the effect size of the gratitude-prosociality link with 
effect sizes with the other specific prosocial emotions as well as general 
Positive Affect (PA) and Negative Affect (NA). This will also provide valuable 
information about which prosocial emotions to target interventions. If gratitude 
has a larger effect size than other prosocial emotions, then gratitude would 
appear a reasonable focus for interventions. 
Other key prosocial emotions were identified primarily from the 
Appraisal Tendency Framework (ATF) of emotions (See Ferrer, Klein, Lerner, 
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Reyna, & Keltner, 2016; Lerner & Keltner, 2000). The ATF approach moves 
beyond exploring just the valence of emotions (NA versus PA) and 
differentiates among emotions in terms of their appraisal dimensions, such as 
certainty (e.g. the emotion arises as a consequence of a predictable stimuli) and 
personal control (e.g., the emotion arises as a consequence of actions/cognition 
under the person’s personal control). The ATF identifies seven specific 
emotions with a relationship to prosociality: gratitude, hope, pride, surprise, 
anger, guilt, and sadness (Ferrer et al., 2016).  
2.1.3.1. Hope, Sadness, and Anger 
Hope refers to a desire for the person to have a better future for 
themselves and/or others, with the belief that this is achievable. Indeed, hope 
for a better future is one of the main motives given for volunteering in early 
stage clinical trials (Catt, Langridge, Fallowfield, Talbot, & Jenkins, 2011). 
Sadness is a key to the Negative State Relief (NSR) model of prosociality 
(Cialdini et al., 1987; Cialdini et al., 1997). The NSR model suggests people 
help to manage their own negative mood arising from observing another 
person’s suffering. Finally, anger is a crucial motivator that underlies the 
punishment of free-riders to preserve group cooperation (Fehr & Fischbacher, 
2004; Gürerk et al., 2006). That is, one major threat to prosociality is free-
riding, whereby people gain a relative advantage by not helping at the expense 
of another’s good deeds. When there is an option to punish free-riding—even if 
this is not implemented—cooperation increases (Skatova & Ferguson, 2013). 
2.1.3.2. Pride, Guilt, and Shame 
Pride is defined by the Oxford English Dictionary as a “feeling of deep 
pleasure or satisfaction derived from one's own achievement”. To link pride to 
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prosociality it is necessary to distinguish hubristic (pride linked to arrogance 
and conceit) from authentic pride (linked to achievement), with authentic pride 
linked to prosociality (Carver, Sinclair, & Johnson, 2010; Tracy & Robins, 
2007). Both guilt and shame (Amodio, Devine, & Harmon-Jones, 2007) are 
moral emotions, with guilt a more private and shame a more public self-focused 
emotion (Amodio et al., 2007; Scheff, 2000; Tangney, 1995). It is argued that 
individuals are motivated to avoid the guilt for not acting prosocially or the 
shame of acting selfishly (Saito, 2015) and indeed, both guilt and shame have 
been shown to lead to increased prosociality (Allpress, Brown, Giner-Sorolla, 
Deonna, & Teroni, 2014; Cunningham, Steinberg, & Grev, 1980; Miller, 2009). 
While specific emotions are linked to prosociality there is evidence that 
both general PA and NA motivate prosociality (see Ferguson, 2016). People 
may act prosocially to maintain PA and manage and reduce NA (Cialdini et al., 
1987; Cialdini & Fultz, 1990; Ferguson, 2016). Thus, as well as exploring if 
gratitude has a stronger link to prosociality than specific emotions I also 
examine if the gratitude-prosociality link was stronger than for PA and NA. 
2.1.4. Moderators of the Gratitude-Prosociality Association 
Below I detail the predictions from the five main theoretical moderators 
of the gratitude-prosociality link (reciprocity, social relationships, collectivism, 
religiosity and associations with prosocial dispositions) as well as exploring if 
the gratitude-prosociality association is stronger for state or dispositional 
gratitude. A number of methodological moderators will be examined as well. 
2.1.4.1. Theoretical Moderators and Predictions 
i.) Reciprocity. Above I argued that gratitude is a potential mechanism in all 
forms of reciprocity (direct, downstream and upstream). Thus, I predict the 
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gratitude-prosociality link will be stronger for studies that focus on reciprocity 
(direct, downstream and upstream) compared to studies that did not. I further 
examine whether the gratitude-prosociality link will be a stronger for studies 
that focus on direct as opposed to indirect (i.e. downstream and upstream) 
reciprocity. Despite the fact that gratitude has the capacity to incite all forms of 
reciprocity, it is less likely to be a central mechanism for downstream indirect 
reciprocity. Thus I would expect to observe a stronger gratitude-prosociality 
link for direct versus overall (downstream plus upstream) indirect reciprocity. 
Within indirect reciprocity I expect the gratitude-prosociality link to be 
stronger for upstream compared to downstream indirect reciprocity. 
ii.) Social Relationships. As the prosocial response to others is likely to 
strengthen close social bonds (direct reciprocity) or indicate that the person is 
worthy of future help (indirect reciprocity), I expect that gratitude that is 
triggered by others (benefit-triggered), as opposed to generalized gratitude 
(Lambert et al., 2009), should have a stronger association with prosociality.  
iii.) Country of participants, Religiosity and Collectivism. Gratitude may be 
linked to prosociality via increased levels of religiosity, thus the gratitude-
prosociality link should be greater in countries with higher levels of religiosity. 
I explored this by examining the level of religiosity within each country in 
which each study took place. Likewise, I predict that the gratitude-prosociality 
link will be stronger in more collectivist countries where gratitude and 
reciprocity are stronger cultural norms, again because the expression of 
gratitude and its link to prosociality are encouraged and supported. 
iv.) Gratitude-Prosociality and Other Prosocial Dispositions. Gratitude 
(especially dispositional gratitude) may be linked to prosociality simply 
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because it is associated with other prosocial dispositions such as agreeableness. 
Indeed, there is evidence linking trait gratitude to other prosocial dispositions 
(e.g. Kruger, 2011; McCullough et al., 2002). However, this link has not been 
systematically examined. As a first step to explore this potential mechanism for 
dispositional gratitude it is necessary to establish if there is a reliable 
association between dispositional gratitude and other prosocial dispositions.  
v.) Gratitude Measure—Emotion, Mood and Disposition.  
Gratitude can be viewed either as a state (encompassing emotional 
reactions and mood) or as a disposition (Parrott, 2001). Gratitude as an emotion 
occurs when an individual is helped by another person, especially if the help 
was intentional (Emmons & Shelton, 2002; Fredrickson, 2004a; Lazarus & 
Lazarus, 1996), and the recipient did nothing to earn that help (Bertocci & 
Millard, 1963; Emmons, 2004). Emmons and McCullough (2003) also defined 
gratitude as a mood reflecting neutral daily events like ‘waking up in the 
morning (pp.379)’. These distinctions map onto Lambert et al.’s (2009) 
distinction between benefit-triggered (being grateful to someone) and 
generalized gratitude (grateful for valued and cherished events and people in 
our lives). With respect to trait gratitude, Wood et al. (2010) define it within a 
life-affirming process as ‘noticing and appreciating the positive in the world’ (p 
891) so as a tendency to experience gratitude in response to others’ kindness. 
Although there is a large evidence base for the link between state 
gratitude and prosociality, Wood and colleagues (2008) highlighted a paucity 
of empirical evidence for the link between trait gratitude and prosociality. I, 
therefore, examined the effect sizes for both state and trait gratitude. To do this 
I grouped both aspects of state gratitude (emotion/benefit triggered and 
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generalized/mood) as a single category. As the trait instantiation of gratitude 
includes both aspects of gratitude, I believe that the comparison between state 
and disposition is more justified by equating the conceptualization of the two. 
Based on the Social Cognitive Model of Gratitude (SCMG) (Wood et 
al., 2008) and Trait Activation Theory (Tett & Guterman, 2000) I predict that 
the effect size for state gratitude will be stronger than for the trait gratitude. 
The SCMG suggests that state gratitude forms an indirect path between trait 
gratitude and prosociality. This indicates that trait gratitude should be a more 
distal and weaker direct predictor of prosociality compared to the more 
proximal state it triggers (see also Ferguson, 2013). Indeed, this pattern of a 
weaker association between a trait than an emotion with respect to a specific 
outcome is observed by others (see Fredrickson, Tugade, Waugh & Larkin, 
2003). Furthermore, the principle of trait activation suggests that any 
behavioural expression, such as prosociality, linked to a trait requires activation 
of the trait by trait relevant cues (See Tett & Guterman, 2000). Thus, the 
assessment of a trait alone should not suffice to fully activate trait tendencies. 
2.1.4.2. Methodological Moderators and Predictions 
A few methodological factors which may influence the gratitude-
prosociality association were examined. They included, i) gratitude induction, 
ii) objectivity of prosociality assessment, iii) target of prosociality—individual 
versus group, iv) gratitude measure—proxy versus actual.  
i.) Gratitude Induction: Laboratory-Studies (Vignettes & 
Experimental/Economic Games) versus Surveys/Field Studies.  
I explored whether laboratory-studies, which use a direct exogenous 
manipulation of gratitude (e.g. Exline, Lisan, & Lisan, 2012; Tsang, 2007) or 
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Survey/Field Studies, where participants completed a cross-sectional battery of 
gratitude and prosociality measures (e.g. Li & Chow, 2015; McCullough et al., 
2002), resulted in a larger effect size. I further delved into a subtle distinction 
within lab-studies: Vignettes (e.g. Graham, 1988; Xia & Kukar-Kinner, 2013) 
versus Experimental/ Economic Games (e.g. Halali et al., 2016; Tsang, 2006a). 
There are several practical advantages in applying the vignette 
technique. For instance, it is cost-effective and can be easily standardised 
(Alexander & Becker, 1978; Gould, 1996; Hughes & Huby, 2002). However, 
the lack of participant involvement in the vignettes may lead participants to 
simply respond in terms of normative theories of gratitude (Hegtvedt, 1990; 
Tsang, 2006b; Weiner, Russell, & Lerman, 1979). On the other hand, 
experimental manipulations/economic games involve laboratory inductions in 
which participants take an active role. For example, participants might be asked 
to recall an experience of being generously treated by others (e.g., Siegel, 
Thomson, & Navarro, 2014); or in an economic game where participants 
experienced gratitude after receiving a financial benefit (e.g. Leung, 2011). 
Experimental /economic game induced gratitude should better reflect the 
participants’ genuinely experienced emotion, relative to vignette-induced 
gratitude, because of the higher extent of involvement (Levine & Moreland, 
2004). As a result, I anticipate a stronger gratitude-prosociality association for 
experimental/economic game studies, compared to vignette studies. 
ii.) Objective-Subjective Assessments of Prosociality. I examined whether the 
prosociality assessment involved an actual expenditure of effort or money 
(objective); or whether it used self- or peer-reported behaviour or intention to 
act prosocially (subjective). Given that subjective tendencies do not always 
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translate into actual behaviours (Ajzen, 1985, 1991; Ajzen & Madden, 1986), I 
expect that studies which examined prosociality subjectively to show a stronger 
link with gratitude than studies where prosociality was assessed objectively. 
iii.) Target of Prosociality—Individual versus Group. Algoe et al. (2008) 
reported that gratitude enhances both dyadic and group relationships. 
Furthermore, the definition of prosociality I adopted entails helping individuals 
and groups equally. Thus, it remains unaddressed whether gratitude-inspired 
prosociality would function similarly when targeted as an individual or a group. 
iv.) Gratitude Measure—Proxy versus Actual. Several studies employ proxy 
measures of gratitude. For example, Naito and associates (Naito & Sakata, 
2010; Naito, Wangwan, & Tani, 2005) examined feelings of joy, warmth and 
helpfulness after receiving help. Considering that a proxy measure is by 
definition an approximate assessment (Kisch, Kovner, Harris, & Kline, 1969), 
it is logical to assume that it should, compared to a direct assessment, constitute 
a greater discrepancy between the operational and the conceptual definition of 
gratitude thus resulting in lower validity (Carver & Scheier, 2008). Therefore, I 
endeavour to examine if studies that employed proxy measures of gratitude 
would have smaller effect sizes compared to studies which adopted a direct 
assessment of participant’s gratitude. 
v.) Age. As there may be developmental trends with respect to experiencing 
gratitude and the chance to be prosocial I include age as a continuous covariate. 
2.2 Methods 
2.2.1. Main Analyses: Gratitude-Prosociality Association 
2.2.1.1. Search Strategies 
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Studies were identified by searching electronic databases (Science, 
Social Science and general scholarly databases, including ISI Web of Science, 
PsycARTICLES, PsycINFO, Scopus, EconLit, Google Scholar, British Library 
EThOS, Applied Social Science Index & Abstracts (ASSIA), Business Source 
Premier (EBSCO), and Dissertation Online) and the reference lists from 
relevant articles. The following search terms for the main meta-analysis on 
Gratitude and Prosociality were used: ‘Gratitude’ , ‘Appreciation’ and 
‘Prosocial Behaviours’, ‘Prosociality’, ‘Prosocial’, ‘Altruism’, ‘Altruistic’ , 
‘Cooperation, ‘Helping’ , ‘Compliance’, ‘Reciprocity’,’ Cooperative’ and 
‘Reciprocal’. In the initial screening phase the abstracts and titles of potentially 
relevant articles (N = 746) were examined, with 420 duplicated entries 
removed. The full text of the remaining articles was inspected (N = 326), and 
thereby eliminated entries (N = 257) that were inconsistent with the eligibility 
criteria (see Sub-section 2.2.1.2). Furthermore, I examined the papers in order 
to remove entries that shared the same dataset, such as multiple analyses 
conducted with an identical dataset. Finally, I contacted authors for additional 
data where whose articles were published (or available online/published as 
book chapters for unpublished work) within the last five years that did not 
include sufficient information for the effect sizes to be computed. 
2.2.1.2. Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria 
 The following inclusion criteria were used to select studies. First, the 
search was confined to papers written in English. Second, I did not impose any 
age limit on the participants in the present review but included age as a 
continuous moderating variable instead. Third, all studies had to involve 
primary and secondary measures of the relationship between gratitude (as a 
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disposition or a state) and prosociality (e.g. behavioural intention or overt 
behaviours). Finally, only studies that reported quantitative findings were 
included. Applying all these inclusion and exclusion criteria 65 papers with a 
grand total of 18, 342 participants, consisting of 91 studies and 252 effect sizes 
were identified. Figure 2.1 provides the information flow diagram prepared 
based on the PRISMA Statement (Liberati et al., 2009).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1. PRISMA Statement 2009 Flow Diagram of Information through 
different phase of the present review (Liberati et al., 2009) 
2.2.1.3. Coding Procedures  
Below I describe and present examples on how the present theoretical 
and methodological were coded. Table 2.1 details the specific criteria used.
Number of records identified 
via searches—E-sources/ 
Hand-searches of reference 
lists: 2819 
Number of records from 
the author’s own data: 2 
Number of full-text articles/ book chapters/ 
working papers/ doctoral theses/ Unpublished 
study data assessed for after initial screening 
(through abstracts or titles): 746 
Number of entries 
excluded after initial 
screening: 2073 
Number of full-text articles/ book chapters/ 
working papers/ doctoral theses/ 
Unpublished study data remaining: 70 
Number of deleted entries 
out of duplications: 420 
Number of entries excluded 
as of this stage: 256, after 
scrutiny of the experimental 
designs and measures  
Number of articles included in the present 
analysis: 65;  
Number of studies included in meta-analysis: 
91;  
 
Number of deleted entries out 
of lack of data (after 
contacting the authors): 2 
Number of deleted entries 
out of duplicated dataset: 
3 
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Table 2.1. Working Definition of the Methodological and Theoretical Moderators 
Moderators Codes Working Definition Examples in the current sample 
Theoretical 
Moderator: 
Reciprocity 
versus 
No reciprocity 
Non-Reciprocity  
(k = 16) 
Studies which i) measured the effect of gratitude 
on prosocial behaviours (or behavioural intention) 
that were not concerned about repaying a benefit 
received, or ii) were survey-based 
i) Participants assigned to the on-going gratitude training 
session were to indicate ‘each day if they had helped someone 
with a problem or offered someone emotional support (pp. 
382)’ 
– (Study 2, Emmons and McCullough, 2003) 
Reciprocity  
(k = 76) 
Studies whose measures of prosocial behaviours 
or intentions involved: 
i) Direct Reciprocity: a direct return of favours to 
the benefactors— an ‘A helps B and B helps A’ 
scenario (Novak & Sigmund, 2007); 
ii) ‘Downstream’ Indirect Reciprocity: individuals 
acting prosocially towards those they observed to 
help others — an ‘A helps B, and C helps A’ 
scenario  
(Novak & Sigmund, 2007); 
iii) ‘Upstream’ Indirect Reciprocity: individuals 
acting prosocially to a third-party after receiving a 
favour from someone else —an ‘A helps B, and B 
helps C’ scenario  
(Novak & Sigmund, 2007); 
i) ‘Direct Reciprocity’: Participants of the ‘Favour’ Condition 
decided how much money (i.e. USD $10) to distribute to their 
benefactors in the previous round. –(Tsang et al., 2012); 
ii) ‘Downstream’ Indirect Reciprocity: Participants of the 
‘experimental’ condition read a vignette of a fictitious 
company engaging in Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) 
investment (e.g. being environmentally-friendly, concern for 
fair trade, employees’ safety and human rights preservation 
etc.). Participants then rated how grateful or thankful they felt 
towards that company for her CSR investment, and indicated 
how likely they would reward her via ‘positive word of mouth’ 
and ‘advocacy behaviours’  –(Romani et al., 2013) 
iii) ‘Upstream’ Indirect Reciprocity: Participants recalled a 
time being treated very generously, and then decided whether 
to donate their participation allowance to a local charity for 
children. – (Study 2, Siegel et al., 2014) 
Direct Reciprocity  
(k = 53) 
See the definition above. See the example above. 
Indirect 
Reciprocity  
(k = 16) 
See the definitions above. Owing to the relatively 
small counts of both downstream (k = 5) and 
upstream (k = 9) studies, together with two studies 
whose outcomes concerned both types of indirect 
reciprocities, I combined all these to form a 
category Indirect Reciprocity in the main 
analyses. 
See the example above. 
Blank Entries  
(k = 10) 
Outcomes involved both direct and indirect 
reciprocities, but the authors did not specifically 
Refer to the above-mentioned example of an ‘ambiguously-
targeted’ prosociality measure (i.e. Naito et al., 2005).    
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report how gratitude was related to each type of 
reciprocities. 
Theoretical 
Moderator: 
Social 
Relationships 
(Lambert et al., 
2009) 
Benefit-triggered 
Gratitude 
(k = 69) 
The gratitude that results from a specific 
‘interpersonal transfer of benefit from a 
beneficiary to a benefactor. (pp. 1194)’ 
Participants’ gratitude towards a confederate who unexpectedly 
offered the former a soda. –(e.g. Study 1, Goei & Boster, 
2005); 
Patron’s gratitude toward the complimentary winery tour and 
wine-tasting –(e.g. Kolyesnikova & Dodd, 2008) 
Generalized 
Gratitude 
(k = 19) 
An emotion, or an affective state, which stems 
from the appreciation of things which ‘are 
meaningful and valuable to oneself. (pp. 1194)’ 
Gratitude Induction: ‘Think back over the past week and write 
down on the lines below up to five things in your life that you 
are grateful or thankful for. (pp. 379)’  
-(Emmons & McCullough, 2003) 
Theoretical 
Moderator: 
Country of 
Participations, 
Religiosity and 
Collectivism 
Continents  
(k  = 91) 
I categorised the 91 studies from 16 countries (or 
regions) on a continental basis. Fifty-five studies 
were conducted in North America, along with 23 
in Asia and 13 in Western Europe.  
‘North America’: Studies that were conducted in the United 
States of America (e.g. Goei & Boster, 2005) or Canada (e.g. 
Spence et al., 2014);  
‘Asia’: Studies that were conducted in China (e.g. Tian, et al., 
2016), Japan (e.g. Naito & Sakata, 2010), India (e.g. Dewani et 
al., 2016), South Korea (e.g. Kim & Lee, 2013), Israel (e.g. 
Halali et al., 2016), Hong Kong (e.g. Zhao, 2010), Thailand 
(e.g. Wangwan, 2014), or Taiwan (e.g. Chang et al, 2012). 
‘Western Europe’: Studies conducted in the United Kingdom 
(e.g. Ma, et al., 2014), Germany (e.g. Wetzel et al., 2014), 
France (e.g. Simon, 2013), Netherlands (e.g. de Hooge, 2014), 
Italy (e.g. Soscia, 2007) and Norway (e.g. Xie et al., 2015). 
 Religiosity I coded the level of religiosity using the Gallup 
(2014) International religiosity Index. In 
particular, the percentage of people from a 
country identifying themselves as, regardless of 
whether they attend a place of worship or not, ‘a 
religious person’ 
Canada: 40%; China; 7%; France: 40%; Germany: 34%; Hong 
Kong: 26%; India: 76%; Israel: 30%; Italy: 76%; Japan: 13%; 
Netherlands: 26%; South Korea: 44%; Thailand: 94%; United 
Kingdom: 30%; United States of America: 56%. 
(No data was provided for Norway and Taiwan) 
Collectivism I coded the level of collectivism via Hofstede's 
(Hofstede, et al., 2010) Individualism-
Collectivism index. A higher score indicates 
higher likelihood of people defining their self-
image as ‘I’ instead of ‘we’ (i.e. low collectivism) 
Canada: 80; China: 20; France: 71; Germany: 67; Hong Kong: 
25; India: 48; Israel: 54; Italy: 76; Japan: 46; Netherlands: 80; 
Norway: 69; South Korea: 18; Taiwan: 17; Thailand: 20; 
United Kingdom: 89; United States of America: 91. 
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Theoretical 
Moderator: 
Gratitude 
Measures 
State/Mood  
(k = 77) 
Gratitude examined or induced as a i) positive 
emotion upon receipt of an intentional, valued 
benefit (Tsang, 2006a, 2007) ; or ii) a mood over a 
designated period of time. 
i) Participants rated survey items such as ‘I am happy to have 
been helped by others,’ and ‘I have benefited from the 
goodwill of others.’ –(Study 2, Spence et al., 2014); 
ii) Participants rated the amount of gratitude they ‘experienced 
“since yesterday”. (pp.637) –(Froh et al., 2009) 
Disposition 
(k = 24) 
Gratitude examined as an enduring characteristic 
of thankfulness that is sustained across contexts 
and over time (Chan, 2013; McCullough et al., 
2002) 
Participants to rate themselves using the GQ-VI (McCullough 
et al., 2002). The sample items included ‘I am grateful to a 
variety of people; As I get older I find myself more able to 
appreciate people’ – (e.g. Tian et al., 2015) 
Methodological 
Moderator:  
Type of Study 
(Lab-Studies vs. 
Survey /Field 
Studies). 
 
Lab-Studies 
 (k = 59) 
Studies which employed a direct, exogenous 
manipulation (or induction) of participants’ 
gratitude mood or affective states. I further 
classified THESE studies under this code into two 
sub-categories: 1) Experimental/ Economic 
Games, and 2) Vignette. 
‘Experimental/ Economic Games’: Participants assigned to the 
‘Gratitude’ condition received a favour from a confederate 
while working on a tedious task. They then decided whether to 
help that confederate fill out a time-consuming survey for that 
confederate. -(Study 1, Bartlett & Desteno, 2006); 
‘Vignette’: Participants read a vignette about a student, who 
struggled to find the past papers to prepare for his/her 
admission exam, who was offered the materials by a current 
graduate student of that programme named Zhang. A year 
later, the protagonist gets into the programme thanks to 
Zhang’s help and learns that Zhang now needs help. 
Participants then indicated how eager they were to help Zhang 
back assuming they were that protagonist. –(Study 2, Yang et 
al., 2015) 
Survey /Field 
Studies  
(k = 32) 
Studies in which participants completed a battery 
of questionnaires (i.e. Survey Study). Studies 
involving manipulation of variables other than 
gratitude, but included peripheral measures on 
participant’s gratitude (i.e. Field Study) were also 
coded as a ‘Survey/Field study’ in the present 
analysis.   
‘Survey Study’: Participants filled out a series of 
questionnaires including the Religiousness Scale (Strayhorn et 
al., 1990), Spirituality Scale (Delaney, 2005), in addition to the 
trait gratitude (i.e. GQ-VI) and prosocial behaviours measures 
(e.g. Peer-helping behaviour scale (Crick, 1996) and Child 
Altruism Inventory (Ma & Leung, 1991)).  -(Li & Chow, 
2015); 
‘Field Study’: A between-subject video vignette study which 
examined the effect of Socio-Economic Statuses (janitor versus 
doctor) and Favours (whether or not the protagonist had bought 
a drink for his ‘target’) on compliance with a date request. 
Participants imagined themselves as the recipient of a date 
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request, and were asked to rate how grateful, appreciative, or 
thankful they felt towards the protagonist throughout the 
episode. –(Hendreickson & Goei, 2009) 
Experimental/ 
Economic Games 
 (k = 34) 
Laboratory Induction: Participants were asked to 
recall being grateful.  
Economic Games: Participants’ gratitude was 
triggered by a co-player’s conferment of a 
financial benefit in the course of an economic 
exchange. 
‘Laboratory Induction’: Participants recalled an incident 
whereby ‘another person did something for you that was very 
kind. (pp.47)’ –(Exline et al., 2012) 
Vignette 
 (k = 25) 
A hypothetical scenario or story in which 
participants were induced to feel grateful as the 
protagonist was treated generously by someone. 
Refer to the above examples of ‘Lab Studies’  
(e.g. Yang et al., 2015).  
Methodological 
Moderator:  
Objective 
versus 
Subjective 
Prosociality 
Assessment 
Objective  
(k = 30) 
Prosociality assessments that involved an actual 
expenditure of effort or money (or other money-
equivalent resources). 
Amount of money (i.e. a $5-dollar note) to distribute to 
‘another participants who will be in the study at a later time 
(pp.213)’ 
 –(Study 2, Exline and Hill, 2012;) 
Subjective 
( k = 62) 
Studies which assessed self-, or peer-reported 
prosocial behaviours, or one’s intention to act 
prosocially to others. 
Customer Purchase Intentions: 1) ‘I would be very likely to 
buy something today’; 2) I would come back to this store.’ 3) 
‘I would likely buy from this store in the future.’  (7-point 
scales)  
–(Palmatier et al., 2009) 
Methodological 
Moderator : 
Target of 
Prosociality: 
Individual 
versus Group 
Individual 
(k = 44) 
Reciprocal, prosocial or cooperative acts or 
behavioural intentions that were directed toward 
an individual recipient. 
Each participant decided how many raffle tickets of his/hers to 
distribute to his/her in-game partner. -(e.g. Tsang, 2006a, 
2007) 
Group  
(k = 34) 
Participants’ decisions to show appreciation to a 
group or organisation by i) behaving prosocially 
toward or ii) harbouring an intention to benefit 
that organisation in the future.  
i) Children participants were given a chance to write a thank-
you card to the Parent-Teacher Association for their provision 
of a multimedia presentation.  –(Froh et al., 2014); 
ii) Loyalty—Advocacy (Lam, Shankar, Erramili & Murthy, 
2004): ‘I will encourage my friends to use this bank’s services’ 
and ‘I will recommend this bank to others.’ (7-point scales) 
–(Study 1 and 2, Xia and Kukar-Kinney, 2013) 
Ambiguous 
(k = 15) 
Studies which provided i) insufficient information 
to judge whether prosociality was individually- or 
group- directed, or ii) studies whose measures of 
i) Participants’ weekly record of their ‘acts of kindness for 
others (pp.4)’ –(Layous et al., 2016); 
ii) Participants’ ratings on the following items were combined 
to form an overall ‘enhanced prosocial behaviours measure’: a) 
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individual and group helping were combined into 
a single index of helping. 
‘Do you want to help your father (i.e. the benefactor in the 
vignette) if he needs help in similar or other situations?’, and b) 
‘Do you want to help others if they help in similar or other 
situations?’   
–(pp. 251, Naito et al., 2005) 
Methodological 
Moderator : 
Gratitude 
Measures: 
Actual versus 
Proxy 
Actual  
(k = 82) 
Studies which adopted a direct or a ‘real’ measure 
or induction of gratitude as a state, mood or a 
disposition. 
Customer’ Gratitude Scale (adapted from Goei & Boster, 
2005): ‘I feel grateful/thankful to this company’, ‘I feel 
appreciative towards/ a sense of gratitude toward this 
company’. (9-point scale) – (pp. 607, Simon, 2013); 
Participants reported a personal experience in which they felt 
grateful toward someone. – (de Hooge, 2014) 
Proxy  
(k = 14) 
Studies which employed an indirect or a 
‘surrogate’ measure of gratitude.  
‘Positive Responses’ evoked by being helped—e.g. ‘Delighted’ 
– (pp. 21, Wangwan, 2014) 
Methodological 
Moderator: 
Published or 
not? Times 
cited,  Years of 
Publications 
and Participant 
Age 
Published?  
(k = 91) 
I included a ‘yes’/ ‘no’ code on whether the study 
had been published.  
 
Yes (k = 72) Published journal articles Tsang (2006a, 2007) 
No (k = 19) Doctoral theses, Book chapters, and Raw Data 
collected 
Doctoral Theses: Langan & Kumar (2015);  
Book Chapters: Mikulincer & Shaver (2010); 
Raw Data Collected; Ma, Tunney & Ferguson (2015) 
Times Cited I included the times cited metrics (accurate as of 
4th August 2016) that are provided by either the 
Web of Science or Google Scholar.  
 
Years of 
Publication 
I included the year of publication (or availability) 
of the sampled articles/studies data. 
 
Participant Age  Sixty-one studies reported the average or the 
median age range of their participants. I imputed 
the average age of the 23 studies which only 
described their sample compositions (i.e. 
undergraduates) by taking mid-point of the usual 
age range of the undergraduate student 
population: 18-24 years (i.e. 21.0 years). Six 
studies did not provide any age data. 
‘Mean age given’: 12.14  –(Froh et al., 2009); 
‘Median age range given’: 35-44 years—imputed participant 
age: 39.50 (Romani et al., 2013); 
‘Only sample description given’: ‘Undergraduate Psychology 
students’ (e.g. Emmons & McCullough,2003; Tsang et al., 
2012);  
‘No information’: Huang (2015); Soscia (2007) 
Sensitivity 
Analysis:  
Zero-order? 
Yes  
(k = 74) 
Zero-order figures (e.g. correlation rs, 
independent sample t-values etc.) used to compute 
the effect estimates. 
‘Zero-order Correlation rs’ – (e.g. Bock et al., 2016); 
‘Independent samples T-test t-values’ (e.g. Hwang & 
Kandampully, 2015) 
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 No 
(k = 18) 
Imputation of effect sizes from a specific 
gratitude-prosociality path in a multiple-path 
model (e.g. Multiple Regressions, Structural 
Equation Modelling (SEMs)) 
‘SEMs’: -(e.g. Study 3, Xia and Kukar-Kinney, 2013); 
‘Multiple Regressions’: 
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i.) Reciprocity versus Non-reciprocity and Reciprocity Nature.  
I coded whether the prosociality measures reported were reciprocally 
driven or not. Reciprocity (k = 76) was defined as an individual’s attempt (or 
motivation) to respond to a positive action with another positive action. These 
were further differentiated into Direct Reciprocity (k = 53), that refers to the 
direct reciprocation of favours received and 2) Indirect Reciprocity (k = 16) that 
included both ‘downstream’ (the individual acts prosocially to someone whom 
they know to have helped a someone else previously k = 5), and ‘upstream’ (the 
individual acts prosocially to a third party after being helped by someone else k 
= 9). Ten studies that examined both direct and indirect reciprocity but did not 
separately report how gratitude was associated with each type of reciprocity 
(e.g. Desteno et al., 2010) were excluded from the analysis that focused on the 
distinction between direct and indirect reciprocity. 
I also coded studies that examined prosocial acts or behavioural 
intentions that were not driven by a need to repay (e.g. Study 1, McCullough et 
al., 2002) as involving Non-Reciprocity (k = 16) (See Table 1 for details). 
ii.) Social Relationships. I coded benefit-triggered gratitude as any emotionally 
felt gratitude in response to another’s help (state measures only, k = 69) and that 
generalized gratitude as an appreciation of valued people, and events in life 
assessed as both a state and trait (k = 19, see Table 1). 
iii.) Country of participations, religiosity and collectivism. Altogether sixteen 
countries are represented. I categorised these countries initially on a continental 
basis (see Table 1). The majority of the studies were conducted in North 
America (k = 55), along with Western Europe (k = 13), Asia (k = 23). Each 
country in the sample was also coded for its level of religiosity using the Gallup 
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(2014) International Religiosity Index and collectivism using the scoring 
procedures of Hofstede, Hofstede, and Minkov (2010).  
iv.) Gratitude Measure—State/Mood versus Disposition. In the present review I 
grouped studies that examined gratitude as either a state or a mood under the 
category State/Mood (k = 77) or as a disposition (k = 24) (see Table 1). 
v.) Gratitude Induction: Experiments versus Surveys. Studies were divided into 
Laboratory Studies (involving a direct manipulation to induce gratitude) (k = 
59) and cross-sectional Surveys/Field Studies (k = 32). Lab studies were further 
sub-divided into: Experimental/Economic Games (k = 34), and Vignettes (k = 
25). Studies that were coded as Vignettes typically triggered participants’ 
feelings of gratitude via hypothetical scenarios in which a protagonist was (or 
was not) helped. Studies that were coded Experimental/Economic Games 
involved gratitude induction via either laboratory induction of recalling being 
grateful or economic games during which one’s gratitude was elicited via 
receiving a financial benefit in the course of an economic interaction. 
Illustrative examples are given in Table 1. 
vi.) Objectivity of Prosocial Measure. I coded the objectivity of the prosocial 
measures reported. An objective measure (k = 30) was defined as an actual 
expenditure of resources, time or effort and subjective measures (k = 62) was 
referred to as a self-reported (or peer-reported) intentions to behave prosocially 
(i.e., without any actual commitment of resources) (Table 1). 
vii.) Target of Prosociality—Individual versus Group. I coded whether the 
prosocial behaviours or behavioural intentions reported were targeted at an 
individual, a group, or an ambiguous entity. An individually-directed (k = 44) 
prosocial measure is illustrated by Tsang (2006a) in which each participant 
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decided how much to give to a specific co-player. By contrast, a group-directed 
(k= 34) prosocial measure is represented by the participants’ decisions to show 
appreciation—for example, by writing a ‘thank-you’ note (Froh et al., 2014) — 
towards a group. Several studies were coded as ambiguously-targeted (k = 15) 
due to insufficient information. For example, if measures of individual and 
group helping were combined into a single index, or if the item was indexed 
helping in general while the authors did not designate this as either a group- or 
an individually- targeted act (see Table 1 for examples). 
viii.) Gratitude Measure—Proxy versus Actual. I also coded whether the 
gratitude measurement used was a proxy or an actual measure. A Proxy 
measure (k = 14) was defined as a surrogate, or indirect assessment of gratitude. 
In contrast, I defined an Actual measure (k = 82) as a direct assessment of 
gratitude as a state, mood or a disposition (see Table 1). 
ix.) Times Cited, Year of Publication and Age.  
First, for all the published studies I coded the number of times that each 
article had been cited. This figure was obtained by examining the times cited 
metrics provided by the databases used in the search (4th August 2016). To 
avoid double-counting I took the highest count metric available.  
Second, I included the years of publication (or availability) of the 
sampled articles/studies data (M: 2010.87, SD: 4.88). The earliest publication I 
included was in the 1980s (Graham, 1988) while the latest one was e-published 
in June 2016 ((Layous, Nelson, Kurtz, & Lyubomirsky, 2016). For unpublished 
entries I recorded either the year in which the papers were available, or the year 
in which the studies were conducted.  
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I coded mean or median age of participants reported in each study. 
Where the only information was a sample description (e.g., American college 
students) I imputed the age for the average American college student (i.e. 
(18+24)/ 2= 21.0 years) in the year that the study was administered.  
2.2.2. Additional Meta-analysis: Association with other Prosocial Dispositions 
and Other Prosocial Emotions 
2.2.2.1. Prosocial Dispositions 
To explore the association between dispositional gratitude and other 
prosocial dispositions I included the following additional search terms 
(‘Agreeableness’, ‘Conscientiousness’, ‘Dispositional Empathy’, and 
‘Forgiveness’). I included Conscientiousness as a prosocial disposition because 
there is evidence that it is associated with volunteering behaviours (Ferguson, 
2004; Lodi-Smith & Roberts, 2007) along with Agreeableness which is 
associated with prosociality in general (Ferguson, Gancarczyk, Wood, Delaney, 
& Corr, 2015; Zhao & Smillie, 2015). This resulted in 24 studies with 103 
effect sizes with a total sample of 7,677.  
2.2.2.2. Other Prosocial Emotions 
To contextualise the gratitude-prosociality association I compared that 
to association with the other prosocial emotions (i.e. hope, pride, surprise, 
anger, guilt, and sadness) as well a general Negative Affect (NA) and Positive 
Affect (PA). A number of existing meta-analyses were identified which 
addressed prosociality with respect to NA (Carlson & Miller, 1987; Dalal, 
2005), PA (Carlson, Charlin, & Miller, 1988), guilt (Boster, Cruz, Manata, 
DeAngelis, & Zhuang, 2016), shame (Lech & Cidam, 2015), sadness (Carlson 
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& Miller, 1987), and happiness (Lyubomirsky, King, & Diener, 2005). To date 
I am yet to locate any meta-analysis for hope, surprise, anger and pride.  
Literature searches for surprise (search terms: ‘Surprise’, ‘Prosocial 
behaviours’, ‘Cooperation’, ‘Helping’, ‘Compliance’ and 'Prosociality’ ) and 
hope (search terms: ‘Hope’, ‘Hopeful’, ‘Prosocial behaviours’, ‘Cooperation’, 
‘Helping’, ‘Compliance’ and 'Prosociality’) revealed no studies. Literature 
searches revealed 23 studies on pride (search terms: ‘Pride’, ‘Prosocial 
behaviours’, ‘Cooperation’, ‘Helping’, ‘Compliance’ and 'Prosociality’) and 37 
on anger (search terms: 'Anger', 'Helping', 'Cooperation', ' Third-party 
punishment', 'altruistic punishment', 'prosocial behaviours').  
The search for anger was limited to papers published after Van Doorn 
and colleagues’ (2014) review on anger and prosocial behaviour and all 
relevant papers (i.e. the ‘direct evidence’) from Van Doorn et al. (2014) were 
included. With respect to anger the definition of prosociality was extended to 
include cooperation (giving to the public good and contribution of resources, 
which did not include an option to punish non-cooperators) along with norm-
enforcing punishment, whereby non-cooperators are punished either by other 
players (second party) or an impartial observer (third party) at a cost to the 
punisher. Punishment of this type is believed to enforce norms of fairness, with 
the evidence showing that it leads to greater cooperation (Fehr & Fischbacher, 
2004; Fehr & Rockenbach, 2004; Gürerk et al., 2004, 2006). Furthermore, 
Peysakhovich, Nowak, and Rand (2014) distinguished cooperation from norm 
enforcement as two clear and distinct aspects of the cooperative phenotype. Thus it 
seemed reasonable to distinguish the two. Two additional meta-analyses were 
conducted to estimate the overall effect sizes for pride and anger on prosocial 
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behaviours. The same set of inclusion and exclusion criteria as the main 
analyses were applied to these additional analyses.  
2.2.3. Overview—Data Synthesis, Meta-bias and Additional Analysis  
For the present review the correlation r was used as the effect-size 
metric. For studies that only reported the standardised s I had applied Peterson 
and Brown’s (2005)—r =  + 0.05 λ (where λ = 1 for non-negative s, and λ = 0 
for negative s)—to impute the corresponding rs. I also computed r for studies 
that did not conduct correlational analyses via sample sizes along with t-values, 
χ2 values, p-values, and standardised mean differences (i.e., Cohen’s d). In 
addition, several measurements were reverse-scored to assure that each positive 
effect size computed would represent a direct association between gratitude and 
prosociality. 
The Random-effects model was adopted to calculate the overall effect 
size of gratitude on prosociality. Because the current sample contained studies 
conducted with noticeably different features I did not follow the Fixed-effects 
because this assumes that all the studies included are functionally identical and 
share a single canonical effect size (Borenstein, Hedges, Higgins, & Rothstein, 
2010; Hedges & Vevea, 1998). Additionally, the Random-effects model allows 
unconditional inferences (i.e., a generalizable conclusion to situations beyond 
the sampled studies) of the results (Field, 2001; Schmidt, Oh, & Hayes, 2009).   
Many studies were found to have reported multiple Gratitude-
Prosociality metrics. It was not uncommon for studies to either include both 
state and dispositional assessment of gratitude alongside a single prosociality 
measure (e.g. Spence, Brown, Keeping, & Lian, 2014; Exline et al., 2012), or to 
have a single gratitude measure alongside multiple prosociality measures (e.g. 
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Watkins et al., 2006). These effect sizes that arise from the same study are not 
independent (Balliet, Mulder, & Van Lange, 2011; Borenstein, Hedges, 
Higgins, & Rothstein, 2009). As a result, study was referred to as the unit of 
analysis meaning that each study included would contribute only one summary 
effect size to the analysis (see Cooper, 1998). The effect sizes were computed 
using Cooper’s (1998) Shifting-Unit-of-Analysis method for studies which 
report multiple, non-independent effect sizes.  
Similar to Balliet and Van Lange’s (2013) reporting, I detail the 95% 
Confidence Intervals alongside certain indices of heterogeneity assessment like 
I2, i.e. the cross-studies ‘inconsistency index’ (Higgins & Thompson, 2002; 
Higgins, Thompson, Deeks, & Altman, 2003), Cochran Q, and tau-squared (the 
‘study-to-study variances’) (Borenstein et al., 2009). The issue of publication 
bias was addressed via examining the funnel plot in which all effect sizes are 
plotted against the standard error. To empirically evaluate the extent of the 
symmetry of the funnel plot, and hence the severity of potential publication bias 
I examined the following indices, namely (1) the effect size estimates following 
Duval & Tweedie’s (2000) Trim-and-Fill and (2) Egger’s regression intercept 
(Egger, Smith, & Phillips, 1997). 
I applied the mixed-effects model in the categorical univariate 
moderator analyses (e.g., study type, reciprocity nature etc.) so as the meta-
regression analyses for the continuous moderators (e.g. times cited and years of 
publication). It should, nevertheless, be noted that the application of mixed-
effects model may, compared to a fixed-effect model, render the analyses over-
conservative and therefore susceptible to Type II-errors (Balliet & Van Lange, 
2013; Lipsey & Wilson, 2001).  
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All analyses in the present review were conducted using the 
Comprehensive Meta-Analysis (CMA) Version 2.0 (Borenstein et al., 2009). 
Meta-regression models, however, were conducted using CMA Version 3.0 
(Borenstein, Hedges, Higgins, & Rothstein, 2014). As a number of effect sizes 
were derived from multivariate analyses (multiple regressions, path models, 
ANCOVA etc.), the effect sizes based on r may be over- or under-estimated. 
Therefore, I explored if the effect size estimates would vary as a function of 
effect sizes that are zero-order (i.e. derived from univariate analyses) or derived 
from partial coefficients. Similar analyses had shown that it has the effect of 
generally reducing effect size estimates (Ferguson & Bibby, 2012).  
2.3 Results 
2.3.1. Overall Analyses 
The list of effect sizes of the association between gratitude and 
prosociality and study characteristics are contained in Table 2.2. The analysis 
revealed a moderate positive association between gratitude and prosociality, r = 
0.374, 95% confidence interval lower limit (LLCI) /Upper limit (ULCI) = 
0.329/0.417, p <.0001. I observed a non-negligible level of variation in the 
distribution of effect sizes (Tau = 0.232, Tau-squared = 0.054). This might be 
explained by the considerable extent of heterogeneity (i.e., I2 = 90.98; Q (90) = 
998.16, p <.0001) inherent among the sampled studies. 
To address the extent to which publication bias may have impacted upon 
the analysis I first examined the adjusted effect size estimates following Duval 
and Tweedie’s (2000) Trim-and-Fill procedure using the Random-effects 
model. No studies were deemed missing below the average effect estimates. In 
contrast, fifteen studies with imputed effect sizes greater than the mean effect 
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estimate were filled in, resulting in an effect estimate that was slightly higher 
than the pre-adjusted mean effect (r = 0.423, LLCI/ULCI = 0.379/ 0.465). This 
suggested that the present analysis might be potentially biased toward 
understating, rather than overstating, the summary effect. Such a potential 
vulnerability to understating the effect is the opposite to what one would 
normally expect from a review that is confounded by publication bias (i.e. the 
under-sampling of non-significant effect sizes which are prevalent among 
unpublished studies (Balliet & Van Lange, 2013; Cooper, 1998). Nevertheless, 
the non-significant Egger’s regression coefficient (intercept = 0.50, standard 
error = 1.09, LLCI/ULCI = -1.67/2.67, p = .6473 (two-tailed)) should have 
dispelled any concern about bias toward underestimation. Taken together, all 
these indicators suggest that the present analysis is not contaminated by 
publication bias. See Figure 2.2 below for the funnel plot. 
 
Figure 2.2 The Funnel Plot (with observed studies only)
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Table 2.2. Studies on the Gratitude-Prosociality Relationship  
Studies (k = 91) Gratitude Survey Measures or Direct Inductions Prosocial Behaviour/ Behavioural Tendencies Measures Years N r 95% LL/ ULCI 
Bartlett & Desteno (2006)      
  Study 1 Experiment: Conferment of Benefits Time Spent on Helping the Confederate 2006 105 0.351 0.1704/0.5018 
  Study 2 Experiment: Conferment of Benefits Time Spent on Helping the Confederate 2006 97 0.290 0.0961/0.4627 
  Study 3 Experiment: Conferment of Benefits Time Spent on Helping the Confederate 2006 35 0.427 0.1091/0.6654 
Bartlett et al. (2012)      
  Study 1 Experiment: Conferment of Benefits Socially Affiliative Decisions 2012 40 0.390 0.0892/0.6254 
  Study 2 Experiment: Conferment of Benefits Costly Social Inclusion Behaviours 2012 25 0.630 0.3127/0.8208 
Bock, Folse, & Black (2016)      
  Study 4 Survey: Gratitude Affect/ Behaviours/ Cognitions Relationship Continuity (Hess, Ganesan, & Klein, 2003) 2016 226 0.285 0.1604/0.4005 
Chang et al., (2012)       
  Single-Study  Survey: GQ-VI (McCullough et al., 2002)  Peer-reported Generosity Exhibited throughout a Semester 2012 174 0.160 0.0128/0.3004 
Cohen (2012)       
  Study 1  Experiment: Recall about Times when Being Benefited 
(Measures: GAC, McCullough et al (2002)) 
Self-reported Urge to Reciprocate/ Verbal Reciprocity/ 
 Reciprocal Actions 
2012 57 0.394 0.1487/0.5936 
  Study 2 Experiment: Recall about Times when Helping 
Someone (Measures: Perceived Recipient’s Gratitude) 
Perceived Recipients’  Urge to Reciprocate/ Verbal Reciprocity/ 
Reciprocal Actions 
2012 59 0.350 0.1026/0.5559 
de Hooge (2014)       
  Study 1 Experiment: Recall of Personal Gratitude Experience Total Gift-giving/ Money Willing to Spend on Gifts 2014 271 0.254 0.1395/0.3626 
  Study 4 Experiment: Recall of Personal Gratitude Experience Gift-Giving/ Money to Spend/Time Spent on Gift Search 2014 138 0.371 0.2171/0.5065 
Desteno, Bartlett et al., (2010)      
  Single-Study  Experiment: Conferment of Benefits Tokens Given: Give-Some Dilemma Game (GSDG) 2010 85 0.290 0.0819/0.4738 
Dewani, Sinha & Mathur (2016)      
  Single-Study  Survey: GQ-VI and GAC (McCullough et al., 2002) Purchase Intention (Sweeny, Geoffrey, & Johnson, 1999) 2016 398 0.235 0.1403/0.3261 
Emmons & McCullough (2003)      
  Study 2 Experiment: Recall of things that ‘you are grateful for’ Offer Emotional Support/ Helped Somebody (Yes/No) 2003 157 0.148 -0.0066/0.2954 
Exline & Hill (2012)      
  Study 2 Experiment: Conferment of Benefits Donations toward an ‘Anonymous Future Participant’  2012 286 0.090 -0.0263/0.2039 
Exline, Lisan & Lisan (2012)      
  Study 1  Experiment: 
 Recall of an incident when ‘another person did 
something for you that was very kind (pp. 47)’ 
In-the-moment kindness motives toward Benefactor/ Close Others (i.e. 
close friends and family)/ Strangers/ Enemies 
2012 217 0.175 0.0425/0.3009 
Froh, Bono & Emmons (2010)      
  Single-Study  Survey: GQ-VI and GAC (McCullough et al., 2002) Child Social Behaviour Questionnaire  
(Warden, Cheyne, Christie, Fitzpatrick, & Reid, 2003) 
2010 700 0.300 0.2310/0.3660 
Froh, Bono, Fan et al. (2014)      
  Study 1  Experiment: Conferment of Benefits Writing Thank-you Cards to the Benefactors 2014 122 0.195 0.0181/0.3605 
Froh,Yurkewicz, & Kashdan (2009)      
  Single-Study  Survey: GAC and ‘Gratitude in response to aids’ Offer Emotional Support/ Helped Somebody (Yes/No) 2009 71 0.172 -0.0545/0.3822 
Goei & Boster (2005)      
  Study 2 Survey:  
GAC and ‘felt a deep sense of gratitude (pp.293)’ 
Compliance: Purchase of Raffle Tickets from Confederates 2005 96 0.280 0.0842/0.4549 
Goei, Roberto, Meyer, & Carlyle (2007)      
  Study 1 Survey: 4-item Gratitude Survey (Goei & Boster, 2005) Compliance: Purchase of Raffle Tickets from Confederates 2007 64 0.240 -0.0062/0.4587 
  Study 2 Survey: 4-item Gratitude Survey (Goei & Boster, 2005) Compliance: Purchase of Raffle Tickets from Confederates 2007 186 0.240 0.0996/0.3711 
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Graham (1988)       
  Study 1 Vignette: The protagonist (i.e. Tim) was selected by 
captain Bob to join the school baseball team.  
A ‘Yes/No’ response to whether or not Tim would give Bob a new 
baseball as a thank-you gift for picking him. 
1988 119 0.559 0.2958/0.7434 
  Study 2 1988 105 0.346 0.1653/0.5042 
Halali, Kogut & Ritov (2016)      
  Study 1A Experiment: Resource Allocation (Tsang, 2006a) Resources to Distribute to the Other Player 2016 146 0.371 0.2223/0.5034 
  Study 2 Experiment: Resource Allocation (Tsang, 2006a) Resources to Distribute to the Other Player 2016 115 0.444 0.2844/0.5803 
Hendrickson & Goei (2009)      
  Single-Study  Survey: 4-item Gratitude Survey (Goei & Boster, 2005) Compliance: Date Request Compliance 2009 115 0.490 0.3371/0.6177 
Huang (2015)       
  Single-Study  Survey: Customer Gratitude  
(Palmatier, Jarvis, Bechkoff & Kardes, 2009) 
Behavioural Loyalty  
(De Wulf, Odekerken-Schroder, & Iacobucci, 2001) 
2015 239 0.700 0.6290/0.7594 
Hwang & Kandampully (2015)      
  Single-Study  Vignette:  
Story about a Hypothetical Grocery Retailer’s 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) commitment 
Participation Intention in that Hypothetical Grocery Retail’s  Prosocial 
Loyalty Programme (pro-social LP) 
2015 350 0.265 0.1669/0.3578 
Janakiraman, Meyer & Morales (2006)      
  Study 2 Survey: Ratings on the item ‘Thankful’ (0 to 100) Purchase Intentions 2006 297 0.253 0.1435/0.3567 
Jin & Merkebu (2014)      
  Single-Study  Survey: Customer Gratitude (measure via GAC) Self-reported Favourable Reciprocal Behaviours (FRBs) 2014 398 0.794 0.7526/0.8287 
Kim & Lee (2013)/ Lee, Kim & Pan (2014)*      
  Single-Study  Survey: Customer Gratitude (measure via GAC) Self-reported Favourable Reciprocal Behaviours (FRBs) 2013 297 0.640 0.5675/0.7026 
Kim, Smith & James (2010)      
  Single-Study  Survey: Consumer Gratitude (measure via GAC) Intention to Reciprocate (Zeithaml, Berry, & Parasuraman, 1996) 2010 272 0.710 0.6456/0.7644 
Kolyesnikova & Dodd (2008)/ Kolyesnikova, Dodd & Wilcox (2009)*     
  Single-Study  Survey:  
3-item measure (example: ‘Desire to say “thank-you” to 
the winery personnel (pp.207)’  
(Kolyesnikova et al., 2009) 
Dollar Amount Spent at Wineries  2008 357 0.510 0.4289/0.5829 
Kolyesnikova, Dodd & Callison (2011)      
  Single-Study  Experiment: Gratitude-inducing Direct Mail Messages Purchase Intent/ Future Behavioural Intentions 2011 120 0.588 0.4571/0.6942 
Krumrei-Mancuso (2016)      
  Single-Study  Survey: Gratitude Disposition (measured via GQ-VI) Self-reported Altruism (Smith, 2006) 2016 314 0.270 0.1642/0.3696 
Kubacka, Finkenauer, Rusbult & Keijsers (2011)      
  Study 1 Survey: Gratitude toward Spouses (via GQ-VI) Relationship Maintenance Behaviours 2011 390 0.311 0.2138/0.4013 
Kwak & Kwon (2016)      
  Study 2 Vignette: Story about Participants’ Favourite Teams 
Partnering with a Local or an International Charity 
Intention to Donate to that Charity  2016 201 0.424 0.3032/0.5310 
Langan & Kumar (2015)      
  Study 2 Vignette: Story about  a Coffee Shop (Local vs. 
International) Engaging in a Donation (Money vs. Time) 
Desire to Reciprocate (example items: ‘Frequent that shop more 
often’; ‘Go out of your way to shop there’ etc.) 
2015 185 0.746 0.6742/0.8037 
Layous, Nelson, Kurtz &  Lyubomirsky (2016)       
  Study 1 Experiment:  
Specific and General Gratitude Training 
Participants’ Weekly Acts of Kindness towards Others 2016 233 0.186 -0.0388/0.3930 
  Study 2 Experiment: General Gratitude Positive Trigger Participants’ Weekly Acts of Kindness towards Others 2016 119 -0.030 -0.2093/0.1503 
Leung (2011)       
  Study 1 Economic Games:  
Two-person Public Goods Game Dilemma 
Cooperation: Contributions to the Public Account 2011 124 0.450 0.2973/0.5803 
  Study 2 Economic Games:  
Two-person Public Goods Game Dilemma 
Cooperation: Contributions to the Public Account 2011 84 0.560 0.3928/0.6914 
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  Study 3 Economic Games:  
Two-person Public Goods Game Dilemma 
Cooperation: Contributions to the Public Account 2011 110 0.340 0.1631/0.4957 
  Study 4 Economic Games: 
 Two-person Public Goods Game Dilemma 
Cooperation: Contributions to the Public Account 2011 90 0.500 0.3267/0.6407 
Li & Chow (2015)      
  Single-Study  Survey: Gratitude Disposition (measured via GQ-VI) Self-reported and Teacher-reported Prosocial Behaviours 2015 243 0.133 0.0073/0.2546 
Ma, Tunney & Ferguson (2014)      
  Single-Study  Economic Games: One-shot Variant of Trust Game (TG) Willingness to Reciprocate (Watkins et al., 2006) 2014 61 0.810 0.7012/0.8819 
Ma, Tunney & Ferguson (Unpublished Study 1)      
  Single-Study  Economic Games: One-shot Variant of Trust Game (TG) Cooperation: Percentage of Repayment  2014 135 0.150 -0.0421/0.3317 
Ma, Tunney & Ferguson (Unpublished Study 2)      
  Single-Study  Economic Games: A repeated version (i.e. Ten Trials, 
Multiple Roles) of the TG used in Ma et al. (2014)  
Decisions to Help (at ‘Helper’ Trials)/ Percentage of Repayment  
(at ‘Recipient’ Trials) 
2015 133 0.097 -0.0799/0.2673 
Markowitz  (2012)       
  Study 1 Survey: Gratitude Disposition (measured via GQ-VI) Responsibility Toward Future Generation (RTFGs) 2012 551 0.360 0.2850/0.4306 
  Study 2a Vignette: Story about Past Generation’s Contribution (or 
the lack thereof) to the Transition of the current Fuel-
efficient economy  
Willingness to Impose an Increase in Taxes on Gasoline 2012 413 -0.011 -0.1074/0.0856 
  Study 2b Survey: Gratitude Disposition (measured via GQ-VI) RTFGs Rating 2012 413 0.210 0.1159/0.3004 
  Study 3 Vignette:  
Story about Past Generation’s Positive (or Negative) Intent 
to help Maintain the National Parks for Future Generations 
Donation to the National Park Foundation 2012 273 0.175 0.0575/0.2878 
McCullough, Emmons & Tsang (2002)      
  Study 1 Survey:  
Peer- and Self-reported Gratitude Disposition (GQ-VI) 
Peer-reported Prosocial Behaviours/Tendencies 2002 238 0.324 0.2052/0.4333 
Michie (2009)       
  Single-Study  Survey:  
Self-Reported Gratitude toward Subordinates (GQ-VI) 
Subordinates’ Rating of Supervisors’ Prosociality 2009 71 0.247 0.0149/0.4545 
Mikulincer & Shaver (2010)      
  Single-Study  Experiment: Conferment of Benefits  
(Bartlett & Desteno, 2006) 
Time Spent on Helping (Bartlett & Desteno, 2006) 2010 80 0.430 0.2322/0.5936 
Morales (2005)       
  Study 2 Vignette:  
Story about a new luggage Store showing very neat, 
interesting displays (i.e. ‘High-effort’ Condition) as 
opposed to just keeping their displays organised (i.e. 
‘Low-effort’ Condition)  
Likelihood of Visiting that Store 2005 88 0.273 0.0677/0.4566 
Naito & Sakata (2010)      
  Study 1 Vignette: A hypothetical scenario where a protagonist—
who lives alone and injured—was helped by a same-sex 
friend for an extended period of time (Naito et al., 2005) 
Enhancement of Prosocial Motivation (e.g. ‘More than before, would 
you want to help your friend, if she were distressed in a similar 
situation’?) 
2010 135 0.386 0.2321/0.5209 
Naito, Wangwan & Tani (2005)      
  Study 1- Japan Vignette: Story about an injured protagonist being helped 
by his/her Parents, Best Friend or a Stranger for an 
extended period of time 
Enhancement of Prosocial Motivation/  
Requital: Giving and Verbal-Facial Expression of Gratitude 
2005 212 0.446 0.2691/0.5930 
  Study 1- Thailand Same as above Same as above 2005 284 0.418 0.2699/0.5460 
Palmatier, Jarvis, Bechkoff, & Kardes (2009)      
  Study 1 Survey: Customer Gratitude (measured via GQ-VI) Customer Purchase Intention/ Customer Commitment 2009 155 0.587 0.4729/0.6814 
  Study 2 Survey: Gratitude-based Reciprocal Motives Share of Wallet/ Customer Commitment  2009 446 0.332 0.2466/0.4120 
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Romani, Grappi & Bagozzi (2013)      
  Single-Study  Vignette:  
Story about a hypothetical business organisation engaging 
in Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) activities 
Positive Word-of-Mouth/ Advocacy Behaviours 2013 188 0.550 0.4417/0.6425 
Rubin (2012)       
  Study 1 Economic Games: Iterated Ultimatum Game (UG) Endowment (USD $100) to Offer to Partner in Next Trial 2012 52 0.050 -0.2260/0.3186 
  Study 2 Economic Games: Give-Some Dilemma Game (GSDG) Tokens Given: Give-Some Dilemma Game (GSDG) 2012 96 0.218 0.0186/0.4012 
Siegel, Thomson & Navarro (2014)      
  Study 2 Experiment:  
Recall of an instance of being Generously Treated 
Donation Behaviours to Charity (i.e. Toys for Tots) 2014 373 0.036 -0.1057/0.1767 
Simon (2013)       
  Single-Study  Survey: Customer Gratitude Survey (Goei & Boster, 2005) Repurchase Intent (Maxham & Netemeyer, 2003) 2013 148 0.645 0.5403/0.7306 
Soscia (2007)       
  Single-Study  Vignette:  
Stories on various protagonists’ Consumption Experience 
Positive Word-of Mouth/ Repurchase Intent 2007 182 0.725 0.6484/0.7878 
Spence, Brown, Keeping & Lian (2014)      
  Study 2 Survey: GQ-VI and State Gratitude Scale (SGS) Organizational Citizenship Behaviour (OCBs) 2014 67 0.145 -0.0431/0.3240 
  Study 3 Survey: GQ-VI and State Gratitude Scale (SGS) Supervisor-, Co-worker-, Organisation-targeted OCBs 2014 104 0.196 0.0500/0.3332 
Tian, Chu & Huebner (2016)      
  Single-Study  Survey: Gratitude Disposition (measured via GQ-VI) Prosocial Behaviour Questionnaire (Feng, 2009) 2016 324 0.520 0.4381/0.5933 
Tian, Du & Huebner (2015)      
  Single-Study  Survey: Gratitude Disposition (measured via GQ-VI) Prosociality Scale (Zhang, Zeng, & Yu, 2004) 2015 706 0.267 0.1600/0.3552 
Tsang (2006a)       
  Single-Study  Experiment: Conferment of Benefits Resource Distribution (i.e. Money Given to Partners) 2006 40 0.550 0.2879/0.7356 
Tsang (2007)       
  Single-Study  Experiment: Conferment of Benefits (Tsang, 2006a) Resource Distribution (Tsang, 2006a) 2007 149 0.572 0.4530/0.6712 
Tsang, Schulwitz ,& Carlisle (2012)      
  Single-Study  Experiment: Conferment of Benefits (Tsang, 2006a) Resource Distribution (Tsang, 2006a) 2012 80 0.270 0.0541/0.4616 
Wangwan (2014)       
  Single-Study-High School  Vignette: Same as the ones used by Naito and Associates  
(Naito & Sakata, 2010, Naito et al., 2005) 
Enhancement of Prosocial Motivation  
(Naito et al., 2005; Naito & Sakata, 2010) 
2014 414 0.120 0.0239/0.2139 
  Single-Study-Undergrad 2014 191 0.109 -0.0334/0.2472 
Watkins, Scheer, Ovnicek & Kolts (2006)      
  Study 1 Vignette: Story about a protagonist’s receipt of a large and 
unexpected favour (i.e. moving apartment) from a friend 
Prosocial Action Thoughts and Tendencies 
(i.e. PATT, Frijda, 1986, 1988) 
2006 107 0.430 0.2618/0.5733 
  Study 2 Vignette:  
Story about a protagonist’s receipt of a small favour  
PATT/Self-reported Altruism  2006 152 0.362 0.2147/0.4924 
Wetzel, Hammerschmidt, & Zablah (2014)      
  Study 1 Survey: Customer Gratitude Survey  
(Palmatier et al., 2009) 
Sales Growth 2014 192 0.160 0.0207/0.2932 
  Study 2 Survey: Customer Gratitude Survey  
(Palmatier et al., 2009) 
Sales Growth 2014 302 0.360 0.2576/0.4544 
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Xia & Kukar-Kinney (2013)      
  Study 1 Vignette:  
Story about a bank willing (or unwilling) to waive a credit 
card penalty fee that was or (was not) the protagonist’s 
fault Loyalty—  
i) Purchase Intention (Lam, Shankar, Eramilli & Murthy, 2004), and 
ii) Advocacy (Lam et al., 2004);  
Future Compliance (Xia & Kukar-Kinney, 2013) 
2013 290 0.571 0.4879/0.6438 
  Study 2 Vignette:  
Story about a protagonist who never had a late payment 
(or was late several times) missing the deadline by a day 
(or a month), and the bank was (or was not) willing to 
waive that charge.  
2013 381 0.502 0.4226/0.5734 
  Study 3 Vignette:  
Story about a participant who contacted the bank to drop a 
credit card late fee, and was told the bank would refund 
them (or compensate them with reward points). 
Protagonists were then told this was a preferential (or a 
casual) arrangement by the bank. 
Purchase Intention and Advocacy (Lam et al., 2004) 2013 225 0.412 0.2977/0.5154 
Xia & Kukar-Kinney (2014)      
  Study 2 Survey: Customer’s Gratitude toward Preferential 
Treatment he/she received in the past (via GQ-VI) 
Positive Word-of-Mouth (Lacey, Suh & Morgan, 2007)/  
Subsequent Purchases (Lam et al., 2004) 
2014 206 0.248 0.1151/0.3720 
Xie & Bagozzi (2014)      
  Single-Study  Vignette:  
Stories of a Norwegian firm’s Corporate Ethical (‘Positive 
Narrative’)/Unethical (‘Negative Narrative’) Actions 
Consumer Support for Non-profits 2014 210 0.267 0.1368/0.3886 
Xie, Bagozzi, & Grønhaug (2015)      
  Single-Study  Vignette: Narrative Scenarios of Corporate Environmental 
Irresponsibility (vs. Responsibility vs. Control) 
Positive Word of Mouth/ 
Likelihood to Invest in the company 
2015 70 0.480 0.2762/0.6425 
Yang, Stoeber, & Wang (2015)      
  Study 3 Vignette: The protagonist received help from a friend. Willingness to help that friend in return 2015 165 0.493 0.3679/0.6005 
Zhao (2010)       
  Study 1 Survey: Gratitude Disposition (measured via GQ-VI) 5-item Helping Tendencies Checklist 2010 381 0.520 0.4427/0.5897 
  Study 2a Vignette:  
Receipt of an unexpected birthday gift from a friend 
Prosocial Motivation/ Magnitude of Reciprocation 2010 123 0.406 0.2471/0.5442 
  Study 2b Vignette: Receipt of help from a friend Prosocial Motivation/ Magnitude of Reciprocation 2010 126 0.294 0.1255/0.4460 
Random Effects Model    18,342 0.3735 0.3287/0.4166 
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Table 2.3. Results of the Univariate Categorical Analyses on the Gratitude and Prosociality Effect Size (Mixed-Effects Model used) 
 Q p-value  
(two-tailed) 
k N Tau-
squared 
Standard 
Error 
Correlation r 95% Lower Limit /  
Upper Limit Confidence Intervals 
Reciprocity vs. Non-Reciprocity 10.135 .0015**       
   Non-Reciprocity   16 3,957 0.024 0.024 0.247 0.165/0.325 
   Reciprocity   76 14,518 0.060 0.060 0.397 0.346/0.446 
Nature of Reciprocity 6.463 .0110**       
   Direct   53 9,114 0.056 0.014 0.435 0.378/0.489 
   Indirect   16 4,075 0.052 0.023 0.282 0.170/0.386 
Nature of Indirect Reciprocity 6.655 .0099**       
  Upstream   9 2,598 0.020 0.013 0.147 0.043/0.247 
  Downstream   5 1,003 0.088 0.071 0.484 0.253/0.663 
Social Relationships (Lambert et al., 2009) 14.807 .0001***       
   Benefit-Triggered Gratitude    69 12,313 0.062 0.014 0.415 0.362/0.466 
   Generalized Gratitude   19 5,460 0.025 0.011 0.240 0.165/0.312 
Country of Participation 1.685 .4306       
   North America   55 10,753 0.057 0.015 0.350 0.289/0.408 
   Asia   23 5,164 0.046 0.017 0.399 0.318/0.474 
   Western Europe   13 2,425 0.065 0.031 0.425 0.298/0.536 
Gratitude Measure 10.253 .0014**       
   Disposition   24 5,988 0.035 0.035 0.248 0.171/0.322 
   State/Mood   77 14,206 0.060 0.060 0.393 0.343/0.441 
Type of Study 0.145 .7037       
   Lab Studies   59 9,449 0.050 0.050 0.367 0.312/0.419 
   Cross-sectional Survey   32 8,893 0.058 0.058 0.385 0.308/0.456 
Gratitude Induction 1.528 .2164       
  Experiment/ Economic Games   34 4,260 0.038 0.013 0.335 0.267/0.399 
  Vignette   25 5,189 0.059 0.021 0.403 0.316/0.484 
Objective/Subjective Prosociality 3.101 .0782       
   Objective   30 4,077 0.028 0.010 0.318 0.254/0.380 
   Subjective   62 14,400 0.060 0.013 0.393 0.337/0.446 
Target of Prosociality 2.756 .0969       
   Group   34 8,478 0.072 0.020 0.431 0.352/0.504 
   Individual   44 6,082 0.019 0.007 0.355 0.309/0.398 
Proxy/ Actual Gratitude Measure 0.661 .4161       
   Actual   82 15,838 0.055 0.011 0.371 0.323/0.417 
   Proxy   14 3,034 0.047 0.023 0.418 0.312/0.513 
Published? 0.429 .5123       
   Published   72 14,857 0.054 0.012 0.381 0.331/0.429 
   Unpublished   19 3,485 0.055 0.025 0.344 0.240/0.440 
Zero-order statistics used? 2.408 .1207       
 Yes   74 14,337 0.052 0.011 0.388 0.340/0.435 
 No   18 4,403 0.049 0.021 0.303 0.200/0.399 
Note. k = Number of studies; N = Total number of participants involved; Q = Between-group Effect; ** p <.01 (two-tailed); *** p <.001 (two-tailed). 
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2.3.2. Moderator Analyses 
Table 2.3 above shows the results of the univariate moderator analyses. 
Below I explored every of the theoretical or methodological moderators. 
2.3.2.1. Reciprocity versus Non-Reciprocity 
I coded if the prosociality measures reported were reciprocity or non-
reciprocity driven. The results indicated a statistically significant difference, Q 
(1) = 10.135, p = .0015, with studies which assessed reciprocal prosocial 
outcomes (r = 0.397, LLCI/ULCI= 0.346/ 0.446, k = 76) resulting in a stronger 
link between prosociality and gratitude than did studies which focused on non-
reciprocal prosocial outcomes (r = 0.247, LLCI/ULCI= 0.165/ 0.325, k = 16).  
2.3.2.2. Reciprocity Nature: Direct versus Indirect Reciprocity 
Outcomes were coded as either direct or indirect reciprocity. The 
results showed that while in both cases the associations were significant, studies 
that examined direct reciprocity (r = 0.435, LLCI/ULCI = 0.378/ 0.489, k = 53) 
had a stronger association between gratitude and prosociality, than studies that 
examined indirect reciprocity (r = 0.282, LLCI/ULCI= 0.170/ 0.386, k = 16),  Q 
(1) = 6.463, p = .0110. This indicates that gratitude is a stronger predictor of 
prosociality in the context of direct rather than indirect reciprocity.Furthermore, 
it was worth noting that there are similar effect sizes, Q (1) = 0.259, p = .611, 
for studies that assessed non-reciprocal prosociality (r = 0.247, LLCI/ULCI = 
0.165 / 0.325, k = 16) and those which examined indirect reciprocity (r = 
0.282). Studies which measured direct reciprocity (r = 0.435), meanwhile, 
reported a significantly larger effect, Q (1) = 14.77, p <.001, than studies whose 
outcomes were non-reciprocal. This might suggest the moderating effect of 
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reciprocity versus non-reciprocity on the gratitude-prosociality association may 
be attributable to the direct instead of the indirect reciprocal exchanges.  
2.3.2.3. Upstream versus Downstream Indirect Reciprocity 
While the associations with both upstream (r = 0.147, LLCI/ULCI = 
0.043/ 0.247, k = 9) and downstream (r = 0.484, LLCI/ULCI = 0.253/ 0.662, k 
= 5) indirect reciprocity were significant, the association was significantly 
stronger for downstream indirect reciprocity, Q (1) = 6.655, p = .0099. 
2.3.2.4. Social Relationships 
I coded whether gratitude was generated by a benefit-triggered 
relationship or generalized gratitude. The results revealed a significant 
difference, Q (1) = 14.807, p = .0001.  While both associations were significant, 
the benefit-triggered gratitude (r = 0.415, LLCI/ULCI = 0.362/ 0.466, k = 69) 
resulted in a significantly larger association than generalized gratitude  
(r = 0.240, LLCI/ULCI = 0.165/ 0.312, k = 19). 
2.3.2.5. Continent of Participation, Religiosity and Collectivism 
I coded the continents in which the studies were administered and 
examined if this moderated the link between gratitude and prosociality. The 
majority of the studies reported a moderate positive relation between gratitude 
and prosociality with studies from Western Europe (r = .425, LLCI/ ULCI = 
0.298/0.536, k = 13) having the largest effect size, then East Asia (r = 0.399, 
LLCI/ ULCI = 0.318/0.474, k = 23) followed by North America (r = 0.350, 
LLCI/ ULCI = 0.289/0.408, k = 55). However, there was no significant 
moderating effect of continent, Q (2) = 1.685, p = .4307. Regression analyses 
showed that effect-size estimates did not vary as a function of religiosity (= -
0.0012, p = .416) or collectivism (= -0.0008, p = .408) within each country.  
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2.3.2.6. Gratitude Measure: State versus Disposition 
I coded whether the type of gratitude examined in the studies was 
referred to as a state/mood or as a disposition. The data revealed that the type of 
gratitude measures did result in different effect sizes, Q (1) = 10.253, p = .001, 
with the gratitude-prosociality association stronger for the studies which 
reported state/mood gratitude measures (r = 0.393, LLCI/ULCI = 0.343/ 0.441, 
k = 77) than studies that examined dispositional gratitude (r = 0.248, 
LLCI/ULCI = 0.171/ 0.322, k = 24).  
2.3.2.7. Type of Study and Gratitude Induction 
I examined whether studies that were classified as Laboratory Studies or 
Survey/Field studies had different gratitude-prosociality effect sizes. As 
displayed in Table 2.3, gratitude was significantly associated with prosociality 
whether it was lab-based (r = .367, LLCI/ULCI = 0.312/ 0.419, k = 59) or a 
survey/field study based (r = .385, LLCI/ULCI = 0.308/ 0.456, k = 32). 
However, whether the study was lab-based or a Survey/Field studies did not 
moderate the effect estimates, Q (1) = 0.145, p = .7037.  
I then examined whether the way through which gratitude was induced 
within the 59 lab-based studies moderated the relationship between gratitude 
and prosociality. It was anticipated that studies that were 
experimental/economic game based would yield a stronger effect-size than 
vignettes. The results, demonstrated that that gratitude-prosociality association 
was significant for both vignettes (r = .403, LLCI/ ULCI = 0.316/ 0.484, k = 
25) and experimental/economic games (r = .335, LLCI/ ULCI = 0.267/ 0.399, k 
= 34), but the two did not differ significantly, Q (1) = 1.528, p = .2164. 
2.3.2.8. Objective versus Subjective Prosociality 
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I coded if the prosociality measure adopted was objective (r = 0.318, 
LLCI/ULCI = 0.254/ 0.380, k = 30) or subjective (r = 0.393, LLCI/ULCI = 
0.337/ 0.446, k = 62). While both effects are significant the results revealed no 
significant moderating effect, Q (1) = 3.101, p = .0782.  
2.3.2.9. Target of Prosociality: Individual versus Group 
I coded if the prosocial behaviours or behavioural tendencies reported 
were individually- or group-targeted. The associations between gratitude and 
prosociality were significant for group-directed prosociality (r = 0 .431, LLCI/ 
ULCI = 0.352/0.504, k = 34), and for the individually-targeted prosociality (r = 
0.355, LLCI/ ULCI = 0.309/0.398, k = 44). However, these associations were 
not significantly different from each other, Q (1) = 2.756, p = .0969. 
2.3.2.10. Proxy versus Actual Gratitude Measure 
I coded whether proxy or actual gratitude measures were used. While 
associations were significant for both proxy (r = 0.418, LLCI/ULCI = 0.312/ 
0.413, k = 14) and actual measures (r = 0.371, LLCI/ULCI = 0.323/ 0.417, k = 
82), these were not different from each other, Q (1) = 0.416, p = .4161.  
2.3.2.11. Times Cited, Years of Publications, and Age 
I considered whether a study was frequently cited would have a bearing 
on its reported effect size. The results demonstrated an absence of significant 
moderating effect by times cited (= -0.0002 , p = .63). Categorical 
comparison between effect sizes from the published (r = 0.381, LLCI/ULCI = 
0.331/ 0.424, k = 72) and unpublished studies (r = 0.344, LLCI/ULCI = 0.240/ 
0.440, k = 19) indicated no significant difference , Q (1) = 0.429, p = .5123. 
There was no effect of year of publication or the year in which the studies were 
conducted (= -0.0038 , p = .50). There was no effect of age either (= 
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0.0034 , p = .17) In short, these results showed that the effect estimates was not 
affected by how frequently cited the studies were, whether the studies were 
published, when the studies were conducted, and how old the participants were. 
2.3.3. Dispositional Gratitude-Prosocial Disposition Associations  
Table 2.4 details the effect size estimates for the association between 
indices of dispositional gratitude and other prosocial dispositions. The Egger’s 
Intercept of 0.293 (95% LLCI/ ULCI= -1.930, 2.514, p = .787 (two-tailed)) 
revealed no publication bias. The Random-Effect Trim-and-Fill analysis 
indicated zero imputed studies in the current sample, resulting in no change in 
the effect estimate. There were 24 studies with 103 effect sizes with a total N of 
7,677.  The overall effect size was positive and significant (r = 0.288, p <.001). 
Thus, while dispositional gratitude and other prosocial dispositions are 
associated this effect is small, and that dispositional gratitude cannot be 
considered as synonymous with a general prosocial disposition.  
2.3.4. Gratitude, Other Prosocial Emotions and Differential Predictive Power 
Tables 2.5 and 2.6 detail the individual and overall effect estimates for 
the pride-prosociality and anger-prosociality links respectively. For pride there 
were twenty-three (k = 23) studies with a total N of 4,509 and 96 effect sizes. 
The effect was positive and significant (r = .212, p <.001) but smaller than that 
of the gratitude-prosociality link. There was also no evidence of publication 
bias with a non-significant (p = .257) Eggers' intercept (-2.248, LLCI/ ULCI =  
-6.257, 1.761). The Random-Effect Trim-and-Fill analysis filled in three studies 
with imputed effects larger than the mean effect estimates, resulting in a 
slightly higher post-adjusted effect estimates (r = 0.250, LLCI/ ULCI: 
0.156/0.339) than the initial estimate (r = 0.212, LLCI/ ULCI: 0.114/0.306).
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Table 2.4. Studies on the Gratitude-Prosociality Disposition Relationship (k = 24, N = 7,677 ) 
Studies Gratitude Measures Prosociality Disposition Measures Years N r 95% LL/ ULCI 
Chan (2013) Dispositional Gratitude Heartland Forgiveness Scale (Others, Self and Situations) 2013 143 0.420 0.275/0.546 
Datu (2014) Dispositional Gratitude Heartland Forgiveness Scale (Others, Self and Situations) 2014 210 0.352 0.227/0.465 
DeShea (2003)       
  Study 2 Dispositional Gratitude Willingness to Forgive (WTF) Scale/ Transgression-Related 
Interpersonal Motivations (TRIM)/ Transgression Narrative Test 
of Forgiveness (TNTF) 
2003 42 0.349 0.051/0.590 
Dwiwardi et al. (2014) Dispositional Gratitude Heartland Forgiveness Scale (Others, Self and Situations) 2014 245 0.490 0.389/0.580 
Hill & Allemand (2011) Dispositional Gratitude Big Five Factors (BFF)-Agreeableness and Conscientiousness/ 
Tendency to Forgive Scale (Brown, 2003) 
2011 927 0.214 0.152/0.275 
Kruger (2011) Dispositional Gratitude Dispositional Empathy/ Heartland Forgiveness Scale (Others) 2011 113 0.292 0.113/0.452 
*Krumrei-Mancuso (2016) Dispositional Gratitude Dispositional Empathy/ Benevolence Subscale (Schwartz,1992) 2016 314 0.334 0.232/0.429 
McCullough et al. (2002)       
  Study 1 Dispositional/Mood Gratitude BFFs- Agreeableness and Conscientiousness/  
Dispositional Empathy 
2002 877 0.283 0.183/0.377 
  *Study 2 Dispositional Gratitude BFFs- Agreeableness and Conscientiousness/  
Disposition to Forgive 
2002 1,228 0.359 0.309/0.406 
  Study 3 Dispositional Gratitude BFFs- Agreeableness and Conscientiousness/  
Dispositional Empathy 
2002 156 0.314 0.165/0.449 
Miley & Spinella (2006) Dispositional Gratitude Dispositional Empathy/ Heartland Forgiveness Scale (Others) 2006 154 0.245 0.090/0.388 
Neto & Menezes (2014) Dispositional Gratitude Forgivingness Scale (Lasting Resentment, Sensitivity to 
Circumstances, and Unconditional Forgiveness) (Mullet et al., 
2003) 
2014 147 0.200 0.040/0.351 
Neto (2007) Dispositional Gratitude BFFs- Agreeableness and Conscientiousness/  
Forgivingness Scale (Mullet et al., 2003) 
2007 152 0.280 0.126/0.421 
Rey & Extremera (2014) Dispositional Gratitude BFFs- Agreeableness and Conscientiousness/ TRIM 2014 535 0.139 0.055/0.221 
Rye et al. (2012)       
  Pre-test assessment Dispositional Gratitude Forgiveness Scale (Rye et al., 2001)  2012 99 0.322 0.133/0.489 
Sandage & Williamson (2010) Dispositional Gratitude Disposition to Forgive (McCullough et al., 1997) 2010 203 0.270 0.137/0.393 
Satici, Uyal & Akin (2014) Dispositional Gratitude Dispositional Forgiveness 2014 331 0.430 0.338/0.514 
Smith (2012) Dispositional Gratitude BF- Agreeableness/ Heartland Forgiveness Scale  
(Others,Self, Situations) 
2012 191 0.075 -0.067/0.215 
Strelan (2007) Dispositional Gratitude Heartland Forgiveness Scale (Others,Self) 2007 275 0.365 0.258/0.463 
Szczesniak & Soares (2011) Dispositional Gratitude TRIM- Motivation to avoid and seek vengeance (reverse-scored) 2011 338 0.281 0.180/0.377 
Toussaint & Friedman (2009) Dispositional Gratitude Heartland Forgiveness Scale/ TRIM- Avoidance and Revenge 2009 71 0.469 0.264/0.633 
Wilks, Neto & Mavroveli (2015) Dispositional Gratitude Forgivingness Scale (Mullet et al., 2003) 2015 327 0.143 -0.017/0.296 
Wood, Joseph & Maltby (2008) Dispositional Gratitude BFFs- Agreeableness and Conscientiousness 2008 398 0.138 0.041/0.233 
Wood, Joseph & Maltby (2009) Dispositional Gratitude BFFs- Agreeableness and Conscientiousness 2009 201 0.177 0.040/0.308 
Random-Effects Model    7,677 0.288 0.242/0.332 
*denotes studies that were included in the current main analysis 
Chapter 2   80 
 
 
 
Table 2.5.Studies on the Pride-Prosociality Relationship (k = 23, N = 4,509 ) 
Studies Pride Measures Prosociality Measures Years N r 95% LL/ ULCI 
*Soscia (2007) Experimental Induction Intent to Repurchase/ Positive Word-of-Mouth 2007 182 0.271 0.130/0.400 
*Michie (2009) Authentic Pride  Supervisor’s Prosociality- Social Justice/ Altruism 2009 71 0.247 0.015/0.454 
de Hooge (2014)       
  *Study 1 Experimental Induction Money to be spent on a gift/ Total Gift-giving 2014 271 0.230 0.114/0.340 
  *Study 4 Experimental Induction Money spent / Total Gift-giving/ Tine spent on gift-search 2014 138 0.290 0.129/0.436 
  Study 5 Experimental Induction Money spent / Total Gift-giving/ Tine spent on gift-search 2014 243 0.152 0.027/0.273 
  Study 6 Experimental Induction Money spent / Total Gift-giving/ Tine spent on gift-search 2014 242 0.109 -0.018/0.232 
Verbeke, Belschak, & Bagozzi (2004)      
  Study 1 Authentic Pride Organizational Citizenship Behaviours (OCBs) 2004 93 0.282 0.083/0.459 
Gouthier & Rhein (2011) Organizational Pride Customer Services Commitment 2011 733 0.535 0.481/0.585 
van der Schalk, Bruder & Manstead (2011)      
  Study 1 Fairness (vs. Unfairness)-induced Pride  Money shared with ‘Responder’ 2011 210 0.061 -0.075/0.195 
  Study 2 Fairness (vs. Unfairness)-induced Pride Money shared with ‘Responder’ 2011 132 0.028 -0.432/0.198 
Bureau, Vallerand, Ntoumanis, & Lafreniere (2013)      
  Study 2 Authentic and Hubristic Pride Self-reported Moral Behaviours 2013 296 -0.077 -0.189/0.038 
van Leeuwen, van Dijk, & Kaynak (2013)      
  Study 1 Collective Pride Helping of disadvantaged outgroup members 2013 67 0.432 0.214/0.609 
  Study 2 Collective Pride Helping of disadvantaged outgroup members 2013 61 0.119 -0.027/0.164 
Antonetti & Maklan (2014)       
  Study 1 Pride from making purchases with a 
sustainable brand 
Intention to purchase  2014 415 0.069 -0.027/0.164 
  Study 2 Pride from making purchases with a 
sustainable brand 
Intention to purchase 2014 135 0.149 -0.021/0.310 
Dorfman, Eyal & Bereby-Meyer (2014)      
  Study 1 Experimental Induction Fishing Game: Amount of Fishes Returned 2014 83 0.246 -0.006/0.468 
  Study 2 Experimental Induction Fishing Game: Amount of Fishes Returned 2014 85 0.199 -0.013/0.393 
Cavanaugh, Bettman & Luce (2015)      
  Study 3 Experimental Induction Distant-Others Helping 2015 176 -0.064 -0.209/0.085 
  Study 4 Experimental Induction Distant-Others/ Close-Others Helping  2015 206 0.054 -0.083/0.189 
Etxebarria, Ortiz, Apodaca, Pascual & Conejero (2015)      
  Study 1 Experimental Induction Induction/ Trait 
Moral Pride 
Time Spent on Helping Others 2015 94 0.444 0.173/0.652 
  Study 2 Dispositional Moral Pride Time Spent on Helping/ Self-reported Habitual Prosociality  2015 77 0.261 -0.035/0.515 
Helm, Renk, & Mishra (2015) Brand Pride Brand Citizenship Behaviours 2015 283 0.580 0.497/0.652 
Krettenauer & Casey (2015) Authentic and Hubristic Pride Self-reported Helping Behaviours 2015 216 0.165 0.033/0.292 
Random-Effects Model   4,509 0.212 0.114/0.307 
*denotes studies that were included in the current main analysis 
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Table 2.6. Studies on the Anger-Prosociality Relationship (k = 38, N = 7,857 ) 
Studies (k = 38) Anger Measures Prosociality Measures Years N r 95% LL/ ULCI 
Polman & Kim (2013)       
  Study 1 Induction Contribution in a Public Goods (PG) Dilemma Game 2013 145 -0.416 -0.542/-0.272 
  Study 3 Induction Contribution in a Public Goods (PG) Dilemma Game 2013 194 -0.315 -0.436/-0.182 
Roberts et al. (2014)       
  Study 1 Trait Anger Friendly Behaviours/ Willingness to Comply with others 2014 99 -0.529 -0.658/-0.371 
Seip et al. (2014)       
  Study 1 Induction Costly Non-Cooperator Punishment:  
Public Goods Games  
2014 81 0.377 0.173/0.550 
  Study 2 Induction Costly Non-Cooperator Punishent:  
Sequential Trust Game (STG) 
2014 88 0.492 0.307/0.641 
  Study 3 Induction Costly Non-Cooperator Punishent:  
Sequential Trust Game (STG) 
2014 38 0.234 -0.092/0.515 
Jordan et al. (2015)       
  Study 1 Induction Third-Party Punishment (TPP) 2015 323 0.341 0.240/0.434 
  Study 2 Induction Third-Party Punishment (TPP) 2015 96 0.531 0.370/0.661 
Gummerum et al. (2016)       
  Study 1 Incidental Anger Third-Party Punishment (TPP) 2016 137 0.265 0.102/0.414 
  Study 2 Incidental Anger Third-Party Compensation (TPC) 2016 137 -0.185 -0.342/-0.017 
  Study 3 Moral Outrage versus  
Personal Anger 
Third-Party Compensation (TPC) 2016 139 0.166 -0.001/0.323 
Landmann & Hess (2016)       
  Study 1 Moral Outrage Third-Party Punishment (TPP) and Compensation (TPC)  2016 136 0.227 0.061/0.381 
  Study 2 Moral Outrage Third-Party Punishment (TPP) and Compensation (TPC)  2016 85 0.216 0.003/0.410 
O'Reilly et al. (2016)       
  Study 1a Moral Outrage Third-Party Punishment (TPP) Intention 2016 164 0.560 0.445/0.657 
  Study 1b Moral Outrage Third-Party Punishment (TPP) Intention 2016 136 0.235 0.069/0.388 
  Study 2 Moral Outrage Third-Party Punishment (TPP) Intention 2016 409 0.391 0.306/0.470 
*Montada & Schneider (1989) Moral Outrage Intention to Execute Prosocial Activities 1989 823 0.400 0.341/0.456 
*Vitaglione & Barnett (2003)       
  Study 4 State and Dispositional 
Empathic Anger 
Intention to Help Victim/ Punish Transgressors 2003 191 0.405 0.279/0.517 
*Iyer, Schmader & Lickel (2007)       
  Study 1 Moral Outrage Intention to Compensate, Advocate Withdrawl etc. 2007 194 0.559 0.454/0.649 
  Study 2 Moral Outrage Intention to Compensate, Advocate Withdrawl etc. 2007 170 0.386 0.250/0.507 
*Wakslak et al. (2007)       
  Study 1 Moral Outrage Support for resource redistribution for 
 under-represneted groups 
2007 108 0.476 0.316/0.610 
  Study 2 Moral Outrage Willingness to help the disadvantaged 2007 120 0.386 0.223/0.529 
*Halperin (2008)       
  Study 3 Group-based Anger Support for education to alter perceptions of outgroup 2008 847 0.370 0.310/0.427 
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*Halperin, Ruaawll, Dweck, & Gross (2011)      
  Study 1 Inter-group Anger Induction Support for Negotiation with Palestinians 2011 262 -0.010 -0.130/0.111 
  Study 2 Inter-group Anger Induction Support for Negotiation with Palestinians 2011 262 0.030 -0.091/0.150 
*Lotz, Okimoto, Schlosser, & Fetchenhauer (2011)      
  Study 1 Moral Outrage Intention to Help Victim/ Punish Transgressors 2011 178 0.330 0.192/0.455 
*Tagar, Federico & Halperin (2011)       
  Study 1 Anger towards Palestinians Willingness to promote peaceful conflict resolution 2011 501 0.141 0.054/0.226 
  Study 2 Inter-group Anger Induction Support of non-violent policies/ conflict resolution 2011 60 0.363 0.085/0.589 
*Nelissen & Zeelenberg (2009)       
  Study 1 Anger towards Norm 
Violatiors 
Third-Party Punishment (TPP) 2009 91 0.178 -0.029/0.371 
  Study 2 Anger towards Unfair 
Allocators 
Third-Party Punishment (TPP) 2009 89 0.467 0.287/0.616 
**Soscia (2007)  Intent to Repurchase/ Positive Word-of-Mouth 2007 182 -0.280 -0.409/-0.141 
**Rubin (2012)       
  Study 1 Induction Money to offer in the next Ultimatum Game trial 2012 52 -0.190 -0.440/0.087 
  Study 2 Induction Contribution in a Give-some game 2012 96 -0.125 -0.317/0.078 
**de Hooge (2014)       
  Study 1 Induction Money to be spent on a gift/ Total Gift-giving 2014 271 -0.479 -0.566/-0.381 
  Study 4 Induction Money spent / Total Gift-giving/  
Tine spent on gift-search 
2014 138 -0.592 -0.691/-0.471 
  Study 5 Induction Money spent / Total Gift-giving/  
Tine spent on gift-search 
2014 243 -0.260 -0.374/-0.139 
  Study 6 Induction Money spent / Total Gift-giving/  
Tine spent on gift-search 
2014 242 -0.191 -0.309/-0.066 
Drouvelis & Grosskopf  (2016) Induction Public Goods Games Contribution/ 
 Costly Prosocial Punishment 
2016 330 -0.007 -0.170/0.156 
Random-Effects Model    7,857 0.136 0.027/0.242 
*denotes articles quoted in Vam Doorm et al.’s (2014) review as ‘direct evidence’ of the ‘anger-prosocial behaviour’ association.  
**denotes studies included in the current main analysis
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Table 2.6 above details the effect sizes for the anger-prosociality link based on 
38 studies that altogether included 7,857 participants and 128 effect sizes. The 
Egger’s test (intercept: -2.267, LLCI/ ULCI = -7.006/1.669, p = .220 (two-
tailed)) revealed no publication bias. Nonetheless, the Random-effect Trim-and-
Fill analysis filled in four studies with effect sizes smaller than the initial 
estimates, resulting in a non-significant post-adjusted effect estimate (r = 0.083, 
-0.0282/0.192, Q = 1028.11). However, as anger is related to two very distinct 
notions of prosociality (i.e. cooperation and norm enforcement) I included this 
as a moderator. This segregation was based upon whether punishment was 
involved (i.e., Second- and Third-party punishment) with studies examining 
‘Third-party Compensations’ (e.g. Study 2, Gummerum, Van Dillen, Van Dijk, 
& Lopez-Perez, 2016) coded as ‘no-punishment’. The difference between 
studies that involved a punishment (k = 18, r = 0.370, 0.312/0.425) and those 
that did not (k = 27, r = 0.022, -0.121/0.157) was significant, Q (1) = 22.525, p 
<.001. Taken together, anger appears linked primarily to norm-enforcing 
punishment rather than direct cooperation.  
 Table 2.7 below highlights the comparison of the effect sizes derived 
from the analyses in this paper and meta-analyses reported by others. Overall 
gratitude has one of the largest effect sizes, with Positive Affect the largest. To 
directly test if the gratitude-prosociality link is stronger than either the Positive 
Affect- prosociality or Negative Affect -prosociality links I identified 69 studies 
(with 195 effect sizes) within the database that contain estimates of the 
associations between other prosocial emotions (happiness, pride, anger, guilt, 
shame) and prosociality that I could compare directly to estimates of the 
gratitude-prosociality association. The results are displayed in Table 2.8. I 
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combined all other prosocial emotions to differentiate Positive Affect (e.g. 
happiness, pride, elevation, interpersonal liking etc.) and Negative Affect (e.g. 
anger, guilt, sadness, shame combined). Gratitude had a significantly stronger 
association with prosociality than either Positive Affect, Q (1) = 3.928, p 
= .0475 (two-tailed) or Negative Affect, Q (1) = 49.77, p <.001 (two-tailed). 
Table 2.7 Comparison of Effect Sizes for Other Prosocial Emotions  
Emotions Authors r Notes 
Gratitude This study 0.374  
Pride This study 0.212  
Anger This study 0.022 - Studies that examined Direct Cooperation (k = 27) 
Anger This study 0.370 - Studies that examined Norm Enforcement (k = 18) 
Anger  This study 0.136 -Overall Strength of anger-prosociality (k = 38) 
Previous Meta-Analyses 
Negative 
Affect 
Carlson & 
Miller (1987) 
0.268 Negative Mood (referred to as ‘bad mood’) with ‘Helpfulness 
measured within one hour of the mood-lowering event’  
Negative 
Affect 
Dalal (2005) -0.100 Negative Affect and Organizational Citizenship Behaviours 
(OCBs) (defined as ‘the intentional employee behaviour that 
is discretionary and not rewarded but that nonetheless 
improves functioning of the organisation (pp.1241)’).  
The r reported was the corrected coefficient 
Positive 
Affect 
Carlson et al. 
(1988) 
0.540 Positive Mood (referred to as ‘good mood (pp.213)’) with the 
‘measurement of Helpfulness that took place within 30 
minutes of the positive mood induction (pp.216)’) 
Positive 
Affect 
Dalal (2005) 0.340 Positive Affect and OCBs.  
The r is the corrected coefficient. 
Happiness Lyubormirsky  
et al.(2005) 
0.220 Happiness (defined as ‘frequent experience of positive 
emotions (pp.820)’) and Prosocial Behaviour (represented by 
‘volunteering’, ‘helping experimenter’, ‘donating blood’ and 
so on) across Experimental , Cross-sectional and 
Longitudinal studies. The r is the calculated weighted overall 
effect based on their reported results.  
Sadness Carlson & 
Miller (1987) 
0.082 Zero-order correlation between studies coded ‘Sadness or 
Temporary Depression’ (defined as ‘the extent to which 
subjects feel specifically downcast, sad, or depressed as a 
result of the negative mood induction’) with the main effect 
estimates. 
Shame Leach & 
Cidam (2015) 
0.180 Shame (defined as emotional ‘experience of a failure to be 
moral, competent or socially appropriate’) and Prosocial 
Motivation or Behaviour (defined as ‘any motivation or 
behaviour intended to benefit another individual or group’). 
The r estimate is derived from the Hedge’s g of 0.372. 
Shame Leach & 
Cidam (2015) 
-0.060 Shame and Cooperation or Affiliation (defined as 
participants’ i) cooperation, ii) negotiation, iii) preferences to 
spend time, or iv) completion of an interdependent task with 
another party). The r estimate is derived from a Hedge’s g of 
-0.118.  
Guilt Carlson & 
Miller (1987) 
0.500 Zero-order correlation between studies coded ‘Guilt’ (defined 
as’ bad feelings due to perceptions of having caused harm to 
someone else or otherwise having done something which 
they shouldn’t have lost (pp.96)’) with the main effect 
estimates. 
Guilt Boster et al. 
(2016) 
0.260 Experimentally varied Guilt and Compliance (defined as 
behavioural compliance or helping behaviour which take the 
form of either an ‘overt action’ or a ‘pledge to act (pp.56)’ ) 
Anger Carlson & 
Miller (1987) 
-0.187 Zero-order correlation between studies coded ‘Anger’ 
(defined as ‘subjects’ experience of anger as a result of the 
induction (pp.96)’) with the main effect estimates 
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Table 2.8.Comparison of Gratitude-Prosociality Association to the Positive-Affect and Negative-Affect Prosociality Associations   
 Effect Estimates  Effect Estimates Differences in Correlation Strengths 
 r LLCI/ ULCI Tau2  r LLCI/ ULCI Tau2 k/ N Q-value 
(df) 
p-value  
(2-tailed) 
Positive Affect-
Prosociality 
0.299 0.222/0.371 0.0417 Gratitude-
Prosociality 
0.417 0.3254/0.501 0.0750 28/ 
6,479 
3.927 (1) 0.0475* 
Negative Affect-
Prosociality 
0.083 0.026/0.140 0.0286 Gratitude-
Prosociality 
0.377 0.320/0.432 0.0384 41/ 
9,026 
49.767 (1) <.0001*** 
* p <. 05 (two-tailed); *** p <.001 (two-tailed); k: Number of studies included in the present comparisons; N: Number of Participants; r: Pearson’s Correlation rs. Positive 
Affect (PA):  ‘Positive Affect/ General Positivity/ Happiness (k = 9)’ (e.g. Bartlett and Desteno, 2006; Soscia, 2007); ‘Amazement (k= 1)’and ‘Love (k= 1)’ (i.e. Exline, et 
al., 2012); ‘Trust (k= 3)’ (e.g. Kim and Lee, 2013); ‘Status Elevation’ (i.e. Wetzel et al., 2014); ‘Empathy (k= 4)’ (e.g. Simon, 2013); ‘Humility (k= 3)’ (e.g. Exline and Hill, 
2012); ‘Satisfaction (k= 7)’ (e.g. Naito and Sakata, 2010; Zhao, 2010); ‘Interpersonal Liking (k= 4)’ (e.g. Study 1 and 2, Goei et al., 2007); ‘Pride (k= 2)’ (e.g. Michie, 2009); 
Negative Affect (NA): ‘Anger/Annoyance’ (e.g. Ma et al., 2014; Xie and Bagozzi, 2014); ‘Guilt (k= 1)’ (e.g. Palmatier et al., 2009); ‘Disappointment (k= 1)’ (i.e. Rubin, 
2012); ‘Entitlement (k= 6)’ (e.g. Study 1 and 2, Xia and Kukar-Kinney, 2013); ‘Indebtedness/Obligation (k= 27)’ (e.g. Tsang, 2006, 2007; Study 1 and 2, Watkins et al., 
2006), ‘Mistrustful (k=1)’ and ‘Weak/Ashamed (k=1)’ (i.e. Exline et al. (2012); ‘Sadness/ Negative Affect/ General Negativity (k= 4)’ (e.g. Soscia, 2007; Tian et al., 2016); 
‘Uneasy (k= 1)’ (i.e. Rubin, 2012)
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2.3.5. Meta-Regression 
 A meta-regression was run using the three main significant differential 
predictors from Table 2.3 (i.e. reciprocity versus non-reciprocity, benefit-
triggered versus generalized gratitude, and state versus trait gratitude). The 
results shown in Table 2.9 indicate that only the state-trait distinction remained 
significant. When all predictors from Table 2.3 were included in the meta-
regression again only the state-trait distinction remained significant.  
Table 2.9.Results of the Meta-Regression  
 B (SE) 95% (L, U) 
Intercept 0.230 (0.071)** 0.091, 0.367 
Benefit-triggered (1) vs. Generalized (0) 0.074 (0.102) -0.125, 0.274 
Reciprocity (1) vs. no reciprocity (0) -0.028 (0.103) -0.213, 0.174 
State (1) vs. Trait (0) 0.157 (0.073)* 0.014, 0.230 
R2 0.05  
Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01. 
2.3.6. Sensitivity Analysis 
I explored the effect of whether the index of association was derived 
from a univariate, zero-order association (r = 0.388, LLCI/ULCI = 0.340/ 
0.435, k = 74), or ones that were derived from higher order partials (r = 0.303, 
LLCI/ULCI = 0.200/0.399, k = 18). While both effects were significant, they 
did not significantly differ from each other, Q (1) = 2.41, p =.121 (Table 2.3). 
2.4. Discussion 
2.4.1. Summary of Evidence 
Despite three decades of research on the link between gratitude and 
prosociality, there has been an absence of a quantitative synthesis of this link 
and a systematic exploration of moderators. In this meta-analytic review a 
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positive moderate association was shown between gratitude and prosociality (r 
= 0.374). The results further indicated that the gratitude-prosociality link was 
significantly stronger for (1) prosociality that involved a direct reciprocal rather 
than an indirect reciprocal exchange, (2), downstream versus upstream indirect 
reciprocity, (3) state/mood rather than dispositional gratitude was assessed, and 
(4) benefit-triggered gratitude in response to others’ kindness rather than 
generalized gratitude about valued and cherished aspects of one’s life. In the 
following I discuss the theoretical significance of the current findings and how 
some of these attributes could be incorporated into existing gratitude 
intervention (or training) regimens. 
Before exploring these findings in more detail it is necessary to 
acknowledge the limitations of the present analyses. This should give the reader 
a cleaner framework to interpret the findings. I applied the Mixed-effects model 
in both the categorical moderator analyses and the meta-regression for the 
continuous moderators. As discussed previously the mixed-effects model is 
notorious for its over-conservativeness (Balliet & Van Lange, 2013; Lipsy & 
Wilson, 2001). Nevertheless, it is appropriate to adopt a Mixed-effects model 
because it assumes the existence of systematic variations in the effect sizes (i.e. 
moderators) alongside the random population variance (Voss, Kramer, Basak, 
Prakash, & Roberts, 2010), despite the potential for Type-II errors.  
It should be noted that the studies reviewed were a mixture of 
experimental manipulations of gratitude or cross-sectional assessments. Thus, 
while it may not feasible to make any clear definitive statement regarding 
causality, I believe that the experimental work—that exogenously manipulates 
gratitude—provides some evidence that gratitude has a causal role with respect 
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to influencing prosocial behaviour. For causal statements where randomization 
has not been used causality can be inferred using propensity score matching 
(See Jackson, Thoemmes, Jonkmann, Ludtke, & Trautwein, 2012) or finding an 
instrumental variable (Shepherd, O’Carroll, & Ferguson, 2014), as long as the 
sample sizes are sufficiently large.  
Similar to what has been addressed in Balliet, Li, Macfarlan, and Van 
Vugt (2011), another potential limitation of the current analysis could be 
attributable to the sampling of the studies and the search strategies. Although 
there were 16 countries represented in the sample (k = 91), the majority of the 
studies were from North America or Western Europe (k = 68). This could be 
due to the fact that I had confined the search to papers written in English only. 
In other words, although I analysed the effect of nationalities (or continent) and 
failed to observe any significant impact on the effect estimates, the current 
analysis may not generalise beyond Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich and 
Democratic (WEIRD) societies (Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010). With 
these limitations in mind, I now address the main theoretical (See Sub-section 
2.4.2) and practical (See Sub-section 2.4.3) implications of the findings. 
2.4.2. Theoretical Implications 
The overall effect estimates arising from the present meta-analysis 
identified a positive medium-sized effect between gratitude and prosociality 
(Cohen, 1988). This confirms the general expectation in the literature that 
gratitude has the capacity to engender prosocial exchanges (McCullough et al., 
2001; McCullough et al., 2008; McCullough & Tsang, 2004).  
This effect emerges as significant regardless of (1) whether it was a lab 
based manipulation or survey/field study based, (2) whether it was based on an 
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objective or subjective estimate of prosociality, (3) whether it was targeted at 
individuals or groups, (4) the continent in which the research occurred, and (5) 
whether gratitude was assessed via a proxy or an actual gratitude measure, thus 
the gratitude-prosociality association is robust to a number of methodological 
moderators. This implies, for example, that subjective measures could be used, 
at least in early stages of research, to gauge effect sizes and test protocols.  
Importantly, however, this association was significantly moderated by a 
number of key theoretical constructs. There were stronger associations between 
gratitude and prosociality in studies that examined reciprocity-based prosocial 
exchanges, compared to prosociality that did not involve reciprocity. This is 
consistent with the moral motivator function of gratitude (McCullough et al., 
2002; McCullough et al., 2001) where gratitude may typify a reciprocal instead 
of a benevolent emotion (Yagil, 2015) such as sympathy (Wispé, 1986) or 
empathy (Scott, Colquitt, Paddock, & Judge, 2010). This is also consistent with 
the theory that gratitude underlies reciprocity (direct, indirect upstream and 
indirect downstream) (Nowak & Roch, 2007). In addition, I observed a 
significantly stronger association between gratitude and reciprocity for direct 
versus indirect reciprocal exchanges. That is, while the present data reiterates 
that gratitude-inspired reciprocity could take on either a direct or an indirect 
(both upstream and downstream) form of reciprocity (Nowak & Roch, 2007; 
Schaumberg & Flynn, 2009), gratitude may be more concerned with direct 
reciprocal altruism (McCullough et al., 2008; Trivers, 1971). This may reflect 
the clearer and stronger social exchange that takes place in direct reciprocation 
where gratitude may also trigger a sense of obligation and indebtedness (Wood 
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et al., 2016), both of which encourage a greater tendency to repay the initial 
favour (see Schaumberg & Flynn, 2009 for a review).  
I also find that the association is stronger for downstream compared to 
upstream indirect reciprocity. This is of particular theoretical significance as 
some authors (e.g., Nowak & Roch, 2007) have tied gratitude specifically to 
upstream indirect reciprocity. The small ks, however, in this specific 
comparison warrant caution in interpreting this finding. However, it should be 
noted that in all form of reciprocal exchanges the association is significant. 
The gratitude-prosociality link was stronger when gratitude was 
triggered in response to others’ kindness (i.e. benefit-triggered) rather than as a 
generalized sense of gratitude (Lambert et al., 2009). I argue that this not only 
reflects a sense of reciprocity but also helps to build strong social ties. That is, 
returning favours to those we are close to emotionally or physically tends to 
strengthen the existing social bonds and create new ones which promote the 
survival of altruism (Preston, 2013). These bonds hold people together under 
times of need and hence epitomise how gratitude might facilitate well-being 
(Emmons & Mishra, 2011). This suggests, with respect to reciprocal 
exchanges, that gratitude may have a particularly important role to play with 
respect to the evolution and maintenance of prosocial behaviour.  
However, with respect to the role of gratitude, it is important to 
distinguish exchanges that focus on family (kin) from those that focus on non-
kin (McCullough et al., 2008; Nowak, 2006). It has been argued that for 
exchanges that involve family and relatives, where kin selection models apply, 
gratitude is less important than for exchanges that involve strangers 
(McCullough et al., 2008). Kin selection models link prosocial exchange to the 
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degree of genetic relatedness between individuals. With people showing 
differential preferable helping towards those to whom they are genetically 
closer than those who are not (see Nowak, 2006 for review). It is argued that in 
such kin-based exchanges the prosociality is primarily about maintaining your 
shared genes in the population. As such, gratitude is not needed to motivate 
prosociality in such context. The current data does not allow for this to be 
tested but it is an interesting and important hypothesis concerning the limits of 
the gratitude-prosociality association. 
The present results suggested that both dispositional and state forms of 
gratitude motivate prosociality, although dispositional gratitude is a weaker 
motivator than state gratitude. The importance of both dispositional and state 
gratitude in facilitating prosociality has been extensively discussed in various 
models in the Social Psychology literature (e.g. Kubacka, Finkenauer, Rusbult, 
& Keijsers, 2011; McCullough et al., 2001; Wood et al., 2008). The current 
study does not allow me to test if indeed state gratitude mediates the 
dispositional gratitude-prosociality link. However, the finding which indicates 
that dispositional gratitude has a weaker link to prosociality than state gratitude 
does bare the signature of models whereby emotions mediate dispositional 
effects (Fredrickson et al., 2003). This is indeed the main mechanism of the 
Social Cognitive Model of Gratitude (SCMG) (Wood et al., 2008).  
While the meta-regression indicated that the distinction between state 
and disposition is the one of primary importance, this does not mean that the 
reciprocity and benefit-triggered associations are irrelevant. Rather, I envisaged 
a state manifestation of gratitude that forms a complex around reciprocity and 
benefit-triggered/generalized gratitude to motivate prosocial exchanges.  
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Additionally, it is worth noting that anger has a unique role with respect 
to punishing non-cooperators to enhance cooperation, rather than fostering 
cooperation directly. This is an important observation as this association 
between anger and altruistic punishment has long been hypothesised, but this is 
first real systematic demonstration that there is a robust effect. 
Finally, dispositional gratitude was significantly and positively 
associated with other prosocial dispositions (e.g., agreeableness), that are also 
known to be associated with prosocial behaviour (see Zhao & Smillie, 2015). 
Whether or not this link to other prosocial dispositions accounts for the current 
link between disposition gratitude and prosociality remains to be investigated, 
but these results clearly suggest that this is a possibility.  
2.4.3. Practical Significance: Implications on Gratitude Intervention 
Compared to the other prosocial emotions examined in this review, 
gratitude had the largest effect size and was a significantly stronger predictor of 
prosociality than either Positive Affect or Negative Affect. This suggests that 
gratitude constitutes a decent target for interventions to enhance prosociality. 
Thus, the main practical application of the findings from this review entails 
implications for extending and developing intervention around gratitude that 
may enhance prosocial behaviour and subjective well-being (see Davis et al., 
2016; Renshaw & Olinger-Steeeves, 2016; Wood et al., 2010).  
The classic gratitude intervention was originated in studies by Emmons 
and McCullough (2003) and Froh, Sefick and Emmons (2008) who instructed 
participants to recall up to five gratitude-inducing events that took place in their 
recent past. Although this gratitude induction may have focused on transitory 
feelings of gratitude, it may not have captured some other factors that influence 
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the link between gratitude and prosociality. Indeed, the moderator analysis 
indicated that the gratitude-prosociality link was stronger when gratitude was 
examined as a state/mood; and when gratitude was triggered by an 
‘interpersonal transfer of a benefit (pp. 1194)’ (Lambert et al., 2009). Moreover, 
both direct reciprocal exchange and downstream indirect reciprocity had the 
largest effect sizes. Thus exchanges that emphasise mutual benefit or attracting 
help from others—thanks to previous good deeds—appear to be crucial. Thus, I 
propose that future gratitude interventions designed to promote prosociality 
should include the element of benefit-triggered gratitude and reciprocity. 
For instance, resembling Watkins and colleagues’ (2003) ‘Grateful 
Essay’ training, practitioners could instruct the trainees to write about a 
particular person, for example a close friend, for whom they feel grateful and 
how they either actually helped, or intended to help, that particular individual 
back (direct reciprocity). Participants could also be instructed to consider how 
their good deeds may influence others to help them when they need help 
(downstream indirect reciprocity) or how feelings of gratitude may influence 
them to help others (upstream indirect reciprocity).  
I acknowledge that some people may spontaneously generate situations 
of this type in a free response list, but not all will. At a group level this may 
serve to weaken the effectiveness of any interventions. Even though the 
changes as suggested at present are small, it is well-known that small changes 
in frames can significantly alter behavioural and emotional responses (Dolan & 
Kahneman, 2008). So while the suggested change at present may be small, it 
still constitutes an empirical question of whether this small change could result 
in a large impact on the enhancement of effectiveness of gratitude interventions.
Chapter 3   94 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 3 
 
Gratefully received, gratefully repaid: the role of perceived fairness in 
cooperative interactions 
 
 
(Experiment 1) 
 
 
A version of the present chapter is published as: 
Ma, L.K., Tunney, R.J., & Ferguson, E. (2014). Gratefully Received, Gratefully 
Repaid: The Role of Perceived Fairness in Cooperative Interactions. PLoS 
ONE, 9(12), e114976. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0114976.  
(Media Coverage:  
Schmouker, O. (2015, March 30). Comment Rendre La Gentillesse Contagieuse  
Au Bureau? Les Affaires. Retrieved from: 
http://www.lesaffaires.com/blogues/olivier-schmouker/comment-rendre-la-
gentillesse-contagieuse-au-bureau/577440 )  
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3.0. Overview of Chapter 3 
Chapter 2—which presents the meta-analysis—illustrated that the 
gratitude-prosociality relation is more prominent among studies which 
examined direct reciprocal outcomes. The meta-analysis also revealed that 
studies which examined gratitude as a state generally reported a larger 
gratitude-prosociality correlation. Building upon these findings, I intend to 
examine gratitude, as a state symbolising appreciation (McCullough et al., 
2002), in the context of a direct reciprocal economic exchange. Additionally, 
this chapter would underline the role of normative fairness perception (Elster, 
2006) in the gratitude-reciprocity link. That is, how the expectations of what an 
average fair person should do (Bicchieri & Chavez, 2010)—in an economic 
exchange—would affect how gratitude relates to one’s decision to reciprocate. 
It is well documented that people are inclined to reward fair behaviours 
by being cooperative, i.e. positive reciprocity (Fehr & Falk, 1999) while 
penalising unfair behaviours via sanctioning, i.e. negative reciprocity (Fehr & 
Falk, 1999). Fair intentions are expected to elicit positive emotions (Greenberg 
& Westcott, 1983), like gratitude (Komter, 2004; Nadler, 2012), triggering 
cooperative behaviours or behavioural tendencies (Fredrickson, 2004a; 
McCullough et al., 2001; Tsang, 2007); while intended unfairness is conducive 
to negative affect, like anger or indebtedness (Hatfield & Sprecher, 1983), 
fostering sanctioning decisions (Ma et al., 2012; Yamagishi et al., 2009). 
Nevertheless, Bicchieri (2006) theorised that when people infer the 
intention of others they do it on the basis of a ‘background of expectations 
(pp.112)’. These expectations, amongst other things, constitute the injunctive 
norm about what an average person ought to do in a given context (Burger et 
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al., 2010; Cialdini et al., 1990; Kallgren, Reno, & Cialdini, 2000). Thus, the 
injunctive norm could be instrumental when one evaluates whether he/she was 
fairly treated, with this attribution already well-documented to shape gratitude 
and reciprocity (Kim & Lee, 2013; Komter, 2004; McCullough et al., 2001).  
As such, in Experiment 1 I created an economic game setting in which 
people were bound to make reference to the injunctive norm to determine 
whether or not they were fairly treated. In so doing I examined how this 
normative fairness attribution would foster a favourable (or negative) 
interpretation of the helper’s intent, and consequently contributed to a greater 
feeling of gratitude (indebtedness) by the recipient. That is, the current 
experiment scrutinised how this chain of attributions would influence the 
recipients’ desire to reciprocate as well their actual reciprocal behaviours, 
especially when not cooperating yields no repercussions. Importantly, this 
experimental design enables me to examine whether people would really rely 
on normative fairness to guide their decision making; and if yes, how such a 
fairness perception will contribute to the gratitude-reciprocity association.   
A hundred and twenty-two students were recruited to play a one-shot, 
variant of trust game in which half played as potential helpers (i.e. P1s 
hereafter, N = 61) and half as recipients (i.e. P2s hereafter, N = 61). Whether a 
participant was a P1 or P2 was chance-determined and all participants knew 
that. P1s had to decide whether to help P2s and whether to make their offer 
unconditional (no repayment needed) or conditional (full or ‘taxed’ repayment). 
P2s decided whether to accept a) the offer and b) whatever conditions attached 
but were blind to the list of helping options available to the P1s.  
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I examined if a normatively unfair offer, i.e. to impose a charge for 
helping knowing that one did not legitimately ‘earn’ thus entitle him/herself to 
that position as the helper (Hoffman & Spitzer, 1985), would prompt a less 
favourable helper intent attribution, thus lead to lower gratitude (or higher 
indebtedness) and ultimately a lower desire to reciprocate. Furthermore, these 
recipients were provided an avenue to sanction the helpers by under-repaying. 
P2s in this game were free to decide whether to really pay up after supposedly 
‘agreeing’ to the contract. I further examined whether gratitude and 
indebtedness will be related to this sanctioning decision.  
All in all, via Experiment 1 I empirically addressed the importance of 
fairness and intent attribution on the gratitude-reciprocity association. In so 
doing I endeavour to build on the meta-analysis (i.e. Chapter 2)—i.e. gratitude 
overall correlates stronger with prosociality that involves direct reciprocity (e.g. 
Graham, 1988; Goei & Boster, 2005; Goei et al., 2007)—by outlining what 
other mediating factor(s) (i.e. injunctive fairness) could contribute to the 
strength of this particular link. In addition, the present experiment also 
investigated whether the above chain of attributions will constitute a similar 
effect on a recipient’s indebtedness, and subsequently affected the participants’ 
reported tendency so as their actual reciprocal (or sanctioning) behaviours. 
3.1. Introduction 
Chapter 2 illustrated the consistent relationship between gratitude and 
reciprocity, in particular direct reciprocity, across studies. Indeed, the 
reciprocity principle stipulates that ‘we should attempt to repay, in kind, what 
another person has provided us (pp.20) (Cialdini, 2001). Fehr and colleagues 
(e.g.Fehr, Gächter, & Kirchsteiger, 1997; Fehr & Gächter, 1998, 2000) further 
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make a distinction between the tendency to remunerate (or show cooperation) 
fair behaviours (positive reciprocity), and the tendency to sanction (or be hostile 
towards) acts we perceive as unkind or unfair (negative reciprocity). 
Additionally, while positive reciprocity is mediated by the perceived 
trustfulness of a giver (Fehr & List, 2004; Fehr & Rockenbach, 2003), negative 
affect—such as anger toward the transgressors (Drouvelis & Grosskopf, 2016; 
Seip et al., 2014; Xiao & Houser, 2005)—mediates negative reciprocal acts.  
3.1.1. Intention, Gratitude and Indebtedness 
The above implies that when a person decides whether to sanction or 
reward an interactional partner the attribution of the partners’ intentions is 
crucial (Charness & Levine, 2007; Falk, Fehr, & Fischbacher, 2008). In fact, 
Falk and Fischbacher (2006) theorised that reciprocation (or retaliation) is 
dependent upon the recipient’s evaluation of the helper’s intention. Hence, 
reciprocity should be more than a knee-jerk reaction to a benefit received, as the 
recipient also ponders why he/she was offered what they were.  
Greenberg and Westcott (1983) argued that a prosocial gesture which 
communicates good intention should elicit positive affect such as gratitude in 
the recipient directed toward the helpers (Tsang, 2006b), and these positive 
emotions can motivate reciprocation (Bartlett & Desteno, 2006; Schaumberg & 
Flynn, 2009; Tsang, 2007). Indeed, Nowak and Roch (2007) had particularly 
highlighted the importance of gratitude in both triggering and sustaining the 
direct and indirect reciprocation mechanisms. Fredrickson (2004a) similarly 
theorised that gratitude drives people to ‘behave prosocially oneself, either 
towards the benefactor, toward others, or both (pp.150).’ This definitely echoes 
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the moderate, positive correlation (r = 0.454, p <.001) between gratitude and 
direct reciprocal measures as reported in Chapter 2 across over ninety studies. 
The corollary of the above is that unfair acts that are perceived to reflect 
malicious intentions should elicit negative emotions such as indebtedness 
(Greenberg & Shapiro, 1971). Indebtedness represents an aversive state of 
tension (Greenberg & Frisch, 1972) that is associated with negative action 
tendencies such as inhibition and avoidance (Watkins et al., 2006). Meanwhile, 
the effect of indebtedness on reciprocity remains inconclusive. While it is well 
documented that an indebted person would reciprocate to rid oneself of the 
unpleasant feeling (Gergen et al., 1975; Schaumberg & Flynn, 2009), 
Greenberg and Westcott (1983) contended that apart from reciprocation 
cognitive restructuring also constitutes a ‘major mode of indebtedness 
reduction (pp.95)’. These restructuring efforts entail a reassessment of the 
benefit received which often leads to the recipients discrediting the benefactors 
and ultimately, feeling less obliged to give back (Greenberg & Westcott, 1983).  
3.1.2. Injunctive norm, Objectives of Experiment 1 and the Hypotheses 
The above summarised the literature on how intent attribution is crucial 
to people’s emotions and subsequent reward or sanctioning decisions. 
Meanwhile, it is argued that when people attend to others’ intentions they do so 
not out thin air, as Bicchieri (2006) stated that ‘an intention is only good or bad 
against a background of expectations (pp.112)’. These expectations by 
definition constitute, amongst other things, the ‘injunctive norm’ which 
delineates how an average person should behave in a given situation (Kallgren 
et al., 2000; Perkins, 2002; Raihani & McAuliffe, 2014). That is, Bicchieri 
(2006) suggested that when evaluating someone else’s intent, e.g. being fair or 
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otherwise, people will base their judgment on whether that ‘someone’ had acted 
in accord with what the society expects from an average fair person. Indeed, the 
idea that injunctive norms underpin fairness judgment has been endorsed by 
models in the social psychology and social cooperation literature (See Fahr & 
Irlenbusch, 2000; Irwin & Simpson, 2013). Nevertheless, to date it still remains 
unaddressed how such a norm-based fairness judgment will incite people’s 
emotions of gratitude, or indebtedness, and how that may ultimately contribute 
to an individual’s decisions to reciprocate or sanction in an economic exchange.  
In Experiment 1 I examined this idea using a one-shot, variant of the 
trust game (i.e. TG) (Berg, Dickhaut, & McCabe, 1995; Camerer, 2003). 
Particularly, in this game 1) all players were anonymous to each other and the 
experimenter (thereby eliminating any motive to build reputations); 2) players 
interacted in pairs with one being a potential helper (i.e. P1) and the other 
playing a potential recipient (i.e. P2); 3) who ended up as either P1 or P2 in 
every pair, was by pure chance thus removing any ability attributions; and 
finally, P2s were completely unaware of the options P1s had available to them.  
Such unawareness is essential as Charness and Levine (2007) argued 
that when making an economic decision an agent (i.e. a recipient) would infer a 
principal’s (i.e. a helper) intention also on the basis of the latter’s range of 
possible behavioural options—that is, the option that was picked and those 
could have been picked. Therefore, by keeping P2s naïve to the options 
available to the helpers, coupled with the double-anonymous (Hoffman et al., 
1994) setting, P2s could only rely on their beliefs about what people should do 
in this context (i.e. injunctive norm) as the basis for evaluating how fair (or 
unfair) their P1 partners were with respect to the any help offer they made.  
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P1s, meanwhile, could offer ‘unconditional’ help (i.e. asking for no 
repayment and P2s could not repay) or ‘conditional’ help (full repayment or 
repayment with an interest charge). I examined whether this difference in the 
types of helping offered—unconditional versus conditional—would suffice to 
induce different attributions of fairness in recipients towards the helper.  
The null hypothesis, by contrast, would state that in the absence of 
information about the options open to the helpers, all help—conditional or 
otherwise—should be perceived as equally fair. Alternatively, it is plausible to 
hypothesise that individuals resort to injunctive norms of fairness (i.e. how 
people ought to behave). That is, when somebody’s good fortune is acquired by 
chance (or assignment), rather than that owner having to earn the ‘Property 
Rights’ (Fahr & Irlenbusch, 2000; Frey & Bohnet, 1995; Oxoby & Spraggon, 
2008) or the ‘Entitlement’ (Elster, 2006; Hoffman & Spitzer, 1985; Hoffman et 
al., 1994) to that good fortune, then in general a ‘fair’ individual should share 
that extra resources with other people equally (Frey & Bohnet, 1995).  
In this case, a typical fair, fortunate P1 should help his/her P2 partner 
and help unconditionally—i.e. ‘for free’. This hypothesis has garnered support 
in the social psychology, social cooperation and behavioural economics 
literature (See Bicchieri, 1999; Hoffman et al., 1996; Ruffle, 1998). As such, I 
predicted a difference in attributions of helpers’ intentions, even in the absence 
of any knowledge about the choices facing the helper, purely based on whether 
or not that offer is unconditional. That is, P2s will rely on the normative belief 
that fair people will help for free when it is easy to administer and when the 
helpers’ potency to help was ‘assigned’ (via chance) instead of ‘earned’.  
In summary,  
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Hypothesis 1: Conditionality of offers—which denotes difference in normative 
fairness of the arrangement—should induce different emotional response from 
the P2s, e.g. the perception of genuine helpfulness, gratitude and so on;  
In addition to hypothesising that an unconditional offer would incite a 
more favourable appraisal of the helper’s intentions, I expected that this should 
then engender a greater (lower) level of gratitude (indebtedness) (Tsang, 2006a; 
Watkins, et al., 2006). I further argued that this gratitude would ultimately 
translate to an elevated desire for recipients to reciprocate in the future (Tsang, 
2006b; Schopler, 1970). A conditional offer, on the contrary, should not only 
elicit a more cynical appraisal of P1s’ intent but also a lower desire to 
reciprocate (Tsang, 2006a), with this related to sanctioning (e.g. not fulfilling 
the repayment obligation) should opportunity beckons (Fehr & Falk, 2002).  
In a nutshell, I tested a serial multiple mediational model (Hayes, 2013) which 
examines if the effect of offer conditionality on reciprocity tendency is 
mediated serially by two psychological processes: 1) initial attributions that the 
helper genuinely intends to be helpful and 2) feelings of gratitude. Figure 3.1 
graphically depicts this hypothesised serial mediational model (i.e. H2). 
 
Figure 3.1. Graphical Presentation of H2—the mediational model.   
On the other hand, as discussed above indebtedness could in theory 
either strengthen or weaken one’s tendency to reciprocate (Greenberg, 1980; 
Hatfield & Sprecher, 1983). Particularly, Greenberg and Westcott (1983) 
Chapter 3   103 
 
 
 
theorised that a recipient would prefer cognitive restructuring over 
reciprocation upon i) a perceived absence of opportunity to reciprocate 
(Schaumberg & Flynn, 2009); ii) a lack of witness to the initial helping episode; 
and iii) recipients anticipating no future exchanges with the benefactors. All 
these conditions were compatible with Experiment 1’s parameters. 
As such, it is conceivable that the present indebted recipients may 
favour cognitive restructuring—which should lead to a decreased desire to 
reciprocate and a higher propensity to actually under-repay— in reducing their 
feeling of indebtedness. As a result, in addition to feeling more indebted upon 
the receipt of the unfair ‘conditional’ offers, I predicted a lower likelihood 
among these indebted recipients to want to and actually reciprocate. 
H3: P2s who received conditional offers, compared to unconditional offers 
recipients, should report higher indebtedness, with this indebtedness being 
negatively related to the intended and actual repayment by these recipients. 
3.2. Methods 
3.2.1. Participants 
One hundred and twenty-two students from the University of 
Nottingham participated (72 were females, mean age: 21.8 years, SD = 3.7 
years). Each participant received an inconvenience allowance of £2 and could 
earn up to £3.50 more.  
3.2.2. Game and its Rationale 
The experiment was administered using Z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). To 
begin with each participant was given a fair die to roll and was seated in a 
separate cubicle. Each session took place with groups of 4 to 10, with players in 
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each session randomly assigned to play in dyads, with one participant being the 
potential helper (P1) and the other playing a potential recipient (P2).  
Each player was initially endowed with 150 money-equivalent ‘Bonus 
Points’ and was informed that he/she needed at least 50 points more to reach the 
‘Bonus Threshold’ (i.e. 200) to claim the bonus money. The initial endowments 
were allocated this way to create a situation in which all players were, to begin 
with, equal in the sense that they were all entitled to zero additional bonuses as 
their initial bonus points stood at 150. It was made explicit to participants that 
each bonus point would be worth one penny but only when he/she made the 200 
point threshold would he/she be entitled to any bonus.  
The only way to reach that threshold was by rolling a fair, six-sided die 
once. The possible payoffs were a loss of -50 points, 0 points, and gains of 50, 
100, 150, and 200 points depending on the number on the dice. It was, 
nevertheless, emphasised that a larger number on the dice did NOT guarantee a 
more favourable bonus points. The purpose of this die-rolling arrangement was 
to convince the participants that what differentiated ‘winners’ (i.e. hitting the 
threshold) from the ‘losers’ (i.e. missing the threshold) was simply better 
fortune but not ability. Every player then learned that he/she had an in-game 
‘partner’ who was unidentifiable and anonymous, and there was no need to 
collaborate with or compete against that partner throughout the experiment.  
Unbeknownst to the participants, all their final bonus scores were pre-
determined. Regardless of the actual die-roll, P1s always received a ‘Die-
rolling’ score 200 (thus they ended up with 350 points: their initial 150 + 200) 
that exceeded the 200 point threshold, while P2s would fall short of the 
threshold. Half the P2s (N = 30) ended up with a final total of 100 bonus point 
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(that is their initial 150 minus 50 points from the dice roll) and the other P2s (N 
= 31) ended up with 150 points (that is their initial 150 plus zero from the dice 
roll). This difference between the P2s was aimed to manipulate the potential 
helping costs for the P1s. P2s with 100 points were in the ‘High-Cost’ helping 
condition, and would require twice the magnitude of their partners’ (or potential 
helpers’) minimum ‘donations’ (i.e. 100) compared to the ‘Low-Cost’ 
recipients with 150 points (i.e. 50), to reach the 200 point threshold. Each 
participant then learned about his/her payoff and that of his/her ‘partner’. 
 At this point both P1s’ and P2s’ gave attributions regarding their 
partners’ Die-rolling scores. Specifically they indicated the extent to which they 
considered their partners’ scores were due to (1) Luck (‘To what extent you 
think that your partner’s High (Low) score is attributable to his/her good (bad) 
luck), and (2) Ability (‘To what extent you think that your partner’s High (Low) 
score is because of his/her capability (incompetence)’). Both items were 
measured using 7-point Likert-type scales (1 = ‘Not At All’ and 7 = 
‘Completely’). In so doing I examined if the participants perceived their 
partners’ (good or bad) outcomes as chance- or ability-based. 
3.2.3. Unconditional ‘Free’ versus Conditional ‘Charged’ Offers 
3.2.3.1. Helper’s Decisions.  
P1s, who were better off financially than P2s, were then inquired if they 
would help P2s by transferring part of their excess bonus points (i.e.  350 – 200 
‘Bonus Threshold’ = 150 points). Helpers could help either unconditionally (i.e. 
to donate their points and demand no repayment: repayment free offer), or 
conditionally by attaching a ‘repayment clause’ to their transfer. All conditional 
helpers then selected a designated level of repayment (See Figure 3.2) as the 
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repayment clauses of their offers.  All these decisions were made privately and 
P2s were blind to the list of choices that were available to P1s. Figure 3.2 
outlines the flow of a P1’s decision. 
Figure 3.2. The flow of decisions made by a potential helper (P1). 
3.2.3.2. Recipient’s Decisions.  
After P1s made the decisions their P2 partners were shown, firstly, 
whether P1s decided to help; and if so, whether the offers were conditional or 
unconditional , and if they were conditional what the repayment terms were. 
P2s who received an offer were then asked to decide whether to accept it. It was 
emphasised to them that they would always be financially better off receiving 
any offer of help compared to no offer of help, in spite of the repayment 
obligation or lack thereof. I then assessed recipients’ perception of their 
helpers’ decisions using the following constructs: (1) State Annoyance ( ‘I am 
annoyed by my partner's decision.’), (2) State Gratitude (Average of items ‘I 
am thankful for my partner’s decision’ and ‘I feel grateful for what my partner 
does for me’, Cronbach’s  = 0.931 ), (3) State Indebtedness (‘I feel indebted to 
my partner’), (4) Obligation (‘I feel obliged to repay my partner’), (5) 
Perceived Genuine Helpfulness (‘My partner's transfer is motivated by his/her 
sincere desire to help me’), (6) Perceived Reasonableness (‘My partner's 
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decision is reasonable’), and (7) Reciprocating Tendency (‘I am eager to help 
my partner out if he/she is in need in the near future’). All items were rated on 
7-point Likert-type scales (1 = ‘Not At All’ and 7 = ‘Completely’). 
I checked that the recipients of conditional offers understood that they 
were always better off economically accepting (rather than declining) the offers, 
even if they paid back in full. P2s who accepted their conditional offers were 
then shown a reminder of their expected repayment. Immediately after that P2s 
decided whether to repay and how much. Importantly by giving P2s the 
freedom to decide whether or not to honour the agreement these recipients were 
‘granted’ the option of defaulting in the form of a ‘breach of contract’ (Shavell, 
1980). Figure 3.3 illustrates the flow of decisions a P2 was expected to make. 
 
Figure 3.3. The flow of decisions made by a potential recipient (P2) 
 
P2s (who received conditional offers) were initially unaware of this 
option to default when making their emotional judgements. The procedures 
were set up as such so to avoid confounding these P2s’ emotional judgements--
which are the primary outcome in this study, and make these judgements 
comparable to the unconditional offer receipts in which there was no room for 
any repayment. P2s who received unconditional offers were not given a latter 
option to repay the ‘free’ gift. This was meant to mirror the real world situation 
in which a ‘free’ gift from a stranger with no option to repay—e.g., altruistic 
organ/blood donation or a graduate school scholarship—would remain as such. 
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Meanwhile, by offering the recipients an opportunity to sanction their 
helpers for their breach of normative fairness (i.e. to only help conditionally), 
Experiment 1 provided a behavioural measure of positive (full repayment) and 
negative reciprocity (zero back-transfer or partial repayment). Thus the level of 
under-repayment should constitute an index of how the recipients were irked by 
P1s’ defiance of the injunctive norm. Hence the option to default provides a 
secondary outcome and one that does not bias the initial emotional judgements. 
In this game all P2s’ decisions (e.g. acceptance, repayment) were fed 
back to their P1 partners, thus affecting their final payoffs. Afterwards, all 
players were shown onscreen their respective compensations. They were then 
instructed to complete the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale (Crowne 
& Marlowe, 1960). In so doing I intended to address any potential validity 
issues attributable to Social Desirable Responding (Carver & Scheier, 2008). 
The experiment ended here and the participants were debriefed and paid. 
3.2.4. Ethics Statement 
Experiment 1 was approved by the ethics committee of the School of 
Psychology at the University of Nottingham. All participants were older than 17 
and all provided written, informed consent prior to participation as approved by 
the ethics committee (Approved 11th Feb 2013; Ref. Code: 267). 
3.3. Results 
3.3.1. Manipulation Check  
I intended to inspect, via two pre-offer ratings using 7-point Likert-Type 
Scales (1= ‘Not At All’; 7 = ‘Completely’), if the present die-rolling procedure 
succeeded in leading our participants (both P1s and P2s) to believe that what 
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segregated the ‘winners’ (i.e. making the 200 point ‘threshold’) from the 
‘losers’ (i.e. missing that) in the game was chance rather than ability. 
Table 3.1. Statistics for Participants’ Rating: Item ‘Chance’ Attribution 
‘To what extent you think that your partner’s high (low) score is attributable to his/her good (bad) luck’1 
  N M SD SE df MD t-statistic p (2-tailed) 
Gender Male 50 4.76 2.37 0.34     
 Female 72 5.24 2.08 0.25     
 Total 122 5.04 2.21 0.20 96.4 0.476 1.147 0.254 
Condition Low-cost 62 5.26 2.20 0.28     
 High-cost 60 4.82 2.21 0.29     
 Total 122 5.04 2.21 0.20 120 0.441 1.106 0.271 
Roles Player 1s 61 4.80 2.29 0.29     
 Player 2s 61 5.28 2.11 0.27     
 Total 122 5.04 2.21 0.20 120 0.475 1.192 0.235 
Note. M: Mean; MD: Mean Difference; 11= ‘Not At All’; 7 = ‘Completely’. 
 
As illustrated in Table 3.1, participants in general (M: 5.04, SD: 2.21) 
were convinced that their partners’ high or low die-rolling scores were due to 
chance. The independent samples t-tests evidenced that this high propensity to 
impute partner’s outcomes to chance was not affected by gender, which cost 
condition and which in-game role the participant was assigned to. 
Table 3.2. Statistics for Participants’ Rating: Item ‘Ability’ Attribution 
‘To what extent you think that your partner’s high (low) score is because of his/her capability 
(incompetence)’ (1= ‘Not At All’; 7= ‘Completely’) 
  N M SD SE df MD t-statistic p (2-tailed) 
Gender Male 50 1.58 1.11 0.16     
 Female 72 1.47 1.01 0.12     
 Total 122 1.59 1.22 0.11 120 0.108 0.558 0.578 
Condition Low-cost 62 1.55 1.28 0.16     
 High-cost 60 1.63 1.16 0.15     
 Total 122 1.59 1.22 0.11 120 0.085 0.384 0.702 
Roles Player 1s 61 1.38 0.86 0.11     
 Player 2s 61 1.80 1.47 0.19     
 Total 122 1.59 1.22 0.11 96.7 0.426 1.955 0.053 
 
Table 3.2 shows that overall participants did not attribute their partners’ 
high or low die-rolling scores to their abilities (M: 1.59, SD: 1.22). Again, this 
attributional tendency was unaffected by gender, cost condition and in-game 
role. Meanwhile, a paired-samples t-test indicated a significant difference, (t 
(121) = 14.82, p <.001), between participants’ average ‘Chance’ (M: 5.04) and 
‘Ability’ attributions (M: 1.59). This suggested that participants were prone to 
attribute their partners’ good (or bad) outcomes to chance instead of ability. 
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Table 3.3. Statistics for Participants’ Attributional Bias 
Attributional Bias = Participant’s ‘Chance’ Attribution – ‘Ability’ Attribution Rating 
  N M SD SE df MD t-statistic p (2-tailed) 
Gender Male 50 3.06 2.90 0.41     
 Female 72 3.72 2.30 0.27     
 Total 122 3.45 2.57 0.23 89.6 0.662 1.348 0.181 
Condition Low-cost 62 3.71 2.55 0.32     
 High-cost 60 3.18 2.59 0.33     
 Total 122 3.45 2.57 0.23 120 0.526 1.132 0.260 
Roles Player 1s 61 3.43 2.51 0.32     
 Player 2s 61 3.48 2.66 0.34     
 Total 122 3.45 2.57 0.23 120 0.049 0.105 0.916 
 
I similarly explored if this attributional bias was explainable by 
participant’s gender, assigned in-game role or cost condition. The data (See 
Table 3.3) revealed that this bias was not accounted for by any of the three 
variables. This illustrated that the participants generally had a consensus that 
chance, instead of ability, accounted for their partners’ die-rolling outcomes. 
3.3.2. Descriptive Data 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4. Decision Tree of P2s (N = 61) 
Forty-nine P2s (80%) received an offer and of these 24 received a 
conditional (10 received an ‘Interest-Free’, 8 a ‘Partial Repayment’ and 6 an 
Offer Declined 
(N=3) 
Offer Accepted 
(N=21) 
Offer Accepted 
(N=24) 
Offer Declined 
(N=1) 
Received a conditional 
offer, i.e. EXPECTED to 
repay (N=24) 
Player 2s (N=61) 
Received an offer (N=49) Did NOT Receive an offer (N=12) 
 
Received an unconditional offer, 
i.e. NO NEED to repay (N=25) 
Cooperated (N=13) Defected (N=8) 
Repaid Nothing (N=1) Repaid Partially (N=7) 
‘Interest-Free’ (N=10) 
‘20%- Interest Repayment’ 
(N=6) 
‘Partial Repayment’ 
offer (N=8) 
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‘Interest Repayment’ offer) and 25 an unconditional offer. While there was one 
rejection among unconditional offer recipients (rejection rate: 1/25= 4%: 96% 
acceptance), three recipients of conditional offers declined theirs (rejection rate: 
3/24 = 12.5%: 87.5% acceptance).  Figure 3.4 depicts the decision tree of P2s. 
3.3.3. General Confounds 
The following analysis delves into the potential effect by the three 
general confounds—namely i) the cost of helping, ii) gender, and iii) Social 
Desirability Responding—on the current key outcome variables. 
3.3.3.1. Cost of Helping 
Table 3.4. Effect of Cost of Helping on Player 2s’ 1) post-offer ratings, 2) 
repayment decisions; and on 3) Helpers’ Transfer Decisions. 
 Testing Condition 
  Low-cost High-cost   
 t df M (SD) M (SD) MD p (2-tailed) 
1. P2s’1 Post-offer Ratings      
State Annoyance 0.54 59 2.29 (1.77) 2.07 (1.43) 0.22 .591 
State Gratitude 1.06 59 4.79 (2.28) 5.37 (1.96) 0.58 .294 
State Indebtedness 1.06 59 3.68 (2.20) 4.30 (2.40) 0.62 .294 
Perceived Genuine Helpfulness2 0.41 47 5.54 (1.10) 5.40 (1.32) 0.14 .686 
Obligation to Repay2 1.16 47 4.58 (1.69) 5.16 (1.80) 0.58 .253 
Reasonableness  0.49 52.6 5.10 (5.30) 4.90 (1.81) 0.20 .628 
Perceived Low Cost of Help2 1.35 47 4.54 (1.62) 3.88 (1.81) 0.66 .184 
Tendency to Reciprocate 0.23 59 5.19 (1.85) 5.30 (1.82) 0.11 .822 
2. Recipients’3 Repayment (in Points)      
Actual Repayment 1.85 13.8 49.0 (17.3) 73.7 (40.4) 24.7 .085 
Discrepancy between Actual and 
Expected Repayment 
0.97 12.5 10.0 (17.0) 25.6 (50.2) 15.6 .349 
3. Helpers’4 Transfer (in Points)      
Discrepancy between Actual and 
Expected (i.e. Minimum) Transfer 
1.38 41.3 14.4 (21.9) 6.84 (15.5) 7.54 .174 
Note. 1 There were 31 P2s in ‘High-cost’ condition of which 25 received either a conditional or 
unconditional offer while 24 out of 30 Player 2s in ‘Low-cost’ condition received either a conditional or 
unconditional offer. 2 Only P2s who received an offer (N=49) were required to respond to this item. 3 
Twenty-one recipients of conditional offers were expected to repay, 10 of them were from ‘Low-cost’ 
condition and 11 were from the ‘High-cost’ condition. 
4There were 24 Player 1s from the ‘Low-cost’ condition and 25 from the ’High-cost’ condition who 
decided to help either conditionally or unconditionally 
 
I first examined whether the effect of cost condition significantly 
influenced 1) P2s’ post-offer ratings, 2) repayment decisions for P2s who 
accepted a conditional offer, 3) helpers’ excess transfers and their 4) other 
helping-related decisions. Independent-sample T-Tests revealed that cost 
condition overall did not differentiate any of 1) the recipients’ post-offer 
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ratings, 2) repayment decisions of the conditional offer acceptors and 3) the 
helpers’ magnitude of ‘over-donation’. The results are detailed in Table 3.4. 
Additionally, a Chi-square test was used to determine whether there was 
a significant difference between helpers from ‘Low-cost’ and ‘High-cost’ 
condition in their 1) decisions to help, and 2) conditionality (need to repay or 
not) of offers made should they agreed to help. Table 3.5 details the results. 
Table 3.5. Effect of Cost of Helping on Helpers’ Helping Decisions. 
                            Testing Condition    
  Low-cost High-cost    
P1s’ Helping Decisions  N N 2 df p (2-tailed) 
1. To Help or Not to Help Helped 24 25    
    (N = 61) Not Helped 7 5    
 Total 31 30 .337 1 .561 
2. Conditionality of Offer Unconditional 13 12    
    Made (N = 49) Conditional 11 13    
 Total 24 25 .186 1 .666 
3. Preferred Repayment Partial 5 5    
    Modes (N = 24) Interest-Free 3 5    
 20%-Interest 3 3    
 Total 11 13 N.A.1 
Note. 1 Chi-squared test was not conducted for ‘Preferred Repayment Modes’. Fisher’s Exact Test was 
indeed run and the results revealed that preferred repayment modes did not significantly differ by Testing 
(i.e. Cost of Helping) Condition (p = .882, two-tailed) 
 
The data (See Table 3.5) revealed that neither decisions had 
significantly differed by testing condition. Furthermore, Fisher’s exact test was 
conducted to determine if helpers’ preferences of repayment modes would 
differ by testing condition. The results indicated no significant effect of testing 
condition on (conditional) helpers’ choices of repayment modes. 
3.3.3.2. Effect of Gender 
 I also examined if participants’ gender had significantly influenced 1) 
recipients’ post-offer ratings (i.e. emotional responses to offers), 2) repayment 
decisions for those who received a conditional offer, 3) helpers’ transfer 
decisions, and their 4) other helping-related decisions. Independent-sample T-
Tests indicated that gender failed to differentiate any of 1) the recipients’ post-
offer ratings (except that male P2s rated their partners’ decisions as more 
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‘reasonable’ than their female counterparts), 2) repayment decisions of the 
recipients of conditional offers and 3) the helpers’ magnitude of transfers and 
‘over-donation’. The results are detailed in Table 3.6. 
Table 3.6. Effect of Gender on Player 2s’ 1) post-offer ratings, 2) repayment 
decisions; and on 3) Helpers’ Transfer Decisions. 
 Testing Condition 
                        Male    Female 
 t df M (SD) M (SD) MD p (2-tailed) 
1. P2s’1 Post-offer Ratings      
State Annoyance 0.439 59 2.05 (1.40) 2.24 (1.71) 0.194 .662 
State Gratitude 0.513 59 5.28 (2.14) 4.98 (2.14) 0.299 .610 
State Indebtedness 0.789 59 3.65(2.23) 4.15 (2.34) 0.496 .433 
Perceived Genuine Helpfulness2 0.122 47 5.50 (1.32) 5.45 (1.18) 0.045 .903 
Obligation to Repay2 0.179 47 4.81 (1.97) 4.91 (1.67) 0.097 .859 
Reasonableness  2.161 59 5.60 (1.39) 4.71 (1.57) 0.893 .035* 
Perceived Low Cost of Help2 0.925 47 3.88 (1.75) 4.36 (1.73) 0.489 .360 
Tendency to Reciprocate 0.758 59 5.50 (1.67) 5.12 (1.90) 0.378 .452 
2. Recipients’3 Repayment (in Points)      
Actual Repayment 0.401 19 66.7 (42.7) 60.1 (30.3) 6.60 .693 
Discrepancy between Actual and 
Expected Repayment 
1.160 19 33.3 (47.2) 12.1 (33.9) 
 
21.2 .260 
3. Helpers’4 Transfer (in Points)      
Actual Transfer 0.924 47 90.0 (29.9) 82.5 (27.2) 7.54 .360 
Discrepancy between Actual and 
Expected (i.e. Minimum) Transfer 
0.315 47 9.61 (18.3) 11.4 (20.2) 1.74 .755 
Note. 1 There were 16 out of 20 male P2s and 33 out of 41 female P2s who received either a conditional or 
unconditional offer. 2 Only P2s who had received an offer (N=49) were required to respond to this item.3 
Twenty-one recipients of conditional offers were expected to repay, there were 6 male recipients and 15 
female recipients. 4 There were 23 male helpers and 26 female helpers. *p < .05 (two-tailed). 
 
A Chi-square test was used to determine whether there was a significant 
difference between female and male helpers in their 1) decisions to help (or 
not), and 2) conditionality of offers made should they agreed to help. 
Table 3.7 Effect of Gender on (Potential) Helpers’ Helping Decisions 
  Male Female    
P1s’ Helping Decisions  N N 2 df p (2-tailed) 
1. To Help or Not to Help Helped 23 26    
    (N = 61) Not Helped 7 5    
 Total 30 31 .501 1 .534 
2. Conditionality of Offer Unconditional 10 15    
    Made (N = 49) Conditional 13 11    
 Total 23 26 .987 1 .396 
3. Preferred Repayment Partial 5 5    
    Modes (N = 24) Interest-Free 4 4    
 20%-Interest 4 2    
 Total 13 11 N.A.1 
Note. 1 Pearson’s Chi-squared test was not conducted due to insufficient counts. 
 
As shown in Table 3.7, neither decisions significantly (p >.05) differed 
by gender. Furthermore, the Fisher’s exact test indicated a lack of gender effect 
(p = .77, two-tailed) on conditional helpers’ selections of repayment modes. 
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3.3.3.3. Effects of Social Desirability Responding (i.e. SDR hereafter) 
Table 3.8. Effect of SDR on recipients’ post-offer ratings and repayment  
 Gs As Is Os Reas PGH Cost Rec AR UR 
MCSD  r .089 -.142 -.308 -.007 .141 -.073 .098 .159 .224 -.087 
 p .541 .329 .031* .964 .332 .620 .502 .274 .329 .706 
 N 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 21 21 
Note. MCSD: Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale; r: Pearson’s r correlation;  
p: p-value (two-tailed). Gs = State Gratitude; As = State Annoyance; Is= State Indebtedness; Os = 
Perceived Obligation to Repay; Reas = Perceived Reasonableness of Partners’ decision;  
PGH = Perceived Genuine Helpfulness in partners’ help; Cost= Perceived Low Cost of Partners’ Help; 
Rec = Recipients’ Eagerness to Reciprocate; AR = Actual Repayment by Recipients of Conditional offers; 
UR = Subtractions of ‘Expected Repayment’ from ‘Actual Repayment’ by recipients who accepted their 
conditional offers (negative values denote defaulting). * p <.05 (two-tailed) 
 
I examined whether SDR had considerably affected the recipients’ post-
offer ratings (See Table 3.8), repayment decisions (See Table 3.8), and P1s’ 
range of helping-related decisions (See Table 3.9). The SDR tendencies were 
operationalized as participants’ composite scores in the MCSD (Crowne & 
Marlowe, 1960). As shown in Table 3.8, there was no evidence that 1) SDR 
tendency was correlated with most of the recipients’ (N = 49) post-offer ratings 
or that 2) SDR tendency influenced the repayment decisions.  
Table 3.9. Effect of SDR on helpers’ helping decisions 
  Help Conditionality Tran Over-donation RM 
MCSD Pearson’s Correlation (r) -.095 -.121 .290* .147 .399 
 p (two-tailed) .468 .409 .043 .313 .054 
 N 61 49 49 49 24 
Note. Help = To Help or Not; Conditionality= Unconditional or Conditional offers Made;  
Trans = Magnitude of Transfer; RM = Conditional Helpers’ Chosen Repayment Modes (i.e. level of 
conditionality in offers made). 
  
SDR was also not correlated with P1s’ decisions to help, conditionality 
of offers made should they helped, preferences for repayment modes, and 
magnitude of ‘over-donation’. The results are presented in Table 3.9. While 
SDR appeared positively (r = .290, p = .043) correlated with the helpers’ 
transfer magnitude, this relationship no longer stood (p >.1) once helpers’ 
‘Expected Transfer’ (i.e. minimum required transfers) was controlled for.  
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Taken together, the above analyses failed to demonstrate any 
associations between MCSD with the current key outcome measures, indicating 
that SDR may not have substantially contaminated the current analysis. 
3.3.4. Hypotheses Testing 
As detailed above the current key outcomes measures were not 
subjected to contamination of the possible confounds. Therefore, in the main 
analysis I collapsed findings from both cost conditions and genders. Below I 
detail the results of the main hypotheses (i.e. H1 to H3) testing. 
3.3.4.1. Testing Hypothesis 1 
H1: Conditionality of offers—which denotes difference in normative fairness of 
the arrangement—should induce different emotional response from the P2s, e.g. 
the perception of genuine helpfulness, gratitude and so on; 
Table 3.10 Statistics for P2s’ Post-offer ratings 
 Conditionality of offer received 
  Unconditionala Conditionalb  
 t-statistic df Mean (SD) Mean (SD) MD SED 
State Annoyance 1.73 37.9 1.40 (0.71) 1.88 (1.15) 0.475 0.275 
State Gratitude 2.05* 47 6.30 (1.27) 5.63 (1.02) 0.675 0.330 
State Indebtedness 0.90 47 4.96 (1.72) 4.46 (2.19) 0.502 0.561 
Perceived Genuine Helpfulness 2.01* 47 5.80 (1.19) 5.13 (1.15) 0.675 0.335 
Obligation to Repay 1.83 47 4.44 (1.73) 5.33 (1.69) 0.893 0.489 
Reasonableness  1.82 47 4.72 (1.62) 5.46 (1.18) 0.738 0.406 
Perceived Low Cost of Help 1.88 47 3.76 (1.79) 4.67 (1.58) 0.907 0.482 
Tendency to Reciprocate 2.74** 38.6 6.28 (0.79) 5.46 (1.25) 0.822 0.300 
Note. aN = 25. bN = 24. SED: Standard Error of Differences.* p <.05 ; ** p < .01 (2-tailed) 
 
Independent samples T-Tests were conducted to examine if the 
conditionality of offer alone elicited differential benefit-triggered emotions and 
interpretations of helpers’ intent. Recipients of unconditional offers (N= 25) 
reported (1) more gratitude (p <.05), (2) that the helpers were genuinely more 
helpful (p <.05), and (3) a higher tendency to reciprocate (p <.01). No other 
post-offer ratings significantly differed by whether the offer received was 
conditional or unconditional. Table 3.10 above details the statistics. 
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3.3.4.2. Testing Hypothesis 2 - The serial mediational model (Figure 3.5) 
 
Figure 3.5. A statistical diagram of the hypothesised mediator model.  
Note. N=49; n.s.= Not Significant; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001.  
 
I examined whether the hypothesised mediational model—which was 
depicted in Figure 3.1—was supported by the current data. This model 
examines if the effect of offer conditionality on reciprocity tendency is 
mediated serially by (1) the degree that the helper was perceived as genuinely 
helpful and (2) the recipients’ level of gratitude. Indeed, the results supported 
this serial multiple mediator model (Figure 3.5). I adopted the Bootstrap 
Confidence Intervals (CI) approach when analysing the current model. Hayes 
(2013) argued that bootstrapping is ‘particularly useful relative to normal 
approach (i.e. the Sobel’s (1982) (pp.110))’ as it better handles the non-
normality of the sampling distribution (of the indirect effects under scrutiny) 
which is inherent in smaller samples, thus rendering ‘a test with higher power 
(pp.106).’) The results are detailed in Table 3.11 and Figure 3.5. 
Table 3.11 Regression Coefficients, Standard Errors, and Model Summary 
Information for the hypothesised Serial Multiple Mediator Model 
 Consequent 
 Mediator 1 (PGH) Mediator 2 (Gs) Y (Rec) 
Antecedent Coef SE p  Coef SE p  Coef SE p 
X (Cond*) a1  .335 .0497 a2 .397 .316 .215 c’ .286 .214 .188 
M1 (PGH)  -- -- -- d21 .412 .132 .003 b1 .339 .097 .0010 
M2 (Gs)  -- -- --  -- -- -- b2 .455 .098 <.001 
Constant iM1 4.45 .533 <.001 iM2 3.12 .759 <.001 iY .876 .591 .145 
  R2 = .080  R2 = .243  R2 = .622 
 F (1,47) = 4.058, p = .0497 F (2,46) = 7.368, p = .0017 F (3,45) = 24.71, p = <.001 
Note * Conditionality: ‘1’denotes receipt of a conditional offer while ‘2’ denotes receipt of an 
unconditional offer. PGH= Perceived Partner Helpfulness; Gs= State Gratitude;  
Rec= Tendency to reciprocate 
 
Chapter 3   117 
 
 
 
The present data show that the conditionality of an offer indirectly 
influenced the recipients’ tendency to reciprocate through its effect on 
attributions of helpfulness and gratitude towards the helper. Recipients 
receiving an unconditional offer were more prone to see their helper as truly 
helpful (a1 = 0.675, p <.05), and therefore reported more gratitude (d21= 0.412, p 
<.01). This elevated gratitude predicts a greater desire to reciprocate (b2 = 
0.455, p <.001). A bias-corrected bootstrap CI for this total indirect effect  
(a1d21b2 = 0.675*0.412*0.455 = 0.127) based on 5,000 samples excluded zero 
(0.012 to 0.368), indicating a significant indirect effect (Field, 2013). 
Further analyses indicated that receiving an unconditional offer 
indirectly influenced gratitude through attributions of helpfulness—i.e. the 
bootstrap CI for this effect (a1d21) did not straddle zero (0.027 to 0.587).  
However, there was no evidence that receiving an unconditional offer 
influenced reciprocity tendency directly (c’= 0.286, p = .19), or that receiving 
an unconditional offer influenced reciprocity indirectly through gratitude only, 
as the CI for this indirect effect (a2b2) included zero (-0.144 to 0.633).  
3.3.4.3. Analyses of Behavioural Data (i.e. Repayment) 
As revealed in Figure 3.4, twenty-one recipients who had accepted their 
conditional offers were asked to repay. Of all these 21 recipients eight (i.e. 
38.1%) defaulted by either repaying partially or nothing, while the rest (N =13, 
61.9 %) all repaid fully. Interestingly, scrutiny of these eight defaulters 
response revealed only one instance of zero repayment, while the rest (N =7) on 
average repaid 58.4% of their expected repayment. A Wilcoxon Signed-ranked 
test demonstrated a significant discrepancy, (Z = 2.53, p = .012), between the 
defaulter’s ‘Expected Repayment’ (M: 86.6) and his/her ‘Actual Repayment’ 
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(M: 38.9). This suggested that a significant level of defaulting occurred among 
these conditional recipients and that is attributable to those 8 defaulters. 
Table 3.12 Effect of Level of Conditionality on Player 2s’ (who received 
conditional offers (N=24)) decision making (acceptance and repayment) 
  Levels of Conditionality of offers received 
  Interest-Free Partial Repayment 20%-Interest  
  N N N Fisher’s Exact 
Test p (2-tailed) 
1. Offer Accept 8 8 5  
Acceptance Decline 2 0 1  
(N =24) Overall 10 8 6 .447 
2. Repayment Cooperate 6 5 2  
(N =21) Default1 2 3 3  
 Overall 8 8 5 .461 
Note. 1 I classify ‘defaulters’ as recipients (N=21) who accepted their offers but under-repaid (either repaid 
partially or nothing). 
 
In addition, the Fisher’s exact test was conducted to examine whether 
the level of conditionality of the offers would influence his/her decision to (1) 
accept (or decline) the offer, and (2) to cooperate (i.e. to fulfil his/her obligated 
repayment) or to under-repay (partly or totally). As shown in Table 3.12, 
neither decisions were significantly influenced (all ps >.05) by the level of 
conditionality of the offers. This indicated that whether or not recipients of 
conditional offers were treated ‘more harshly’ did not affect their decisions to 
accept (or reject) and their decisions to cooperate (or default). 
3.3.4.4. Testing Hypothesis 3 
H3: P2s who received conditional offers, compared to unconditional offers 
recipients, should report more indebtedness, with this indebtedness being 
negatively related to the intended and actual repayment by these recipients 
As illustrated in Table 3.10, recipients of conditional (M: 4.46, SD: 
2.19) and unconditional (M: 4.96; SD: 1.72) offers felt similarly (p >.05) 
indebted to their helpers. Contrary to the above review of the literature, 
indebtedness was found positively and strongly correlated with positively-
valenced emotion items such as gratitude, r (59) = 0.721, p <. 001, and 
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tendency to reciprocate, r (59) = 0.518, p <. 001, while negatively correlated to 
annoyance, r (59) = -0.423, p<. 001. P2s’ indebtedness, meanwhile, was not 
correlated (p > .05) to their perception of P1s’ genuine helpfulness. 
Table 3.13. Effect of P2s’ (who received and accepted their conditional offers 
(N=21)) Emotion on their later Repayment Magnitude 
  Gs As Is Os Reas PGH Cost Rec 
Repayment Pearson’s r .159 -.058 -.032 .292 -.005 -.029 -.094 .089 
Percentage p (two-tailed) .490 .804 .890 .198 .981 .901 .686 .702 
 N 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 
Note. Gs = State Gratitude; As = State Annoyance; Is= State Indebtedness; Os = Perceived Obligation to 
Repay; Reas = Perceived Reasonableness of Partners’ decision; PGH = Perceived Genuine Helpfulness; 
Cost= Perceived Low Cost; Rec = Eagerness to Reciprocate. Repayment Percentage = (Actual/ Expected 
Repayment) * 100%.   
 
In addition, there was no evidence that P2s’ (N=21) repayment 
magnitude was correlated (all ps>. 05) with their emotions (e.g. indebtedness, 
gratitude etc.) the moment they accepted that normatively unfair offers. Table 
3.13 details the correlational analyses with respect to the magnitude of 
repayment and emotions of P2s. All in all, the present data did not support H3. 
3.4. Discussion 
3.4.1. Summary of Results 
3.4.1.1. Injunctive Fairness and Gratitude 
The present data illustrated that conditionality of an offer of help alone, 
when the recipient is not aware of the options open to the helper, can 
significantly influence how recipients interpreted the helpers’ intentions, so as 
the recipients’ feelings of gratitude, and their eagerness to reciprocate. In 
addition, the results show that the greater the perceptions of the helpers’ 
intentions to be helpful (influenced by offer conditionality) the greater the level 
of gratitude towards them, and resulting in a greater tendency to reciprocate.  
Furthermore, the behavioural data revealed that when recipients 
received a conditional offer, nearly 40% of them (8 out of 21) acted 
uncooperatively despite prior acceptance (of their obligation), either giving less 
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than they agreed or defecting completely. This indicated that people, albeit 
lacking awareness of the options open to helpers, still made differential 
judgments based solely on whether they received a conditional or unconditional 
offer. I interpret this as an example of the adherence to the injunctive fairness 
norm. That is, in the absence of information about the helper, recipients could 
only infer their helpers’ intent to be helpful with reference to the normative 
beliefs about what an average ‘fair’ person should do when the opportunity to 
be in a position to help was determined by chance.  
3.4.1.2. Gratitude versus Indebtedness 
Additionally, the present data showed that people’s tendency to want to 
reciprocate when treated fairly and be less cooperative when treated less fairly 
(in a normative sense) is, in part, dependent on attributional and emotional 
processing. People who inferred that the helpers’ intentions were positive—feel 
gratitude towards—were more inclined to be eager to help them back in the 
future. Thus intentions and gratitude are two key processes that help explain the 
link between conditionality of offers and willingness to reciprocate.  
Nonetheless, the same logic does not apply to indebtedness. While 
indebtedness was positively related to one’s desire to reciprocate—contrary to 
our prediction that P2s here should favour cognitive restructuring over 
reciprocation, indebtedness was not correlated with offer conditionality and 
intent perception. This implied that indebtedness, unlike gratitude, was 
uninfluenced by normative fairness. An indebted recipient may still strive to 
reciprocate irrespective of the intent of his/her benefactor, and also whether or 
not that benefit constituted a fair gesture. This indeed echoes Tsang’s (2006a) 
observation that while perceived benevolence was crucial in cultivating 
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gratitude, recipients experienced similar indebtedness whether their helpers 
were acting prosocially thanks to a benevolent or an ulterior reason.  
3.4.1.3. The Mediational Model-Role of Normative Fairness Perception on the 
Gratitude-reciprocity link 
Meanwhile, the present mediational model demonstrates that injunctive 
normative beliefs about fairness are important with respect to intentions 
(Bicchieri & Chavez, 2010) and emotional responses associated with 
cooperation and reciprocation (Komter, 2004; Nadler, 2012). Recipients in 
Experiment 1 had no knowledge about who their helpers were, what their 
helpers had done in the past, would never meet them, and importantly, knew 
nothing about the array of options facing the helpers. All they knew was that 
their helpers’ good fortune to be in a position to help was by chance.  
Consistent with the notion that under these circumstances people should 
act generously and help for free (Elster, 2006), the results show clearly that 
when this is not the case the recipients would view these helpers as less 
genuinely helpful, feel less gratitude and are less likely to want to reciprocate to 
them. In fact, this reduced willingness to reciprocate resonates with the indirect 
reciprocation literature which evidences that we prefer to help ‘kind’ people 
with a good reputation (See Milinski, Semmann, & Krambeck, 2002; Nowak, 
2005, 2006; Nowak & Sigmund, 2007; Semmann, Krambeck, & Milinski, 
2005). Here the results indicate that reputation can be inferred from very 
minimal information, that is, the conditionality of help only (Ksenia, 2008).  
3.4.2. Interesting Observation- Phenomenon of ‘Cheap-riding’ 
While only a relatively small segment of recipients who received 
conditional offers a non-negligible percentage (38%) of them still showed 
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uncooperative behaviour, and interestingly all but one of these defectors chose 
to be somewhat ‘altruistic’ by repaying the majority of their obligated 
repayment. It is, important and theoretically intriguing to examine the 
psychological or situational factors that motivate someone to engage in this 
kind of ‘impure’ free-riding or ‘cheap-riding’ (Asch, Gigliotti, & Polito, 1993; 
Bchir & Willinger, 2013; Cornes & Sandler, 1984; Krishnamurthy, 2000).  
Such cheap-riding may symbolise dissatisfaction with the helpers, the 
actual value the recipients place on the offer or perhaps a means to irk the 
helpers by deliberately underpaying on their agreed repayment. This reduced 
backtransfer has been documented before in trust games when the recipient 
knew in advance their trustors could have refrained from making their 
investment conditional (or punishable) (see Fehr & Rockenbach, 2003). Here 
the data revealed a similar phenomenon in the absence of this knowledge. Fehr 
and colleagues (Fehr & Rockenbach, 2004; Fehr & Schmidt, 2006) had 
interpreted this as evidence for ‘strong reciprocity’ (Wiessner, 2005).  
But then one question remains: Why bother to pay back at all, even at a 
reduced level? The recipients in this game, if they wished to, could have 
retained all the money (with no repercussion). However, it appears that these 
recipients deliberately under-repaid as to express their disapproval of their 
helpers’ breach of normative fairness. I am inclined to interpret this as a means 
of giving these unfair helpers their ‘just deserts’ (Scott, Matland, Michelbach, 
& Borenstein, 2001; Weinstein, 2011; Wenzel & Thielmann, 2006) and signally 
disapproval designed to deter their helpers from being ungenerous to others in 
the future (Gromet & Darley, 2009; Okimoto & Wenzel, 2008). However, 
taking everything may enrage the helpers and even worse, set the stage for them 
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to retrospectively rationalise their initial amoral acts (i.e. not being fair) (Carroll 
& Meeks, 1999; Hartman & Nelson, 1999). It may also result in repugnance at 
the recipient that generalises to others hence dampened their desire to help in 
the future. Thus not repaying anything may appear inadvisable.  
On the contrary, partial repayment signals to the helpers that they were 
not nice for starters – did not observe the injunctive norm – by indicating via 
partial repayment what the recipients believed the (conditional) help was really 
worth. This, therefore, may serve to make the helper feel guilty. These feeling 
of guilt are likely to render the helpers more cooperative in the future (See 
Boster et al. (2016) for a meta-analysis on guilt-compliance link). Thus partial 
repayment might be a means to enforce normative fairness in a way similar to 
altruistic punishment (Fowler, 2005). However, at present I could not rule out 
any alternative perspectives (e.g. the recipients under-repaying out of sheer 
selfishness) that could account for the observed partial repayment.  
3.5. Implications of Chapter 3 
The present chapter addressed a few things. First, it demonstrated the 
importance of injunctive norm in functioning as a basis on which people 
evaluate whether they were fairly (or unfairly) treated. And importantly, this 
evaluation would consequently influence people’s attribution of the helpers’ 
intent, and therefore influence how much gratitude was felt and ultimately 
one’s desire to reciprocate. Additionally, this path model could complement the 
meta-analysis (presented in Chapter 2) by highlighting another potential 
moderator— i.e. the perception of normative fairness—in influencing how 
gratitude (as an affective state) relates to one’s prosocial intention.  
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Secondly, the current data acknowledged the divergence of indebtedness 
and gratitude which was well-documented in the literature (Schaumberg & 
Flynn, 2009; Tsang, 2006b; Watkins et al., 2006). Particularly, the present 
analyses highlighted the lack of association between perceived fairness, or 
perceived genuine helpfulness, and recipients’ indebtedness.  That is, recipients 
could still feel indebtedness (and want to reciprocate accordingly) despite the 
lack of perceived helpful intent or the fact that the arrangement was not 
injunctively fair. Nonetheless, the present path model (Figure 3.5) indicated that 
this was clearly not the case for gratitude; as gratitude was more strongly 
experienced upon receipt of injunctively fair offers and when helpers were 
regarded genuinely helpful. This should add to the literature by highlighting the 
role of indebtedness—as a psychological state—in fostering reciprocal 
economic behaviours, considering that indebtedness is, to my understanding, a 
basically unexplored domain in the experimental economics literature. 
Finally, the behavioural data revealed that upon being unfairly treated 
recipients displayed a non-negligible extent of sanctioning by breaching their 
agreement. It is, however, still premature to draw many conclusions as only a 
small fraction of recipients (N = 21, i.e. 34%) had accepted the conditional 
offer (thus giving them the very opportunity to under-repay), not to mention 
only eight of them had ‘cashed in on’ this sanctioning option. And although a 
few speculations have been made on motives behind the observed ‘cheap-
riding’—e.g. to give the helpers their ‘just deserts’ (Wenzel & Thielmann, 
2006; Santos & Rivera, 2015)—none were scrutinised at present.  
Hence, the primary objective of Experiment 2—which will be 
thoroughly discussed in Chapter 4—was to delve into the situational or 
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psychological factor (s) that would motivate, and potentially perpetuate, this 
kind of ‘cheap-riding’ behaviour (Cornes & Sandler, 1984). In particular, via 
Experiment 2 I intended to examine, and potentially disambiguate the 
psychological parameters which underlie one’s decision to cheap-ride, 
cooperate, and free-ride on a taxed, or repayment-bound benefit. 
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Chapter 4 
 
Gratefully received, Gratefully Retaliate, or Cheap-rode? Examining the 
Role of emotion in Cheap-riding in Economic Exchanges  
 
 
(Experiment 2) 
A version of the present chapter has been presented as: 
Ma, L.K., Tunney,  R.J., & Ferguson, E. (2014). Why cooperate if being a nice 
guy does not pay? Implications on Situational and Dispositional Determinants 
of ‘Cheap-riding’ Behaviours. Poster presented at the British Society for the 
Psychology of Individual Differences (BSPID) Annual Conference 2014, City 
University of London 
Ma, L.K., Tunney, R.J., & Ferguson, E. (2015). Gratefully Perceived, 
Gratefully Rejected, or Repaid?—The role of gratitude and perceived fairness 
in economic interactions. Poster presented at the 16th International Conference 
on Social Dilemmas (ICSD), Chinese University of Hong Kong. 
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4.0. Overview of Chapter 4 
I observed a non-negligible degree of cheap-riding in Experiment 1 
among participants who accepted the injunctively unfair offers. Cheap-riding at 
present was operationally defined as a recipients’ partial repayment of an 
accepted conditional offer. While speculations had been raised on why people 
would engage in such an economically irrational act (e.g. provisions of ‘Just 
Deserts’ (Weinsetein, 2011; Wenzel & Thielmann, 2006)) all these warranted 
empirical scrutiny which belongs to the focus of the present chapter. 
Additionally, the small fractions of recipients i) being ‘eligible’ to (i.e. 21/ 61= 
34%; N = 21), and ii) deciding to (i.e. 8/61= 13.1%; N = 8), under-repay their 
conditional offers in Experiment 1further necessitates a relatively less under-
sampled and more customized follow-up investigation in Experiment 2.  
Despite being a sparingly examined research topic the notion cheap-
riding has been discussed (or even examined) in different domains. Those 
included, but not confined to, the i) Public Goods Game (e.g. Asch et al., 1993; 
Bchir & Willinger, 2013; Isaac, Schmidtz, & Walker, 1989), ii) Marketing (e.g. 
Krishnamurthy, 2000; Roma & Perrone, 2010; Scherer, 1993), and even the iii) 
International Relations (e.g. Borcherding, 1981; Kennedy, 2015; Lu, 2016; 
Oneal, 1990) literature. As such, cheap-riding—which is conceptualised as a 
potential contributor’s endeavour to piggyback on the high contributions of 
others (e.g. ones’ teammates) (Stigler, 1974; Thompson, 1987)—should be far 
from just an experimental artefact. 
However, none of the abovementioned empirical works had touched 
upon the psychology behind cheap-riding. To date there is still a gap in the 
literature on the role of emotions in inciting, and potentially sustaining, cheap-
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riding. Thus, to fill this gap—which constitutes another crucial objective of the 
present chapter—I examined the psychological correlates (e.g. state gratitude, 
indebtedness, or even experienced warm-glow (Ferguson & Flynn, 2016) etc.) 
of cheap-riding in the present economic exchange context.  
I administered a one-shot game that specifically scrutinised i) the 
‘baseline’ response (i.e. to fully repay (‘cooperate’), utterly not repay (‘free-
ride’), or just partially repay (‘cheap-ride’) to a ‘non-free’ conditional offer 
(Ma et al., 2014), and importantly, ii) whether the benefit-triggered state 
gratitude (Lambert et al., 2009) and indebtedness (Greenberg & Shapiro, 1971; 
Hatfield & Sprecher, 1983) will be predictive of people’s cheap-riding 
decisions. Via this one-shot, variant of Trust Game I assessed also the motives 
(which will be discussed later) behind recipients’ repayment decisions. In so 
doing I explored whether cheap-riding would, compared to cooperation and 
free-riding, be originated from a unique pattern of psychological correlates.        
In the present game each participant played in pairs with an 
anonymous—in reality fictitious —‘partner’. Unlike Experiment 1, all 
participants (N =135) were pre-programmed to ‘lose out’ on the dice-rolling 
and were accordingly entitled to zero bonus. Participants then received an offer 
from their ‘fortunate’, victorious partners. All these offers were conditional, as 
recipients learned that upon acceptance they all undertook an obligation to 
repay. Acceptors (N = 87) were then allowed to decide whether to a) pay up in 
full (i.e. ‘cooperating’, N = 59), b) to ‘cheap-ride’ via just giving back partially 
(N = 17); or c) to entirely evade the payment (i.e. ‘free-riding’, N = 11).  
In short, Experiment 2 should represent a continuation of Experiment 1 
by featuring a more focused and comprehensive investigation into cheap-riding. 
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Additionally, via the psychometrics I examined how gratitude (as both a state 
and a disposition) and indebtedness (as a state) would be related to one’s 
trustworthiness or the lack thereof (i.e.to breach a repayment ‘contract’ via 
cheap- or free-riding). Furthermore, by examining the motives of repayment I 
endeavoured to disentangle the psychology of cheap-riders from that of the 
cooperators and that of the free-riders.    
4.1. Introduction 
4.1.1. What Cheap-riding constitutes?  
Experiment 1 showed that participants when subjected to normative 
unfairness (Elster, 2006) would react by partially breaching a repayment 
obligation. I termed this deliberate, reduced back-transfer ‘cheap-riding’ in the 
present thesis. Indeed, cheap-riding in the wider literature was similarly 
conceptualised as a contributor’s endeavours to just give as little as possible 
(Asch et al., 1993; Cornes & Sandler, 1984) with the intention to exploit the 
other contributors’ high contributions (Thompson, 1987). Thus, as opposed to a 
total avoidance of contribution which is commonly understood as ‘free-riding’ 
(Krishnamurthy, 2000; Olson & Perl, 2005), cheap-riding is characterised by, a) 
contributing the bare minimum (Schmitz, 1995), and crucially, b) the cheap-
riders’ cost (i.e. their non-zero inputs) being outweighed by their share of 
benefits (Kennedy, 2015; Olson & Zeckhauser, 1966).   
While the cheap-riding has been empirically examined in the Public 
Goods Games literature (e.g. Bchir & Willinger, 2013; Marks, Lehr, & 
Brastow, 2006; Isaac et al., 1989), as abovementioned there is also evidence 
that cheap-riding indeed exists in myriads of interpersonal, societal, or even 
international contexts. Those include and are certainly not limited to, 1) 
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churchgoers contributing ‘relatively little to their congregations (pp.125)’ as 
they take advantage of ‘a few members who contribute far more than their 
“fair” share (pp.125)’ (Olson & Perl, 2005); 2) other nations’ exploitation (via 
their respective internal healthcare policy-making) of the American 
pharmaceutical manufacturers’ Research-and-Development efforts (Scherer, 
1993); 3) the alleged inadequate efforts from China in global energy security 
preservation (Kennedy, 2015); and 4) the United States shouldering an 
overwhelming burden of military defence against the Soviet Union relative to 
her fellow NATO member states such as Japan and France (Thompson, 1987). 
4.1.2. The Main Objectives of the present Experiment  
Nonetheless, it remains unaddressed as of what motivates people to 
cheap-ride (especially when ‘free-riding’ is a feasible option). This 
phenomenon appears counterintuitive because it deviates from what is normally 
expected from a rational, profit-maximizing economic agent. As reiterated in 
Chapter 3, the conditional offer acceptors could have defaulted at ‘full throttle’ 
with neither possibility of being recognised (and accordingly reprimanded), nor 
incentives to manage reputations (Güney & Newell, 2013) thanks to the double-
anonymous, one-shot game design (e.g. Hoffman et al., 1994). Meanwhile, 
shirking from an obligation, albeit incompletely, hardly constitutes the most 
moral gesture either. Taken together, cheap-riding should make little sense from 
a rationality standpoint, therefore hinting that psychological factors may instead 
underlie people’s decisions to cheap-ride.  
As addressed in Section 4.0, despite the existing coverage in the wider 
literature it remains unexamined in regards the psychological correlates of 
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cheap-riding. Specifically, to date there is still an absence of empirical 
assessment of the role of emotions in inciting or restraining cheap-riding. 
Accordingly, one important objective of Experiment 2 concerns the scrutiny of 
the psychological correlates of cheap-riding. Importantly, via Experiment 2 I 
intended to disambiguate the psychology among people who choose to i) 
stubbornly adhere to a prior commitment despite temptations to default (i.e. 
cooperating); ii) make the most out of every possible means in pursuit of self-
gain (i.e. free-riding); and iii) somewhat cross the ‘moral’ line by breaching the 
contract (Shavell, 1980) but refuse to free-ride on others (i.e. cheap-riding).  
The present chapter also shed light on an alternative aspect of the 
gratitude-prosociality association. That is, the role of state and dispositional 
gratitude in restraining sanctioning behaviours (i.e. the Moral Motive 
Hypothesis of Gratitude (McCullough et al., 2001; McCullough et al., 2008)) in 
cheap- or free-riding at present. Data of Experiment 1 highlighted the role of 
gratitude in conjunction with intent attributions—both of which were subjected 
to the injunctive norm (Cialdini et al. 1990; Kallgren et al., 2000) — in 
prompting prosocial intention following the receipt of a normatively fair 
benefit. Experiment 2, in contrast, would examine how gratitude would serve to 
mitigate cheap- or free-riding as triggered by a normatively unfair benefit.  
Analyses of Experiment 1 also revealed the well-documented divergent 
routes via which indebtedness and gratitude were related to increased, direct 
reciprocal intentions (Schaumberg & Flynn, 2009; Watkins et al., 2006; Tsang, 
2006b). Feeling of indebtedness was shown to also correlate with prosocial 
intentions (i.e. ‘willingness to reciprocate’), although this correlation, unlike 
gratitude, was independent of whether the offer was fair (See Chapter 3).  
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Meanwhile, Greenberg and colleagues (Greenberg, 1980; Greenberg and 
Westcott, 1983) had theorised that indebtedness could instigate a benefit-
triggered sanctioning response, following a distorted benefit re-appraisal which 
is intended to manage one’s feeling of indebtedness (Hatfield & Sprecher, 
1983) (See Chapters 1 and 3). While this theory was not confirmed (See 
Chapter 3), the evidently small sample (i.e. N = 21) eligible for the analyses in 
Experiment 1 certainly makes it difficult to rule out the possibility that the 
theory is still valid. Therefore, via a less under-sampled experiment—in which 
135 participants would be subjected to a normatively unfair treatment (i.e. a 
conditional offer receipt)—I strive to re-examine the hypothesised 
indebtedness-sanctioning link via benefit appraisals (i.e. the Cognitive 
Restructuring Hypothesis (Greenberg, 1980; Greenberg & Westcott, 1983)). 
 It is, meanwhile, worthwhile to point out that the chronological order of 
the present three experiments and the meta-analysis was not identical to the 
ordering of the present thesis. The meta-analysis (i.e. Chapter 2) on the 
gratitude-prosociality association was indeed conducted after the completion of 
data collection of Experiments 1 to 3 (i.e. Chapters 3 to 5). Indeed, as outlined 
in Chapter 2 there is considerable inconsistency in the literature in regards how 
strongly gratitude (as a state or a disposition) is linked toward prosociality. 
This, coupled with the non-existence of empirical works on the indebtedness-
prosociality link, should render any valid a-priori power analyses to estimate 
the necessary Ns very difficult. A more in-depth discussion about the statistical 
power issue and the null findings of Experiments 1 to 3 will be featured in the 
General Discussion chapter (i.e. Chapter 6).        
4.1.3. Possible Factors behind Cheap-riding 
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 Below (i.e. Sub-sections 4.1.3.1 and 4.1.3.2) I discuss certain key 
factors that may contribute to or undermine cheap-riding. They included the 
provision of ‘Just Deserts’ (Weinstein, 2011), gratitude and indebtedness.      
4.1.3.1. Provision of ‘Just Deserts’ (Carlsmith, Darley, & Robinson, 2002)  
 One suggested possible motive behind cheap-riding in Experiment 1 lies 
in the provision of ‘Just Deserts’ (Darley, Carlsmith, & Robinson, 2000; Santos 
& Rivera, 2015). That is, via paying back partially the cheap-riders intended to 
communicate their discontent with their helpers’ belittlement of normative 
fairness, and that the amount repaid should be indicative of what they perceived 
their helpers ‘genuinely deserved’(Ma et al., 2014). This explanation resonates 
with the ‘Just Deserts’ Theory of Retribution (Carlsmith et al., 2002; 
Starkweather, 1992; Wong, 2006) which argues that punishment cannot be 
equated to sheer vengeance, as a fair punisher will also contemplate how a 
punishment would measure up to the damage done (Moore, 1997). 
Accordingly, an appropriate sanction should be one that is proportionate to the 
initial harm so that the ‘moral balance’ can be restored following the 
implementation of such (Dyckman, 1998; Wenzel & Thielmann, 2006).  
 Going back to the cheap-riding situation of Experiment 1, participants 
were aware a priori that their repayment (or the lack thereof) would indeed 
affect their co-players’ ultimate payoffs. As a result, to cheap-ride—when free-
riding was also feasible and clearly a more rational choice—in this situation can 
be interpreted as the recipients trying to convey a message like: ‘You are a 
cheapskate and I am having a go at you for that, and I’d like you to have a re-
think of what you did!’ Thus, these cheap-riders were making a case that the 
helpers deserved their comeuppances, and hopefully this may get the helpers to 
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repent a bit and stop doing that to others in the future (Ma et al., 2014). It is 
worth noting that cheap-riding of this kind should transcend beyond the simple 
negative ‘tit-for-tat’ (Brown, 1986), given that the main purpose of cheap-riding 
here is not about avenging oneself (if that is the case people should have ‘free-
rode’ instead), but for preserving mutual adherence to normative fairness in the 
long run (i.e. ‘Strong Reciprocity’, Bowles and Gintis (2004)).  
Building on this logic, dodging the repayment in its entirety (i.e. free-
riding) may have defeated this purpose. That is because the null payment may 
offer the perfect excuse for any ‘free-rode’ helpers to retrospectively rationalise 
their initial miserliness (Carroll & Meeks, 1999). As a result, not only will these 
norm-breaking helpers refuse to repent their own misdeed, they will also be 
livid with the recipients’ hostile gestures and therefore become even more 
inclined to be ungenerous to others in the future (Ma et al., 2014). 
 Cheap-riding, on the contrary, should give rise to a lower likelihood for 
such a self-justification. I argued that the act of cheap-riding may propel the 
helpers to ponder why they were just partially but not totally defaulted. 
Consequently, these ‘cheap-rode’ helpers should be more able to think through 
if their initial fairness-violating act (i.e. only helped conditionally) was what 
earned them the partial under-repayment (Ma et al., 2014).     
  Taken together, this whole ‘Just Desert’ perspective of sanction 
(Carlsmith et al., 2002; Darley et al., 2000) would argue that cheap-riding may 
serve a similar purpose as altruistic punishment (Boyd, Gintis, Bowles, & 
Richerson, 2003; Fehr & Gächter, 2002; Fowler, 2005) as an enforcer of 
normative fairness (Fehr, Fischbacher, & Gächter, 2002) . That is, via incurring 
a cost to themselves in their partial repayment the cheap-riders aimed to incite 
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more prosociality (in the form of normatively fair behaviours) from their 
partners in the future (See Boyd et al., 2003; Egas & Ridel, 2008).  
4.1.3.2. Gratitude, Indebtedness, and Cheap-riding 
As the present thesis primarily concerns the investigation into how 
gratitude nurtures cooperativeness in economic exchanges, there is no reason to 
not look into how gratitude (as a state or a trait) may relate to cheap-riding. 
Below I discuss also how state indebtedness might prompt cheap-riding.   
1) Gratitude and Cheap-riding 
McCullough and associates (McCullough et al., 2001; McCullough and 
Tsang, 2004; McCullough et al., 2008) maintained that gratitude fosters 
endeavours to repay the benefactors’ kindness via one of its fundamental 
functions as a moral motive (i.e. the ‘Moral Motive’ Hypothesis). This Moral 
Motive perspective stipulates that the gratitude emotion should push the 
recipient toward not only contributing to the benefactors’ future well-being, but 
also the inhibition of any destructive acts toward whom gratitude was felt.   
Moreover, the Moral Barometer Hypothesis of gratitude (McCullough, 
et al., 2001) argues that the mere presence (or absence) of the gratitude 
experience already signals to a recipient whether a benefit was worth feeling 
grateful for. People only experience gratitude toward a benefit if certain 
parameters are met (McCullough et al., 2008). They included; a) a recognition 
that the benefit symbolises a token of benevolence; b) a perception that the 
benefit is of value; and c) the knowledge about the intentionality of the 
conferment of that benefit (i.e. whether that was by chance or deliberate). 
Thus, the above two moral hypotheses of gratitude imply that gratitude and the 
punishment of one’s benefactor should have no room for co-existence. 
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Nonetheless, as addressed above cheap-riding at present should represent a 
punitive act which is intended to serve a correctional purpose in the long run 
(Egas & Ridel, 2008; Fehr et al., 2002)—as the cheap-riders believed that via 
giving the helpers their ‘just deserts’ (Carlsmith et al., 2002; Darley, 2001; 
Darley et al., 2000) the latter will make amends by showing more adherence to 
the fairness norm in the future (Ma et al., 2014). As a result, it should be 
impossible to fathom a situation in which on one hand, someone feels grateful 
toward a helper’s benevolence but at the same time, still feels like punishing 
that very same helper to assure that he/she will treat others better in the future.   
 The Social-Cognitive Model of Gratitude (i.e. SCMG (Wood et al., 
2008) theorised that people with high dispositional gratitude have a tendency to 
see the positives in the daily encounters. Thus these people should be more 
prone to ‘over-rate’ the benefits bestowed upon them (by perceiving more 
kindness in the benefit conferment), which should be translated to more intense 
feelings of gratitude (Nadler, 2012; Tsang, 2006b), and ultimately a higher 
tendency to return the kindness (See Tsang, 2006a, 2007; Tsang et al., 2012). 
Building upon this sequence of reasoning, there is again no reason to argue that 
dispositional gratitude would in any way encourage any punitive acts toward 
the benefactors in cheap- or free-riding. On the contrary, the SCMG should 
predict an inverse, indirect relationship between dispositional gratitude and 
defaulting (cheap- and free-riding inclusive) that is serially mediated (Hayes, 
2013) by i) benefit appraisals, followed by ii) state gratitude. See Figure 4.1. 
 
 
Figure 4.1 The SCMG (Wood et al., 2008) Predictions on Cheap-/Free-riding 
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2) Indebtedness and Cheap-riding 
Greenberg and Westcott (1983) theorised that there are two major 
avenues through which a recipient could manage his/her benefit-triggered 
feeling of indebtedness. They are, 1) direct or indirect reciprocation; and 2) 
Cognitive Restructuring. While the former can be likened to the act of paying 
off a debt (Schaumberg & Flynn, 2009), the latter entails a re-appraisal of the 
exchange which, in the first place, prompted indebtedness (Greenberg, 1980). 
Specifically, a recipient may revisit and accordingly query his/her initial 
appraisal of the whole benefit conferment scenario. Questions such as ‘Was the 
gift really that kind-intentioned?’ or ‘Was it really that much of a fuss for that 
helper to have benefited me?’ may be pondered over (Greenberg, 1980). All 
these thinking may—as theorised by Greenberg and Westcott (1983)—give rise 
to a negative and possibly distorted re-assessment of the benefit exchange (e.g. 
‘He/she is helping me because he/she has a ‘benevolent’ reputation to 
maintain), which accordingly rids the recipients of any indebtedness-invoked 
discomfort (Greenberg & Shaprio, 1971).  
Additionally, the link between perceived negative intent and sanctioning 
has been well documented in the experimental economics literature (Fehr & 
Gächter, 2002; Falk & Fischbacher, 2006).As reiterated throughout the present 
thesis, cheap-riding in this context exemplifies a form of sanction intended for 
norm enforcement (Ma et al., 2014; Weinstein, 2011). Thus, the Cognitive 
Restructuring Hypothesis (i.e. CRH) (Greenberg, 1980; Greenberg & Westcott, 
1983) will argue that benefit-triggered indebtedness may prompt a more cynical 
benefit re-appraisal—which should comprise a perception of ill intent from the 
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helper (Hatfield & Sprecher, 1983), with that perceived malice ultimately 
leading to a sanctioning response in cheap-riding. 
4.1.4. Exploratory Aims of Experiment 2 
Overall, via Experiment 2 I intended to complement Experiment 1 and 
examine how emotions (especially gratitude and indebtedness) would relate to 
cheap-riding in an economic game context. These were achieved with the 
assistance of a one-shot game that is similar to the one used in Experiment 1 
(See Section 4.2 for details about the experimental design and rationales). 
Below (i.e. Sub-sections 4.1.4.1 and 4.1.4.2) I summarise the two principal 
exploratory aims and the respective predictions of Experiment 2.  
4.1.4.1. Exploratory Aim 1: Does more (normative) unfairness count?  
Chapter 3 indicated that people would respond differently upon receipt 
of a normatively fair (i.e. ‘unconditional’ offer) as opposed to an unfair (i.e. 
‘conditional’ offer) treatment. Particularly, the serial mediational model (See 
Chapter 3) emphatically corroborated the significance of the injunctive fairness 
norm (Elster, 2006; Paddock, 2005) in guiding a positive helper intent 
attribution, which then prompts gratitude and ultimately a (direct) reciprocal 
intention. The behavioural data evidenced a display of sanctioning (mostly in 
the form of cheap-riding) among those unfairly treated recipients.  
Via Experiment 2 I intend to further look into one interesting issue: is 
there an ‘all-or-nothing’ threshold for fairness attribution? Data of Experiment 
1 revealed an absence of differences in emotional and behavioural responses 
from recipients of offers of varying conditionality, implying that an increasing 
extent of unfairness would not bother the recipients. Since the injunctive norm 
stipulated that a fair gesture in Experiment 1 entails the provision of a ‘free’ 
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help (Elster, 2006; Frey & Bohnet, 1995), the varying extent of expected 
repayment (i.e. conditionality) should connote different ‘severity’ of violation 
in normative fairness (Cialdini et al., 1990). As such, it should be logical to 
anticipate a graded pattern of i) emotional negativity (e.g. more indebtedness) 
so as positivity (e.g. less gratitude) towards, or ii) an overt sanctioning (e.g. 
cheap- or free-riding) against, offers with increasing (normative) unfairness. 
Hence, one principal exploratory aim of Experiment 2—in which 135 
participants were all due to receive an unfair conditional offer— entails how the 
increasing normative unfairness would relate to more emotional negativity (e.g. 
more indebtedness and less gratitude) and sanctioning (i.e. cheap-ride or free-
ride). Similar to Experiment 1, participants acknowledged that their helpers had 
not legitimately ‘earned’ their positions as potential helpers (Fahr & Irlenbusch, 
2000; Frey & Bohnet, 1995; Hoffman et al., 1994), thus all repayment 
obligations attached to the offer should constitute no moral legitimacy (Elster, 
2006). As a result, all offers in Experiment 2 should be in principle normatively 
unfair (Ma et al., 2014), with the severity of this unfairness being a 
manipulation at present (see Section 4.2 for details). 
4.1.4.2. Exploratory Aim 2: The Psychology of Cheap-riders  
Further to scrutiny over how situations (i.e. injunctive unfairness) could 
contribute to people’s decision to cheap-ride, a key objective of Experiment 2 
entails the analysis the psychological correlates of cheap-riding. First, I 
analysed benefit-triggered emotions (i.e. the ‘pre-repayment emotions) would 
predict people’s repayment decisions. The current analysis would in particular 
shed light upon how state gratitude and indebtedness will be associated with 
participants’ sanctioning decisions (i.e. cheap- or free-riding). 
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1) Affective Gratitude, Indebtedness and Sanctioning in Experiment 2 
As elaborated above (i.e., sub-section 4.1.3.2) emotional gratitude, 
thanks to its two moral functions as a moral barometer and moral motive 
(McCullough et al., 2001; McCullough et al., 2008), should in no way promote 
endeavours to harm the benefactors’ well-being. Hence, a strong inverse 
relationship between recipients’ state gratitude and the magnitude of under-
repayment should be expected. I also predicted a sharp contrast between the 
cooperators’ state gratitude and that of both the cheap-riders and free-riders. 
By contrast, state indebtedness could incite cognitive restructuring 
which results in perceptions of malicious intent in the helpers’ gestures, with 
these negative attributions capable of inciting sanctioning behaviours. 
Greenberg and Westcott (1983) also stated that a double-blinded, one-shot 
exchange context will constitute an ideal breeding platform for Cognitive 
Restructuring to be resorted to ahead of reciprocation. Given that both these 
features were retained in the present game, it should be logical to predict a 
positive, indirect link between state indebtedness and magnitude of under-
payment which is mediated by benefit appraisals. Figure 4.2 illustrates the path 
model outlined by this Cognitive Restructuring Hypothesis (CRH). 
 
Figure 4.2 The CRH: effect of state indebtedness on under-repayment.  
2) Differentiating Cheap-riding, Cooperating and Free-riding  
Via eleven post-repayment survey items (as detailed in Table 4.1 below) 
I specifically probed into the motives behind the offer acceptors’ various 
repayment decisions (i.e. to cheap-ride, cooperate or free-ride). Four items were 
adapted from Ferguson and Flynn (2016) to measure experienced warm-glow 
State Indebtedness (Is) Benefit Appraisal 
(BA) 
Under-repayment % (UR %) 
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(Cronbach’s  = .802, N of items = 4) Warm-glow is defined as a sense of 
internal satisfaction derived from a person’s act of cooperativeness (Andreoni, 
1990; Harbaugh, 1998; Holmes, 2009) which has been extensively proven to 
underlie prosociality in the experimental economics literature (e.g. Khanna et 
al., 1995; Carpenter et al., 2008; Crumpler & Grossman, 2008). Hence, there is 
no reason to overlook how warm-glow may at present foster trustworthiness 
(i.e. cooperativeness) among the acceptors—thus in a way undermine their urge 
to cheap- or to free-ride.  An example item will be ‘It made me feel emotionally 
positive about myself to have repaid (or have avoided the repayment).’ 
Table 4.1. Survey Items for Repayment Motives   
Questions Adapted From 
The fact that I repaid/did not repay made me feel good about myself Experienced Warm-Glow (EWG) 
(Ferguson & Flynn, 2016) 
It made me feel emotionally positive about myself to have 
repaid/have avoided the repayment 
Ferguson and Flynn (2016)- EWG 
I feel irritated by my partner's request for a repayment. Self-created—NTFT 
My repayment left me with a feeling of 'warm glow' inside Ferguson and Flynn (2016)- EWG 
I see my Repayment/Non-repayment as a means to punish my 
partner for his/her unreasonable request. 
Self-created—NTFT 
I would feel guilty if I didn't stick with my repayment decision. Ferguson and Flynn (2016)- EWG 
The way I responded to my partner's offer is the most appropriate 
way to restore fairness between myself and my partner . 
Self-created—Just Desert 
I see my Repayment/Non-repayment as a retaliatory act against my 
partner's offer 
Self-created—NTFT 
I see my repayment/non-repayment best signifies how grateful I feel 
towards my partner. 
Self-created—NTFT*  
By repaying/not repaying, I manage to offer my partner what he/she 
truly deserves. 
Self-created—Just Desert 
I repaid/ did not repay because I endeavoured to attain a relatively 
more equal payoff distribution between me and my partner 
Self-created—Just Desert 
*Reverse-scored for the Reliability Analysis. NTFT= Negative ‘Tit-for-Tat’ 
 
Three self-created items (Cronbach’s  = .649, N of items = 3) were 
included to measure whether the urge to provide the helpers with their ‘just 
deserts’ (Carlsmith et al., 2002; Darley, 2001; Weinstein, 2011) will be related 
to the acceptors’ decision to cheap-ride. An example item will be ‘By repaying 
or not repaying, I manage to offer my partner what he/she truly deserves’. I 
further included four self-created items (Cronbach’s  = .650, N  of items = 4) 
to measure how an acceptor’s negative ‘tit-for-tat’ (i.e. NTFT) mentality 
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(Brown, 1986; Massey, 2009) will be related to his/her cheap- or free-riding 
decisions. An example item will be ‘I see my repayment or non-repayment as a 
means to punish my partner for his or her unreasonable request’. 
Taken together, via these eleven survey items (See Table 4.1) I intended 
to gather an insight into the mindset of a cheap-rider at present. And more 
importantly, I endeavoured to underscore if, and how, such a cheap-rider’s 
mindset will deviate from that of a cooperator and of a free-rider.  
3) Dispositional Gratitude and Under-repayment 
 
 
Figure 4.3 The SCMG serially mediated prediction of DG on Under-repayment 
 I tested how benefit appraisals and state gratitude could serially 
mediate (Hayes, 2013) the path between dispositional gratitude and under-
repayment percentage (as an inverse measure of trustworthiness). Hence, by 
testing the path model as illustrated in Figure 4.3 I examined if dispositional 
gratitude would restrain defaulting (both cheap- and free-riding inclusive) the 
way as theorised in the Social Cognitive Model of Gratitude (SCMG) (Wood et 
al., 2008). This under-repayment percentage (i.e. UR %) is given by the 
formula: ‘[Obligated Repayment - Actual Repayment] * 100%. 
4.2. Methods 
4.2.1. Participants 
One hundred and thirty-five students from The University of 
Nottingham participated in Experiment 2 (81 were females, mean age: 21.1 
years, SD = 3.6 years). Each participant was paid an inconvenience allowance 
of £2 and was aware that they could earn up to £3.50 more. 
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4.2.2. Game and its Rationale 
 The experiment was administered using Z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). To 
begin with, each participant was seated in a separate cubicle and asked to read 
the instructions. Each session took place with groups of four to ten. All 
participants played the game on their own although they were told that they 
each would play with a random partner (i.e. a fellow participant) in pairs. 
 Each player was initially endowed with 150 money-equivalent ‘Bonus 
Points’ and was aware that he/she needed at least 50 points more to reach the 
‘Bonus Threshold’ (i.e. 200) .Reaching this 200-point mark (i.e. Bonus 
Threshold’), by rolling the fair, six-sided dice once, was the only way 
participants could leave the experiment with any additional bonus money. The 
possible payoffs were a loss of 50 points, 0 points, and gains of 50, 100, 150, 
and 200 points. It was again emphasised that the magnitude of the number 
rolled had no direct association with the final allocations of bonus points.  
Each player then learned that he/she had an in-game, unidentifiable and 
anonymous ‘partner’. Neither competitions nor collaboration with this ‘partner’ 
would be necessary. Regardless of the actual die-roll, participants were all pre-
programmed to end up with only 100 points which were below the 200-point 
threshold, leaving them zero bonuses. Each participant then learned that his/her 
‘partner’ had emerged ‘victorious’ by acquiring 350 points at the end, entitling 
them to a £3.50 bonus. In short, unlike Experiment 1, all participants in the 
current game were potential recipients (i.e. P2s).  
4.2.3. Receipts of the Normatively Unfair, Conditional offers 
All participants then learned that their partners had offered to entrust 
part of their excess bonus points (i.e. 150) to help them attain that 200-point 
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mark. Specifically, by accepting these offers—which enabled the recipients to 
earn some bonus money—these acceptors took on the obligation to make 
varying back-transfers (out of their new earnings) to their helpers. Indeed, the 
lack of moral legitimacy for a ‘winner’ to make his/her sharing conditional in 
this particular context had been reiterated throughout the chapters. Thus, all 
offers as presently constructed should be injunctively unfair. 
4.2.4. Manipulating Conditionality: Does more unfairness matter? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.4. The sequence of behavioural decisions to be made by a participant 
I manipulated this normative unfairness across offers by subjecting 
recipients to offers with varying conditionalities. These included; an ‘Interest-
free’ offer where the acceptors only had to repay the ‘principal’ (N = 32); or a 
‘surcharged’ offer whereby acceptors would repay the principal plus an interest 
charge. The levels of these interest charges were further manipulated as a 
Cheap-riders to INDICATE specifically How Much they would like to repay their partners   
Die-rolling 
(Endowment- 150; 
Bonus Threshold- 200) 
Failure to reach the 200-
point mark—i.e. a 
‘donation’ is warranted 
 
Receipt of a Conditional offer (Manipulation of Normative Unfairness) 
 
Interest-Free 
(N= 32) 
12.5% Interest 
(N= 33) 
25% Interest 
(N= 34) 
50% Interest 
(N= 36) 
Recipients to Accept or Decline the offer 
Accepted  Rejected  
Reminder of Obligated Repayment shown  
Repay as agreed (i.e. 
Cooperate) 
Repay NOTHING 
(i.e. Free-ride)  
 
Repay SOMETHING (i.e. 
Cheap-ride) 
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participant could receive either a 12.5%- (N = 33); or a 25%- (N = 34) or a 
50%-Interest offer (N = 36). Recipients were told upfront and later on reminded 
that it would make more financial sense accepting the offer (in spite of the 
repayment) than rejecting that. Recipients at this stage had no idea about a) the 
availability of alternative offers; and 2) the non-binding nature of the repayment 
clause. Figure 4.4 illustrates the flow of behavioural decisions. 
4.2.5. Recipients’ Emotional Reactions toward the unfair offers 
 
Table 4.2 Pre-repayment Survey Items 
Pre-repayment Survey Items Constructs  
I am annoyed by my partner’s decision State Annoyance 
How much gratitude would you feel towards your partner?  State Gratitude 
I feel indebted to my partner State Indebtedness 
How much do you consider your partner's transfer is motivated by his/her 
sincere desire to help you?’  
Perceived Genuine 
Helpfulness 
I feel obliged to repay my partner. State Obligation 
My partner was being fair to have offered his/her help Perceived Fairness 
My partner's decision is reasonable. Perceived Reasonableness 
My partner's decision is understandable. Understandability 
How valuable do you consider that your partner's help is to you?  Perceived Value in Help 
How much did it cost your partner to help you (1: Nothing; 7: A Great Deal) Perceived Cost to Helper 
I am eager to help my partner out if he/she is in need in the near future Reciprocity Tendency 
 
Recipients then rated items (i.e. pre-repayment ratings) in relation to 
their offer-triggered emotions. Table 4.2 presents the list of items and the 
psychological constructs represented by each of them. Particularly, the item 
‘how much gratitude would you feel towards your partner’ was adopted to 
represent the construct state gratitude at present, which was used to examine 
the current gratitude-related hypotheses such as i) the Moral Barometer and 
Moral Motive Hypothesis of Gratitude (McCullough et al., 2001; McCullough 
et al., 2008), and ii) the Social Cognitive Model of Gratitude (SCMG) (Wood et 
al., 2008). The item ‘I feel indebted to my partner’ will represent the construct 
state indebtedness that is tested in the present Cognitive Restructuring 
Hypothesis (CRH) (Greenberg, 1980; Greenberg & Westcott, 1983). 
Additionally, following Wood et al.’s (2008) procedures, I averaged the three 
items ‘Perceived Value in Help’, ‘Perceived Genuine Helpfulness’ and 
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‘Perceived Cost to Helpers’ to form the composite ‘Benefit Appraisals’ 
(Cronbach’s  = .691, N of items = 3) —which is indeed an integral component 
in both the Social Cognitive Model of Gratitude (Wood et al., 2008) and 
Cognitive Restructuring Hypothesis (Greenberg & Westcott, 1983). 
4.2.6. Behavioural Repayment Decisions
Figure 4.5 An example reminder of obligated repayment among offer acceptors 
 Participants who accepted their offers were then shown onscreen a 
reminder of how much they were expected to repay (See Figure 4.5). 
Immediately after that reminder participants were facing a forced-choices 
scenario as they contemplated whether to repay a) ‘Nothing At All’ (i.e. free-
riding), b) ‘Some of the Agreed Amount’ (i.e. cheap-riding), or c) ‘the Whole 
of the Agreed Repayment’ (i.e. cooperating). Participants who selected to 
cheap-ride were then instructed to specify the magnitude of their desired 
repayment (See Figure 4.4). I conceded that while this explicit segregation  
facilitated the categorisation of repayment this may have also brought forth the 
‘Response Effect’ that might have predisposed the participants into selecting a 
particular option (Feldman, 1989; Zaller & Feldman, 1992). Refer to the 
General Discussion chapter (Chapter 6) for more discussions about the 
‘Response Effect’ and how that may be resolved in future investigations. 
4.2.7. Reasons for Repaying (or not repaying) 
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Immediately after repaying participants were instructed to rate 11 items 
(See Figure 4.5) that served to explore the motives behind the way they repaid 
or (did not repay). Sub-section 4.1.4.2 detailed the rationales for the inclusion 
of these items  Participants were then shown onscreen their respective 
compensations, and consequently asked to fill out two questionnaires, namely 
the i) Impression Management Scale (i.e. IMS) (Paulhus, 1991), ii) Gratitude 
Questionnaire-VI (i.e. GQ-VI) (McCullough et al., 2002). Via the IMS 
(Cronbach’s  = .797, N of items = 20) and GQ-VI (Cronbach’s  = .690, N of 
items = 6) I measured respectively, participants’ 1) tendencies to make 
decisions to manage own social impression, and 2) dispositional gratitude. The 
experiment ended here and the participants were debriefed and paid.  
 
Figure 4.5. Post-repayment Survey Items 
 
4.2.8. Ethics Statement 
Experiment 2 was approved by the ethics committee of the School of 
Psychology at the University of Nottingham. All participants were older than 17 
and all provided written, informed consent prior to participation as approved by 
the ethics committee (Approved 14th Aug 2013; Ref. Code: 332). 
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4.3. Results 
4.3.1. Descriptive Data 
All 135 participants received a conditional offer (32 received an 
‘Interest-free’, 33 a ’12.5%-interest’, 34 a ‘25%-interest’ and 36 a ‘50%-
interest’ offer). Of these 48 rejected their offers (i.e. 35.56% (48/135) rejection; 
64.44% (87/135) acceptance, 2 (1, N = 135) = 10.7, p = .0011. Among these 87 
acceptors 59 repaid fully (i.e. cooperate), 11 repaid nothing (i.e. free-ride) and 
17 repaid partially (i.e. cheap-ride). Particularly, these 17 cheap-riders on 
average repaid 56.4% (SD: 31.5) of the obligations, which was not different (U 
= 54.00, p = .744) from that of the seven cheap-riders from Experiment 1 (M: 
58.4%). Figure 4.6 illustrates the present decision tree. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.6. Decision Tree of the participants (N = 135) 
 
4.3.2. Exploratory Aim 1: Does more (normative) unfairness count? 
One key exploratory aim of Experiment 2 entails whether the increasing 
severity of normative unfairness would prompt a graded pattern of emotional 
negativity, and ultimately more sanctioning in the form of cheap- or free-riding. 
Receipt of a’ taxed’ offer of ‘partners’ donation’ (N =135) 
Zero-Interest 
 (N = 32) 
12.5% Interest 
 (N = 33) 
25%-Interest 
 (N = 34) 
50%-Interest 
 (N = 36) 
Recipients to Accept or Decline the offer 
Accepted (N =87) Rejected (N = 48) 
To repay IN FULL  
(i.e. Cooperate, N = 59) 
To repay NOTHING 
(i.e. Free-ride, N = 11)  
 
To repay PARTIALLY 
(i.e. Cheap-ride, N = 17) 
Cheap-riders INDICATED how much they decided to repay (Mean Repayment % 
(i.e. Actual/ Expected repayment * 100%): 56.39 %; SD: 31.53) 
Chapter 4   149 
 
 
 
Below I examined whether the present manipulation of injunctive unfairness 
(i.e. levels of conditionality) would impact on, a) participants’ emotions toward 
the offers (i.e. Sub-section 4.3.2.1); or b) the acceptors’ (N= 87) categorical 
and numerical repayment decisions (i.e. Sub-section 4.3.2.2). 
4.3.2.1. Levels of Conditionality on Emotions towards offer 
A one-way ANOVA was conducted to examine the effect of offer 
conditionality (i.e. Interest-free vs. 12.5%- vs. 25%- vs. 50%-Interest) over 
participants’ offer-triggered emotions. Table 4.3 illustrates the findings. 
Table 4.3. Effect of offer conditionality over Pre-repayment Survey Ratings 
Repayment Obligations (i.e. Levels of Offer Conditionality) 
 Interest-Free 12.5% 25% 50%   
 N M  
(SD) 
N M  
(SD) 
N M  
(SD) 
N M  
(SD) 
F- p 
State 
Gratitude 
32 4.87 
(1.54) 
33 5.00 
(1.35) 
34 4.44 
(1.24) 
36 4.39 
(1.40) 
1.67 .177 
State 
Annoyance 
32 2.34 
(1.41) 
33 2.00 
(1.23) 
34 2.29 
(1.40) 
36 2.86 
(1.73) 
2.10 .104 
State 
Indebtedness 
32 4.16 
(2.13) 
33 4.67 
(1.76) 
34 4.09 
(2.04) 
36 4.64 
(2.00) 
0.81 .490 
Obligation 
to Repay 
32 5.13 
(1.81) 
33 4.67 
(1.90) 
34 5.09 
(1.98) 
36 5.03 
(1.92) 
0.40 .750 
Perceived 
Help Value 
32 5.00 
(1.55) 
33 4.76 
(1.48) 
34 4.50 
(1.50) 
36 4.81 
(1.19) 
0.69 .562 
Perceived 
Fairness 
32 5.06 
(1.34) 
33 5.03 
(1.59) 
34 4.97 
(1.27) 
36 4.58 
(1.57) 
0.82 .486 
Perceived 
Helpfulness 
32 4.16 
(1.59) 
33 4.06 
(1.66) 
34 3.71 
(1.70) 
36 4.31 
(1.75) 
0.80 .498 
Perceived 
Cost to Helper 
32 3.66 
(1.73) 
33 3.88 
(1.83) 
34 3.59 
(1.58) 
36 3.92 
(1.95) 
0.28 .837 
Reciprocity 
Tendency 
32 5.03 
(1.60) 
33 5.24 
(1.62) 
34 5.50 
(1.31) 
36 5.17 
(1.68) 
0.53 .661 
Note.’12.5%’= 12.5%-Interest Offer; ‘25%’= 25%-Interest Offer; ‘50%’ = 50%-Interest Offer 
 
Overall, the data (See Table 4.3) revealed no evidence (all ps >. 10) that 
increasing levels of unfairness had engendered different emotional negativity 
(or positivity). This echoes Experiment 1’s results whereby a more 
unreasonable offer, which in principle epitomises more injunctive unfairness, 
would not irk the recipients (in an existing unfair arrangement) even further. 
Interestingly, results of the independent samples t-tests (See Table 4.4 
below) demonstrated that compared to the 87 acceptors, the 48 rejectors 
reported lower offer-triggered 1) state gratitude, 2) state indebtedness, and 3) a 
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less positive overall benefit appraisal (Wood et al., 2008) (all ps <. 05, two-
tailed). The rejectors also deemed the offers as less reasonable (p = .048) and 
were marginally (p = .061) less willing to reciprocate (Ma et al., 2014). 
Table 4.4 Supplementary Analysis—Independent samples T-Tests on Pre-
repayment Ratings by Decisions to whether Accept or Reject (N= 135)  
 Rejectors Acceptors     
Pre-repayment Ratings N M N M MD df t-value p (2-tailed) 
State Gratitude 48 4.29 87 4.87 0.582 76.3 2.173 .033* 
State Annoyance 48 2.69 87 2.22 0.469 76.8 1.643 .105 
State Indebtedness 48 3.81 87 4.71 0.900 79.9 2.413 .018* 
Obligation to repay 48 4.25 87 5.38 1.129 66.8 3.023 .004* 
Perceived Value in Help 48 4.19 87 5.08 0.893 75.2 3.330 .001** 
Perceived Helpfulness 48 3.88 87 4.44 1.062 133 3.690 <.001*** 
Perceived Cost to Helpers 48 3.35 87 3.99 0.634 133 2.019 .045* 
Benefit Appraisal 48 3.64 87 4.50 0.863 133 3.948 <.001*** 
Tendency to Reciprocate 48 4.88 87 5.44 0.562 79.3 1.901 .061 
Perceived Fairness 48 4.75 87 4.99 0.239 133 0.914 .362 
Reasonableness 48 4.75 87 5.24 0.491 133 1.998 .048* 
Understandability  48 5.27 87 5.03 0.236 133 0.855 .394 
Note. *p <.05 (two-tailed); ** p <.01 (two-tailed); *** p <.001 (two-tailed) 
 
Meanwhile, results of a 2 (Acceptance: Accept vs. Reject) * 4 
(Conditionality: Interest-Free vs. 12.5%- vs. 25%- vs. 50%-Interest) Chi-square 
test revealed no interaction (2 (3) = 3.30, p =. 23) between the two variables. 
These results suggest that not only did the increasing unfairness (i.e. 
conditionality) of the offers not trigger more emotional negativity (less 
positivity), there was no effect on offer acceptances (or rejections) either.   
4.3.2.2. Levels of Conditionality on Acceptors’ Repayment  
I then tested whether a ‘harsher’ offer would prompt more eventual 
sanctioning in cheap- or free-riding among the 87 acceptors. The present 
analyses concerned both the categorical (i.e. cheap-ride vs. free-ride vs. 
cooperate) and the numerical facets of the acceptors’ repayment decisions. The 
latter was given by the metrics under-repayment percentage (i.e. UR %).   
1) Unfairness and Sanctioning (Part 1: Categorical)  
I had to scrap the originally planned 3 (Repayment: Cheap- vs. Free-
riding vs. Cooperating) * 4 (Conditionality) Chi-square test due to the present 
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low counts of both cheap- (N = 17) and free-riders (N = 11), as there will be 
extremely small tally in a few cells (e.g. 1 or 2) which renders the whole 
analysis meaningless. Thus in this specific analysis I aggregated the counts of 
both cheap- and free-riders to create the category defaulters. The 2 (Defaulters 
(N = 28) vs. Cooperators (N = 59)) * 4 (Conditionality) Chi-square test again 
indicated no interaction between the two (2 (3) = 1.58, p =. 68), signalling a 
null effect of varying offer unfairness on acceptors’ decisions to default or not. 
2) Unfairness and Sanctioning (Part 2: Numerical) 
I administered a One-way ANOVA on the effect of offer conditionality on 
the acceptors’ under-repayment rates (i.e. UR %). The results, which were 
summarised in Table 4.5 below, indicated no evidence that more unfairly 
treated acceptors would under-repay more when opportunities beckoned. 
Table 4.5. Effect of Offer Conditionality over UR% 
One-way ANOVA of effect by Offer Conditionality on Acceptors’ (N= 87) UR% 
  N Mean SE df F-value (p, two-tailed) 
Offer Interest-Free 21 16.19 7.29   
Conditionality 12.5%-Interest 24 16.93 6.96   
 25%-Interest 23 20.83 7.98   
 50%-Interest 19 32.42 10.06   
 Overall 87 21.17 3.99 3 0.802 (.496) 
 
Taken together, the present analyses hinted that a more (or less) 
deviation from the injunctive norm of fairness —which stipulated in this 
context that a typical fair ‘winner’ should help the ‘loser’ unconditionally 
especially when the former simply rode his/her luck to that ‘victory’ (Ma et al., 
2014)—did not matter. The analyses revealed neither signs of 1) more 
emotional negativity, nor 2) any different pattern of behavioural responses in 
offer acceptances and sanctioning decisions in cheap- or free-riding, from 
recipients of more unfair offers. These results seemed to give a resounding no 
to the present exploratory aim ‘does more unfairness matter’. Meanwhile, the 
results which showed that acceptors reported more 1) emotional positivity (e.g. 
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state gratitude, reasonableness and so on), and a 2) more positive benefit 
appraisal than rejectors, is certainly an intriguing and somewhat a surprise 
finding that warrants a more in-depth discussion later (See Section 4.4.2). 
4.3.3. Exploratory Aim 2: The Psychology of Cheap-riders 
Another key exploratory aim of Experiment 2 entails the scrutiny of 
psychological correlates of cheap-riding. Thus, the upcoming three sub-sections 
(i.e. 4.3.3.1 to 4.3.3.3) would examine the following topics:  
1) State Gratitude, Indebtedness and Sanctioning (Sub-section 4.3.3.1); 
2) Differentiating Cooperation, Cheap- and Free-riding (Sub-section 4.3.3.2); 
3) Dispositional Gratitude and Cheap-riding (Sub-section 4.3.3.3). 
4.3.3.1 State Gratitude, Indebtedness, and sanctioning 
Throughout this chapter I reiterated why I predicted state gratitude to 
undermine under-repayment (i.e. cheap- and free-riding inclusive) (the Moral 
Motive and Moral Barometer Hypotheses of Gratitude, McCullough et al., 
2001). I discussed also how state indebtedness will indirectly prompt more 
under-repayment via a more cynical benefit appraisal (Cognitive Restructuring 
Hypothesis (CRH), Greenberg and Westcott, 1983)) (Refer to Figure 
4.2).Hence, this sub-section would feature the following analyses:  
i) A Kruskal-Wallis test on the 87 acceptors’ pre-repayment ratings (e.g. state 
gratitude and indebtedness), on the basis of their nominal repayment decisions 
(i.e. to cheap-ride, free-ride or cooperate). Table 4.6 details the statistics;  
ii) A Spearman’s correlational analysis between the acceptors’ pre-repayment 
ratings and their under-repayment rates (UR %). Table 4.7 details the results; 
iii) A path analysis via PROCESS (Hayes, 2013) on the indirect effect of state 
indebtedness over UR%. Table 4.8 and Figure 4.7 present the findings. 
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Table 4.6 Pre-repayment ratings by Acceptors’ repayment decisions (N = 87) 
 Categorical Repayment Decisions (N= 87) 
 Cooperatea Cheap-rideb Free-ridec   
 Median Median Median df H(p-value) 
State Gratitude 5 5 5 2 0.12 (.942) 
State Annoyance 2 2 3 2 3.27 (.195) 
State Indebtedness 5 4 5 2 3.93 (.140) 
Obligation to repay 6 5 5 2 3.34 (.188) 
Benefit Appraisald 4.67 4.67 4 2 1.02 (.601) 
Tendency to Reciprocate 6 6 4 2 11.1 (.004**) 
Reasonableness 5 5 5 2 0.32 (.322) 
Understandability 5 5 5 2 0.20 (.201) 
Perceived Fairness 5 5 5 2 0.94 (.935) 
Note.  aN = 59. bN = 17, cN = 11. **p <.01 (two-sided).  
 
As detailed in Table 4.6, acceptors’ categorical repayment decisions had 
not differentiated (ps > .10) almost all the pre-repayment survey ratings. The 
only exception was the item ‘tendency to reciprocate’ (p = .004), where free-
riders understandably reported feeling less looking forward—than both cheap-
riders (p = .014) and cooperators (p =.003)—to helping their helpers back. In 
short, the present acceptors’ differential repayment choice could not be 
attributed to them experiencing varying gratitude towards the helpers. 
Table 4.7 Spearman’s Correlation between pre-repayment ratings and UR% 
  Gs As Is Ob BA Rec Res Und Fair 
Overall 
UR%  
(N= 87) 
r -.011 .147 -.103 -.187 -.10 -.247 -.155 -.114 -.019 
p .920 .175 .343 .083 .357 .021* .151 .295 .859 
N 87 87 87 87 87 87 87 87 87 
Cheap-
riders’ 
UR% 
r .149 .229 .180 .129 .110 -.010 .045 .240 .200 
p .569 .377 .489 .622 .673 .969 .863 .353 .441 
N 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 
Note. Gs = State Gratitude; As = State Annoyance; Is = State Indebtedness; Ob = Perceived Obligation to 
repay; Fair = Perceived Fairness in; BA= Benefit Appraisal; Rec = Participants’ Eagerness to Reciprocate; 
Res: Reasonableness; Und: Understandability ; Fair: Perceived Fairness; r = Spearman’s rho correlation 
coefficient; p: p-value (two-tailed); * p <. 05 (two-tailed) 
 
The results of the Spearman’s correlational analyses (See Table 4.7) 
further highlighted the absence of associations between the acceptors’ benefit-
triggered emotions and their subsequent repayment (or the lack thereof). Once 
again, the data failed to confirm the prediction that state gratitude would 
diminish or even rule out sanctioning (cheap- and free-riding inclusive). 
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Nevertheless, the current small portions of cheap-riders (N = 17) may render 
the analysis underpowered thus not allowing many conclusions to be drawn. 
Table 4.8 Regression Coefficients, Standard Errors, and Model Summary 
Information for the Path Model (i.e. Figure 4.7) 
 Consequent 
 M (Benefit Appraisal) Y (Under-repayment Rate, UR %) 
Antecedent  Coef SE p  Coef SE p 
X (State Indebtedness) a 0.48 0.21 .023 c -0.738 2.37 .756 
M (Benefit Appraisal)  — — — b -0.619 1.21 .609 
Constant iM1 11.24 1.04 <.001 iM2 33.00 17.80 .067 
 R2 = .0598 R2 = .0055 
 F (1, 85) = 5.404, p =.0225 F (2, 84) = 0.2332, p =.7925 
 
As illustrated in Table 4.8 and Figure 4.7 below, results of the 
PROCESS (Hayes, 2013) failed to confirm the present hypothesised path model 
(i.e. Figure 4.7). The 95% bias-corrected bootstrap confidence intervals for the 
present indirect effect (i.e. ab: 0.48*-0.74 = -0.30)—based upon 5000 
samples—included zero (i.e. -1.72 to 0.69), indicating non-significance (Field, 
2013). Contrary to what Greenberg and Westcott (1983) theorised, state 
indebtedness had indeed elicited a more favourable (a = 0.48, p = .023) overall 
appraisal (cost of helping, perceived helper’s sincerity, and perceived value in 
the benefit) of the offers. This positive benefit appraisal (Wood et al., 2008), 
however, failed to impact upon the under-repayment rate (b = -0.62, p = .61).  
 
 
 
Figure 4.7 A statistical diagram of the path model of the effect of state 
indebtedness over under-repayment percentage 
Note. N = 87; * p <.05 (two-tailed); n,s.= Non-significant at p <.05 (two-tailed) 
 
Additionally, as detailed above indebtedness was revealed to have 
neither a) differentiated acceptors based on their categorical repayment (i.e. 
cheap- vs. free-ride vs. cooperate, See Table 4.6), nor b) correlated to their 
magnitude of under-repayment (See Table 4.7). Taken together, state 
X 
M 
Y State Indebtedness 
Benefit Appraisal 
Under-repayment rate 
a = 0.48*. b = -0.619, n.s. 
c = -0.738, n.s. 
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indebtedness was not demonstrated to have—indirectly or directly— impacted 
on people’s sanctioning decisions in Experiment 2 as hypothesised.  
4.3.3.2 Differentiating Cooperation, Cheap- and Free-riding 
The above suggested that the various emotions upon offer receipt could 
not account for the acceptors’ differential repayment decisions. Hence, the 
present sub-section would address the principal axis analysis conducted on the 
post-repayment items (Refer to Table 4.1 for the items). Particularly, through 
this exploratory factor analysis I aimed to a) garner insight on why acceptors 
would (or would not) repay in this context and crucially, b) tease apart the 
psychology of cheap-riders from that of free-riders and of cooperators.  
1) Overview and Results of the present Principal Axis Analysis (PAA) 
The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (i.e. KMO hereafter) measure verified the 
‘middling’ (Hutcheson & Sofroniou, 1999) sampling adequacy (i.e. KMO 
= .784) of the present PAA. The diagonals of the anti-image correlation 
matrices were all above .5 (See Table 4.8 below)—which justified the inclusion 
of each item in the current analysis (Field, 2013). The Bartlett’s test of 
sphericity was significant, 2 (55) = 373.43, p < .001. Upon inspection of the 
Scree Plot, three factors with Eigenvalues over 1.0 were extracted. These 
factors in aggregate explained 54.23 % of the total variance. The items that 
clustered on the same factors highlight that Factor 1 represented the 
‘Experienced Warm-Glow’ (Ferguson & Flynn, 2016) (Eigenvalue = 1.73; 
Factor Loadings = .43 to .88; Cronbach’s α = .822), Factor 2 as ‘Justice 
Pursuit’ (Eigenvalue  1.64; Factor Loadings = .40 to .81; Cronbach’s α = .770), 
and Factor 3 as ‘Retaliation/ Punitive Responses’ (Eigenvalue = 1.64; Factor 
Loadings = .55 to .87; Cronbach’s α = .711). Reliability analyses showed that 
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all three factors had ‘meritorious’ reliabilities (i.e. all αs >.70) (George & 
Mallery, 2003). Factor loadings below .40 were all suppressed. I also applied 
the ‘separation of .15 guideline’ in the event of double-loading (Bundick, 2011; 
Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007; Worthington & Whittaker, 2006). For instance, I 
suppressed the item DD’s (See Table 4.9 below) factor loadings (.428) on the 
factor ‘Experienced Warm-glow’ as this item was evidently more strongly 
loaded (i.e. difference exceeds .15) on the factor ‘Justice Pursuit’ (.809). Lastly, 
items of the same factor were averaged to form the composite factor scores (El-
Alayli & Messé, 2004). Table 4.9 details the key information of the PAA. 
Table 4.9 Factor loadings, Eigenvalues, Percentage of variance and Reliability 
Analyses based on a PAA for the 11 post-repayment survey items (N = 87) 
 Post-Rotation Factor Loadings   
Post-repayment Survey Items Experienced 
Warm-Glow 
Justice 
Pursuit 
Retaliation/ 
Punishment 
AIC 
Diagonals 
It made me feel emotionally positive about 
myself to have repaid (avoided repayment). (EP) 
.877 .125 .034 .798 
The fact that I repaid (did not repay) made me 
feel good about myself. (FG) 
.810 .169 -.083 .812 
I would feel guilty if I didn’t stick with my 
repayment decision (GA) 
.588 .232 -.222 .882 
My repayment (non-repayment) left me with a 
feeling of 'warm glow' inside. (WG) 
.547 .227 .210 .810 
I see my Repayment/Non-repayment as a means 
to punish my partner for his/her unreasonable 
request. (RP) 
-.111 -.073 .871 .612 
I feel irritated by my partner's request for a 
repayment. (RI) 
-.089 -.133 .621 .697 
I see my Repayment/Non-repayment as a 
retaliatory act against my partner's offer. (PR) 
.097 .035 .551 .665 
I repaid/ did not repay because I endeavoured to 
attain a relatively more equal payoff distribution 
between me and my partner. (ED) 
.000 .402 .039 .683 
By repaying or not repaying, I manage to offer 
my partner what he/she truly deserves (DD) 
.428 .809 -.098 .777 
I see my repayment/non-repayment best signifies 
how grateful I feel towards my partner. (RG) 
.399 .687 -.170 .811 
The way I responded to my partner’s offer is the 
most appropriate way to restore fairness between 
myself and my partner (RF) 
.394 .514 -.230 .849 
Post-Rotation Eigenvalues  2.598 1.725 1.643 — 
Post-Rotation Percentage of Explained Variance 23.62 15.68 14.94 — 
Components’ Cronbach’s  Alpha (α) .802 .770 .711 — 
Note AIC: Anti-Image Correlation. Factor loadings that appear in bold were not suppressed. See Sub-
section 4.3.3.2 above for a more in-depth discussion about the suppression criteria. 
 
2) Dissociating Cooperation, Cheap-riding, and Free-riding 
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First, correlational analyses revealed a strong association (r (85) = .69, p 
<.001) between indices ‘Experienced Warm-Glow (i.e. EWG hereafter)’ (M = 
4.97, SD = 1.29) and ‘Justice Pursuit (i.e. JP hereafter)’ (M = 5.06, SD = 1.28). 
Meanwhile, index ‘Retaliation/ Punitive Responses (i.e. RPR hereafter) (M = 
2.72, SD = 1.28) did not correlate with either EWG or FP (both ps >. 05). 
One-way ANOVAs were conducted to scrutinise whether cheap-riders 
(N= 17), free-riders (N= 11) and cooperators (N = 59) would score differently 
on any of these factor scores (See Table 4.10). The Tukey’s HSD post-hoc 
analyses were administered to break down any significant main effects. 
Table 4.10. ANOVA Statistics for Factor Scores by Repayment Decisions 
Participants’ (N=87) Component Ratings by Repayment Decisions 
 Free-Riding (FR) Cheap-riding (CR) Cooperating (CP) 
Component Indices N M 
 (SD) 
N M 
 (SD) 
N M 
 (SD) 
F- 
Experienced Warm-glow (EWG) 
(FG + EP + GA+ WG)/ 4 
11 3.80 
(1.00)a 
17 4.68 
(1.14) 
59 5.26 
(1.25)a 
7.43** 
Justice Pursuit (JP)   
(ED + DD + RG + RF)/4 
11 3.64 
(1.05)bc 
17 5.06 
(0.92)c 
59 5.33 
(1.25)b 
9.73*** 
Retaliatory/ Punitive Response 
(RPR) (RP + RI+ PR)/3  
11 3.91 
(1.08)d 
17 3.55 
(1.70)e 
59 2.27 
(1.19)de 
11.83*** 
Note. a FR < CP (p <.01; Tukey-HSD adjusted) ; b FR < CP (p <.001; Tukey-HSD adjusted); c FR < CR (p 
<.01; Tukey-HSD adjusted); d FR> CP (p <.001; Tukey-HSD adjusted); d FR> CP (p <.01; Tukey-HSD 
adjusted). ** p <.001 (2-tailed); *** p <.0001 (2-tailed) 
 
  
Figure 4.8. Factor Score Justice Pursuit by Repayment Decisions (N = 87) 
 
0
1
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3
4
5
6
7
Free-riders (N= 11) Cheap-riders (N= 17) Cooperators (N=59)
MD: 1.69, p <.001 
MD: 1.42, p <.01
MD: 0.27, n.s.
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As can be seen in Table 4.10 there are significant main effects (all ps 
<.01) by repayment decisions on all the three factor scores. Specifically, the 
Tukey-HSD analyses revealed that cheap-riders (M: 5.06; SD: 0.92) were no 
different (p >.05) from cooperators (M: 5.33; SD: 1.25) in using Justice Pursuit 
(e.g. ‘giving partner what I think he/she truly deserves’) to rationalise their 
repayment. By contrast, free-riders (M: 3.64; SD: 1.05) were less inclined—
than both cheap-riders and cooperators (both ps <.01) —to rationalise their 
zero back-transfer as a pursuit of justice (See Figure 4.8).  
  
Figure 4.9 Factor Experienced Warm-Glow by Repayment Decisions (N = 87) 
 
Meanwhile, as highlighted in Figure 4.9, cheap-riders (M: 4.68; SD: 
1.14) and cooperators (M: 5.26; SD: 1.25) reported having derived similar 
levels (p >.10) of Emotional Warm-Glow from their respective repayment 
decisions. Free-riders (M: 3.80; SD: 1.00), on the other hand, were 
understandably more reluctant than cooperators (p <.01) to cite experienced 
warm-glow as why they decided to take full advantage of the situation. 
Table 4.11. Spearman’s Correlation of Factor Scores by Repayment 
 Cheap-riders (N= 17) Cooperators (N= 59) Free-riders (N= 11) 
Spearman’s Rho    
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Free-riders (N= 11) Cheap-riders (N= 17) Cooperators (N=59)
MD: 1.46, p <.01
MD:0.88, n.s. 
MD: 0.58, n.s.
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Experienced Warm-
Glow * Retaliation 
0.432 -0.118 0.510 
Experienced Warm-
Glow * Justice Pursuit 
0.630** 0.663*** 0.393 
Retaliation *  
Justice Pursuit 
0.065 -0.165 0.704* 
Note. * p <.05 (two-tailed); ** p<.01 (two-tailed); *** p<.001 (two-tailed). 
 
The above implied that cheap-riders tended to both think (i.e. to bring 
justice) and feel (i.e. warm-glow) similar to people who earnestly fulfilled their 
obligation (despite the unfair treatment). This was further evidenced (See Table 
4.11) by the significant association (both ps <.01) between the factors 
‘Experienced Warm Glow’ and ‘Justice Pursuit’ only among cheap-riders  
(rs = .63) and cooperators (rs = .66) but not the free-riders (rs = .393, p = .232). 
However, results of the cocor analysis (Diedenhofen & Musch, 2015) indicated 
no significant differences among these three correlation indices. 
  
Figure 4.10. Factor Retaliation/ Punishment by Repayment Decisions (N = 87) 
 
It is, meanwhile, untrue to claim that cheap- and free-riders have 
nothing in common. First, Figure 4.9 highlighted that they reported having 
acquired similar emotional warm-glow (p >.10) from their refusal to cooperate. 
Furthermore, as depicted in Figure 4.10 both cheap- (M: 3.55; SD: 1.70) and 
free-riders (M: 3.91, SD: 1.08) were evidently more likely (both ps <.001), 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Free-riders (N= 11) Cheap-riders (N= 17) Cooperators (N=59)
MD: 0.36, n.s.
MD: 1.64, p <.001 
MD: 1.28, p <.001
Chapter 4   160 
 
 
 
compared to cooperators (M: 2.27; SD: 1.19), to attribute a punitive intent to 
their repayment decisions. Taken together, both the present cheap- and free-
riders were similarly (p >. 10) motivated to exercise their ‘rights’ to sanction 
with a penalising intent—which was absent among those cooperators.  
In summary, the above analyses evidenced an emotional ambivalence 
among the present cheap-riders. They felt motivated, like the free-riders, to 
express their irritation with their helpers not acting in accord with the injunctive 
fairness norm (i.e. moral outrage, Batson et al., 2007; Batson, Chao, & Givens, 
2009). Nonetheless, just like the cooperators they experienced an internal 
emotional satisfaction (Holmes, 2009; Ribar & Wilhelm, 2002) from their de 
facto ‘voluntary’ back-transfer. Additionally, these cheap-riders were pointing 
to the quest for distributive justice (Tyler, 1994) or provision of ‘just deserts’ 
(Carlsmith et al., 2002; Darley, 2001)—like the cooperators—as for why they 
ended up paying back partially. All in all, the present cheap-riders appeared to 
want to cultivate a ‘firm but fair’ persona (Komorita, Hilty, & Parks, 1991; 
Preston, 2013) by how they reacted against normative injustice. 
4.3.3.3. Dispositional Gratitude and Cheap-riding 
Table 4.12 Regression Coefficients, Standard Errors, and Model Summary 
Information for the Serial Multiple Mediator Model (Figure 4.11). 
 Consequent 
 M1 (Benefit Appraisal, BA) M2 (State Gratitude, Gs) Y (Under-repayment 
Rate) 
Antecedent  Coef SE p  Coef SE p  Coef SE p 
X (Trait 
Gratitude) 
a1 -0.89 0.42 .832 a2 0.15 0.13 .262 c' -3.77 4.54 .409 
M1 (BA)  — — — d21 0.17 0.03 <.001 b1 -0.94 1.33 .485 
M2 (Gs)  — — —  — — — b2 1.24 3.84 .749 
Constant iM1 13.99 2.28 <.001 iM2 1.85 0.84 .030 iy 48.2 30.5 .118 
  R2= .0005  R2= .2356  R2= .2356 
 F (1,85) = 0.045, p =.832 F (2,84) = 12.95, p <.001 F (3,83) = 0.368, p =.776 
 
As outlined above the present investigation into the cheap-riders’ 
psychology also entail the link between dispositional gratitude and cheap-
riding. Particularly, I tested the Social-Cognitive Model of Gratitude (i.e. 
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SCMG; Wood et al., 2008)—which argued that dispositional gratitude will 
restrain under-repayment (i.e. cheap- and free-riding inclusive) via its serially 
mediated effect on state gratitude through benefit appraisal (See Figure 4.11). 
Thus, the following features the path analysis with PROCESS (Hayes, 2013) on 
the serial mediational model of dispositional gratitude over under-repayment 
rate (i.e. UR %). Table 4.12 and Figure 4.11 detail the statistics.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.11 A statistical diagram of the serial mediational model (i.e. the 
SCMG prediction) of the effect of trait gratitude over under-repayment rate  
Note. N = 87; * p <.05 (two-tailed); n,s.= Non-significant at p <.05 (two-tailed). 
 
95% Bootstrap Confidence Intervals was adopted in the present analysis. 
The results, as detailed in Table 4.12 and Figure 4.11, indicated that almost 
none of the present hypothesised paths were significant at p <.05. The bias-
corrected, 5000-sampled Bootstrap Confidence Intervals of the aggregate 
indirect effect (i.e. a1d21b2 = -0.89*0.17*1.24 = -0.018) included zero (i.e. -1.08 
to 0.60), suggesting non-significance. In a nutshell, the present data fails to 
confirm the indirect role of dispositional gratitude in restraining sanctioning as 
theorised in the Social Cognitive Model of Gratitude (Wood et al., 2008). 
4.3.4. General Confounds 
This section addresses the effects (or the lack thereof) by two general 
confounds, namely Gender (i.e. sub-section 4.3.4.1) and Social Desirability 
Responding (i.e. sub-section 4.3.4.2), on the present key study variables (i.e. the 
1) in-game survey ratings and 2) actual behavioural decisions).  
4.3.4.1 Gender Differences 
a2 = 0.14, n.s. 
X 
M1 
M2 
Y Trait 
Gratitude 
State Gratitude 
Under-repayment Rate 
Benefit Appraisal 
a1 = -0.89, n.s. 
d21= 0.17*** 
b2 = 1.23, n.s. 
b1 = -0.94, n.s. 
c’= -3.77, n.s. 
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1) Gender Effect on the Pre-and Post-repayment Ratings 
Results of the Independent-samples T-tests revealed no gender effect in 
both the pre- (i.e. Table 4.13, all ps >.10, two-tailed) and the post-repayment 
(i.e. Table 4.14, all ps > .05, two-tailed) ratings. In short, gender had no role in 
differentiating either the recipients’ (N = 135) offer-invoked emotions, or the 
acceptors’ (N = 87) self-reported motives behind their repayment decisions. 
Table 4.13. Gender and Pre-repayment Ratings (i.e. offer-invoked emotions) 
 Male Female     
Pre-repayment Ratings N M N M MD df t p (2-tailed) 
State Gratitude 54 4.61 81 4.70 0.09 133 0.377 .707 
State Annoyance 54 2.57 81 2.26 0.32 133 1.216 .226 
State Indebtedness 54 4.35 81 4.42 0.07 133 0.194 .846 
Obligation to repay 54 4.89 81 5.04 0.15 133 0.445 .657 
Perceived Value in the Help 54 4.83 81 4.72 0.12 92.5 0.442 .659 
Perceived Helpfulness 54 4.13 81 4.01 0.12 133 0.398 .692 
Perceived Cost to Helpers 54 3.63 81 3.85 0.22 133 0.715 .476 
Tendency to Reciprocate 54 5.31 81 5.19 0.13 133 0.474 .636 
Perceived Fairness 54 5.04 81 4.81 0.22 96.6 0.834 .406 
Reasonableness 54 4.98 81 5.12 0.14 133 0.583 .561 
Understandability 54 4.91 81 5.26 0.35 89.2 1.227 .223 
 
Table 4.14. Gender and Post-repayment Ratings (i.e. Repayment Motives) 
 Male Female     
Post-repayment Ratings N M N M MD df t p 
‘Feel Good about myself’ 36 4.86 51 5.24 0.374 85 1.07 .288 
‘Feel Emotionally Positive’ 36 4.92 51 5.39 0.475 85 1.45 .151 
‘Feel irritated by repayment request’ 36 2.94 51 2.76 0.180 85 0.48 .636 
‘Feeling of “warm-glow” inside’ 36 4.50 51 4.14 0.363 85 0.96 .339 
‘Punish partners’ unreasonable requests’ 36 2.58 51 1.98 0.603 63.7 1.55 .126 
‘Will feel guilty if I did not’ 36 4.97 51 5.76 0.792 57.2 1.91 .061 
‘To restore fairness’ 36 5.17 51 5.73 0.559 85 1.56 .122 
‘To retaliate against partners’ offers’ 36 2.83 51 3.29 0.461 85 1.08 .285 
‘To show gratitude toward partners’ 36 4.83 51 4.94 0.108 85 0.29 .770 
‘To give what my partner truly deserves’ 36 4.78 51 4.86 0.085 85 0.22 .826 
‘To attain equal payoff distributions’ 36 5.08 51 5.00 0.083 85 0.24 .809 
 
2) Gender Effect on the Behavioural Decisions 
 
Table 4.15. Gender and the categorical in-game behavioural decisions 
 Male Female    
1. Offer Acceptance (N = 135) N N df 2 p (two-sided) 
Offer Accepted 36 51    
Offer Declined 18 30    
Overall 54 81 1 0.194 .660 
2. Repayment Decisions (N = 87)      
2a. Repayment Analysis (i)      
Cooperate (Repaid Fully)  27 32    
Default (Repaid Nothing or Partially)  9 19    
Overall 36 51 1 1.452 .228 
2b. Repayment Analysis (ii)      
Cooperate (Repaid Fully) 27 32    
Cheap-ride (Repaid Partially)  2 15    
Free-ride (Repaid Nothing) 7 4    
Overall 36 51 2 8.860 .012 
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Table 4.15 details the analyses of gender effect on both the offer 
acceptance/rejection (N = 135) and repayment (N = 87) decisions. The data 
showed no evidence (p = .66) that a particular gender was more inclined to take 
what was offered to them. While the results highlighted a significant interaction 
(2 (2) = 8.86, p =.012) between repayment (i.e. cheap- vs. free-ride vs. 
cooperate) and gender, this interaction vanished (p =.23) once the effect was re-
analysed when cheap- and free-riders were re-grouped as ‘defaulters’. Such a 
re-categorisation was needed because of a few small (i.e. below 5) cell counts 
(e.g. N= 2 for male cheap-riders, N= 4 for female free-riders) in the initial 2 
(Gender)*3 (cheap- vs. free-ride vs. cooperate) Chi-square test. 
Additionally, results of an independent-samples t-test indicated no 
evidence (p = .902) that male (M: 21.8; SD: 40.2, N = 36) and female (M: 20.7; 
SD: 35.4, N = 51) acceptors had under-repaid differently. Taken together, the 
data fails to acknowledge any contamination by gender on either the current 
psychometric (i.e. the ratings) or behavioural (e.g. repayment) measures. 
4.3.4.2. Effect of Social Desirability Responding (i.e. SDR hereafter) 
1) Effect of SDR on the Pre-and Post-repayment Ratings 
Table 4.16. Correlation Table of SDR and Pre-repayment Ratings 
  Gs As Is Ob PV PGH PCo Rec Res Und Fair 
SDR  r -.06 -.06 .03 -.02 .00 -.08 .07 .04 .01 -.01 -.09 
(measured p .51 .46 .74 .84 .99 .34 .42 .67 .92 .92 .28 
via IMS) N 135 135 135 135 135 135 135 135 135 135 135 
Note. IMS: Paulhus’s (1991) Impression Management Scale Composite;  r: Pearson’s Correlation r; p: p-
value (two-tailed); Gs = State Gratitude; As = State Annoyance; Is = State Indebtedness; Ob = Perceived 
Obligation to repay; Fair = Perceived Fairness in the offer; PV: Perceived Value in the offer; PGH: 
Perceived Helpfulness; PCo: Perceived Cost to Helpers;  Rec = Tendency to Reciprocate; Res: 
Reasonableness; Und: Understandability ; Fair: Perceived Fairness.  
 
Table 4.17. Correlation Table of SDR and Post-repayment Ratings 
  FG EP IR WG RP GA RF PR RG DD ED 
SDR  r .01 .06 -.07 -.05 -.10 .02 .02 -.06 .15 .11 -.05 
(measured p .93 .61 .50 .62 .35 .87 .84 .58 .16 .30 .64 
via IMS) N 87 87 87 87 87 87 87 87 87 87 87 
Note. r: Pearson’s Correlation r; p: p-value (two-tailed); FG: ‘Feel Good about myself’; EP: ‘Feel 
Emotionally Positive’; WG = ‘Feeling of “warm-glow” inside’; GA = ‘Will feel guilty if I did not.’; RI = 
‘Feel irritated by repayment request.’; RP = ‘Punish partners’ unreasonable requests’; RF = ‘To restore 
Chapter 4   164 
 
 
 
fairness’; PR = ‘To retaliate against partners’ offers’; RG = ‘To show gratitude toward partners’; DD = 
‘To give what my partner truly deserves’; ED: ‘To attain equal payoff distributions’. 
 
Results of the correlational analyses revealed that SDR—which was 
operationalized by Paulhus’s (1991) Impression Management Scale— were not 
correlated to any of the participants’ pre- (i.e. Table 4.16, all ps >. 10) and post-
repayment ratings (i.e. Table 4.17, all ps >. 10). Hence, how recipients (N = 
135) reported feeling towards the offers, and the way acceptors (N = 87) 
justified their repayment decisions both appeared not biased by SDR.  
Table 4.18. SDR and the categorical in-game behavioural decisions 
Social Desirability Responding (Operationalized by IMS, Paulhus, 1991) 
 M SD Mean Difference t-value df p (two-tailed)  
1. Offer Acceptance        
Acceptors (N = 87) 74.51 18.4     
Rejectors (N = 48)  73.13 17.7     
Overall (N = 135) 74.01 18.1 1.38 .423 123 .673 
2. Repayment Decisions M SD  F-value df p (two-tailed)  
Cooperators (N = 59) 76.76 19.7     
Cheap-riders (N = 17) 72.88 14.1     
Free-riders (N = 11) 64.91 14.1     
Overall (N =87) 74.51 18.4 Not Applicable 2.058 84 .134 
 
Statistical analyses (See Table 4.18) failed to evidence that SDR had 
segregated, 1) offer acceptors from rejectors (p = .673); 2) acceptors who 
repaid fully, partially and utterly nothing (p = .134). Meanwhile, correlational 
analyses revealed a negative association between under-repayment rates and 
SDR (i.e. the IMS composite), rs (85) = -0.22, p = .046 (two-tailed), hinting that 
acceptors who were more concerned about their social impressions would be 
more reluctant to sanction ‘at full throttle’. Nonetheless, this correlation 
vanished when I confined the analyses to only defaulters (i.e. cheap- and free-
riders inclusive, rs (26) = -0.26, p = .19) or just the cheap-riders, rs (15) = -0.07, 
p = .78. All in all, the data indicated minimal signs that participants’ crucial 
decisions at present were bothered by Social Desirability Responding. 
4.4. Discussion 
4.4.1. Does more unfairness matter? 
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Chapter 3 (i.e. Experiment 1) underlined the role of normative fairness 
in guiding fairness perception, which then contributes to recipients’ emotions 
(gratitude in particular) and ultimately a desire to directly reciprocate (Ma et 
al., 2014). Particularly, Experiment 1 showed that recipients could infer 
reputations (i.e. whether their helpers were fair people) —under the guidance of 
the injunctive norm—based on whether or not the help they received was 
conditional. Crucially, while Chapter 3 indicated an unambiguous divide 
between perceptions of an unfair versus a fair offer—which was evidenced by 
the mediational model (refer to Figure 3.5), it remains unaddressed how people 
may differentially perceive offers of varying unfairness. That is, knowing that 
people would take issue with an unfair—relative to a fair— offer, I 
endeavoured to examine if a more outrageously unfair offer would irk them 
even further. Or alternatively, there exists a ‘fairness-versus-unfairness’ 
threshold and once that was passed, it mattered no more as in how egregious 
that infringement of fairness became (in comparison to other scenarios). 
Indeed, data of Experiment 2 appeared to endorse this ‘fairness 
threshold’ perspective. Echoing the observations from Experiment 1, the 
current manipulation of the degree of unfairness had practically no effect on all 
the outcome measures (e.g. offer-invoked emotions, offer acceptances and 
repayment). Taken together, Experiments 1 and 2 may in combination 
suggested that (injunctive) fairness perception could belong to an ‘all-or-
nothing’ concept: once the border of injunctive fairness had been overstepped 
people will just pay no mind to the ‘severity’ of that infringement. 
4.4.2. Gratitude, Indebtedness and Sanctioning in Economic Games 
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Overall, the results showed little evidence that gratitude (as a state and a 
disposition) and indebtedness were related to the participants’ reciprocal or 
sanctioning decisions (i.e. repayment). This again echoed the results in 
Experiment 1 whereby recipients’ various affective states (e.g. gratitude, 
indebtedness etc.)—triggered by the conditional offer receipts (N = 21)—were 
also not predictive of how they actually repaid their helpers (See Chapter 3).  
Figure 4.12. Understanding Check Example Screens (Experiment 1) 
 
 
Figure 4.13 Understanding Check Example Screens (Experiment 2) 
 
While it may be convenient to point the finger at the power issue for the 
absence of expected findings (especially for Experiment 1), another reason 
could lie in a shared experimental feature of Experiments 1 and 2—i.e. the 
recipients’ implicit assumption of the binding nature of the repayment 
conditions before they decided whether to accept. Recipients only came to 
know of the feasibility of not honouring their repayment after they indicated 
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acceptances. This, in conjunction with the understanding checks which 
explicitly highlighted the advantages of acceptances despite the full repayment 
(See Figures 4.12 and 4.13 above), could have ruled out any thoughts to 
possibly under-repay when recipients decided whether to accept the offers. 
As a result, those who were bothered by the injunctive unfairness may 
have already severed the tie with the helper before even getting to know they 
could punish. In fact, the evidence of people shunning a financial benefit amidst 
perceived injustice has been well documented in the Impunity Game literature 
(e.g. Ma et al., 2012; Takagishi et al., 2009; Yamagishi et al., 2012). 
Thus it is not unreasonable to speculate that those who remained in the 
loop (by accepting) were at least not taking so much issue with their (in 
principle) unfair offers. Indeed, the present findings which highlighted how 
differently acceptors and rejectors felt about the offers certainly give substances 
to this speculation (See Sub-section 4.3.2.1). In particular, the data (i.e. Table 
4.4) showed that rejectors felt less grateful, indebted, and gave a less 
favourable appraisal, toward the offers. They also deemed the exchange less 
reasonable and felt less likely to reciprocate. All these resonated with a 
speculation that the current participants, who were not aware of the non-binding 
nature of the condition a priori, may have indeed used their acceptance decision 
as a proxy sanction (or reward) in response to their helpers’ gestures. 
Consequently, the repayment may be inflated because those who were 
discontented with the arrangement, thus more prone to sanction, may have been 
‘filtered’ from the repayment analyses. While logically sound, neither 
Experiments 1 nor 2 had examined the psychology of the rejectors. Therefore, it 
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still remains to be seen whether the above does explain why neither gratitude 
nor indebtedness was shown to relate to repayment in Experiments 1 and 2. 
4.4.3. Disambiguating Cheap-, Free-riders and Cooperators 
As a continuation of Experiment 1, one key objective of the present 
experiment entails finding out why people cheap-ride on someone. The results 
of the Principal Axis Analysis identified three factors of why (or why not) they 
repaid an injunctively unfair offer even when not doing so yielded no 
repercussions. Those included, a) Experienced Warm-glow (Ferguson & Flynn, 
2016); b) Justice Pursuit; and c) Retaliation/ Punitive Responses. 
Importantly, the follow-up analysis of these three factor scores—on the 
basis of repayment decisions—offered insights upon the unique mentality that 
underlies cheap-riding. On one hand, cheap-riders would fancy some paybacks, 
just like their free-riding counterparts, out of the irritation at helpers’ departure 
from a moral standard in injunctive fairness (Batson et al., 2007; Batson et al., 
2009; Wakslak et al., 2007). On the other, cheap-riding constituted more than 
just a channel for venting out frustrations (Legkaukas & Jakimavičiūtė, 2007). 
Cheap-riders were as convinced as the cooperators that their partial repayment 
would promote distributive justice (Tyler, 1994), and meanwhile provided what 
they believed were the fair shares to their helpers (Santos & Rivera, 2015; 
Weinstein, 2011; Wenzel & Thielmann, 2006). Furthermore, cheap-riders also 
derived a sense of emotional satisfaction (Beccheti & Degli Antoni, 2010; Falk, 
2007; Harbaugh, 1998) from their de facto ‘voluntary’ repayment gesture, as 
did acceptors who earnestly fulfilled their prior agreement. 
All in all, the present cheap-riders appeared to capture the gist of the 
theory of ‘Just Deserts’ in sanctioning (Carlsmith et al., 2002; Darley et al., 
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2000; Starkweather, 1992). Instead of being fixated on vengeance, a ‘just’ 
punishment entails giving the offenders a rightful, deserving comeuppance 
(Moore, 1997) that serves to restore the overall moral balance (Wenzel & 
Thielmann, 2006). This clearly echoes the present cheap-riders’ pattern of 
responses toward the post-repayment survey as outlined above. 
4.4.4. Cheap-riding in Real-life Settings: Under-contribution of Child Support 
Indeed, I argue that one fitting example that epitomises cheap-riding in 
a real-life setting will be the under-contribution of child support in the United 
Kingdom (See Allbeson, 2016; Savage, 2015). According to the Child Support 
Act 1991, a ‘non-resident parent’ (i.e. the parent who is not involved in the 
main day-to-day child care) is obliged to financially provide for his/her ex-
partner (i.e. the ‘receiving parent’) in regards their children’s daily living 
expenditure. This amount of contribution is computed after taking into 
consideration a basket of factors in relation to the non-resident parent’s socio-
economic status (e.g. weekly income, whether he/she is on a benefit etc.). 
Meanwhile, data from the Child Support Agency (CSA hereafter) 
suggested that as of September 2014 there is a total of ‘uncollectible’ child 
maintenance which amounts to £2,917 million, with over a quarter of the non-
resident parents contributing less than half of their obligated amount (See 
Savage, 2015). A closer look at the data revealed that there were 17.2% of 
paying parents paying a non-zero but below 80% of the stipulated contribution. 
I interpret this 17.2% of under-contribution as a quintessence of cheap-
riding as presently operationalized (i.e. a partial repayment of an affordable, 
conditional offer). As explained above this contribution is supposedly tailored 
each non-resident parent’s earning power, thereby rendering him/her no 
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grounds to quote affordability as a reason to not pay up. However, the CSA’s 
notoriety in its failure to retrieve the maintenance arrears has been so flagrant 
that even Mary Quinn, the Head of the CSA in Northern Ireland, once had to 
publicly apologise for it (See Savage, 2007). Hence, there is no reason to not 
expect that these non-resident parents should have known of the de facto 
absence of repercussions even if they refuse to contribute in full. 
 In other words, resembling the conditional offer acceptors in 
Experiments 1 and 2, these non-resident parents should know that if they 
wanted to they could have not contributed anything and practically faced no 
consequences (although in principle they would still risk imprisonment or 
forced sales of properties). Nevertheless, the fact that this particular portion of 
non-resident parents was contributing something clearly captures the essence of 
cheap-riding, that is, to piggyback on others’ high contribution (i.e. former 
partners’ effort and financial expenditure in child-raising) by giving just the 
bare minimum (See Bchir & Willinger, 2013; Isaac et al., 1989; Marks et al., 
2006). Interestingly, the present proportion of cheap-riding (i.e. 17/87= 19.5%) 
was not too far off from the abovementioned figure from the CSA (i.e. 17.2%) 
that was calculated based on a total sample of 86,700. Thus I believe this not 
only emphasises that the present analysis of cheap-riding is not without 
ecological validity (Brewer, 2000; Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 2002), but also 
enables the extrapolation of certain crucial findings into the understanding of 
the child support evasion situation that is discussed in Section 4.5.1 below. 
4.5 Implications of Chapter 4 
While Section 4.4 summarised and discussed—from a theoretical 
standpoint—several key features of the present analyses, this section would 
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highlight two important implications. They included, first, how the analyses of 
cheap-riders add to the understanding of child support under-contributions (i.e. 
Sub-section 4.5.1), and second, a few methodological concerns (of both 
Experiments 1 and 2) which constitute four unanswered questions (i.e. UAQs 1 
to 4) that warrant future investigations (i.e. Sub-sections 4.5.2.1 to 4.5.2.4). 
4.5.1. Cheap-riders and Under-Contributing Non-resident Parents 
 One crucial discovery of the present analyses, as discussed in Sub-
section 4.4.3, entails the profiling of the cheap-riders’ emotional ambivalence 
behind their partial back-transfers. It is conceivable that such an emotional 
ambivalence may also underlie why certain non-resident parents would under-
contribute their shares of child support. On one hand, just like the present 
cheap-riders these parents may under-repay to show retributions against their 
exes for the separation and/or the loss of custody (Hetherington & Stanley-
Hagan, 1999; Stahly, 2000). But on the other, leaving the entire burden of 
child-raising to the exes may have crossed the line of what a ’Just Desert’ 
should constitute (Darley et al., 2000; Moore, 1997; Wenzel & Thielmann, 
2006) —especially if that ex-partner is far from well-off (See ‘A Single 
Parent’s Story’ in Savage (2015)). Furthermore, the fact that one contributes, 
albeit incompletely, could also help lessen that non-custodial parent’s guilt over 
the deprivation of his/her children of a loving family (Arditti, 1992; Braver et 
al., 1993; Seagull & Seagull, 1977)—and that guilt aversion is a defining 
attribute of ‘experienced warm-glow’ (Ferguson & Flynn, 2016). 
 All in all, the above implied that all three present extracted factors—
namely, Experienced Warm-Glow, Justice Pursuit and Retaliation/ Punitive 
Responses—appears to each have a role in egging those non-resident parents on 
Chapter 4   172 
 
 
 
underpaying their shares. Nonetheless, while the above described how the 
current analyses may account for why a non-resident parent would contribute 
insufficiently, it is still arbitrary to make a case that these are the genuine 
reasons behind. There could still a whole lot of other reasons behind why 
people would under-contribute their child support. For instance, a non-resident 
father may have doubt about the paternity of that child he legally ‘shares’ with 
his ex-partner (See O’Connor, Kelleher, & Kelleher, 2008), thus not paying the 
support in full (with the understanding that not doing so will not practically 
bring forth any repercussions) may represent some forms of self-protections. 
Taken together, qualitative analyses such as Grounded Theory or case study 
will be warranted if one endeavours to specifically address the psychology of 
those non-custodial parents (e.g. Cook, McKenzie, & Natalier, 2015; Klett-
Davies, 2016; Skinner, 2013; Wilson, 2006).   
4.5.2. Unanswered Questions (i.e. UAQs) that warrant further research  
Below (i.e. Subsections 4.5.2.1 to 4.5.2.4) I outline several UAQs (i.e. 
UAQs 1 to 4) that warrant further empirical scrutiny. These UAQs primarily 
concern the methodological features of both Experiments 1 and 2.  
4.5.2.1 UAQ #1: Does ‘more fairness’ really not count? Is there really a 
‘threshold’ for fairness perception? 
 Overall, results of Experiment 2 in combination with Experiment 1 
hinted the existence of a threshold in fairness evaluation. Recipients whose 
helpers had infringed normative fairness seemed not differentially offended by 
the relative severity of that violation.  
While such an absolute construal of a ‘fairness-unfairness’ divide has 
been documented in the literature (Bian & Keller, 1999; Eckel & Grossman, 
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1996b), Wood and colleagues (2011) contended that relativity matters as people 
are sensitive to how their treatment compare against what others were having 
(i.e. the ‘Gratitude Relativity Hypothesis (i.e. GRH hereafter)). Thus, the GRH 
would challenge this absolute perspective of fairness judgment, as it should 
predict less discontent with (and more gratitude toward) helpers who gave a 
less unreasonable offer (e.g. an ‘Interest-Free’ compared to a ‘50%-interest’ 
offer). In other words, more unfairness should ‘count’ according to the GRH.   
Nevertheless, the lack of transparency as regards helpers’ behavioural 
options (and also what other recipients were getting) in Experiments 1 and 2 
prevented the scrutiny of GRH. While the rationale of such information denial 
has been detailed in Chapter 3, it remains intriguing to test whether this 
‘fairness-threshold’ perspective would prevail in a context in which recipients 
could infer helpers’ intent based on both their actual and their ‘could-have-
chosen’ options (Charness & Levine, 2007). That is, whether the fairness-
threshold perspective or the GRH would better portray a recipient’s in-game 
fairness perception should be the focus of a relevant future scrutiny. 
4.5.2.2 UAQ #2: Were the lack of opportunities to play both in-game roles to 
blame for the observed ‘over-cooperativeness’ in Experiments 1 and 2?  
While Experiments 1 and 2 had each recorded a certain extent of 
cynicism—for instance, the lack of helping (i.e. 19.7% in Experiment 1) and 
under-repayment (i.e. 38 % and 32% defaulting rate in Experiments 1 and 2 
respectively), it is undeniable that a majority of the participants were not 
behaving as a quintessential profit-maximizer. Discussions on why participants 
in Experiments 1 and 2 appeared too prosocial would be detailed in Chapter 5.  
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Indeed, I suspected that a reason behind the relative lack of cynicism in 
both experiments may be attributed to the fact that both games were single-role 
games. Participants in Experiments 1 and 2 were only assigned to one in-game 
role. Burks, Carpenter, and Verhoogen (2003) argued that such a single-role 
design may, relative to a design where players would assume different roles 
(i.e. both trustors and trustees) in different trials, have inflated participants’ in-
game prosociality. Burks et al. (2003) attributed this increased prosociality in a 
single-role game to participants feeling more personally responsible for their 
co-player’s ultimate payoffs (i.e. the ‘Reduced Responsibility Hypothesis’). 
Thus they might be more uncomfortable acting in accord with their self-interest 
knowing that their acts were the only determinant of their partners’ poor 
payoffs. Taken together, Experiments 1 and 2 had definitely left the door open 
for future scrutiny as of whether the single-role design was the reason for the 
observed patterns of over-generous decision making.  
4.5.2.3 UAQ #3: Why reject an offer in the present experimental set-up? 
One intriguing observation of the present study no doubt entails the 
almost threefold increase in rejection (35.6%) compared to that of Experiment 1 
(conditional offer rejection: 3/24: 12.5%). While the above (i.e. Sub-section 
4.4.2) alluded to the possibility of participants rejecting out of a retaliatory 
intent against injustice (Takagishi et al., 2009; Yamagishi et al., 2009), the 
psychology of rejectors in this scenario was still yet to be ascertained.  
Particularly, dispositional indebtedness (Mathews & Green, 2010; 
Mathews & Shook, 2013) may also constitute a strong correlate of people’s 
decision to shun a financially advantageous arrangement. As detailed in 
Chapter 1 dispositionally indebted people are best characterised by their 
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extreme endeavours to avoid owing anybody anything (Greenberg & Westcott, 
1983), thanks to their religious adherence to the reciprocity norm (Gouldner, 
1960). It is, therefore, conceivable the high rejections may be attributable to 
individual differences along the continuum of dispositional indebtedness.   
However, neither of the two experiments, as presently constructed, 
could disentangle two above-mentioned motives of rejections. Therefore, to 
better examine the role of dispositional indebtedness in fostering rejection I 
suggest amending another shared feature of Experiments 1 and 2: recipients’ 
pre-acceptance unawareness of the non-binding nature of the repayment.  
By removing this unawareness a true punisher should instead accept the 
offer and then default, considering that rejection is no longer the most effective 
punitive strategy. In contrast, a dispositionally indebted person should always 
reject to avoid building up credits with others (Greenberg & Westcott, 1983).  
4.5.2.4 UAQ #4: Cheap-riding as a fairness enforcement strategy?  
Lastly, I argued that cheap-riding could function in a similar fashion as 
altruistic punishment (Boyd et al., 2003; Fehr et al., 2002; Fehr & Gächter, 
2002; Fowler, 2005). That is, by deliberately under-repaying a cheap-rider 
endeavours to curb any future ungenerous acts from that helper (Ma et al., 
2014). Nonetheless, it remains unexamined as of how valid this logic is, and 
how efficacious cheap-riding is as a strategy to be relied upon in implementing 
normative fairness. Therefore, a future relevant study should constitute a direct 
manipulation of cheap-riding that permits the scrutiny of the effect of being 
‘cheap-rode’ over that ‘victim’s’ propensity to play fair consequently. 
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5.0. Overview of Chapter 5 
 In Experiment 1 I highlighted how normative fairness guides fairness 
perception, especially in situations where information about others’ intent was 
absent, and how this perception would mould one’s emotional gratitude and a 
desire to cooperate. Among those ill-treated (normatively speaking) participants 
a non-negligible portion of them retaliated in the form of cheap-riding.  
Experiment 2, meanwhile, offered a more in-depth analysis of cheap-
riding. The data revealed a pattern of cheap-riding that shared resemblance not 
only to observations in Experiment 1, but also to the reality (i.e. non-resident 
parents under-contributing their child support). I also disentangled the 
psychology of cheap-riders from cooperators and that of typical maximizers.   
While Experiments 1 and 2 in combination constituted a decent measure 
of how state or trait gratitude, aside from factors such as normative fairness or 
Just Deserts (Carlsmith et al. 2002; Darley, 2001), shapes people’s prosociality 
in economic exchanges, Chapter 4 outlined certain issues that warrant attention. 
They were, a) recipients’ lack of access to ‘what my helper could have done 
instead of what he/she did’; b) the ‘over-generosity’ issue, and c) recipients’ 
unawareness of feasibility to default and their high rates of offer rejections.  
As such, the primary objective of Experiment 3 was to address a few 
unanswered questions (i.e. UAQs hereafter) in Chapters 3 and 4 by 
incorporating new design features. The below summarises, in bulletin points, 
the four crucial UAQs and how the five new features could help address them.  
- UAQ 1: Is there really an ‘all-or-nothing’ threshold for injunctive fairness? - 
Design Feature 1: Recipients in this game were no longer blind to the helping 
options available to each helper. Such an awareness should enable recipients to 
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deduce the injunctive fairness by comparing what they actually to what they 
could have received. Hence this would allow the scrutiny of whether the 
observed ‘all-or-nothing’ pattern of injunctive fairness attribution in 
Experiments 1 and 2 is moderated by recipients’ knowledge. That is, now that 
recipients knew how they could have been treated differently, would a more 
unfair (e.g. a ‘50%-Interest’) offer still prompt a similar appraisal (e.g. intent, 
gratitude etc.) than when they were given a fairer (e.g. ‘Interest-free’) one? 
- UAQ 2: Were participants in Experiments 1 and 2 too cooperative due to the 
lack of opportunities to assume both in-game roles (i.e. helpers and recipients)?  
- Design Feature 2: I argued that the one-shot nature and specifically, the lack 
of chances to play both as helpers and recipients may explain the lack of 
cynicism in either experiment (i.e. over 80% helping in Experiment 1 and over 
60% full repayment in both Experiments). Indeed, Burks, Carpenter and 
Verhoogen (2003) theorised that playing both roles may lead players to feel less 
responsibility for others’ payoffs thus remove their guilt over selfish decisions 
(i.e. the Reduced Responsibility Hypothesis). Thus, by having participants play 
an iterated, two-role version of the game I examined whether a different pattern 
of helping and repayment (than Experiments 1 and 2) would be observed.  
- UAQ 3: Were rejections in Experiment 2 down to injustice or indebtedness? 
- Design Feature 3: It remains unclear if the high rate of rejection (i.e. 35.6%) 
of conditional offers was down to recipients’ disapproval of perceived injustice, 
or a trait indebtedness-induced repulsion against benefit acceptance (Greenberg 
& Westcott, 1983). I argued that this confusion could originate from 
Experiment 2’s design where players had no awareness of the feasibility of 
repayment evasion. As such, in Experiment 3 I informed participants of this 
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feasibility before the acceptance or rejection decisions. While this new feature 
may not tamper with the indebtedness-motivated rejections, I would expect 
minimal rejections out of perceived unfairness as there is clearly a more 
effective strategy to retaliate: to simply take the offers and then not repay. 
- UAQ 4: Does being ‘cheap-rode’ prompt more eventual fair plays?  
- Design Feature 4 and 5: I argued the logic behind cheap-riding should be 
similar to that of altruistic punishment (Fehr & Gächter, 2002; Fowler, 2005). 
That is, via their reduced payback cheap-riders endeavoured to prevent future 
non-generosity of their helpers (Ma et al., 2014). To examine the validity of this 
argument I included two additional features as summarised below: 
First, I manipulated the magnitude of partners’ repayment for participants who 
helped conditionally in the first trial (in which they played as a potential 
helper). A conditional offer in Trial 1, depending on a one’s assigned condition, 
may be partially repaid (i.e. Cheap-riding condition), fully repaid (i.e. Fairness 
condition’) or utterly not repaid (i.e. Free-riding condition). Second, 
participants played as a helper twice (i.e. Helper Trials, HTs hereafter) and eight 
times as a recipient (i.e. Recipient Trials, RTs hereafter), while the 8 RTs were 
sandwiched by the 2HTs (i.e. Trial 1 and Trial 10). During the 8 RTs 
participants received offers of varying conditionalities (to be discussed later).  
Overall, features 4 and 5 should permit the analysis of whether being ‘cheap-
rode’ would push people to act more in accord with injunctive fairness. That is, 
whether the conditional helpers (on Trial 1) from the Cheap-riding condition 
would be more inclined to show generosity in the ensuing experimental trials.  
5.1. Introduction 
5.1.1. The Purpose of Experiment 3 
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The key objective of Experiment 3 was to address a few unexamined 
issues in Experiments 1 and 2, and in so doing I intended to complement the 
robustness of the overall investigation of gratitude-induced prosociality. I aimed 
also to further the understanding of the gratitude-(direct) reciprocity relation—
which was a key discovery in Chapter 2—by examining what other variables 
(situational or dispositional) could have contributed to the strength of this link. 
The next section (i.e. Section 5.1.2) discusses how the new features of the 
current experiment could address the UAQs as outlined in Section 5.0. 
5.1.2. Unanswered Questions from Experiments 1 and 2 
In this section I discuss at length a series of UAQs from Experiments 1 
and 2, and importantly, I elaborate on how the new features could help tackle 
these UAQs. While this section may touch upon a few present predictions and 
hypotheses, they are to be thoroughly discussed in Section 5.1.3. 
5.1.2.1. UAQ 1: Does the degree of unfairness really not count? 
One intriguing observation of Experiments 1 and 2 was that participants 
whose helpers breached the injunctive fairness norm (i.e. via giving conditional 
offers with varying repayment expectations) seemed not bothered by the extent 
of their helpers’ non-generosity. Meanwhile, data of Experiment 1 illustrates 
that people favoured unconditional (injunctively fair) over conditional 
(injunctively not fair) offers (e.g. more perceived helpfulness and state 
gratitude). In sum, data from Experiments 1 and 2 imply that individuals care 
only about whether injunctive fairness was observed, and crucially when it was 
not a more (or less) severe deviation from fairness would not matter.  
The above hinted that there may be a ‘threshold’ to segregate fairness 
from unfairness (in a normative sense). Nonetheless, a shared feature of 
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Experiments 1 and 2 (i.e. recipients’ naivety about the helpers’ available 
options) may render this fairness threshold perspective debatable. In particular, 
it remains unaddressed as in how differently would recipients respond if they 
could decipher their helpers’ intent based on both the helpers’ selected and 
neglected options (Charness & Levine, 2007)? Hence, one key new feature of 
Experiment 3 would be the recipients’ awareness of the helpers’ list of options. 
In the present study participants played an iterated game in which they 
had opportunities—at different trials—to assume the role as a helper or a 
recipient. Participants played as a potential helper (i.e. P1s hereafter) in Trial 1 
and 10 and as a potential recipient (i.e. P2s hereafter) for the eight trials in 
between. The trials were arranged this way to notify the participants, prior to 
playing as P2s, of the various behavioural options a P1 will be endowed with.  
Via this revised experimental set-up I measured whether the 
transparency of P1s’ options would affect participants’ offer appraisals and 
behavioural decisions during the Recipient Trials. Specifically, I assessed 
whether the well-informed recipients in this game would replicate the ‘all-or-
nothing’ pattern of fairness perceptions as indicated in Experiments 1 and 2.  
As such, I tested two competing hypotheses. The Gratitude Relativity 
Hypothesis (i.e. GRH) (Wood, Maltby & Brown, 2011)—which predicts a 
graded offer appraisal (i.e. how an offer is appraised is subject to its relative 
worth to other offers), and the Inelastic Fairness Construal (i.e. IFC) notion—
which argues the fairness threshold perspective as mentioned above (i.e. how 
fair an offer is only hinges on whether it is consistent with the injunctive norm). 
Section 5.1.3 features a detailed discussion in relation to GRH and IFC. 
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5.1.2.2. UAQ 2: Was the lack of both perspectives as helpers and recipients to 
blame for the observed over-cooperativeness in both Experiments 1 and 2? 
Another issue surrounding Experiments 1 and 2 was that participants seemed to 
be too cooperative. Below I discuss why I came to this conclusion and how the 
current revised design may subject that to scrutiny. 
a) How were participants in Experiments 1 and 2 ‘overly cooperative’? 
While I addressed the moral rationale of P1s in Experiment 1 to not only 
help but also help unconditionally (Elster, 2006), the fact that one was willing 
to entrust something to an anonymous, one-time fellow co-player (even with 
expectations to be repaid) alone already constitutes a prosocial gesture (Berg et 
al., 1995; Fehr & Rockenbach, 2003). Gergen and colleagues (Gergen, Diebold, 
Seipel, & Gresser, 1969; Gergen et al., 1975) even argued that gifting 
unconditional benefits in economic games may engender suspicion as recipients 
may ponder why the helpers were being that benevolent. Considering also that 
the one-shot, double-blinded design of Experiment 1 should have removed any 
reputation-incentivized helping (Güney & Newell, 2013), the observed 80% 
helping rate (and with the majority being unconditional helping, i.e. 51%) 
should evidence an over-generosity issue among helpers in Experiment 1. 
Meanwhile, the meta-analysis by Johnson and Mislin (2011) over 160 
Trust Games revealed an average trustworthiness index (i.e. TI hereafter) of 
37%. This TI was the ratio of a trustee’s actual back-transfer to the highest 
possible back-transfer. Indeed, the TIs of both Experiments 1 and 2 (i.e. 
Experiment 1 (N = 21): M: 81.4%; SD: 33.4; Experiment 2 (N = 87): M: 78.8%; 
SD: 37.2), which were above the mean estimates (i.e. 37%) by some distances, 
were not far off from the maximum TI (i.e. 81.2%) in Johnson and Mislin’s 
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(2011) review. In this regard, it should not be unreasonable to argue that 
participants in Experiments 1 and 2 were overly trustworthy. 
b) Single-role vs. Two-role Games: Analysing why people over-cooperate?      
 I suggested that the one-shot, single-role design of Experiments 1 and 2 
may account for why people seemed to be overly prosocial in either study. In 
particular, Burks et al. (2003) put forth two hypotheses on how playing both 
roles (as senders and receivers) could contribute to participants’ in-game 
prosociality. The Reduced Responsibility Hypothesis (i.e. RRH)—which argues 
that playing both roles reduces the players’ helping and reciprocating 
intentions, and the Golden Rules Hypothesis (i.e. GRH)—which argues the 
otherwise. See Section 5.1.3.2 for more details about RRH and GRH. 
As such, the present revised design should help tackle UAQ 2 by testing 
the RRH and the GRH. In particular, I examined whether a similar pattern of 
over-helping or over-repayment would still be found in a context where players 
could garner perspectives of both helpers and recipients. 
5.1.2.3. UAQ 3: Was negative reciprocity or trait indebtedness to blame for 
rejecting a financially advantageous, albeit injunctively unfair, offer?    
I discussed that the lack of prior knowledge on one’s ‘defaulting’ rights 
(in both Experiments 1 and 2) may account for the high rejection rate (i.e. 36%) 
of offers in Experiment 2. Evidence in the impunity game (IG) literature has 
documented the feasibility of players irrationally rejecting a financial benefit 
out of preservation of social fairness (e.g. Yamagishi et al., 2009; Yamagishi et 
al., 2012). Hence, in Chapter 4 I speculated that participants may have utilised 
their ‘acceptance/rejection’ options to retaliate against the helpers’ belittlement 
of injunctive fairness, instead of their repayment options as originally expected.  
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Nonetheless, I also argued that trait indebtedness (Mathews & Green, 
2010; Mathews & Shook, 2013) may be an alternative reason why people 
quitted on a financial benefit. A dispositionally indebted person is characterised 
by an ever-present disgust to be the one to receive in an exchange (Greenberg & 
Westcott, 1983). Thus, such an indebtedness-driven rejection should not relate 
to endeavours to protest against injustice. However, in Experiment 2 there was 
no way to rule out either of the motives behind the observed rejections.  
Therefore, to unravel this confusion I brought in another modification in 
Experiment 3. Instead of keeping recipients in the dark they were informed, 
before they accepted (or rejected) the offers, that the acceptors had the freedom 
to, later on, decide whether or not and how much to repay. This new feature 
should enable the disentanglement of the two abovementioned motives behind 
the rejections. Obviously, knowing that the ‘default’ option is now open a 
punisher is expected to accept and later on default. In contrast, dispositionally 
indebted participants should still reject nonetheless as they always strive to 
refrain from owing anybody (Greenberg & Westcott, 1983).  
5.1.2.4. UAQ 4: Does being ‘cheap-rode’ make the ‘victims’ act more fairly?  
 Throughout the thesis I contended that the logic to cheap-ride in an 
economic game could be analogous to that of altruistic punishment (Fehr & 
Gächter, 2002). That is, by incurring a cost (i.e. making a partial repayment 
despite not having to) the cheap-riders strive to prevent their miserly helpers 
from ‘victimising’ other people in the future. Nonetheless, it remains to be seen 
how valid this notion is, and even if cheap-riding is resorted to how effective it 
is in enforcing fairness. Thus here I examined whether being ‘cheap-rode’ 
would prompt more eventual fair (or generous) gestures from the ‘victims’.    
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In Experiment 3 I manipulated partners’ repayment among players who 
made conditional offers in Trial 1 where they played as P1s. Thus, by having 
different conditional givers experience different levels of partners’ repayment 
(i.e. cooperating, cheap- or free-riding) I examined specifically whether (and 
how) being cheap-rode (compared to other treatments) would succeed in 
inciting more generous decisions in the ensuing trials (i.e. Trial 2 to 10). 
5.1.3. Exploratory Aims and Hypotheses 
In this section, I present the list of hypotheses and exploratory aims of 
the current chapter and the respective predictions were summarised in Table 
5.1. I intend to discuss at length the procedures of the current experimental 
design in section 5.2 (i.e. the Method section).    
5.1.3.1. Inelastic Fairness Construal vs. Gratitude Relativity Hypothesis  
I addressed, in Section 5.1.2.1, how granting participants the 
perspectives of both helpers and recipients should facilitate the analyses of 
whether injunctive fairness is an absolute or a relative judgment (i.e. ‘whether 
more unfairness really does not count (i.e. UAQ 1)’. There were two 
hypotheses making competing predictions on the matter, and they were, a) the 
Inelastic Fairness Construal argument and, b) the Gratitude Relativity 
Hypothesis (Wood et al., 2011). Both hypotheses are discussed below. 
i) Inelastic Fairness Construal Argument  
Eckel and Grossman (1996b) introduced the concept of fairness 
elasticity in the context of economic games. In particular, they contended that 
an inelastic fairness demand, as characterised by the consistent sanctioning 
against unfair treatment despite the increasing cost of doing so, should originate 
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from the punisher’s stubborn allegiance to a set of moral principles (Gilligan, 
1982) like the injunctive norms (Biel, Von Borgstede, & Dahlstrand, 1999). 
The above fairness perspective hinted that the crucial criterion for 
fairness perception lies in the injunctive norm. That is, whether a treatment was 
fair should hinge on how that specific treatment compares to normative 
fairness. Thus, relativity should be irrelevant as people would focus on how a 
specific treatment fares against the ‘standard’ fair treatment, but not against 
other treatments. Indeed, such an inelastic (or absolute) fairness construal is 
documented in the literature (Bian & Keller, 1999; Eckel & Grossman, 1996b). 
Building upon this inelastic fairness construal (IFC) notion, the 
information of whether a helper could be nicer (or nastier) should have no role 
in offer appraisals. Recipients are expected to evaluate, subject to the guidance 
of injunctive norm (Ma et al., 2014), whether the offer on its own constituted a 
fair (or an unfair) gesture. As such, the IFC should predict an ‘all-or-nothing’ 
threshold in fairness attribution similar to Experiments 1 and 2. In other words, 
only a dichotomous ‘fair vs. unfair’ contrast in intent and emotions between 
receipts of unconditional and conditional (i.e. ‘the interest-free’, ‘25%-interest’ 
and ‘50%-interest’) offers should exist. The IFC would also predict all 
conditional offer receipts, regardless of conditionalities, to trigger similar 
emotions and intent, considering that the imposition of repayment clauses alone 
already breached the injunctive fairness norm (Elster, 2006; Ma et al., 2014). 
ii) Gratitude Relativity Hypothesis (i.e. GRH hereafter) (Wood et al., 2011) 
The GRH argues that the experience of gratitude does not function in an 
absolute manner. Relativity matters as people are vigilant to how their benefits 
‘rank’ among what others have acquired. Accordingly, a person who is 
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convinced that his/her benefit does not compare favourably should barely 
experience any gratitude. Thus, the GRH implies that recipients seldom judge a 
benefit in isolation as recipients always contemplate its relative worth. 
Hence, the newfound transparency of helpers’ options in the present 
study should facilitate the comparisons of offers that one actually received with 
what he/she could have received. This comparison should then elicit a graded, 
linear fairness appraisal of offers of varying conditionalities. For instance, 
knowing that a helper could have helped unconditionally, a recipient should 
think even less highly of helpers giving 50%-interest offers than those ‘interest-
free’ offer givers. Therefore, the GRH would hypothesise not only different 
intent attributions (and emotions) between receipts of conditional and 
unconditional offers, but also across receipts of conditional offers of varying 
repayment obligations (i.e. ‘interest-free’ vs. 25%-interest’ vs. ‘50% interest’). 
5.1.3.2. Playing Both Roles and Over-generosity 
I highlighted in Section 5.1.2.2 how the present repeated and two-role 
design allows scrutiny over the two competing hypotheses by Burks et al 
(2003). They were the Golden Rules Hypothesis and the Reduced Responsibility 
Hypothesis. Via the current analysis I examined whether the lack of 
opportunities to play both in-game roles (i.e. single-role game) was indeed the 
reason why people over-cooperated in Experiments 1 and 2 (i.e. UAQ 2). 
i) Golden Rules Hypothesis 
Burks et al. (2003) contended that the playing both roles could raise the 
salience of the Golden Rule (i.e. ‘Do unto others as you would have them do 
unto you’). Therefore, playing both roles should raise trustfulness (i.e. 
willingness to give offers) and trustworthiness (i.e. reciprocity) from the 
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participants, as they would fancy the same to occur to them (Burks et al., 2003). 
In short, the Golden Rule Hypothesis should predict even more ‘over-helping’ 
and ‘over-repayment’ in the present experiment than in Experiments 1 and 2. 
ii) Reduced Responsibility Hypothesis 
Burks and colleague (2003), nonetheless, also theorised that playing 
both roles may undermine prosociality, especially when the game involves 
partner-switching and independent trials. Burks et al. (2003) argued that 
playing both roles under such a setting may diminish prosociality because of a 
decreased sense of personal responsibility for partner’s earning in each trial. As 
a result, participants may feel less uncomfortable making selfish decisions. 
Participants at present were told they each had a different ‘partner’ in 
each trial, and that their final outcome depended on the performance on a 
randomly selected trial. Therefore, the Reduced Responsibility Hypothesis 
should predict more selfish responding such as refusal to i) make any offers in 
the helper trials, or ii) fulfil the repayment obligations, in the present 
experiment than in Experiments 1 and 2. 
5.1.3.3. Cheap-riding as Normative Fairness Enforcement? 
The present manipulation of ‘partners’ repayment’ (i.e. partial, full or 
zero repayment) permits the scrutiny of the feasibility of cheap-riding in 
enforcing normative fairness. Thus, this norm-enforcement hypothesis (i.e. 
NEH hereafter) would predict that being cheap-rode should incite more 
generosity from the victims as they make amends for their initial violation of 
normative fairness (i.e. not helping for ‘free’ in Trial 1) (Ma et al., 2014). 
As such, the NEH should predict that relative to conditional helpers (of 
Trial 1) whose offers were fully repaid or utterly not repaid, helpers whose 
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recipients partially repaid (i.e. Cheap-riding Condition) should demonstrate 
more fair plays in subsequent trials such as helping unconditionally in Trial 10. 
The null hypothesis, nevertheless, would state that being ‘cheap-rode’ have no 
specific role in fostering more fair gestures from the victims. 
5.1.3.4. Recurring Research Themes 
In addition to the exploratory aims and hypotheses detailed above, this 
chapter also comprises the analyses of two recurring research themes of the 
thesis. In particular, this section highlights how Gratitude and Indebtedness, as 
a state or trait, would influence cooperation or sanctioning in Experiment 3. 
a) Recurring Research Theme 1: Gratitude and Decision Making 
Since the present thesis primarily concerns the scrutiny of how gratitude 
nurtures prosociality in economic exchanges, there is no reason to overlook 
how state or trait gratitude would relate to the range of cooperative (or 
retaliatory) decision-making (e.g. helping and repayment) in Experiment 3.  
ai.) State Gratitude and Prosociality (or Antisociality) in Economic Games 
The Moral Barometer hypothesis (McCullough et al., 2001) suggests the 
logical fallacy in people feeling gratitude while harbouring intentions to harm 
the benefactors (See Chapter 1 for a detailed discussion). The Moral Motive 
hypothesis (McCullough et al., 2001) also addressed the role of state gratitude 
in cultivating a desire to repay the benefactors. Taken together, both the above 
Moral Functional Hypotheses of Gratitude should dismiss any motives to 
default by any grateful recipients. Therefore, these two moral gratitude 
hypotheses should predict minimal state gratitude from recipients under-
repaying (partially or completely) their conditional offers (See Table 5.1). 
aii.) Trait Gratitude and Prosociality (or Antisociality) in Economic Games 
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Furthermore, gratitude as a trait should also discourage retaliation in 
Experiment 3. Particularly, the Social Cognitive Model of Gratitude (i.e., 
SCMG, Wood et al., 2008) outlined how trait gratitude could indirectly dictate 
state gratitude by altering recipients’ appraisal of benefits (Wood et al., 2008), 
with state gratitude being theorised to restrain antisociality towards the helpers 
(McCullough et al., 2001). Thus, by testing the below path model (See Figure 
5.1) examined whether trait gratitude would also restrain defaulting (i.e. under-
repayment) the way as theorised by Wood et al. (2008). 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1. The SCMG (Wood et al., 2008) Prediction on Defaulting 
 
b) Recurring Research Theme 2: Indebtedness and Decision Making 
This chapter also includes the analysis of how indebtedness, as a state or 
a trait, would impact upon participants’ decision making in Experiment 3. 
bi.) State Indebtedness and Prosociality (or Antisociality) in Economic Games  
 Indebtedness as an unpleasant state that results from a benefit receipt 
(Greenberg & Shapiro, 1971) should also have some bearing on participants’ 
in-game decisions. Greenberg and Westcott (1983) suggested that a double-
blinded experimental set-up constitutes the perfect breeding grounds for 
indebted recipients to adopt Cognitive Restructuring to manage his/her arousal. 
Given that in Experiment 3 I retained the double-anonymity (Hoffman et 
al., 1994) feature, an emotionally indebted recipient may be tempted to berate 
their helpers’ intent as to rid oneself of the indebtedness-invoked discomfort 
(Hatfield & Sprecher, 1983). Such a distorted intent attribution may 
consequently trigger retaliation (Falk & Fischbacher, 2006) in the form of 
cheap- or free-riding. Taken together, this Cognitive Restructuring Hypothesis 
Trait 
Gratitude 
(TG) 
Benefit 
Appraisal 
(BA) 
Affective 
Gratitude 
(Gs) 
Under-
repayment % 
(UR %) 
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(i.e. CRH hereafter) of indebtedness (Greenberg and Westcott, 1983) should 
predict a positive, indirect effect of state indebtedness on participants’ under-
repayment (i.e. UR %) via benefit appraisal (i.e. BA) (See Figure 5.2). 
 
Figure 5.2. CRH’s (Greenberg & Westcott, 1983) Prediction on Defaulting  
Nonetheless, Greenberg (1980) argued that reciprocity could also help 
relieve an indebted recipient of his/her arousal. Therefore, echoing the Negative 
State Relief Model (Cialdini al., 1987), an indebted recipient would strive to 
escape the psychological shackle (Greenberg & Shapiro, 1971) by giving back. 
Contrary to the CRH, this indebtedness-reciprocity notion would predict a 
negative association between state indebtedness and participants’ UR %. 
Recipients feeling more indebted (toward the helpers) should have a higher 
propensity to want to and actually make restitutions in the present game. 
bii.)Trait Indebtedness and Prosociality (or Antisociality) in Economic Games 
Dispositionally indebted individuals derive utilities via putting (and 
keeping) other people in debt (Greenberg & Westcott, 1983), as they enjoy 
being under-benefited in an interaction (Hatfield & Sprecher, 1983). Thus, I 
expected a more dispositionally indebted participant to help unconditionally, 
since giving to a stranger (while stressing that there is no need to pay up) 
should place the helper in the most disadvantageous position. 
A dispositionally indebted person is also characterised by an extreme 
sensitivity to (the state of) owing and a rigid allegiance to the reciprocity 
principle (Greenberg & Westcott, 1983). Therefore, I would anticipate 
acceptors who under-repaid (either completely or partially) their conditional 
offers to be less dispositionally indebted than the fully-repaying acceptors.
State Indebtedness (Is) Benefit Appraisal 
(BA) 
Under-repayment % (UR %) 
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Table 5.1. Unanswered Questions, Hypotheses and Predictions of Experiment 3 
Unanswered Questions 
(UAQ) 
Hypotheses/ Exploratory Aims Predictions/ Expected Results 
1. Does degree of unfairness 
really ‘not count’ as suggested 
in Experiments 1 and 2? 
Yes: Inelastic Fairness Construal (IFC)  
(Eckel & Grossman, 1996b) 
IFC: Differences in intent attributions (and emotions) only based on if the offer 
was Conditional (i.e. injunctively unfair) or Unconditional (i.e.injunctively fair);  
No: Gratitude Relativity Hypothesis (i.e. 
GRH)  (Wood et al., 2011) 
GRH: Differences in intent perceptions, and emotions, across offer 
conditionalities (i.e. Unconditional vs. Interest-Free vs. 25%- vs 50%-Interest).  
2. Was the lack of chances to 
play both roles in Experiments 
1 and 2 to blame for the ‘over-
generosity’ issue? 
Yes: Golden Rule Hypothesis  
(Burks et al., 2003)  
No: Reduced Responsibility Hypothesis 
(Burks et al., 2003) 
Golden Rule Hypothesis: More cooperativeness (i.e. helping in both Helper 
Trials; Reciprocity in Recipient Trials) in Experiment 3 than both Experiments 1 
and 2   
Reduced Responsibility Hypothesis: More selfish responding in Experiments 3 
than Experiments 1 and 2 (i.e. less helping and reciprocity in both HTs and RTs)  
3. Were rejections in 
Experiment 2 attributable to 
negative reciprocity or trait 
indebtedness? 
Negative Reciprocity-driven Rejections 
(Bolton, Katok, & Zwick, 1998) 
The percentage of Conditional offer rejections at present should be significantly 
lower than that of Experiment 2 (i.e. 35.6%).   
Trait Indebtedness-driven Rejections 
(Greenberg & Westcott, 1983) 
Conditional offer Rejectors should score higher than acceptors in the 
Indebtedness Scales-Revised (i.e. IS-R) (Elster, Maleki, McLeod, & Watkins, 
2005)  
4. Does being ‘cheap-rode’ 
prompt more eventual fair plays 
from the ‘victims’?    
‘Norm-Enforcement’ Hypothesis (i.e. 
NEH) (i.e. Cheap-riding performs a similar 
function as Altruistic Punishment) 
NEH: Conditional helpers (at Trial 1) from ‘Cheap-riding’ condition, compared 
to helpers from ‘Fairness’ or ‘Free-riding’ conditions, should show more 
generosity in the eventual trials (e.g. give unconditional or less unfair) offers in 
Trial 10) 
(Recurring Research Theme 1) 
Does Gratitude (as a state or a 
disposition) nurture cooperation 
in economic exchanges? 
State Gratitude:  
Moral Barometer and Moral Motive 
Hypotheses of Gratitude  
(McCullough et al., 2001) 
Both Moral Barometer and Motive Hypotheses:  Conditional offer acceptors who 
repaid fully (i.e. Cooperators) should report more state gratitude than recipients 
repaying partly (i.e. Cheap-riders) or nothing at all (i.e. Free-riders).   
Trait Gratitude: Social Cognitive Model of 
Gratitude (SCMG) (Wood, et al., 2008) 
SCMG: Trait Gratitude should restrain defaulting (i.e. partial or zero repayments 
of conditional offers) via Benefit Appraisal and Emotional Gratitude (See Figure 
5.1) 
(Recurring Research Theme 2) 
Does Indebtedness (as a state or 
as a trait) prompt cooperative 
or retaliatory economic 
State Indebtedness:  
1. Cognitive-Restructuring Hypothesis 
(Greenberg & Westcott, 1983); vs. 
2. Indebtedness-driven Reciprocity  
Cognitive-Restructuring Hypothesis:  State Indebtedness should promote under-
repayment via Benefit Appraisal (See Figure 5.2). 
Indebtedness-Driven Reciprocity: Recipients feeling indebted should, compared 
to defaulters, be more likely to make restitutions by repaying fully  
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decision making in the current 
context?  
Trait Indebtedness: 
1. Trait Indebtedness-motivated rejection 
(See UAQ 3 above); 
2. Indebtedness-driven helping  
(Greenberg & Westcott, 1983); 
3. Indebtedness-driven reciprocity 
1. See UAQ 3 above. 
2. Unconditional helpers (in both Helper Trials) should be the most 
dispositionally indebted (i.e. scoring higher in IS-R than Non-helpers and 
Conditional helpers); 
3. Conditional offer acceptors who under-repaid (partially or completely) should 
report lower IS-R than those who repaid in full (i.e. cooperated). 
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5.2. Methods 
5.2.1. Participants 
One hundred and thirty-three students from The University of 
Nottingham participated in the experiment (79 were females, mean age: 22.7 
years, SD = 4.7). Each participant was guaranteed a basic allowance of £3 and 
was automatically entered into a prize draw in which they may win a cash prize 
up to £35. Participants knew that in each session (N= 8-10) one of them would 
be randomly drawn as the winner thus became entitled to that cash prize. 
5.2.2. Game Design 
The present experiment was a modified, repeated version of 
Experiments 1 and 2 that was conducted with software Z-Tree (Fischbacher, 
2007). To begin with each participant was given a fair die to roll and was seated 
in a separate cubicle. Each experimental session took place with groups of 8 to 
10 participants. Participants were told the game included multiple (but had no 
idea how many) trials, and that they would each be partnered with a different, 
randomly assigned (and anonymous) fellow participant in each trial. 
5.2.2.1. Similarities with Experiments 1 and 2  
Each player was initially endowed with 150 money-equivalent ‘Bonus 
Points’, and therefore he/she needed 50 additional points to reach the ‘Bonus 
Threshold’ (i.e. 200 points) to have a chance to be entered into the lottery draw 
to win a cash prize. It was made clear to every player that each bonus point 
he/she gained would be worth 10 pennies but only when that player made the 
‘200 point threshold’ was he/she entitled to the possibility to win any cash 
prize.  
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The only way to reach that threshold was by rolling a fair, six-sided die 
once. The possible payoffs were a loss of -50 points, 0 points, and gains of 50, 
100, 150, and 200 points depending on the number on the dice. It was 
emphasised that a larger number on the dice did NOT guarantee a more 
favourable allocation of bonus points. Also, in each trial every player learned 
that he/she was partnered with an unidentifiable and anonymous fellow 
participant. Participants were reminded that ‘neither joint effort nor competition 
with your partner is warranted’. Again, participants were led to believe they 
played with one another although in reality they played on their own. All ‘post-
die roll’ scores were pre-determined with no reference to the actual die-roll.  
5.2.2.2. New Features of Experiment 3  
In this section I highlighted several new features of Experiment 3. They 
included the ‘Jackpot Trials’; perspectives of both helpers and recipients; prior 
knowledge of defaulting rights; and the manipulation of partners’ repayment.  
a) The ‘Jackpot Trials’ 
A new feature of Experiment 3 was that participants were not paid for 
every trial they played. They were informed that, amongst each session, one 
participant would be drawn as the winner. And for that winner his/her cash 
prize would be based on the performance of a randomly picked trial—the 
‘Jackpot Trial' (i.e. JT)— he/she participated. For instance, if a player who won 
the draw and had achieved 350 points on his/her JT, then he/she would win a 
£35-cash prize. It was made clear to the participants that a final score below the 
200 point threshold at the JT means that his/her cash prize would remain 
ZERO. Thus, participants were recommended to take each trial seriously.  
b) Perspectives of both Helpers and Recipients 
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Participants played as a potential helper (i.e. P1s) twice and as a 
recipient (i.e. P2) eight times in this game. Meanwhile, they did not know a 
priori in which trial they would play as a P1 or as a P2. The next sections (i.e., b 
i) and b ii)) detail the chain of decisions a participant had to make. 
b i.) The Helper Trials (HT)—the first and the final (10th) trial 
 
Figure 5.3. Notification of partners’ failure to win any bonuses 
 
An HT was almost identical to Experiment 1. All participants, after their 
die-rolling, were told they ended up with a final score of 350. Thus, they could 
win a £35-cash prize if they also won the prize draw. They were also informed 
that their ‘partners’ acquired just 100 points (i.e. below the threshold) thus 
would win no bonuses, even if the latter won the lottery (See Figure 5.3). 
 
Figure 5.4. Range of helping options (Helper Trials) 
As a result, participants were asked if they would help by transferring 
part of their excess points (i.e.  350 – 200 ‘Threshold’ = 150 points), so that in 
case that partner won the conditional lottery he/she could still acquire some 
bonus money. Participants could make either an unconditional or a conditional 
transfer (See Figure 5.4). Conditional offer givers would then decide a level of 
repayment out of three alternatives (i.e. Interest-Free, 25%-, or 50%-Interest 
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Offer) as the repayment clause (See Figure 5.5). All offer givers then specified 
the transfer magnitude (from the range 100- 150 points). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.5. The Flow of Decisions in the Helper Trials (Trial 1 and Trial 10) 
 
Conditional helpers were then notified of their recipients’ actual 
repayment decisions—which belonged to another new feature of Experiment 3 
(to be discussed later in e))—despite their previous agreement. The trial ceased 
here with participants knowing what their cash prizes would be if they won the 
lottery Figure 5.5 outlines the flow of decisions in a helper trial. Participants 
played as a potential helper in the first (i.e. T1) and the tenth trial (i.e. T10).  
b ii). The Recipient Trials (RTs, the 2nd to 9th Trial) 
Participants told they won (by scoring 350) but their ‘partners’ lost as they did not make the 200-point 
threshold (i.e. 100 Bonus points only)   
Participants decided if they agreed to help by making a 
‘donation’ (can be not ‘free’, i.e. conditional)  
Participants decided to help Participants did NOT help 
Fair ‘Unconditional’ offers (i.e. 
No Need to Repay) 
Unfair ‘Conditional’ offers (i.e. Repayment Demanded) 
‘Interest-free’ offer 
(Only Give back the 
‘Principal’) 
25%-Interest 
(Principal + a 
25% interest) 
50%-Interest 
(Principal + a 
50% interest) 
All conditional offers were ‘accepted’ by their ‘partners’ and ‘repaid’ 
differently depending on one’s assigned condition 
‘Fairness’ Condition (N= 
44) i.e. offers repaid 
FULLY as agreed 
‘Cheap-riding’ Condition 
(N= 44) i.e. offers repaid 
PARTLY 
‘Free-riding’ Condition 
(N= 45) i.e. offers NOT 
repaid AT ALL 
Participants informed of ‘Partners’’ Repayment Decisions, then proceed onto the 
next trial (Trial 1), or the End of Experiment 3 (Trial 10) 
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All participants purportedly ‘lost’ the die-rolling game, as they ended up 
with only 100 Points, and therefore entitled to NO cash prize (for that trial) 
even if they eventually won the lottery. Nonetheless, every player then learned 
that his/her ‘partner’, who ‘won’ like he/she did in Trial 1 (i.e. getting 350 
Bonus Points), offered to help by giving away part (i.e. 100 points) of his/her 
excess bonus points (i.e. 350-200 (Bonus Threshold) =150 points). 
Table 5.2 Counter-balancing of the sequences of the offers received (in blocks) 
Trial/ 
Block 
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 10th 
(Last) 
A Helper 25% I-F 50%  UC I-F UC 50% 25% Helper 
B Helper 25% UC I-F 50% UC 50% I-F 25% Helper 
C Helper 25% 50% UC I-F 50% I-F UC 25% Helper 
D Helper 25% 50% UC 50% I-F I-F UC 25% Helper 
E Helper 25% I-F I-F UC 50% UC 50% 25% Helper 
F Helper 25% UC 50% I-F UC 50% I-F 25% Helper 
Note. Helper = Helper Trials; UC = Unconditional Offers; I-F= ‘Interest-free’ Offers; 25% = ‘25%-
Interest’ Offers; 50% = ‘50%-Interest’ Offers. 
 
Participants took turn to receive two unconditional offers, ‘interest-free’, 
‘25%-interest’ and ‘50%-interest’ offers over their eight trials as recipients 
(Refer to Table 5.2). I counter-balanced, using a Latin square, the order of the 
conditionality of offers a player would receive in six blocks (block A to F). 
Participants were randomly assigned to one out of these six blocks. 
Recipients of conditional offers were told their offers were not ‘free’. 
By accepting they undertook an obligation that, in case they eventually won the 
lottery they would return part of their earnings. For example, a recipient who 
accepted an ‘interest-free’ 100-point offer (i.e. £10) on the 5th trial, who then 
won the draw (and trial 5 being the JT) thus became entitled to a £20-cash 
prize, was expected to repay £10. Meanwhile, unconditional offer recipients 
were told they were not expected to repay. Participants then decided whether to 
accept (or decline) the offers. They were reminded that a rejection would yield 
them ZERO payoffs even if they won the lottery. This reminder served to 
assure that participants understood the financial risks in rejecting any offers. 
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c) Prior Knowledge of one’s ‘right to default’ 
Recipients were told they could ‘decide whether to repay, and the 
amount of repayment later’ before their acceptance decisions. After indicating 
offer acceptances (or rejections) participants would rate ten items (shown in 
Table 5.3) about their emotions toward their helpers. 
Table 5.3 Measurement of Recipients’ Emotions toward their Offers 
Item Questions Constructs Represented 
1 I feel indebted (i.e. feeling like I owe something) to my 
partner. 
Indebtedness (State) 
2 How much gratitude would you feel towards your partner?  Gratitude (State) 
3 I am annoyed by my partner's decision. Annoyance (State) 
4 I would have done the same thing were I in my partner's shoes. Perspective-Taking 
5 I feel obliged to repay my partner Obligation 
6 How much do you consider your partner's transfer is motivated 
by a sincere desire to help? 
Perceived Helpfulness 
(Wood et al., 2008) 
7 My partner could have been more generous to me. Generosity 
8 How much do you think it cost your partner to have offered 
you help? (‘1’= ‘Nothing’; 7= ‘A Great Deal’) 
Perceived Cost of the 
Benefits (Wood et al., 2008) 
9 I am eager to help my partner out if he/she is in need in the 
near future 
Willingness to Reciprocate 
(Ma et al., 2014) 
10 How valuable do you consider that your partner's help is to 
you?   
Valuableness of the Benefits  
Note. Items 6, 8 and 10 were averaged to form a Benefit Appraisal composite. 
 
d) Avenues for Restitutions among Unconditional offer recipients 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
‘Free’ (Unconditional) Offers ‘Charged’ (Conditional) Offers 
Participants only scored 100 points whereas their ‘partners’ scored 350 points  
Receipt of offers with different repayment terms  
Interest-
Free 
25%-
Interest 
50%-
Interest 
Recipients, knowing that they could later on NOT repay,  
decided whether to Accept or Decline the offers 
 
Offers Accepted Offers Rejected 
‘Free’ offers holders: could 
voluntarily repay their helpers 
‘Charged’ offer holders: Reminder of their 
Obligated Repayment shown onscreen 
Repayment Options (as a forced choice) 
Repay FULLY Repay SOMETHING Repay NOTHING 
Participants to indicate specifically How Much to repay their partners 
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Figure 5.6. The Flow of Decisions in the Recipient Trials (Trials 2-9)
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Acceptors of conditional offers were then shown a reminder of their 
expected repayment. Immediately after that they would decide whether to repay 
‘nothing at all’, ‘some’, or ‘the whole’ of the repayment. Acceptors who chose 
to give back ‘some’ then specified their intended repayment (See Figure 5.6). 
Meanwhile, the present experiment permitted acceptors of unconditional offers 
to repay voluntarily (See Figure 5.7 below). It was, however, reiterated to the 
acceptors that the helpers ‘did not expect to receive any repayment’. 
Figure 5.7. Available Avenues to Repay for Unconditional Offer Acceptors 
 
e). Manipulation of Partners’ Repayment (Trial 1 and 10) 
The fifth new feature of Experiment 3 entails the manipulation of 
repayment decisions by a participant’s ‘partner’ when the participant played as 
P1s. I randomly assigned participants into one out of three conditions in which 
their conditional offers yielded different repayment (See Figure 5.5). These 
conditions included: first, a Fairness condition (N = 44) in which the ‘partners’ 
repaid fully (i.e. cooperation). Alternatively, participants could be assigned to 
the Cheap-riding condition (N = 44) where their offers were partially repaid. 
This partial repayment was a randomly-generated figure between 1p and the 
amount that ‘partner’ should repay. Or, a participant could end up in the Free-
riding condition (N = 45) in which he/she received utterly no repayment.  
At the end of each helper trial, every conditional helper was shown the 
repayment he/she should receive and the repayment he/she actually received 
(See Figure 5.8). This serves to highlight to the participants whether their 
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partners had breached the agreement. Participants who refused to help or helped 
unconditionally in Trial 1 were ‘immune’ to this manipulation. 
 
Figure 5.8 Notification of ‘Partners’’ Repayment (Cheap-riding Condition) 
 
5.2.2.3. Analysing Individual Differences in the Game 
While I retained the assessment of Trait Gratitude—measured by 
Gratitude-Questionnaire-VI (McCullough et al, 2002) (Cronbach’s  = .729, k 
= 6), and Social Desirability Responding—assessed via Paulhus’ (1991) 
Impression Management Scale (Cronbach’s  = .787, k = 19), in Experiment 3 I 
added the measure of Trait indebtedness. I adopted the Indebtedness Scale-
Revised (Elster et al., 2005) (Cronbach’s  = .902, k = 22) in examining how 
dispositionally indebted a participant was. All these surveys were conducted 
after Trial 10. The entire experimental session ended here and participants were 
debriefed and received their compensations. 
5.2.3. Ethics Statement 
The present experiment was approved by the ethics committee of the 
School of Psychology at the University of Nottingham. All participants were 
aged above 17 and all gave written, informed consent prior to participation as 
approved by the ethics committee (Approved 14th Oct 2014; Ref. Code: 531). 
5.2.4. Outcomes Section 
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In this section I outline and operationalize several crucial test variables 
in relation to the hypotheses and exploratory aims (Refer to Table 5.1.). 
5.2.4.1. Key Variables in the two Helper Trials (HTs, i.e. Trial 1 and 10) 
a) Incidence and Conditionality of Helping 
One primary indicator of cooperative responding (in the two HTs) was 
the percentage of helping. Apart from exploring the overall participants’ 
cooperativeness (by helping an unknown co-player), one key aspect of this 
analysis was the change in one’s helping decisions over the two HTs.  
Another indicator of prosociality during the HTs was the levels of 
repayment a P1 requested from the recipient (i.e. unconditional, interest-free, 
25% interest and 50% interest). I scrutinised also the presence (or absence) of 
change in conditionalities of offers made when participants played P1s again in 
Trial 10. Both variables are crucial in relation to certain hypotheses. For 
instance, the norm-enforcement hypothesis would argue that ‘cheap-rode’ 
conditional offer givers (in Trial 1) would give unconditional offers in Trial 10. 
Therefore, I specifically coded 1) whether or not conditional helpers at Trial 1 
would give unconditional offers in Trial 10; and 2) whether or not conditional 
helpers at Trial 1 would make more generous offers in Trial 10 (e.g. gave 
‘50%-interest’ offer at Trial 1 but made ‘25%-Interest’ offer at Trial 10). 
b) Magnitude of Transfers 
In Experiment 3 prospective helpers were granted freedom to decide the 
range (from 100- 150) bonus points to transfer in both Helper Trials. Hence, I 
regarded also the transfer magnitude as a token of prosociality at present. 
5.2.4.2. Key Variables in the Recipient Trials (RTs, i.e. Trial 2 to 9) 
a) Offer Acceptances and Rejections  
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I examined the proportion of players accepting (or declining) their offers while 
knowing that they could just take the offers and forget about repaying.   
b) Pre-repayment Ratings  
I measured participants’ evaluations of their offers via a series of ratings 
in 7-point Likert scales (i.e. pre-repayment ratings). As a recurring theme of the 
thesis, here I specifically inspect how state gratitude and indebtedness would 
relate to the recipients’ cooperativeness (e.g. repayment or the lack thereof).  
In each RT an item ‘My partner could have been more generous to me’ 
served as a manipulation check. Via this I ascertained participants’ awareness 
of the various levels of injunctive fairness implied by different offers (i.e. 
unconditional, ‘Interest-free’, 25%-interest’ and ‘50%-interest’), and the fact 
that their helpers could have acted more generous or selfish. Additionally, 
recipients gave an overall offer appraisal (Wood et al., 2008) by indicating their 
i) perceived genuine helpfulness, ii) perceived values of the offers, and ii) 
perceived costliness to the helpers (for helping). I created a composite ‘Benefit 
Appraisal’ in each RT by averaging participants’ ratings on items (i) to (iii).  
c) Categorical and Numerical Repayment Decisions   
In the present analysis I used the same categorical classifications as 
Experiment 2 of conditional offer acceptors based on their repayment. 
Acceptors who repaid completely were the cooperators. Those who repaid 
nothing were termed the free-riders as did Krishnamurthy (2000). Participants 
whose repayment was short of the expected amount were classified as the 
cheap-riders (Cornes & Sandler, 1984). In addition to these categorical 
classifications, I also quantified participants’ sanctioning via computing the 
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under-repayment percentage for each acceptor for every receipt. This under-
repayment metric (i.e. UR% hereafter) was computed by the formula 
[100%- (Participant’s Actual Repayment/ Expected Repayment)* 100%]. 
This UR% metrics and the above nominal classifications were NOT 
applicable in the two RTs where participants received unconditional offers, 
since these recipients were not expected to repay unless they volunteered to. 
Thus, I operationalize the cooperativeness of these unconditional offer 
acceptors by the magnitude of any voluntary repayment they made. 
5.2.4.3. Variables in the Dispositional Assessment 
In the present experiment I employed the Impression Management 
Scales (Paulhus, 1991) (Cronbach’s  = .787, k = 19), the Gratitude 
Questionnaire-VI (McCullough et al., 2002) (Cronbach’s  = .729, k = 6), and 
the Indebtedness Scales-Revised (Elster et al., 2005) (Cronbach’s  = .902, k = 
22), respectively as the validated assessment of Social Desirability Responding, 
Dispositional Gratitude and Dispositional Indebtedness. I computed a 
composite score for each of these inventories via averaging, after reverse-
scoring, participants’ ratings on these scales. All participants’ ratings were on 
7-point Likert Scales (i.e. ‘1’: ‘Strongly Disagree’; ‘7’: Strongly Agree’). 
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5.3. Results- Methodological Features 
In this chapter I split the results section into two halves (i.e. Sections 5.3 
and 5.4). Importantly, the present section entails the scrutiny over hypotheses 
related to the methodological features of Experiment 3 (i.e. one-shot versus 
iterated design, partner repayment manipulation etc.). This sub-section includes 
also analyses over whether the present crucial (decision) variables were 
confounded by factors such as gender or social desirability responding. 
Meanwhile, analyses on unanswered questions (i.e. UAQs hereafter) on how 
state or trait emotions (e.g. gratitude or indebtedness) impacted decision-
making (in the present game) are discussed in Section 5.4.    
5.3.1. UAQ 2: Was the lack of perspectives of both the helpers and recipients to 
blame for the over-generosity issue in Experiments 1 and 2?  
 I examined two competing hypotheses on how the presence (or lack 
thereof) of perspectives of both in-game roles would foster prosociality in 
Experiment 3. The Reduced Responsibility Hypothesis (Burks et al., 2003)—
which predicts playing both roles should undermine prosociality (e.g. less 
helping or repayment) in Experiment 3 relative to Experiments 1 and 2 (which 
are both one-shot games); and the Golden Rules Hypothesis (Burks et al., 
2003)—which argues that playing both roles should instead encourage 
prosociality in the present context in comparison to Experiments 1 and 2. 
5.3.1.1. Statistical Analyses 
a) Comparing Helping Decisions (Experiment 1 vs. Experiment 3) 
To test both the Reduced Responsibility and the Golden Rule 
Hypotheses I compared several crucial decisions in the present game to that of 
Experiments 1 and 2 (i.e. E1 and E2 hereafter). First, I compared the helping 
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decisions (i.e. rate of helping and offer conditionality etc.) in E1 to both Helper 
Trials (i.e. Trial 1 and 10) in the present game. Data from Trial 1 was NOT 
excluded as participants were aware (before the start) that they could be ‘either 
in a position to help or to receive help’, depending on their (and their partners’) 
‘final score at each trial’. I analysed the difference across experiments (i.e. E1 
vs. Trial 1; or E1 vs. Trial 10) on binary outcome measures (e.g. help or no 
help) using a 2 (Experiments)*2 (Outcomes) Chi-square test. Here I 
dichotomized offer conditionality into unconditional or conditional thanks to 
the low counts of conditional offer givers of each specific category in E1. I also 
replaced the analysis of transfer magnitude with whether helpers ‘over-donated’ 
(i.e. gave away more than required) as half of the potential helpers (N = 30) 
were stipulated to make bigger donations in E1. Table 5.4 illustrates the data. 
b) Comparing Repayment Decisions (Experiments 1 and 2 vs. Experiment 3) 
To further examine the Reduced Responsibility and Golden Rule 
Hypotheses I also explored how repayment decisions of the present experiment 
compared to that of Experiments 1 and 2. 
b i.) Comparing Repayment Decisions (Experiment 1 vs. Experiment 3) 
Owing to the relative low counts (N = 21) of conditional offer acceptors 
in E1 I dichotomize these acceptors’ repayment into cooperators (i.e. repaying 
fully) or defaulters (i.e. partial or complete under-repayment). I excluded 
repayment data from the two present RTs where recipients were 
unconditionally gifted; since unconditionally gifted recipients in E1 (N = 25) 
were not offered any avenues to repay (See Chapter 3). I included also the 
comparison of under-repayment rate (i.e. UR% hereafter) in E1 with that of the 
current experiment. Again, the analysis with nominal binary outcomes (i.e. 
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cooperate or default) was done via a 2 (Experiments)*2 (Outcomes) Chi-square 
test. The numerical variable (i.e. UR %) was examined using the Mann-
Whitney U Test. Table 5.5 and Table 5.6 outline the results. 
b ii.) Comparing Repayment Decisions (Experiment 2 vs. Experiment 3)  
To analyse how categorical repayment (i.e. repay all, nothing or 
partially) of conditional offer acceptors differed across experiments (i.e. 
Experiment 2 vs. Initial and vs. Second receipts in Experiment 3)—while 
controlling for offer conditionality—I resorted to the Multinomial Logit Model 
(i.e. MNLM hereafter). The MNLM permits comparisons of multiple groups 
via a combination of binary logistic regressions (El-habi, 2012), thus allows 
each category (e.g. repaying all or nothing) of the outcome variable to be 
contrasted with a reference category (e.g. repaying some) (Fredua, 2015). The 
current model— based upon a generalized logit link function (Horton & 
Lipsitz, 1999)—was examined with a robust variance estimator (Zeger & 
Liang, 1986) and an exchangeable ‘working’ correlation structure. This specific 
analysis was conducted via SAS-callable SUDAAN Release 9.0.1, as 
statisticians (Hardin & Hilbe, 2003; Horton & Lipsitz, 1999) generally agreed 
that SUDAAN is one of the only packages that can handle nominal multinomial 
regressions (i.e. generalized logit link). The findings are detailed in Table 5.7. 
Additionally, I examined, via independent samples t-tests, whether the 
UR% were different in E2 in comparison to both receipts of conditional offers 
in Experiment 3. Table 5.8 details the findings. 
5.3.1.2. Results 
a) Is helpfulness more prevalent in a single- (E1) or a both-role (E3) design?   
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As shown in Table 5.4, there was no evidence (both ps >. 05) that the 
rate of offer provisions of Experiment 1 (i.e. 49/61 = 80.3%) differed from that 
of Trial 1 (i.e. 95/133= 71.4%) or Trial 10 (i.e. 104/ 133= 78.2%).  Similar 
results emerged (2 (1) = 0.824, p = .364) when I contrasted the rate of 
provisions of Experiment 1 (i.e. 71.4%) with the combined rates (computed via 
summing both Trial 1 and Trial 10) of Experiment 3 (i.e. 199/266 = 74.8%) 
Table 5.4 Comparison of Helping Decisions (E1 vs. E3T1 vs. E3T10) 
 Experiment 1 (E1) vs. Experiment 3-Trial 1 (E3T1) vs. -Trial 10 (E3T10) 
    E1 E3T1 E3T10 E1 vs. E3T1 E1 vs. E3T10 
  N N N 2 p 2 p 
1.Helper vs. 
Non-helper 
Non-Helper 12 38 29     
Helper 49 95 104     
 Total 61 133 133 1.73 .22 0.11 .74 
2.Offer 
Conditionality  
Conditional 24 83 84     
Unconditional 25 12 20     
 Total 49 95 104 24.95 <.001 16.21 <.001 
3. Over-
donated? 
Yes 14 12 17     
No 35 83 87 4.70 .030 3.08 .079 
Note. All statistical tests were two-tailed. 2 = Pearson’s Chi-square.  
 
The rate of making an unconditional (instead of conditional) transfer 
was higher (both ps <.001) in Experiment 1 (i.e. 25/49 = 51.0%) than both Trial 
1 (i.e. 12/95= 12.6%), Trial 10 (i.e. 20/104= 19.2%) and the overall rates (i.e. 
32/199= 16.1%, 2 (1) = 27.12, p <. 001) of Experiment 3. The rate of over-
donation in E1 (i.e. 14/49 = 28.6%) was higher (p = .030) than that of Trial 
1(i.e. 12.6%) but was only marginally different (p = .079) from that of Trial 10 
(i.e. 17/104 = 16.3%).The comparison is again significant (2 (1) = 5.376, p 
= .020) when I compared the over-donation rate of Experiment 1 (i.e. 28.6%) to 
the combined rate of Experiment 3 (i.e. 14.5%). Overall, the current analyses 
failed to offer conclusive evidence as of whether playing both roles would 
haunt or promote generosity when participants played as a potential helper. 
b i.) Are people more trustworthy in a single-(E1) or a both-role (E3) design? 
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The analyses (See Table 5.5 below) offer no evidence (all ps >. 05) that 
the propensity to cooperate (or default) was different in a one-shot scenario (i.e. 
E1) versus in a context where participants played both roles (i.e. E3). 
Table 5.5 Comparison of Repayment Decisions (E1 vs. E3a vs. E3b) 
Experiment 1 (E1) vs. Experiment 3-Initial Receipt (E3I) vs. Second Receipt (E3S) 
  E1 E3I E3S E1 vs. E3I E1 vs. E3S E1 vs. E3(Total) 
  N N N 2 p 2 p 2 p 
CN           
‘-20%’  Cooperate 5 — —       
 Default 3 — —       
‘I-F’ Cooperate 6 92 91       
 Default 2 38 37       
 Total 8 130 128 No analysis done due to insufficient sample in E1. 
 ‘20%’ Cooperate 2 — —       
 Default 3 — —       
 ‘25%’  Cooperate — 73 55       
 Default — 39 65       
 ‘50%’ Cooperate — 39 36       
 Default — 68 70       
Overall Cooperate 13 204 182       
 Default 8 145 172       
 Total 21 349 354 0.007 .933 0.505 .478 0.170 .680 
Note. CN: Conditionality; ‘-20’: offers of which acceptors only had to repay 80% of the transfer; ‘I-F’: 
Interest-Free offers; ‘20%’: offers of which acceptors were liable to a 20%-interest in addition to repaying 
the ‘principal’; ‘25%’: 25%-Interest offers; ‘50%’: 50%-Interest offers. Cooperators: Acceptors who 
repaid fully; Defaulters; Acceptors repaying partly or nothing at all.   
 
Table 5.6 Comparison of Numerical Repayment (E1 vs. E3a vs. E3b) 
 Experiment 1 (E1) vs. Experiment 3-Initial Receipt (E3I) vs. Second Receipt (E3S) 
 E1 E3I E3S E1 vs. E3I E1 vs. E3S E1 vs. E3 (All) 
CN N UR% 
(SD) 
N UR% 
(SD) 
N UR% 
(SD) 
Mann-Whitney 
U (p,2-tailed) 
U  
(p, 2-tailed)  
U  
(p, 2-tailed)  
-20%  8 26.6 
(40.3) 
— — — —       
Interest
-Free 
8 6.37 
(17.6) 
130 20.8 
(35.6)  
128 18.6 
(32.7) 
No analysis done due to insufficient sample in E1. 
20% 5 26.5 
(41.5) 
— — — —       
25% — — 112 22.5 
(37.3) 
120 32.4 
(38.6) 
      
50% — — 107 40.4 
(39.1) 
106 38.5 
(37.3) 
      
Overall 21 18.86 
(33.5) 
349 27.4 
(38.2) 
354 29.2 
(37.0) 
3370.0 (.488) 3168.0 (.219) 6538.0 (.327) 
Note. CN: Conditionality; ‘-20’: offers of which acceptors only had to repay 80% of the transfer; ‘I-F’: 
Interest-Free offers; ‘20%’: offers of which acceptors were liable to a 20%-interest in addition to repaying 
the ‘principal’; ‘25%’: 25%-Interest offers; ‘50%’: 50%-Interest offers. 
 
The Mann-Whitney U tests (See Table 5.6) indicated no evidence (all ps 
>. 05) either that the UR% in Experiment 1 (M: 18.9%) were different from 
either the initial (M: 27.4%) or the second receipts (M: 29.2%) of Experiment 
3. Considering also the comparisons of helping decisions among E1 vs. E3 (i.e. 
Table 5.6), overall the current data seemed to endorse neither of the Golden 
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Rule nor the Reduced Responsibility Hypothesis, as the experience of playing 
both roles apparently neither depressed nor stimulated more trustfulness (i.e. 
more helping) and trustworthiness (i.e. less under-repayment or defaulting ). 
b ii.) Are people more trustworthy in a single- (E2) or a both-role (E3) design?  
Table 5.7 Comparison of Repayment (Offer Conditionality as covariate) 
   Variable: Experiment 
 Odds Ratio 
(ORs) 
Intercept Experiment 2 vs.  
E3-Initial (RC) 
E3-Second vs.  
E3-Initial (RC) 
1. Reference Category (RC):     
- Experiment 3-Initial Receipt (i.e. E3-Initial) (Experiment) &   
- Repay Partially (Repayment)     
Variable: Categorical Repayment     
-Repay All vs.  Odds Ratio 0.81 2.41* 0.82 
 Repay Partially (Reference) 95% LLOR 0.56 1.13 0.65 
 95% ULOR 1.17 5.13 1.04 
-Repay Nothing vs.  Odds Ratio 0.19 3.70* 1.45 
 Repay Partially (Reference) 95% LLOR 0.10 1.28 0.96 
 95% ULOR 0.36 10.73 2.17 
2. Reference Category (RC):     
- Experiment 3 (i.e. E3)-Second Receipt (Experiment) & Experiment 2 vs.  E3-Initial vs.  
- Repay Partially (Repayment)   E3-Second (RC) E3-Second (RC) 
Variable: Categorical Repayment     
-Repay All vs.  Odds Ratio 0.66* 2.94* 1.22 
 Repay Partially (Reference) 95% LLOR 0.45 1.36 0.96 
 95% ULOR 0.99 6.32 1.55 
-Repay Nothing vs.  Odds Ratio 0.28* 2.56 0.69 
 Repay Partially (Reference) 95% LLOR 0.17 0.95 0.46 
 95% ULOR 0.45 6.88 1.04 
3. Reference Category (RC):   Variable: Experiment 
- Experiment 3-Initial Receipt  (Experiment) & Intercept Experiment 2 vs.  
E3-Initial (RC) 
E3-Second vs.  
E3-Initial (RC) - Repay Nothing (Repayment)   
Variable: Categorical Repayment     
-Repay All vs.  Odds Ratio 4.25* 0.59 0.50* 
 Repay Nothing (Reference) 95% LLOR 2.25 0.23 0.32 
 95% ULOR 8.04 1.55 0.77 
-Repay Partially vs.  Odds Ratio 5.27* 0.24* 0.60* 
 Repay Nothing (Reference) 95% LLOR 2.78 0.08 0.38 
 95% ULOR 9.98 0.71 0.95 
4. Reference Category (RC):   Variable: Manipulation 
- Experiment 3-Second Receipt (Experiment) & Intercept Experiment 2 vs. 
E3-Second (RC) 
E3-Initial vs. 
 E3-Second (RC) - Repay Nothing (Repayment)   
Variable: Categorical Repayment     
-Repay All vs.  Odds Ratio 2.13* 1.19 2.00* 
Repay Nothing (Reference) 95% LLOR 1.25 0.49 1.29 
 95% ULOR 3.64 2.86 3.08 
-Repay Partially vs. Odds Ratio 3.15* 0.41 1.67* 
Repay Nothing (Reference) 95% LLOR 1.93 0.15 1.05 
 95% ULOR 5.14 1.10 2.65 
Note. LLOR: Lower Limit Odds Ratio; ULOR: Upper Limit Odds Ratio. * denotes that the 95% CIs did 
not overlap the null value (i.e. OR=1), implying statistical significance (Szumilas, 2010).  
 
Below I examined whether Golden Rule or the Reduced Responsibility 
Hypothesis would explain any differences in trustworthiness between that of 
Experiments 2 and 3. The present multinomial model, which comprises 
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experiments (i.e. Experiment 2 vs. Experiment 3-Initial vs. Experiment 3-
Second Receipt) as predictor and conditionality (i.e. Interest-free vs. 25%- vs. 
50%-Interest) as covariate, is significant (Wald 2 (12) = 123.9, p <.001). Both 
variables have significant main effects (i.e. experiments, Wald 2 (4) = 17.18, p 
=.002; conditionality, Wald 2 (6) = 55.7, p <.001) over repayment (i.e. repay 
fully vs. partially vs. nothing). There was, however, no evidence that these two 
variables had interacted to influence repayment (Wald 2 (7) = 11.1, p =.13). I 
detail in the following a breakdown of the significant effect by experiments. 
Scrutiny of the odds ratios (i.e. OR hereafter) suggested that acceptors 
from experiment 2 (N= 87), compared to either receipt in Experiment 3, were, 
in general, more reluctant to partially repay (i.e. cheap-ride). For instance, 
acceptors from E2 were, compared to the initial acceptance in E3, 2.41 times 
(i.e. 95% CI (1.13, 5.13)) more likely to repay all than to repay partially. They 
were also 3.70 times (i.e. 95% CI (1.28, 10.73)) likelier to repay nothing rather 
than to repay partially, compared to acceptors of initial offers in Experiment 3. 
A similar trend was observed (See Table 5.7 above) when contrasting 
the categorical repayment in E2 to that of the second offer acceptance in E3. 
The former were 2.94 times likelier (i.e. 95% CI (1.36, 6.32)) than the latter to 
repay fully instead of partially. There was marginal evidence that (i.e. 95% CI 
(0.95, 6.88)) the former would prefer (OR: 2.56) repaying nothing than 
partially, compared to the present participants who accepted their conditional 
offers in their second receipts. There was no evidence that E2 participants’ 
decisions to repay fully or none differed from that of in Experiment 3. Taken 
together, the current analyses imply an ‘all-or-nothing’ repaying mindset of 
acceptors in Experiment 2. They appeared to prefer either honouring their 
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obligations totally or simply shirking from that altogether. Thus, again there is 
no clear-cut evidence that people are overall more (or less) trustworthy in a 
single- vis-à-vis a both-role context. Neither the Golden Rule nor the Reduced 
Responsibility Hypothesis was confirmed. 
Table 5.8 Comparison of Numerical Repayment (E2 vs. E3a vs. E3b) 
 Experiment 2 (E2) vs. Experiment 3-Initial Receipt (E3I) vs. Second Receipt (E3S) 
 E2 E3I E3S E2 vs. E3I E2 vs. E3S E2 vs. E3 (All) 
CN N UR% 
(SD) 
N UR% 
(SD) 
N UR% 
(SD) 
df t (p) df t (p) df t (p) 
Interest
-Free 
21 16.2 
(33.4)  
130 20.8 
(35.6)  
128 18.6 
(32.7) 
149 0.56 
(.579) 
147 0.31 
(.759) 
277 0.45 
(.651) 
12.5% 24 16.9 
(34.1) 
— — — — No analysis was done. 
25% 23 20.8 
(38.3) 
112 22.5 
(37.3) 
120 32.4 
(38.6) 
133 0.19 
(.847) 
141 1.32 
(.190) 
253 0.81 
(.418) 
50% 19 32.4 
(43.9) 
107 40.4 
(39.1) 
106 38.5 
(37.3) 
124 0.80 
(.424) 
123 0.63 
(.529) 
230 0.76 
(.450) 
Overall 87 21.2 
(37.2) 
349 27.4 
(38.2) 
354 29.2 
(37.0) 
434 1.36 
(.175) 
439 1.81 
(.071) 
788 1.67 
(.096) 
Note. UR%: Mean Under-repayment rate; CN: Conditional offers; t: t-value; p: p-value (2-tailed) 
 
Meanwhile, comparison on the UR% (See Table 5.8) offered no 
evidence (all ps >.05) that acceptors were differentially retaliatory in a one-
shot, vis-à-vis in an iterated context where they had experiences playing both 
in-game roles. Taken together, apart from the sporadic evidence (See Table 5.7) 
that acceptors in Experiment 2 were less likely to cheap-ride, overall the 
current data barely supports either the Golden Rule Hypothesis or the Reduced 
Responsibility Hypothesis. Participants who accepted their conditional offers 
appeared more or less trustworthy with (i.e. Experiment 3) or without (i.e. 
Experiment 2) the perspectives of both helpers and recipients. 
5.3.1.3. Conclusion 
All in all, the above extensive comparisons of decision-making in 
Experiments 1 and 2 to that of Experiment 3 did not supply any clear-cut 
evidence that the present two-role, repeated game design had either raised or 
undermined participants’ in-game generosity or trustworthiness. Therefore, the 
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current analyses failed to justify the over-generosity issues evident in 
Experiments 1 and 2 by the single-role design in both experiments. 
5.3.2. UAQ 3: Were rejections in Experiment 2 attributable to negative 
reciprocity or dispositional indebtedness? 
I predicted that, thanks to the recipients’ knowledge of a more efficient 
way to retaliate (i.e. take the offer and not repay), the offer rejection rate should 
be noticeably lower in Experiment 3 than in Experiment 2 (i.e. 35.6%) if 
negative reciprocity was what engendered  rejections in Experiment 2 (See 
Table 1) . I also hypothesised that rejections at present should be primarily 
driven by trait indebtedness and as a result, the rejectors of conditional offers 
should be more dispositionally indebted than the acceptors. Below I include the 
comparison of rejections across Experiments 2 and 3, alongside the analyses 
over the psychology of the present rejectors. It should be noted that analyses 
relating to how indebtedness (as a state or trait) contributed to prosociality (e.g. 
helping or repayment) in Experiment 3 will be featured in Section 5.4. 
5.3.2.1. Statistical Analyses 
a) Comparing the Rates of Conditional offer rejections in Experiment 2 and 3 
 There was no evidence that conditionality had affected offer rejections 
in Experiment 2, 2 (3) = 3.30, p = .23 (See Chapter 4). Thus, via a Generalised 
Estimating Equation (i.e. GEE hereafter)—with an exchangeable correlation 
structure—I first examined whether conditionality would alone, or interacted 
with the order of receipt (i.e. initial vs. second) to, predict rejection in 
Experiment 3. In this analysis I excluded data from the two Recipient Trials 
during which participants received unconditional offers. 
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Second, to directly compare the overall landscapes of conditional offer 
rejections in both experiments (i.e. E2 and E3 hereafter) I carried out a three-
way, 2*2*4, Log-linear analysis. The two-level factors were Experiments (i.e. 
E2 vs. E3) and Acceptances (or rejection), while the four-level factor was 
Conditionality (i.e. Interest-Free vs. 12.5% vs. 25% vs. 50%-Interest).   
b) Trait Indebtedness and Offer Rejections 
 The Mann-Whitney U test was adopted in examining whether offer 
rejectors would, as predicted, report higher trait indebtedness than acceptors. 
Participants’ each receipt of their eight offers (of varying conditionality) was 
separately analysed. Table 5.9 details the findings. 
5.3.2.2. Results 
a) Comparing Conditional offer Rejections in Experiment 2 and 3: Is Negative 
Reciprocity (i.e. to sanction unfair helpers) driving rejections in Experiment 2?  
First, results of the GEE revealed only a significant main effect by 
conditionality on rejection in Experiment 3 (Wald 2 (2) = 29.3, p <.001). 
Particularly, scrutiny of the odds ratios indicated that compared to the ‘Interest-
free’ offers; the odds of rejecting (over accepting) was 10.53 times (Wald 2 (1) 
= 17.87, p <.001) higher upon receipts of 50%-Interest offer, and the odds of 
rejecting was also 8.13 times higher (Wald 2 (1) = 11.63, p <.001) when 
participants received the 25%-Interest offers. Meanwhile, the odds of rejection 
were 2.35 times higher (Wald 2 (1) = 11.16, p <.001) when participants 
received a 50%- instead of a 25%-interest offer. 
Secondly, the log-linear analysis showed that the model which retained 
only the two-way interactions (e.g. Experiments * Acceptance and 
Conditionality * Acceptance) would fit the data best, Likelihood Ratio 2 (3) = 
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7.88, p = .056. The significant Conditionality * Acceptance interaction (partial 
2 (3) = 37.5, p <.001) echoes the above GEE analysis which highlights that 
rejections would hinge on conditionality. More importantly, the significant 
Experiments* Acceptance interaction (partial 2 (1) = 39.8, p <.001) shed light 
upon the noticeable difference between offer rejections in Experiment 2 (i.e. 
48/135 = 35.6%) and Experiment 3 (i.e. 95/ 798 = 11.9%). This shows that the 
availability of an alternative (and more cost-effective) punishing means in 
Experiment 3 has significantly diminished offer rejections, thus hinting that 
negative reciprocity may have underlain the high rejections in Experiment 2. 
b) Testing the Dispositional Indebtedness-driven Rejection Hypothesis 
 
Table 5.9 Effect of Trait Indebtedness on rejection (by Conditionality) 
Average Indebtedness Scale-Revised (IS-R) Scores (by Offer Acceptances) 
Receipt Conditionality Accept Reject Mann-Whitney U 
  N Mean (SD) N Mean (SD) N U 
Initial Unconditional 129 4.89 (0.95) 4 5.22 (1.25) No Analyses Donea 
Second Unconditional 130 4.89 (0.94) 3 5.42 (1.44) No Analyses Donea 
Initial Interest-Free 130 4.92 (0.95) 3 4.36 (1.07) No Analyses Donea 
Second Interest-Free 128 4.92 (0.94) 5 4.71 (1.41) No Analyses Donea 
Initial 25%-Interest 112 4.95 (0.91) 21 4.68 (1.13) 133 1012.0 
Second 25%-Interest 120 4.96 (0.97) 13 4.42 (0.66) 133 520.5* 
Initial 50%-Interest 107 4.95 (0.94) 26 4.72 (0.99) 133 1213.5 
Second 50%-Interest 106 4.96 (0.96) 27 4.69 (0.90) 133 1203.0 
Note. a No analysis was done owing to insufficient counts of rejectors. * p <. 05 (2-tailed) 
 
The present data (See Table 5.9) sternly dispels the speculation that 
dispositional indebtedness was responsible for the observed irrational rejections 
in the current experiment. Rejectors overall appeared similarly dispositionally 
indebted compared to the acceptors (at almost all levels of conditionality). 
Nonetheless, it is worth noting that the current lop-sided acceptor-rejector 
distribution (See Table 5.9) may render the results questionable. 
5.3.2.4. Conclusion 
Predictably, the knowledge about the availability of an alternative 
avenue to retaliate clearly contributed to the lower rejections in Experiment 3. It 
was worth noting that the participants still displayed a higher propensity to shun 
Chapter 5   217 
 
 
 
the highly ‘taxed’ offers (i.e. the 25%- and 50%-interest offers) despite 
knowing that they 1) were financially better off accepting that and, 2) could 
default as they wished. Such an economically irrational rejection, contrary to 
what was predicted in this chapter, appeared unrelated to trait indebtedness. 
5.3.3. UAQ 4: Does being ‘cheap-rode’ prompt the victims to play fair? 
The present norm-enforcement hypothesis (i.e. NEH hereafter) predicted 
that the ‘cheap-rode’ conditional helpers in T1 (N = 30) should, compared to 
those whose ‘taxed’ offers were fully repaid (N = 24) or utterly not repaid (N = 
29), exhibit a greater pursuit of injunctive fairness eventually via making more 
generous offers in T10 or avoid under-repaying any accepted (conditional) 
offers. The following presents the analyses of the NEH. 
5.3.3.1. Statistical Analyses 
Here I examined two crucial outcome variables. They included a) 
categorical repayment of accepted conditional offers, and b) whether a more 
generous offer (See 5.2.4.1 for details) was made in T10. 
To analyse the effect of repayment manipulation (Trial 1, i.e. fairness 
vs. free-ride vs. cheap-ride), while controlling for offer conditionality (i.e. 
Interest-free vs. 25%- vs. 50%-Interest), on participants’ (N= 83) categorical 
repayment (i.e. repay partially (or cheap-ride) vs. nothing (or free-ride) vs. fully 
(or cooperate)) I once again resorted to the Multinomial Logit model (Hardin & 
Hilbe, 2003). The current model, which was based upon a generalized logit link 
function, was analysed with a robust variance estimator and an exchangeable 
correlation structure. This specific analysis was administered using SUDAAN 
(Bieler & Williams, 1997; Shah, 1998). Table 5.10 illustrates the results. 
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Meanwhile, the GEE analysis on whether partner repayment 
manipulation (in T1) predicted increased generosity in T10 (i.e. Yes or No) was 
conducted using SPSS v. 22. Both nominal regression analyses would exclude 
non-helpers and unconditional helpers (Total N = 50) from T1 as both parties 
were unaffected by the repayment manipulation. Furthermore, the analysis of 
categorical repayment only entailed cases in which participants accepted their 
conditional offers, as the current analysis primarily concerns how people repay 
their ‘taxed’ offers subject to how their own recipients repaid them previously 
5.3.3.2. Results    
a) Testing if being ‘Cheap-rode’ prompted more trustworthiness during the RTs 
The overall model, which comprises manipulation (i.e. Conditions 
‘Fairness’ vs. ‘Free-ride’ vs. ‘Cheap-ride’) as the predictor and offer 
conditionality (i.e. Interest-free vs. 25%- vs. 50%-Interest) as a covariate, is 
significant (Wald 2 (10) = 86.87, p <.001). Both variables were shown to have 
significant main effects (i.e. manipulation, Wald 2 (4) = 16.70, p =.002; offer 
conditionality, Wald 2 (4) = 36.63, p <.001) over repayment (i.e. repay fully 
vs. partially vs. nothing). There was, meanwhile, no evidence (i.e. Wald 2 (8) 
= 12.01, p =.15) that manipulation had interacted with conditionality to 
significantly influence repayment. In the following I detail the scrutiny of the 
main effect manipulation. Table 5.10 below summarises the findings. 
Scrutiny of the odds ratios (See Table 5.10 below) revealed that, 
compared to helpers whose initial offers were fully repaid (N = 24, i.e. 
‘Fairness’ condition), partially repaid helpers (N = 30, i.e. ‘Cheap-riding’ 
condition) were 4.84 times more likely (i.e. 95% CI (1.88, 12.48)) to also 
partially repay their own conditional offers than repaying fully. Meanwhile, 
Chapter 5   219 
 
 
 
compared to helpers whose initial offers were utterly not repaid (i.e. ‘Free-
riding’ condition, N = 30), ‘cheap-rode’ helpers were also 3.85 times (i.e. 
1/0.26) more likely (i.e. 95% CI (1.03, 14.3)) to also partially repay than not 
repay their conditional offers. Nonetheless, the current data offered no 
indication that ‘cheap-rode’ helpers, compared to fully repaid or ‘free-rode’ 
helpers, were more propelled to repay fully or to refrain from totally defaulting 
on their (accepted) conditional offers. 
Table 5.10 Repayment Manipulation on Repayment (Conditionality as co-variate)  
   Variable: Manipulation 
 Odds Ratio 
(ORs) 
Intercept Fairness vs.  
Free-riding (RC) 
Cheap-riding vs. 
Free-riding (RC) 
1. Reference Category (RC):     
- Free-riding (Manipulation) &     
- Repay Partially (Repayment)     
Variable: Categorical Repayment     
-Repay All vs.  Odds Ratio 1.96* 3.65* 0.71 
 Repay Partially (Reference) 95% LLOR 1.01 1.37 0.31 
 95% ULOR 3.82 9.69 1.62 
-Repay Nothing vs.  Odds Ratio 0.35 0.58 0.26* 
 Repay Partially (Reference) 95% LLOR 0.11 0.14 0.07 
 95% ULOR 1.12 2.38 0.97 
2. Reference Category (RC):     
- Free-riding (Manipulation) &     
- Repay Nothing (Repayment)     
Variable: Categorical Repayment     
-Repay Nothing vs.  Odds Ratio 0.18* 0.18* 0.36 
 Repay All (Reference) 95% LLOR 0.05 0.04 0.08 
 95% ULOR 0.59 0.82 1.58 
-Repay Partially vs.  Odds Ratio 0.51* 0.29* 1.38 
 Repay All (Reference) 95% LLOR 0.26 0.11 0.60 
 95% ULOR 0.99 0.76 3.17 
3. Reference Category (RC):   Variable: Manipulation 
- Fairness (Manipulation) & Odds Ratio Intercept Cheap-riding vs. 
Fairness (RC) 
Free-riding vs. 
Fairness (RC) - Repay All (Repayment) (ORs)  
Variable: Categorical Repayment     
-Repay Partially vs.  Odds Ratio 0.60 4.84* 3.50* 
 Repay All (Reference) 95% LLOR 0.27 1.88 1.32 
 95% ULOR 1.32 12.48 9.28 
-Repay Nothing vs.  Odds Ratio 0.60 2.02 5.58* 
 Repay All (Reference) 95% LLOR 0.27 0.41 1.22 
 95% ULOR 1.32 10.05 25.57 
4. Reference Category (RC):   Variable: Manipulation 
- Fairness (Manipulation) & Odds Ratio Intercept Cheap-riding vs. 
Fairness (RC) 
Free-riding vs. 
Fairness (RC) - Repay Nothing (Repayment) (ORs)  
Variable: Categorical Repayment     
-Repay Partially vs.  Odds Ratio 3.82 2.00 0.63 
Repay Nothing (Reference) 95% LLOR 0.81 0.31 0.12 
 95% ULOR 18.04 13.10 3.39 
-Repay All vs. Odds Ratio 6.16* 0.39 0.19 
Repay Nothing (Reference) 95% LLOR 1.21 0.05 0.03 
 95% ULOR 31.42 3.04 1.18 
Note. LLOR: Lower Limit Odds Ratio; ULOR: Upper Limit Odds Ratio. * denotes that the 95% CIs did 
not overlap the null value (i.e. OR=1), implying statistical significance (Szumilas, 2010). 
 
Chapter 5   220 
 
 
 
In short, the data revealed that instead of feeling more prompted to 
cooperate or refrain from free-riding (as hypothesised), participants who were 
subject to others’ cheap-riding acts tended more to ‘pay it forward’ when 
opportunity beckons. Participants were simply mimicking the cheap-riding 
antics from their own recipients (T1) when it became their turns to decide how 
they would respond to a conditional offer (i.e. the 8 Recipient Trials). In other 
words, the norm enforcement hypothesis of cheap-riding was not supported. 
b) Testing if being ‘Cheap-rode’ prompted more Generosity in Trial 10 
The data revealed a significant effect of partner repayment in T1( Wald 
2 (2) = 5.99, p = .050) on whether a more generous offer was shown in T10. 
Specifically, scrutiny of the ORs indicated that, compared to a ‘free-rode’ 
helper, a ‘cheap-rode’ helper was 4.78 times more likely (Wald 2 (1) = 5.75, p 
= .017) to showcase more generosity in T10. There was, however, no evidence 
(Wald 2 (1) = 0.19, p = .67) that the odds of giving a more generous offer in 
T10 were different among the fully-repaid and ‘cheap-rode’ conditional helpers. 
5.3.3.3. Conclusion 
The present data offered minimal endorsement to the norm-enforcement 
hypothesis—which predicted that experience of being ‘cheap-rode’ should 
inspire more eventual fair (or generous) gestures from the victims. Particularly, 
the analyses on the categorical repayment decisions (See Table 5.10) hinted 
that the manner through which a conditional helper was repaid had established 
an unofficial guideline for that helper to follow through when he/she was to 
repay his/her own taxed offers. Furthermore, analyses on whether the 
experience of being ‘cheap-rode’ had contributed to more generosity in Trial 10 
(i.e. second Helper Trial) also revealed inconclusive findings. While ‘cheap-
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rode’ helpers were more tempted to showcase more generosity than ‘free-rode’ 
helpers, there was no evidence that these ‘cheap-rode’ helpers were more 
inclined to be generous compared to the fully repaid helpers. All in all, the 
present analyses overall fails to confirm the notion that cheap-riding could help 
safeguard normative fairness in a fashion that is relatable to altruistic 
punishment. 
5.3.4. General Confounds 
This sub-section explores the effects of two general confounds, namely 
1) Gender, and 2) Social Desirability Responding (SDR), on the key variables. 
5.3.4.1. Effect of Gender 
The below presents the analyses on the potential role of gender in 
participants’ decision-making in the two Helper Trials (i.e. HTs, Trial 1 and 10) 
and the eight Recipient Trials (i.e. RTs, Trial 2 to 9) in between. 
a) Statistical Analyses 
I examined several crucial decisions in both HTs. They included a) 
decisions to help or not; b) conditionality of offers made (i.e. unconditional, 
interest-free, 25% or 50%-Interest) ; c) transfer magnitude and d) whether or 
not a more generous offer was made in T10 among conditional helpers in T1 (N 
= 83). Meanwhile, scrutiny of gender effect on decisions in the eight Recipient 
Trials entails the following: i) offer acceptance (or rejection); ii) categorical 
repayment (i.e. partial, zero or full repayment); and iii) numerical repayment 
(i.e. repayment amount and under-repayment rate (UR %)). 
Unless otherwise specified, the GEE method—with an exchangeable 
correlation structure—was employed to examine if gender significantly 
influenced any of the decision variables. Particularly, I analysed the effect of 
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gender, while including trial order (i.e. T1 vs. T10) as a covariate, on the 
conditionality of offers made—which is a nominal multinomial variable—via 
SUDAAN. I also adopted SUDAAN (Bieler & Williams, 1997; Shah, 1998) 
when examining whether gender affected participants’ categorical repayment 
(while including repayment terms as a covariate). These two models—both 
based upon a generalized logit link function—were analysed with a robust 
variance estimator and an exchangeable working correlation structure. 
b) Results 
bi.) Gender and Decision-making in the two Helper Trials (Trials 1 and 10) 
First, the analyses revealed no signs that gender had a) on its own (Wald 
2 (1) = 1.23, p = .27), or b) interacted with trial order (i.e. T1 vs. T10) (Wald 
2 (1) = 1.75, p = .19), to affect decisions of whether to help. Gender was also 
found not to have independently (Wald 2 (1) = 0.11, p = .74), nor interacted 
with trial order (Wald 2 (1) = 2.00, p = .16) to influence transfer magnitude 
should a participant agreed to help. Additionally, gender was not instrumental 
(Wald 2 (1) = 0.027, p = .87) in predicting whether a conditional helper (N = 
83) in T1 be more generous in T10. 
Meanwhile, the multinomial analyses revealed that gender had neither 
on its own (Wald 2 (1) = 0.03, p = .87), nor interacted with trial order (Wald 
2 (3) = 5.55, p = .14), to affect helpers’ preferred repayment clauses (i.e. No 
repayment needed vs. Zero- vs. 25%- vs. 50%-Interest) to attach to their offers.  
bii.) Gender and Decision-making in the Recipient Trials (i.e. T2 to T9) 
The gender effect on offer acceptance was qualified by a significant 
Gender* Conditionality (i.e. unconditional vs. interest-free vs. 25% vs. 50%) 
interaction (Wald 2 (3) = 12.51, p = .006). While gender (Wald 2 (1) = 1.74, p 
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= .187) did not predict more acceptances, the effect of conditionality remained 
significant (Wald 2 (3) = 38.4, p < .001). Breaking down the interaction, there 
was no evidence (all ps >.05) that the odds of female (over male) rejection 
(instead of acceptances) differed across levels of conditionality. 
Analyses over instances of conditional offer acceptances indicated 
neither direct (Wald 2 (1) = 0.28, p = .60) nor indirect (interaction with 
conditionality) (Wald 2 (1) = 0.91, p = .64) effects of gender on under-
repayment rate. Lastly, multinomial analyses revealed no signs that gender had 
a) on its own (Wald 2 (2) = 3.09, p = .21), or b) interacted with conditionality 
(i.e. Unconditional, Interest-free, 25%, 50%-Interest) (Wald 2 (6) = 3.05, p 
= .80), to affect repayment (i.e. repay partially vs. repay nothing vs. repay 
fully). 
c) Conclusion  
All in all, the current data indicated a near total absence of gender effect 
on the list of crucial behavioural variables in Experiment 3. In other words, 
participants did not, in this context, show glimpses of varying trustfulness (as a 
helper) or trustworthiness (as a recipient) subject to gender. 
5.3.4.2. Effect of Social Desirability Responding (i.e. SDR hereafter) 
In the below sub-section I detail the analyses on the role of SDR may 
play in participants’ decision-making throughout Experiment 3.  
a) Statistical Analyses 
Similar to the above gender effect analyses, here I examined how SDR 
would relate to the same set of decision variables (e.g. whether to help; offer 
acceptances etc.) in Experiment 3. As addressed in Section 5.2.4.3 at present I 
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operationally defined participants’ SDR as their average composite ratings in 
Paulhus’s (1991) Impression Management Scale (i.e. IMS hereafter).  
 
b) Results 
bi.) SDR and Decision-making in the two Helper Trials (Trials 1 and 10) 
Table 5.11 Effect of SDR on Decision Making over the two Helper Trials 
Average Impression Management Scale (i.e. IMS, Paulhus, 1991) Scoresa 
1. To Help or Not to Help? N Mean SD df t MTr b SD ρ 
1.1. Helper Trial 1 (Trial 1)          
- Helper 95 3.960 0.816   — — — 
- Non-Helper 38 3.963 0.959   — — — 
Overall 133 3.961 0.855 131 0.02 — — — 
1.2. Helper Trial 2 (Trial 10)          
- Helper 104 3.995 0.792   — — — 
- Non-Helper 29 3.837 1.059   — — — 
Overall 133 3.961 0.855 37.2 0.75 — — — 
2. Change in Helping Decisions    Kruskal- Wallis Test  
    (T1 vs. T10) N Mean SD df Chi-square p 
- Helpers in both T1 and T10 81 4.037 0.789    
- Helpers (T1) turned  Non-Helpers (T10) 14 3.515 0.852    
- Non-Helpers (T1) turned Helpers (T10) 23 3.849 0.800    
- Non-Helpers in both T1 and T10 15 4.137 1.170    
Overall 133 3.961 0.855 3 3.290 .349 
3. Conditionality of Help         
3.1. Helper Trial 1 (Trial 1) N Mean SD df F MTr b SD ρ 
- Unconditional (UC) 12 4.69312 0.222   106.7 16.14 .361 
- Conditional (CN)         
  - Interest-Free (CNIF) 49 3.8601 0.100   105.6 15.53 .243 
  - 25%-Interest (CN25) 24 3.8252 0.170   105.7 13.76 .298 
  - 50%-Interest (CN50) 10 3.895 0.320   100.0 0.00 N.A.c 
Overall 95 3.960 0.837 3,91 4.08** — — — 
 N Mean SD df t MTr b SD ρ 
- Unconditional (UC) 12 4.693 0.770   106.7 16.14 .361 
- Conditional (CN) Total 83 3.854 0.770   105.0 14.06 .232* 
Overall 133 3.961 0.855 93 3.53*** 105.2 14.26 .240* 
         
3.2. Helper Trial 2 (Trial 10) N Mean SD df F MTr b SD ρ 
- Unconditional (UC) 20 4.253 0.783   110.0 18.85 .328 
- Conditional (CN)         
  - Interest-Free (CNIF) 54 4.033 0.825   107.4 17.26 .056 
  - 25%-Interest (CN25) 21 3.797 0.579   106.0 15.62 .099 
  - 50%-Interest (CN50) 9 3.661 0.932   100.0 0.00 N.A.c 
Overall 104 3.995 0.792 3,100 1.76 — — — 
 N Mean SD df t MTr b SD ρ 
- Unconditional (UC) 20 4.253 0.783   110.0 18.85 .328 
- Conditional (CN) Total 84 3.934 0.786   106.3 15.94 .067 
Overall 104 3.995 0.792 102 1.63 107.0 16.51 .140 
Note. 1. Tamhane's T2 indicated a significant difference (MD: 0.83, p = .021) in IMS of UC and CNIF 
givers. 2. Tamhane's T2 indicated a significant difference (MD: 0.87, p = .029) in IMS between UC and 
CN25 givers. * p <.05 (2-sided); ** p <.01 (2-sided); *** p <.001 (2-sided).  
ρ = Spearman’s Rho (2-tailed) on MTr and IMS. a 7-point Likert Scales (1-7), higher scores signal a 
greater propensity to maintain impression. b Mean Transfer Magnitude (in Bonus Points). 
 c No analysis was done owing to zero variance in CN50 givers’ transfer magnitude 
 
As illustrated in Table 5.11 above, overall there were merely sporadic 
signs that SDR was related to participants’ decisions over the two Helper Trials. 
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For instance, Spearman’s correlation showed that Impression Management 
Scale score was positively—albeit weakly—associated with, a) (all) helpers’ (N 
= 95) transfer magnitude (rs (93) = .24, p = .019); and b) conditional helpers’ (N 
= 83) transfer magnitude (rs (81) = .23, p = .035) in T1. However, both 
correlations ceased to exist (all ps >.05) in Trial 10 (See Table 5.11). 
bii.) SDR and Decision-making in the Recipient Trials (i.e. T2 to T9) 
Table 5.12 a. Effect of SDR on Offer Acceptance (by Conditionality) 
Average Impression Management Scale (IMS) Scores (by Offer Acceptances) 
Receipt Conditionality Accept Reject Mann-Whitney U 
  N Mean (SD) N Mean (SD) N U 
Initial Unconditional 129 3.94 (0.85) 4 4.59 (0.67) No Analyses Donea 
Second Unconditional 130 3.94 (0.85) 3 4.77 (0.69) No Analyses Donea 
Initial Interest-Free 130 3.95 (0.86) 3 4.23 (0.94) No Analyses Donea 
Second Interest-Free 128 3.95 (0.85) 5 4.19 (1.00) No Analyses Donea 
Initial 25%-Interest 112 3.97 (0.81) 21 3.91 (1.09) 133 1085.00 
Second 25%-Interest 120 3.93 (0.84) 13 4.22 (1.01) 133 648.00 
Initial 50%-Interest 107 3.91 (0.82) 26 4.15 (0.97) 133 1230.00 
Second 50%-Interest 106 3.91 (0.83) 27 4.17 (0.92) 133 1211.00 
Note. a No analysis was done owing to insufficient counts of rejectors.  
 
As shown in Table 5.12a, the present data provided no substances to the 
speculation that SDR prompted more offer acceptances (or rejections). The 
similar conclusion applied to acceptors’ repayment decisions in that (See Table 
5.12b) IMS overall failed to differentiate acceptors who repaid fully, partially, 
and nothing at all, after they accepted the offers. SDR was not correlated (ps 
>.05) to almost all under-repayment rates of offers of different conditionality. 
Table 5.12b Effect of SDR on Repayment Decisions (by Conditionality) 
Average Impression Management Scale (IMS) Scores (by Repayment) 
Rec Cond Zero Repayment Partial Repayment Full Repayment    
  N Mean (SD) N Mean (SD) N Mean (SD) F- UR% r 
1st UC 31 3.78 (0.98) 62 4.07 (0.79) 36 3.86 (0.85) 1.441 - - 
2nd  UC 39 3.88 (1.00) 50 3.97 (0.64) 41 3.97 (0.94) 0.141 - - 
1st I-F 7 3.78 (1.22) 31 3.85 (0.73) 92 4.00 (0.87) 1.116a 20.81 -.068 
2nd  I-F 8 3.41 (1.45) 29 4.06 (0.74) 91 3.97 (0.81) 2.037a 18.56 -.103 
1st 25% 8 3.48 (1.19) 31 3.70 (0.71) b 73 4.14 (0.76) b 8.592b 22.49 -.215* 
2nd  25% 19 3.94 (1.18) 46 3.79 (0.75) 55 4.05 (0.76) 3.129a 32.38 -.036 
1st 50% 12 3.57 (1.07) 56 3.88 (0.83) 39 4.06 (0.72) 1.760 40.38 -.178 
2nd  50% 16 3.62 (1.14) 54 3.91 (0.78) 36 4.04 (0.75) 1.446 38.45 -.140 
Note. UC: Unconditional; I-F: ‘Interest-Free’; 25%: ‘25%-Interest’; 50%: ‘50%-Interest’.  Rec: Receipt; 
1st: Initial Receipt; 2nd: Second Receipt. UR%= Under-repayment rate. UR% was not calculated for every 
receipt of unconditional offer.  a Kruskal-Wallis was conducted and the results (Chi-Square) were not 
significant (p >.1) (two-tailed). b Kruskal-Wallis was run and the results were significant, 2 (2) = 8.59, p 
= .014. Pairwise comparison illustrated a significant difference in IMS between cheap-riders (M: 3.70) and 
cooperators (M: 4.14).  r = Pearson’s r (two-tailed) on under-repayment rates and IMS.  
* IMS was negatively correlated to UR% for the initial receipt of 25%- offer (r (110) = -.215, p = .023).  
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c) Conclusion 
While the present analyses indicated sporadic signs (e.g. associations 
between transfer magnitude and IMS) that SDR was related to participants’ 
prosociality, overall the results did not suggest that SDR had consistently 
heightened both participants’ trustfulness (i.e. in both HTs) and trustworthiness 
(i.e. in T2 to T9). As such, the present analyses should speak volumes about the 
minimal interference of SDR with the present major decision variables.   
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5.4. Results- Gratitude, Indebtedness and Decision Making  
 In this sub-section I present analyses tackling the unanswered questions 
(UAQs) or research themes that involved state and trait gratitude (and 
indebtedness) and decision making in Experiment 3.  
5.4.1. UAQ 1: Does more unfairness really ‘not matter’?  
 To tackle UAQ 1 the present analysis tested two competing hypotheses 
on how transparency of helpers’ available options would influence recipients’ 
offer appraisals. The Inelastic Fairness Construal (i.e. IFC) argument—which 
predicts a dichotomous ‘fair versus unfair’ contrast in intent and emotions 
among the unconditional and the conditional offers (i.e. more (or less) 
unfairness would not count); and Wood et al.’s (2011) Gratitude Relativity 
Hypothesis (i.e. GRH) —which proposes a graded, linear fairness appraisals of 
offers of varying repayment obligations (i.e. more unfairness matters).  
5.4.1.1. Statistical Analysis  
 I adopted a 2 (Offer Receipts: Initial vs. Second) X 4 (Conditionalities: 
Unconditional vs. Interest-Free vs. 25%-Interest vs. 50%-Interest) repeated 
ANOVA on all the pre-repayment rating items. Two-tailed Bonferroni analyses 
were conducted to further examine any significant main effects or interactions.   
5.4.1.2. Results  
a) Manipulation Check: Perceived Inadequate Generosity  
 In each recipient trial the item ‘My partner could have been more 
generous to me’ was included to examine if participants were aware of the 
varying extent of injunctive fairness (or lack thereof) of each offer they 
received. The results revealed only a main effect of Conditionality (F (2.07, 
273) = 131.7, p <.001). Importantly, the Bonferroni post-hoc analyses revealed 
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a significant linear trend, F (1,132) = 212, p <. 001, which illustrated that 
perceived inadequacy generosity was highest among receipts of 50%-interest 
offer (M: 5.12; SD: 0.15) and lowest upon receipts of unconditional offers (M: 
2.17, SD: 0.13) (See Table 5.13 and 5.14). Therefore, the present conditionality 
manipulation succeeded in leading recipients to acknowledge the varying extent 
of generosity (implying different injunctive fairness) across offers. 
Table 5.13 Effect of Conditionality on Pre-repayment Emotional Ratings 
Level of Conditionality 
 Unconditional I-F 25% 50% F-values 
 M (SE) M (SE) M (SE) M (SE)  
Inadequate Generosity 2.17 (.13) 3.66 (.16) 4.44 (.13) 5.12 (.15) 131.7*** 
State Indebtedness 5.37 (.13) 4.79 (.15) 4.03 (.15) 3.60 (.17) 63.1*** 
State Gratitude 6.12 (.10) 5.16 (.12) 4.28 (.13) 3.64 (.15) 145.9*** 
Annoyance 1.67 (.10) 2.27 (.13) 3.09 (.14) 4.02 (.17) 90.35*** 
Obligations (to repay) 4.98 (.16) 5.29 (.14) 4.80 (.14) 4.17 (.16) 20.77*** 
Eagerness to Reciprocate 5.91 (.10) 5.25 (.12) 4.51 (.13) 3.98 (.15) 109.5*** 
Perspective-Taking 4.06 (.15) 4.97 (.15) 3.82 (.14) 3.02 (.14) 39.16*** 
Benefit Appraisal 5.66 (.10) 4.68 (.11) 4.04 (.10) 3.52 (.12) 167.3*** 
Note. *** p <.001 (2-tailed); ‘I-F’: Interest-Free; ‘25%’: 25%-Interest Offer; ‘50%’: 50%-Interest Offer 
 
Table 5.14 Bonferroni Post-hoc analyses of the Main Effects in Table 5.13 
Bonferroni Post-hoc Comparisons (Two-tailed) 
 UC vs. I-F UC vs. 25% UC vs. 50% I-F vs. 25% I-F vs. 50% 25% vs. 50% 
 MD (SE) MD (SE) MD (SE) MD (SE) MD (SE) MD (SE) 
IG 1.50 (.17)*** 2.27 (.18)*** 2.95 (.20)*** 0.78 (.12)*** 1.46 (.15)*** 0.68 (.10)*** 
Is 0.58 (.13)*** 1.34 (.15)*** 1.77 (.17)*** 0.75 (.12)*** 1.19 (.14)*** 0.44 (.13)** 
Gs 0.97 (.10)*** 1.84 (.14)*** 2.49 (.16)*** 0.88 (.11)*** 1.52 (.14)*** 0.64 (.11)*** 
As 0.60 (.13)*** 1.42 (.15)*** 2.35 (.19)*** 0.82 (.14)*** 1.75 (.17)*** 0.93 (.14)*** 
Os 0.31 (.14) 0.18 (.16) 0.81 (.19)*** 0.50 (.10)*** 1.12 (.14)*** 0.63 (.13)*** 
RC 0.65 (.10)*** 1.40 (.12)*** 1.93 (.15)*** 0.74 (.09)*** 1.27 (.12)*** 0.53 (.09)*** 
PT 0.91 (.19)*** 0.24 (.21) 1.04 (.19)*** 1.15 (.17)*** 1.95 (.18)*** 0.80 (.14)*** 
BA  0.98 (.09)*** 1.62 (.11)*** 2.14 (.13)*** 0.64 (.08)*** 1.16 (.11)*** 0.52 (.08)*** 
Note. IG: Inadequate Generosity; Is: State Indebtedness; Gs: State Gratitude; As: State Annoyance; Os: 
Obligation to Repay; RC: Eagerness to Reciprocate; PT: Perspective Taking; BA: Benefit Appraisal; MD: 
(Absolute) Mean Differences; SE: Standard Errors; ** p <.01 (2-tailed); *** p <.001 (2-tailed). 
 
b) The rest of pre-repayment ratings (e.g. state gratitude, indebtedness etc.)  
The results (See Table 5.14) revealed significant main effects of 
Conditionality (all ps <.001) on all pre-repayment ratings. Breaking down these 
main effects, post-hoc analyses (See Table 5.14) overall revealed that the 
higher the expected repayment the lower the positive affective responses (e.g. 
feeling less affective gratitude). Recipients also felt more annoyed by; less 
obligated to repay, and interestingly, less indebted to helpers who demanded 
more back-transfer. Recipients’ disapproval of more unfair offers was also 
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evidenced by their graded responses (See Table 5.13) on item ‘I would have 
done the same thing were I in my partner’s shoes’ (i.e. Perspective-Taking). 
5.4.1.3. Conclusion 
 Instead of feeling similarly unimpressed with a more blatant deviation 
from normative fairness, the current data sternly refuted the IFC as recipients 
demonstrated a graded appraisal (i.e. emotions and intent) with respect to the 
varying fairness connoted across offers. This suggests that injunctive fairness 
does not function in an ‘all-or-nothing’ fashion as relativity matters. I interpret 
this as an example of recipients computing the worth of their offers relative to 
what they could have got, thanks to their newfound access to helpers’ 
behavioural alternatives in Experiment 3. In short, the GRH was confirmed. 
5.4.2. Recurring Research Theme 1: Does gratitude, as a state or a trait, nurture 
prosociality (or undermine antisociality) in economic games?  
 In this sub-section I examine how state gratitude would on its own (i.e. 
the Moral Barometer and Moral Motive Hypotheses of Gratitude, McCullough 
et al., 2001), or in conjunction with trait gratitude (i.e. the Social Cognitive 
Model of Gratitude; Wood et al., 2008) in preserving cooperation (or 
undermining sanctioning) in the present experiment.  
5.4.2.1. Moral Barometer and Moral Motive Hypotheses of Gratitude 
 Both Moral Hypotheses of Gratitude (McCullough et al., 2001) would 
dismiss partial or complete under-repayment among any grateful conditional 
offer acceptors. As such, a sharp contrast between state gratitude of 
cooperators and that of both cheap- and free-riders should be expected.   
a) Statistical Analyses  
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A generalised estimating equation (i.e. GEE) method with an 
exchangeable correlation structure was used to analyse the data. I excluded 
participants’ (N = 133) responses in their two RTs in which they received 
unconditional offers. I also excluded the 95 instances of rejections as this 
analysis focused only on how state gratitude relates to repayment preferences of 
the acceptors. In summary, here I examined how participants’ categorical 
repayment (i.e. cooperate, cheap-ride or free-ride) would be related to their 
state gratitude in each of their six receipts of conditional offers (total receipts = 
133* 6 = 798).  Bonferroni pairwise comparisons were administered to further 
break down how this relationship may differ across each level of repayment. 
Additionally, I ran a hierarchical linear regression inspecting how state 
gratitude would predict under-repayment rate (i.e. UR %), with expected 
repayment and order of receipts (i.e. initial or subsequent) being the first and 
second variables entered prior to state gratitude. 
b) Results 
The results of GEE indicated a significant difference (Wald 2 (2) = 
38.54, p <.001) on the state gratitude (toward helpers) rating that preceded 
cheap-riding, cooperation and free-riding. Post-hoc analyses illustrated that 
instances of cooperation (N = 386; M: 5.01; SE: 0.12) were preceded by higher 
state gratitude (both ps <.001) than both cheap-riding (N = 247; M: 4.22; SE: 
0.16) and free-riding (N = 70; M: 3.49; SE: 0.31). There was marginal (p 
= .057) evidence suggesting that cheap-riding were preceded by higher state 
gratitude (toward the offers) than free-riding. 
The regression analysis gave substance to the argument that state 
gratitude should restrain under-repayment (i.e. Moral Motive Hypothesis). Beta 
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coefficients for the three predictors were expected repayment, β = .159, t = 4.19, 
p < .001; receipts, β = .021, t = 0.58, n.s.; and state gratitude, β = -.159, t = -
5.01, p < .001. The best fitting model for predicting under-repayment rate is a 
linear combination of expected repayment and state gratitude (R = .280, R2 
= .076, F (2,700) = 29.9, p < .001). The data suggested that a) the higher the 
stipulated repayment the greater extent the acceptors would under-repay; and 
b) the more gratitude the acceptors felt the less prone they were to under-repay 
at full throttle. Additionally, a simple linear regression analysis showed that the 
magnitude of voluntary repayment upon unconditional offer acceptances (N= 
259) could be predicted by state gratitude,  = .130, t (257) = 2.11, p = .036. 
c) Conclusion 
Overall the analyses were mostly in support of the Moral Barometer and 
Moral Motive Hypotheses of Gratitude (McCullough et al., 2001). Specifically, 
results of the GEE highlighted that cooperators consistently experienced more 
state gratitude toward the offers than both cheap- and free-riders In addition, 
results of the hierarchical regression demonstrated that state gratitude inversely 
predicted one’s extent of under-repayment (while holding expected repayment 
constant). Thus, consistent with the Moral Motive Hypothesis which argues that 
state gratitude should restrain intent to undermine benefactors’ well-being, at 
present state gratitude seemed to put a handbrake on how people defaulted.   
Nonetheless, it is worth noting that although instances of  defaulting 
(cheap- and free-riding inclusive) were preceded by lower gratitude than were 
cooperating, cheap-riders still on average reported a non-negligible extent of 
gratitude  (M: 4.22; SE: 0.16). Thus, contrary to my prediction (See Table 5.1) 
the experience of gratitude still would not entirely eradicate defaulting.  
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5.4.2.2. Social Cognitive Model of Gratitude (i.e. SCMG) (Wood et al. 2008) 
While the above addresses the direct effect of state gratitude over 
defaulting, in this sub-section I examined how the interplay between 
dispositional and state gratitude, as theorised in the SCMG, would contribute to 
people’s decisions to under-repay in Experiment 3. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.9. The SCMG (Wood et al., 2008) Prediction on Defaulting 
 
a) Statistical Analyses 
I analysed the path model in Figure 5.9 via Hayes’s (2013) PROCESS 
using the Bootstrap Confidence Intervals (CI) approach (5000 Bootstrap 
samples). Participants’ individual receipt of their six conditional offers was 
separately analysed. I subjected the model (Figure 5.9) to the analyses which 
focus on under-repayment rate, composite benefit appraisal and state gratitude 
for each receipt of offer of varying conditionality (i.e. Interest-free, 25% and 
50%-Interest). The current analyses only included the 703 instances (i.e. N= 
703) in which a conditional offer was accepted. Table 5.15 details the results. 
b) Results and Conclusion 
 
Table 5.15 Regression Coefficients, Standard Errors (SEs), and Model 
Summary Information for the Path Model (Figure 5.9) under scrutiny 
Indirect Effect of Trait Gratitude on UR% (serially mediated by Benefit Appraisal then State Gratitude) 
Receipt Con N Co-
efficient 
Bootstrap 
SE 
Bootstrap 
LLCI 
Bootstrap 
ULCI 
Significant at 
p <.05? 
Initial I-F 130 -0.0453 0.7394 -1.7596 1.3332 No 
Second I-F 128 -0.9404 1.0162 -3.5422 0.6298 No 
Initial 25% 112 -0.6537 0.7317 -3.1263 0.2293 No 
Second 25% 120 -0.9614 1.0144 -4.4140 0.1465 No 
Initial 50% 107 0.0540 0.7206 -1.0530 2.1998 No 
Second 50% 106 -0.2700 1.2000 -3.1236 1.7962 No 
Note. N = Number of offer acceptors; Con: Conditionality; ‘UC’: Unconditional; ‘I-F’: Interest-Free; 
‘25%’: 25%-Interest; ‘50%’: 50%-Interest.; Boots LLCI (ULCI): Bootstrap CIs Lower (Upper) Limit 
 
The results (See Table 5.15) revealed that the hypothesised total indirect 
effect (i.e. Trait Gratitude Benefit Appraisal State GratitudeUR %) was 
Trait 
Gratitude 
(TG) 
Benefit 
Appraisal 
(BA) 
State 
Gratitude 
(Gs) 
Under-
repayment % 
(UR %) 
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non-significant at every conditional offer receipt. This statistical non-
significance was represented by the CIs which include zero at 95% levels of 
confidence (See Table 5.15). Hence, similar to Experiment 2, there was again 
no evidence that state gratitude (along with composite benefit appraisal) would 
mediate the path between trait gratitude and prosociality. 
5.4.3. Recurring Research Theme 2: Does indebtedness, as a state or a trait, 
nurture prosociality (or undermine antisociality) in economic games?  
 This sub-section details the analyses on hypotheses (e.g. Cognitive 
Restructuring Hypothesis) in relation to how indebtedness, as a state or a trait, 
affected participants’ cooperativeness or the lack thereof in Experiment 3.    
5.4.3.1. Does state indebtedness promote or suppress trustworthiness?   
 As summarised in Table 5.1 the present chapter entails scrutiny over 
two competing predictions on how state indebtedness would influence 
participants’ decisions to under-repay or repay fully. The Indebtedness-driven 
Reciprocity Argument—which argues an inverse relationship between state 
indebtedness and under-repayment, and the Cognitive Restructuring Hypothesis 
(i.e. CRH) (Greenberg & Westcott, 1983)—which argues that indebtedness 
should indirectly promote under-repayment via more cynical benefit appraisals.  
a) Statistical Analyses 
To test the Indebtedness-driven Reciprocity argument I adopted a GEE 
with an exchangeable correlation structure. I examined how participants’ 
categorical repayment (i.e. cooperate, cheap- or free-ride) decisions related to 
their state indebtedness in each of their receipts of conditional offers (total 
receipts = 133* 6 = 798).  Bonferroni pairwise analyses were used to delve into 
how this relationship may differ across each level of repayment. I also ran a 
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hierarchical linear regression testing how state indebtedness predicted under-
repayment rate, with expected repayment and receipts (i.e. initial or subsequent) 
being the first and second variables entered prior to state indebtedness. 
 
 
Figure 5.10 CRH’s (Greenberg & Westcott, 1983) Prediction on Defaulting 
 
To test the CRH I examined the path model (See Figure 5.10) using the 
PROCESS (Hayes, 2013) with 5000 Bootstrap samples. This analysis examined 
only the 703 instances (i.e. N = 703) in which a conditional offer was accepted, 
while controlling for variables expected repayment (i.e. Interest-Free, 25%- 
Interest and 50%-Interest) and offer receipts (initial or second receipts). The 
results are summarised in Table 5.16 and Figure 5.11. 
b) Results 
bi.) Testing if State Indebtedness would enhance trustworthiness 
The results of GEE indicated a significant effect of repayment (Wald 2 
(2) = 18.71, p <.001) on state indebtedness. Bonferroni analyses indicated that, 
similar to state gratitude (See Section 5.4.2.1), instances of cooperation were 
(N = 386; M: 4.64; SE: 0.15) preceded by higher state indebtedness (both ps 
<.05) than both cheap-riding (N = 247; M: 4.01; SE: 0.18) and free-riding (N = 
70; M: 3.67; SE: 0.35). There was no evidence (p = .997) that cheap-riders and 
free-riders experienced different state indebtedness toward their helpers.  
  The regression analysis provided further confirmation of Indebtedness-driven 
Reciprocity argument. Beta coefficients for the three predictors were expected 
repayment, β = .186, t = 4.99, p < .001; offer receipts, β = .029, t = 0.81, n.s.; 
and state indebtedness, β = -.147, t = -3.95, p < .001. The best fitting model for 
predicting under-repayment rate is a linear combination of expected repayment, 
State Indebtedness (Is) Benefit Appraisal 
(BA) 
Under-repayment % (UR %) 
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and state indebtedness (R = .257, R2 = .063, F (2,700) = 24.7, p < .001). The 
data suggested that a) the higher the stipulated repayment the greater extent of 
under-repayment would be; and b) the more indebtedness experienced by the 
acceptors the more they would give back. Additionally, a simple linear 
regression analysis revealed that the magnitude of voluntary repayment of 
unconditional offers (N= 259) significantly regressed on state indebtedness,  
= .262, t (257) = 4.36, p < .001. Taken together, the current data confirmed the 
Indebtedness-driven Reciprocity argument as state indebtedness appeared to 
both preserve trustworthiness and foster voluntary back-transfer. 
bii.) Would State Indebtedness lead to increased under-repayment via more 
cynical benefit appraisals (i.e. Cognitive Restructuring Hypothesis (CRH)))? 
Table 5.16 Regression Coefficients, Standard Errors, and Model Summary 
Information for the CRH prediction on under-repayment rate (Figure 5.11) 
 Consequent 
 M (Benefit Appraisal) Y (Under-repayment %) 
Antecedents  Coeff SE p  Coeff SE p 
X (State Indebtedness) a 0.342 0.02 <.001 c -1.354 0.81 .0940 
M (Benefit Appraisal)  -- -- -- b -4.122 1.21 <.001 
Co1: Expected Repayment  -0.011 0.00 <.001  0.029 0.01 <.001 
Co2: First or Second Receipt  -0.078 0.09 .3601  1.892 2.73 .4881 
Constant iM1 4.319 0.32 <.001 iM2 12.53 11.5 .2775 
 R2 = 0.3133 R2 = 0.0821 
 F (3,699) = 106.3 , p <.0001 F (4,698) = 15.62 , p <.0001 
Note. Co 1 and Co2: Covariates 1 and 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.11 Statistical diagram of analysis over the CRH prediction on UR% 
 
The data, as detailed in Table 5.16 and Figure 5.11, refuted the CRH as 
it reflected that state indebtedness indirectly affected under-repayment in an 
opposite direction as anticipated by the CRH. The bias-corrected bootstrap 95% 
CI for the present indirect effect (ab = 0.34*-4.12 = -1.41) did not include zero 
(-2.32 to -0.58), thus implying statistical significance. Acceptors feeling more 
X 
M 
Y State 
Indebtedness 
Benefit Appraisal Composite 
Under-repayment % 
 (i.e. UR %) 
a = 0.342, p <.001 b = -4.122, p <. 001. 
c = -1.354, n.s. 
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indebted were more inclined to think positively about their ‘taxed’ offers (a = 
0.342, p <.001). Understandably, this positive evaluation will predict a lower 
under-repayment rate (increased trustworthiness) (b = -4.12, p <.001). 
c) Conclusion 
All in all, state indebtedness in Experiment 3 appeared to facilitate 
cooperative economic decisions in a similar fashion as state gratitude. Although 
the current experimental features (e.g. double-blinded, partner-switching design 
etc.) should in theory breed cognitive restructuring (Greenberg, 1980; 
Greenberg & Westcott, 1983), the observed positive link between indebtedness 
and benefit appraisal dispels the idea that people would try to escape from their 
feeling of indebtedness by negatively appraising their offers (which includes 
demonising one’s helper, or belittling the value of the benefits that they were 
bestowed upon (Hatfield & Sprecher, 1983)). People, meanwhile, still 
considered direct reciprocity as the ‘major mode of indebtedness reduction 
(pp.95)’ (Greenberg & Westcott, 1983), even in a situation where the absence 
of the need to repay was very much emphasised (i.e. unconditional offer). 
5.4.3.2. Does trait indebtedness promote or suppress cooperation? 
This sub-section features the analyses on the two hypotheses regarding 
how trait indebtedness would influence participants’ decisions in the helper 
trials (i.e. Indebtedness-driven Helping (‘Helping Argument’ hereafter)) and in 
the recipient trials (i.e. Indebtedness-driven Repayment (‘Repayment 
Argument’ hereafter)). Specifically, the ‘Helping Argument’ predicts that 
dispositionally indebted helpers will be more likely to help unconditionally. 
Meanwhile, the ‘Repayment Argument’ states that dispositionally indebted 
recipients will always refrain from partially or fully defaulting (See Table 5.1). 
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a) Statistical Analyses 
To test the ‘Helping Argument’ I examined several outcome measures 
of the two helper trials (i.e. Trial 1 and 10). They were i) decisions to help or 
not; ii) whether (and how) participants changed their ‘Help versus No Help’ 
decisions in Trial 10; iii) conditionality of offers made; and the iv) transfer 
magnitude. The results are summarised in a nutshell in Table 5.17. 
To test the ‘Repayment Argument’ I ran a hierarchical regression 
analysis examining how trait indebtedness would predict under-repayment rate, 
while controlling for both expected repayment (i.e. Interest-Free, 25%- and 
50%-Interest) and offer receipts (i.e. initial or subsequent receipts). I also tested 
how trait indebtedness would relate to acceptors’ categorical repayment (i.e. 
cooperate, cheap- or free-ride), while controlling for expected repayment, using 
the GEE method with an exchangeable correlation structure. In both the 
hierarchical regression and GEE I focused only on the 733 instances in which a 
conditional offer was accepted (N = 703).  
I included two separate analyses on effects of trait indebtedness on 
participants’ repayment in the two RTs where they received unconditional 
offers. I conducted a hierarchical regression examining how trait indebtedness 
predicts repayment magnitude while controlling for offer receipts (initial or 
second). I also adopted the GEE method to explore how trait indebtedness 
would relate to unconditional offer acceptors’ categorical repayment, while 
controlling for offer receipts (i.e. initial or subsequent receipts).  
b) Results 
The analyses, as detailed in Table 5.17 below offered no indication that 
trait indebtedness had any significant direct influence on the various decisions 
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(e.g. to help or not to help; the magnitude of transfer; and conditionality etc.) in 
Trials 1 and 10 (all ps >. 05). Therefore, contrary to the Indebtedness-driven 
Helping argument, helpfulness (or trustfulness) in Experiment 3 appeared 
unrelated with indebtedness as a disposition. 
Table 5.17 Effect of Trait Indebtedness on Trial 1 (T1) and Trial 10 (T10) 
Average Indebtedness Scale-Revised (IS-R) Scoresa 
1. To Help or Not to Help? N Mean SD df t MTr b SD ρ 
1.3. Helper Trial 1 (Trial 1)          
- Helper 95 4.82 0.95   — — — 
- Non-Helper 38 5.12 0.93   — — — 
Overall 133 4.90 0.95 131 1.64 — — — 
1.4. Helper Trial 2 (Trial 10)          
- Helper 104 4.85 0.91   — — — 
- Non-Helper 29 5.10 1.09   — — — 
Overall 133 4.90 0.95 131 1.25 — — — 
2. Change in Helping Decisions    Kruskal- Wallis Test  
    (T1 vs. T10) N Mean SD df Chi-square p 
- Helpers in both T1 and T10 81 4.76 0.91    
- Helpers (T1) turned  Non-Helpers (T10) 14 5.14 1.15    
- Non-Helpers (T1) turned Helpers (T10) 23 5.15 0.86    
- Non-Helpers in both T1 and T10 15 5.06 1.06    
Overall 133 4.90 0.95 3 5.029 .170 
3. Conditionality of Help         
3.1. Helper Trial 1 (Trial 1) N Mean SD df F MTr b SD ρ 
- Unconditional (UC) 12 4.80 1.02   106.7 16.14 -.371 
- Conditional (CN)         
  - Interest-Free (CNIF) 49 4.82 0.93   105.6 15.53 .181 
  - 25%-Interest (CN25) 24 4.54 0.85   105.7 13.76 -.395 
  - 50%-Interest (CN50) 10 5.50 1.00   100.0 0.00 N.A.c 
Overall 95 4.82 0.95 3,91 2.52 — — — 
 N Mean SD df t MTr b SD ρ 
- Unconditional (UC) 12 4.80 1.02   106.7 16.14 -.371 
- Conditional (CN) Total 83 4.82 0.95   105.0 14.06 -.050 
Overall 95 4.82 0.95 93 0.06 105.2 14.26 -.091 
         
3.2. Helper Trial 2 (Trial 10) N Mean SD df F MTr b SD ρ 
- Unconditional (UC) 20 4.85 0.94   110.0 18.85 -.226 
- Conditional (CN)         
  - Interest-Free (CNIF) 54 4.76 0.89   107.4 17.26 .032 
  - 25%-Interest (CN25) 21 5.15 0.79   106.0 15.62 -.260 
  - 50%-Interest (CN50) 9 4.67 1.20   100.0 0.00 N.A.c 
Overall 104 4.85 0.91 3,100 1.06 — — — 
 N Mean SD df t MTr b SD ρ 
- Unconditional (UC) 20 4.85 0.94   110.0 18.85 -.226 
- Conditional (CN) Total 84 4.85 0.91   106.3 15.94 .010 
Overall 104 4.85 0.91 102 0.01 107.0 16.51 -.048 
Note. * p <.05 (2-sided); ** p <.01 (2-sided); *** p <.001 (2-sided). a 7-point Likert Scales (1-7), higher 
scores signal greater overall dispositional indebtedness. b Mean Transfer Magnitude (in Bonus Points). 
c No analysis was done owing to zero variance in CN50 givers’ transfer magnitude; ρ = Spearman’s Rho 
(two-tailed) on MTr and Trait Indebtedness (given by IS-R). 
 
Results of the hierarchical regression also offered minimal clear-cut 
evidence for the hypothesis that dispositional indebtedness undermines under-
repayment, despite a trend is shown. Beta coefficients for the three predictors 
Chapter 5   239 
 
 
 
were expected repayment, β = .213, t = 5.77, p < .001; offer receipts, β = .024, t 
= 0.65, p = .514; and trait indebtedness, β = .070, t = 1.91, p = .057. Crucially, 
the inclusion of trait indebtedness did not bring a significant improvement to 
the model (p = .057). Meanwhile, results of the GEE also revealed no 
differences (Wald 2 (2) = 2.11, p = .348) in trait indebtedness, after controlling 
for expected repayment, among cooperators (M: 4.92, SE: 0.08), cheap-riders 
(M: 4.92, SE: 0.08) and free-riders (M: 4.92, SE: 0.082). In short, the data did 
not confirm the present (Trait) Indebtedness-driven Repayment hypothesis. 
Furthermore, the regression analysis examining how trait indebtedness 
predicts unconditional offer repayment also did not show any significant effect, 
β = -.015, t (256) = -0.25, p = .807. The results of the GEE also offered no 
evidence (Wald 2 (2) = 0.034, p = .983) that trait indebtedness differentiated 
the categorical repayment decisions among unconditional offer takers. 
c) Conclusion 
Overall, the above analyses suggested a total absence of direct effects of 
trait indebtedness on participants’ decision-making throughout Experiment 3. 
While at present I will not dismiss any potential indirect effects trait 
indebtedness may have on the present decision variables, it is, however, beyond 
the scope of the current thesis to examine issues as such. 
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5.5. Discussion 
The key objective of Experiment 3 entails the scrutiny of a few 
unexplored domains—which were summarised by the four unanswered 
questions— in Experiments 1 and 2. While these UAQs predominantly 
concerned the methodological facets (i.e. UAQs 2 to 4), UAQ 1 touched on 
how state and trait emotions—gratitude and indebtedness in particular— would 
be related to cooperativeness and sanctioning within economic games. In so 
doing, I endeavour to render the present thesis a more all-round and robust 
investigation of the gratitude (or indebtedness)-prosociality association in the 
realm of Behavioural Economics. 
In this section I discuss three key findings at present. They included, a) 
the fairness-enforcing aspect of cheap-riding (i.e. the norm-enforcement 
hypothesis, See Sub-section 5.5.1 below); b) the moderating effect of 
knowledge on recipients’ fairness attributions (i.e. would the transparency of 
helpers’ options inspire recipients to quit adopting an ‘all-or-nothing’ 
perspective when evaluating fairness? See Sub-section 5.5. 2), and c) how 
gratitude and indebtedness were related to the display of prosociality at present 
(i.e. See Sub-section 5.5.3). Sub-section 5.5.4 will conclude the discussion by 
reviewing some other findings (e.g. whether the single- or both-role design 
would explain the ‘over-generosity’ issue) in relation to the other 
methodological UAQs. 
5.5.1. The Norm-enforcing Role of Cheap-riding 
The comparison of repayment between Experiments 2 and 3 provided 
insights on how prevalent cheap-riding is resorted to may depend on whether it 
could serve a norm-enforcing function. Specifically, analyses of the odds ratios 
Chapter 5   241 
 
 
 
showed that acceptors in a one-off setting (Experiment 2) were less likely to 
cheap-ride than acceptors in the present iterated context (See Table 5.7). 
I argued throughout this thesis the principal motive for cheap-riding—in 
this particular context—entails conveying a ‘fair but firm’, ‘cannot be 
exploited’ image of an unfairly treated victim (Komorita et al., 1991; Komorita 
et al., 1992; Komorita & Parks, 1999), and in so doing the punisher attempts to 
curb further fairness infringement by that offender (Ma et al., 2014). This 
should capture the essence of the current norm-enforcement hypothesis (NEH). 
Building on this logic, it makes sense that a participant would prefer 
cheap-riding in a context knowing that his/her ‘perpetrator’ may have another 
‘shot’ to continue being unkind to other people —that is, a repeated game. 
Participants in Experiment 3 were explicitly told that it was a multiple-shot 
experiment, and that everyone would be partnered with a different co-player in 
each round. By contrast, in Experiment 2 participants were told it was a one-
shot game and there were neither explicit instructions nor implications of 
repeated (or multiple) interactions and partner-switching throughout. 
Taken together, Experiment 3 should constitute a better platform for 
cheap-riding that is intended to serve a norm-enforcing purpose. That is 
because participants knew that their ‘perpetrators’ (i.e. ungenerous helpers) 
would have at least another chance to subject others to unfair treatment. On the 
contrary, in Experiment 2 participants were under an impression that this was 
the one and only trial and the helpers had no room to continue their ‘unfair’ 
streak even if they wished to. Accordingly, a fairness-enforcing cheap-riding 
should make more sense in an iterated rather than in a one-shot context. Thus, 
the present data which showed that cheap-riding was less prevalent in 
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Experiment 2 than in Experiment 3 may symbolise the participants’ capability 
of selecting the ‘right’ circumstance to optimise the norm-enforcing capacity of 
cheap-riding. I, therefore, interpret this as a partial confirmation of the NEH. 
While the above suggests that people tended to cheap-ride more in a 
context in which doing so better serves its immediate purpose, here I 
particularly delve into how efficacious cheap-riding can be relied upon in 
implementing normative fairness. Overall, the results (See Sub-section 5.3.3, 
i.e. testing UAQ #4)  indicated that conditional offer givers (N = 83) who had 
been ‘cheap-rode’ would—compared to the ‘free-rode’ givers— tend more to 
give a more generous offer in Trial 10; although the results showed no 
differences in likelihood for more generosity among the ‘cheap-rode’ and fully-
repaid givers. 
In addition, cheap-rode’ givers were more likely to also partially repay 
the conditional offers that they accepted during their six ensuing recipient trials. 
There were, however, no signs of them—compared to the ‘fully repaid’ and 
‘free-rode’ givers—being more inclined to repay fully or refrain from free-
riding (See Table 5.10). That is, being ‘cheap-rode’ did not incite more 
trustworthiness or a less blatant breach of normative fairness, but a ‘tit-for-tat’ 
pattern of cheap-riding directed to others—thus the NEH is not fully supported. 
All in all, while the cross-study comparisons alluded to the notion that 
people prefer to cheap-ride more in a context in which fairness enforcement 
should be more feasible (i.e. the iterated game ), analyses of the present 
repayment’s manipulation revealed that being ‘cheap-rode’ did not incite more 
eventual fair plays from the victims. This could be understood as participants 
expecting that their decisions (i.e. cheap-riding) may have a certain 
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consequence (i.e.to prompt more eventual compliance of the injunctive fairness 
norm) which did not actually turn out to be the case. 
5.5.2. Moderating Effect of Recipients’ Knowledge about Helpers’ Options on 
Fairness Attribution, Benefit Appraisal, and Experienced Gratitude 
 One key objective of Experiment 3 involves the analyses of whether the 
hinted ‘threshold’ mentality in fairness evaluation in Experiments 1 and 2 will 
be moderated by the recipients’ awareness of helpers’ options. Does more 
unfairness still not count (i.e. UAQ #1)? Or that Relativity should matter as 
theorised in the Gratitude Relativity Hypothesis (GRH) (Wood et al., 2011)? 
 Both the present psychometric and behavioural evidence were in 
support of the GRH (Wood et al., 2011). Recipients at present had shown the 
hypothesised graded pattern of emotional ratings towards offers of varying 
unfairness. Recipients reported considerably more prosocial emotions (e.g. 
emotional gratitude, a desire to reciprocate etc.) and less disapproval (e.g. 
annoyance) towards receipts of ‘fairer’ (i.e. unconditional or ‘interest-free’) 
offers. Interestingly, as opposed to the literature (e.g. Tsang, 2006b; Watkins et 
al., 2006) a more salient demand for a return favour (i.e. a ‘harsher’ repayment 
clause) at present had triggered i) lower state indebtedness and, ii) the perceived 
obligation to repay. In Schaumberg and Flynn’s (2009) words, a more unfair 
offer at present seemed to have undermined both the ‘want–to’ (i.e. gratitude-
inspired) and the ‘have-to’ (indebtedness-invoked) motives to reciprocate. 
Aside from the survey ratings, the current behavioural data also 
challenged the notion that there exists a ‘fair versus unfair’ threshold—thus 
more unfairness should not matter once that threshold had been overstepped. 
First, as recapped in Sub-section 5.3.2.2 the odds of offer rejections were higher 
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among the more unfair offers (e.g. 25%-, 50%- Interest offers); despite knowing 
in advance that it is possible to default. Meanwhile, the data from a 
supplementary Multinomial Logit Model Analyses (See Table 5.18) further 
evidenced the impact of conditionality (while controlling for whether the 
recipients were affected by the ‘Partner’s Repayment Manipulation (in Trial 
1)’) on acceptors’ categorical repayment of their conditional offers. 
Table 5.18 Supplementary analysis: Comparison of Repayment by 
Conditionality (Repayment Manipulation1 as a covariate, N= 133) 
 Variable: Conditionality (RC: ‘Interest-Free’ offers) 
 Odds Ratio 
(ORs) 
Intercept 25%- Interest vs.  
Interest-Free  
50%-Interest vs. 
Interest-Free  
1. Variable: Categorical Repayment    
-Repay Partially vs.  Odds Ratio 0.22* 1.92* 4.50* 
 Repay All (Reference Category) 95% LLOR 0.13 1.32 2.81 
 95% ULOR 0.37 2.81 7.21 
-Repay Nothing vs.  Odds Ratio 0.08* 2.70* 4.18* 
 Repay All (Reference Category) 95% LLOR 0.03 1.69 2.32 
 95% ULOR 0.02 4.33 7.55 
 Variable: Conditionality (RC: ‘25%-Interest’ offers) 
 Odds Ratio Intercept Interest-Free vs.  
25%- Interest 
50%-Interest vs. 
25%-Interest   (ORs)  
2. Variable: Categorical Repayment    
-Repay Partially vs.  Odds Ratio 0.42* 0.52* 2.34* 
 Repay All (Reference Category) 95% LLOR 0.26 0.36 1.64 
 95% ULOR 0.70 0.76 3.33 
-Repay Nothing vs.  Odds Ratio 0.22* 0.37* 1.55* 
 Repay All (Reference Category) 95% LLOR 0.10 0.23 1.00 
 95% ULOR 0.49 0.59 2.39 
Note.1 the 50 participants who were unaffected by the partner repayment manipulation (i.e. refused to help 
or help unconditionally at Trial 1) was coded ‘unaffected’ in this analysis. 
LLOR: Lower Limit Odds Ratio; ULOR: Upper Limit Odds Ratio. * denotes that the 95% Confidence 
Intervals did not overlap the null value (i.e. OR=1)—suggesting statistical significance (Szumilas, 2010).  
 
Indeed, this supplementary analysis (See Table 5.18) indicated that the 
odds of acceptors under-repaying (i.e. partial or zero back-transfer) over 
cooperating (i.e. repay fully) were higher among the ‘harsher’ offers compared 
to the ‘lenient’ ones (e.g. 50%- vs. 25%-Interest and 25%- vs. Interest-Free 
etc.). Overall, the behavioural evidence suggested that not only were the more 
unfair offers more frequently rejected, they were also more likely to yield a 
sanctioning response (i.e. repay partly or nothing) from those who accepted. 
Taken together, both the in-game survey ratings (i.e. appraisals and 
emotions) and the actual decisions (i.e. acceptances and repayment) were in 
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support of the GRH (Wood et al., 2011). Participants reacted both emotionally 
(e.g. feeling more gratitude, indebtedness etc.) and behaviourally (e.g. repaying 
despite ‘not having to’) towards offers of varying extent of normative fairness 
(or unfairness). I interpret this as a result of recipients being allowed to compute 
the relative worth of each offer they received (Wood et al., 2011), thanks to the 
newfound transparency of the helpers’ range of alternatives. Any discrepancy in 
this relative worth (across offers) is subsequently translated into different 
emotions and displays of prosociality (or the lack thereof). 
5.5.3. Gratitude, Indebtedness, and the present Display of Prosociality 
 In this section, I recap and discuss how gratitude and indebtedness had 
directly or indirectly contributed to prosociality in the present game. First, the 
results overall showed that acceptors feeling more gratitude (for the conditional 
offers) would less likely default on their helpers (by partial or total under-
repaying). The magnitude of voluntary backtransfer to unconditional helpers 
was also regressed on state gratitude. While all these observations were 
consistent with the Moral Motive Hypothesis (McCullough et al., 2001; 
McCullough et al., 2008) in that gratitude will undermine endeavours to harm 
the benefactors, the results, nonetheless, demonstrated that the experience of 
gratitude would not entirely rule out defaulting as hypothesised (i.e. Moral 
Barometer Hypothesis (McCullough et al., 2001; McCullough et al., 2008)). 
Indeed, instances of cheap-riding were still preceded by a considerable degree 
of experienced gratitude (towards one’s conditional offer givers).  
 Interestingly, an almost identical pattern of findings emerged for state 
indebtedness and recipients’ trustworthiness. Acceptors who reported feeling 
more indebted would also more likely cooperate than under-repay (both 
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partially and totally). Confirming the present Indebtedness-driven reciprocity 
notion (Schaumberg & Flynn, 2009), state indebtedness had a) an inverse 
association with the under-repayment rate of conditional offers; and b) a direct 
correlation with the voluntary repayment of unconditional offers. 
Furthermore, echoing the analyses in Chapter 4, the current design 
features (e.g. double-anonymity and partner-switching) did not encourage the 
helper vilification as Greenberg and Westcott (1983) suggested as a route via 
which a recipient can eradicate his/her benefit-triggered indebtedness. Data 
from the path analysis revealed quite the opposite results: state indebtedness 
would indirectly promote trustworthiness (i.e. suppress under-repayment) via 
more favourable benefit appraisals. 
In summary, the findings appeared to challenge the well-documented 
(e.g. Watkins et al., 2006; Tsang, 2006b) divergence in how gratitude vis-à-vis 
indebtedness are related to prosociality—which was replicated in a relatively 
under-sampled Experiment 1 (N= 49) (See Chapter 3). Participants at present 
felt less appreciative and indebted upon receipts of increasingly unfair offers, 
and that both affective states were predictive of trustworthiness, so as sheer 
generosity, in a similar fashion under an iterated economic exchange context. 
Additionally, analyses on whether dispositional gratitude would shape 
prosociality as suggested in the Social-Cognitive Model of Gratitude (Wood et 
al. 2008) revealed insignificant results. Echoing the analysis of Chapter 4, the 
present investigation again failed to confirm that dispositional gratitude would 
enhance trustworthiness via the serial mediation (Hayes, 2013) via i) benefit 
appraisals followed by ii) state gratitude. 
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Finally, analyses on hypotheses in relation to how dispositional 
indebtedness would foster helping (i.e. Indebtedness-driven Helping) or 
trustworthiness (i.e. Indebtedness-driven Repayment) again produced null 
findings (See Sub-section 5.4.3.2 and Table 5.17). In a separate analysis (See 
Table 5.9) I showed that dispositional indebtedness was not segregating offer 
acceptors from the rejectors, even though I also acknowledged that (See Sub-
section 5.3.2.2) the present lop-sided acceptor-rejector distribution may render 
this particular analysis unfit to be drawn any conclusions from. 
Taken together, unlike the state measures, neither dispositional gratitude 
nor indebtedness was found to have affected participants’ crucial decisions as 
hypothesised (See Table 5.1). These seemed to be in line with the key findings 
in the meta-analysis (See Chapter 2) whereby the display of gratitude-triggered 
prosociality should depend more on whether the gratified person is feeling 
grateful at that instant, rather than whether or not that said individual is 
endowed with a grateful character or life orientation (Wood et al., 2010). The 
current data hinted that this very same line of reasoning may also apply to how 
indebtedness would be related to prosociality as well. 
5.5.4. Solutions to other Methodological Unanswered Questions (UAQs) 
 Below (i.e. Sub-sections 5.5.4.1 and 5.5.4.2) I review how the present 
results would address the two other methodological UAQs. They included, 
firstly, the UAQ # 2 (See Sub-section 5.1.2.2) which questioned if the lack of 
opportunities to play both as helpers and recipients was to blame for the ‘over-
generosity’ issue in Experiments 1 and 2; and secondly, the UAQ # 3 (See Sub-
section 5.1.2.3) which inquired if the high rejections (i.e. 35.6%) in Experiment 
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2 were propelled by negative reciprocity (Bolton et al., 1998), or trait 
indebtedness (Greenberg & Westcott, 1983; Mathews & Shook, 2013). 
5.5.4.1. Solution to UAQ #2: Playing Both Roles and Over-generosity  
Indeed, the analyses had confirmed neither the Golden Rule nor the 
Reduced Responsibility Hypothesis (Burks et al., 2003). Overall there was no 
clear-cut evidence to conclude that the present a) both-role, and b) iterated 
design had enhanced either, i) trustfulness or, ii) overall trustworthiness. 
Although as discussed in Section 5.5.1 acceptors in Experiment 2 were, 
compared to Experiment 3, more likely to prefer fully or utterly not repaying 
than cheap-riding on their offers, the comparison of under-repayment rates (i.e. 
UR%) in Experiments 2 and 3 revealed no significant differences. Thus, despite 
the fact that acceptors in Experiments 2 and 3 had adopted different categorical 
repayment options, such a difference was not translated to the overall measure 
of trustworthiness (i.e. UR %). All in all, the ‘over-generosity’ concern in 
Experiments 1 and 2 appeared to persist despite the present modified design. 
5.5.4.2. Solution to UAQ #3: Were the High Rejections in Experiment 2 
attributable to Negative Reciprocity or Dispositional Indebtedness?  
 Predictably, the incidence of offer rejections was significantly lower in 
the present experiment (i.e. 11.9%) than in Experiment 2 (i.e. 35.6%). I 
attribute such a drastic decline to a modified feature at present—that is, a pre-
acceptance notification of the non-binding nature of the repayment clause. This 
new feature should rule out the possibility of recipients rejecting as to express 
their discontent with the normative unfairness that they were putting up with 
(See Chapter 4), as they could do so via taking the offers and then not repay. 
Chapter 5   249 
 
 
 
While it is crystal clear that recipients at present should harbour 
minimal incentives to reject and the data showed exactly that, the important 
question here is: had this reduced rejections translated to more sanctioning in 
Experiment 3? Indeed, as discussed above the cross-study comparison had 
evidenced a higher prevalence of cheap-riding (over cooperating and free-
riding) at present compared to Experiment 2. Additionally, the overall incidence 
of cooperating (over defaulting in general) was significantly higher (p = .022, 
two-tailed) in Experiment 2 (i.e. 59/ 87= 67.8%) compared to Experiment 3 (i.e. 
386/ 703= 54.9%; for conditional offers only), although such a difference in 
categorical repayment was not translated to the present overall index of 
trustworthiness (i.e. under-repayment %). 
Taken together, the results hinted that participants did utilise the 
current set-up to penalise their helpers via defaulting, and more importantly, an 
overwhelming segment of these defaulting involved cheap- (i.e. 77.9%) rather 
than free-riding (i.e. 22.1%). Thus, contrary to the convenient speculation that 
the present recipients refused to reject so they could fully exploit their helpers, 
they appeared to instead scrap rejections for cheap-riding—whereby the 
correctional, ‘Just Desert’ (Carlsmith et al., 2002) aspect of cheap-riding had 
been thoroughly discussed in Chapter 4. As a result, the present observed sharp 
decline in rejections should add substance to the speculation that a large chunk 
of rejections in Experiment 2 may have originated from a desire to penalise 
unfairness—and in a way confirming the Negative Reciprocity Hypothesis. 
Additionally, I tested whether dispositional indebtedness will have a 
role in prompting rejections. The data overall failed to show any signs of 
dispositionally indebted individuals being more propelled to accept or reject. 
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Impression management (Paulhus, 1991) was also a non-factor in acceptance. 
The current acceptance decisions seemed to primarily hinge on situational 
parameters such as offer conditionality, as the data indicated that the odds of 
rejection were evidently lower for offers with a more lenient repayment clause 
(e.g. ‘interest-free’). Nonetheless, the overall rare occurrence of rejections (See 
Table 5.9) may have limited the scope and the validity of analyses as of why 
people would bother to reject an offer in the present experiment. 
5.6. Implications and Future Directions 
Overall, Experiment 3 offered a robust response toward the list of 
unanswered questions (UAQs) from Experiments 1 and 2. While some UAQs 
remain unresolved, for instance, the overall ‘over-generosity’ issues emanating 
from Experiments 1 to 3 and that cheap-riding was not norm-enforcing as 
expected, the current chapter had complemented Experiment 2’s investigations 
into cheap-riding, and more importantly, the role of gratitude and indebtedness 
in fostering reciprocity (or restraining sanctioning) in economic exchanges. In 
subs-sections 5.6.1 and 5.6.2 I review two unresolved UAQs and discuss how 
that could be addressed in future investigations. 
5.6.1. Unresolved UAQ 1: Over-generosity: Social Heuristics (Rand et al., 
2012; Rand et al., 2014) or the House Money Effect (Clark, 2002) to blame? 
The cross-study analyses failed to show that participants under the 
present iterated and multiple-roles experimental design was more prosocial or 
profit-maximizing than those of the one-shot, single-role Experiments 1 and 2. 
Thus, it is conceivable that other facets of Experiments 1 and 2 may account for 
the observed ‘over-cooperativeness’. 
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Rand and associates (2014) theorised that human beings developed a 
social heuristics through numerous day-to-day interactions during which 
cooperation is inevitable and advantageous. As a result, people acquire a 
cooperative ‘intuitive defaults’ (Bear & Rand, 2016; Jordan, Peysakhovich, & 
Rand, 2014; Peysakhovich & Rand, 2016) and may inadvertently let it dictate 
their decision-making in situations where being cooperative is not 
advantageous (e.g. one-shot, double-blind games like Experiments 1 and 2). 
Indeed, the above notion which attributes people’s reluctance to be 
pro-self in one-shot games to their inherent cooperative instinct had garnered 
extensive attention from the research community. While Rand and associates 
(e.g. Rand et al., 2014) had consistently demonstrated the inverse relation 
between conscious reflection and prosociality in a series of public good games 
(i.e. PGs hereafter), Verkoeijen and Bouwmeester (2014) failed to replicate this 
intuitive-cooperation effect in their five studies that were modelled after those 
of Rand and colleagues’. Additionally, Verkoeijen and Bouwmeester (2014) 
meta-analysed 28 experiments that scrutinised this intuitive-cooperation effect 
in PGs and identified an immaterial—albeit still statistically significant—
overall effect estimate (i.e. Cohen’s d = 0.087, R2= 0.0018). 
Taken together, while theoretically possible it is still not without doubt 
that intuitive kindness is the bona fide solution to the present unresolved over-
generosity problem. Indeed, analyses of Experiments 1 to 3 had not included 
the decision time measures, nor had I directly manipulated the time allowed for 
the present decision making —for instance, the ‘time-delay versus the time-
pressure conditions (Rand et al., 2012). Therefore, a future design that 
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incorporates either of these two features should be warranted for a more in-
depth investigation into the intuitive-over-cooperation effect. 
Meanwhile, one shared feature of Experiments 1 to 3 entails the absence 
of needs for participants to legitimately ‘earn’ their endowment. Potential 
helpers (i.e. P1s) and recipients (i.e. P2s) throughout Experiments 1 to 3 knew 
and acknowledged that chance rather than competence was what ‘entitled’ them 
to the positions (the one to help or to expect help) they were in. As such, it 
should be legitimate to argue that P1s in Experiment 1 and 3 were basically 
playing with the ‘House Money’ (Clark, 2002) when deciding whether or not 
and how to help their partners out. On the other hand, P2s were also aware that 
it was not their partners’ fault that they ‘lost’, and therefore it should be fair—at 
least from an absolute standpoint—that their partners just walked away with 
their proceeds without sparing them a glance. Furthermore, in Experiments 1 to 
3 communications between players were strictly forbidden. P2s were practically 
‘spoon-fed’ the offers without even having to ask (not to mention earning that), 
unlike Andreoni and Rao’s (2011) design in which recipients had to at least 
send a verbal request for help. Therefore, it should be reasonable to argue that 
the P2s in Experiments 1 to 3 were also playing with the house—or at least 
‘unearned’ (Oxoby & Spraggon, 2008)—money. Indeed, the tendency of 
participants to be more generous or less risk-averse playing with house money 
is well documented in the behavioural economics literature (e.g. Cherry et al., 
2002; Harrison, 2007). By contrast, when endowment has to be earned people 
would act more in accord with rationality (Oxoby & Spraggon, 2008). 
In a nutshell, an alternative avenue to enhance the present resolution of 
the over-generosity issue entails a slight change in the ways endowment was 
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allocated to the participants. Specifically, instead of the present dice-rolling set-
up the experimenter could consider having the players partake in a general 
knowledge quiz, and telling them that a certain criterion (e.g. 8 out of 10) had to 
be met for any contestants to claim any bonus money. The experimenter could 
then manipulate the difficulty of these questions. For instance, participants 
assigned to the ‘helper’ condition could have a ‘cakewalk’ to that target, while 
those assigned to the ‘recipient’ condition would face way tougher questions. 
Additionally, a recipient in this modified design could be stipulated to at least 
need to make a ‘donation request’ should they fancy being bailed out. While 
these new features are not without flaws (e.g. the competence attribution and 
one’s propensity to proactively seek help etc.), they should, however, in 
combination provide a more valid assessment by taking out one well-
documented reason to be overly cooperative: the house money effect. 
5.6.2. Unresolved UAQ 2: Cheap-riding not Norm-enforcing—the partner-
switching design or the lack of justifications (from the punishers) to blame? 
The present analyses highlighted that while cheap-riding would more 
likely be resorted to in situations where doing so better serves its immediate 
norm-enforcing purpose (i.e. an iterated instead of a one-shot game); there is no 
guarantee of how well it necessarily works. Nevertheless, I suspected that this 
lack of efficacy could be liable to the present partner-switching, or the stranger 
design as coined by Fehr and Gächter (2000).  
Contrary to a partner-matching design (Fehr & Gächter, 2000) in which 
participants played an iterated game with the same co-player(s), at present 
participants were supposedly playing with a different co-player every round—
while staying anonymous throughout. Indeed, results of a meta-analysis on over 
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126 social dilemma experiments (Balliet, Mulder, & Van Lange, 2011) 
suggested that the punishment-cooperation link was significantly stronger in a 
partner-matching than both partner-switching and one-shot designs, and that 
the number of iterations was practically a non-factor in how effective 
punishment is in inciting cooperativeness. As such, it is conceivable that the 
current absence of norm-enforcing efficacy of cheap-riding could be ascribed to 
the partner-switching nature of Experiment 3. 
Meanwhile, Xiao and Tan (2014) contended that justification is integral 
to the proper functioning of any punishment institutions, as people despise 
those that work in favour of the enforcer’s self-gains. Indeed, the failure of a 
morally unjustified punishment in enhancing cooperation has been well 
documented in the Trust Game literature (e.g. Fehr & Rockenbach, 2003; Fehr 
& List, 2004). In Experiments 2 and 3 neither the ‘cheap-rode’ nor ‘free-rode’ 
victims were given any justifications why they were repaid as such. This 
absence of justifications—together with the fact that the cheap-riding enforcers 
were still ‘profiting’ from the exchange—may undermine the legitimacy of the 
cheap-riding (Xiao & Tan, 2014) and not surprisingly, the efficacy of cheap-
riding to get the victims to act more in accord with normative fairness. 
In a nutshell, I argue that the present analyses of cheap-riding could be 
complemented with two minor design modifications as discussed in the 
following. They included, first, an iterated partner-matching to replace the 
current partner-switching design. Similar to Güney and Newell’s (2013) 
procedure, participants would be informed they would play with an anonymous 
partner for multiple rounds. Meanwhile, the experimenter withholds details on 
i) the total number of trials (which was already part of the present game’s 
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features); and importantly, ii) when participants would swap partners. In so 
doing a ‘cheap-rode’ helper in a preceding trial should be more incentivized to 
make amends for his/her initial ‘wrongdoing’ by being cooperative in the next, 
knowing that he/she might encounter the same interactional partner again. 
Meanwhile, a second recommended adjustment entails the helpers’ 
access to their offer acceptors’ post-repayment ratings (that probed into their 
motives behind their repayment or the lack thereof). Alternatively, similar to 
Xiao and Tan’s (2014) Justification Treatment the punisher—at present a 
cheap- or free-rider—could be stipulated to give an explanation to the helper 
why he/she under-repaid. Either of these new features should highlight to the 
helpers explicitly why—justified or otherwise—their offers were repaid as such. 
Indeed, data from Xiao and Tan (2014) demonstrated that when ‘punishment is 
profitable for the enforcer (pp.14)’ a justification could render a) a perception of 
legitimacy in the sanction, and importantly, b) more efficiency of that sanction 
in promoting prosociality. 
Meanwhile, Xiao and Tan (2014) also showed that the need to justify a 
sanction would confine the enforcer to only penalise people for their misdeed 
rather than for ulterior reasons. Taken together, I argue that by allowing the 
defaulters (cheap- and free-riders inclusive) to account for their non-repayment, 
or at least making their post-repayment survey responses known to their 
helpers, should render a more overall legitimate analysis of how cheap-riding 
could emulate altruistic punishment.  Table 5.19 below provided a summary of 
the list of currently unresolved UAQs (i.e. UUAQs hereafter) and the above-
listed recommended measures to address each of them. 
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Table 5.19 List of recommended changes for the scrutiny of the UUAQs 
UUAQs Possible Reasons Recommended Changes  
1. What 
caused people 
to be overly 
generous in 
the present 
experiments?   
Social Heuristics 
Hypotheses (i.e. 
SHH, Rand et al., 
2012; Rand & 
Nowak, 2013; 
Rand et al., 2014; 
Jordan et al., 2014) 
1. A more time-sensitive software 
package to record participants’ decision 
time—e.g., the Psychopy (Peirce, 2007). 
The currently adopted version of Z-Tree 
(version 3.3.1.2; Fischbacher, 2007) 
could only record decision time precise 
to seconds; or 
2. A direct manipulation of permitted 
decision time—e.g. Rand et al.’s (2012) 
time-delay vs. time-pressure conditions.  
House Money 
Effect  
(i.e. HME, Cherry 
et al., 2002; Clark, 
2002; Harrison, 
2007; Thaler & 
Johnson, 1990) 
1. To have players ‘earned’ their 
endowment via a knowledge quiz.  
2. To maintain the ‘Helper versus 
Recipient’ set-up I adjust the difficulty 
of the questions presented to those 
assigned to the ‘Helper’ or the 
‘Recipient’ Groups; 
3. Recipients need to proactively ask for 
help (e.g. Andreoni & Rao, 2011) 
2. Why was 
Cheap-riding 
unable to 
enforce 
normative 
fairness as 
hypothesised?  
The current 
Partner-switching 
design, and the 
One-shot nature of 
Experiment 2 
To inform participants that they would 
each play with an anonymous fellow 
player for multiple rounds; and I 
withhold information in relation to a) 
how many trials the experiment would 
entail, and b) when the partner-
switching would take place (e.g. Güney 
& Newell, 2013). 
Lack of 
Justification from 
the enforcer of 
cheap- or free-
riding 
1. A mandatory explanatory note to be 
sent to his/her helper if an acceptor is to 
partially or completely under-repay (e.g. 
Xiao & Tan, 2014); or 
2. To show the post-repayment survey 
responses of the cheap- or free-riders to 
their respective helpers afterwards.  
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General Discussions 
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6.0. Overview of the Present Thesis 
Throughout Chapters 2 to 5 a recurring theme was thoroughly 
examined, that is, how gratitude as a construct would relate to prosociality or 
sanctioning in a Behavioural Economics context. Every empirical study casts 
light upon certain elements of the gratitude-prosociality association, with each 
ensuing experiment providing a follow-up analysis to validate, as well as, to 
build upon, those particular observations. 
In particular, while the meta-analysis (i.e. Chapter 2) revealed that the 
gratitude-prosociality link is stronger among studies which examined gratitude 
as a benefit-triggered (Lambert et al., 2009), transitory affective state, or 
studies which adopted direct, reciprocal prosociality measure, Experiment 1 
(i.e. Chapter 3) built upon that by examining how this gratitude-reciprocity 
association would be subject to helper intent attribution, and how the 
injunctive fairness norm (Elster, 2006; Paddock, 2005) could contribute to that 
and thus shaped recipients’ feeling of gratitude (or indebtedness) throughout 
the episode, and ultimately his/her urge to directly reciprocate. Experiment 2 
(i.e. Chapter 4) shifted the spotlight towards recipients’ emotional and 
reciprocal reactions towards injunctively unfair (i.e. conditional) offers (Ma et 
al., 2014), and tested whether dispositional gratitude would contribute to 
prosociality (or sanctioning) in this context as predicted by the Social 
Cognitive Model of Gratitude (i.e. SCMG, Wood et al., 2008). Meanwhile, 
Experiment 3 (i.e. Chapter 5) served as a round-up by examining a few 
unanswered questions (see Chapters 4 and 5) from the two prior studies, via a 
game with a different design (i.e. an iterated game with role-switching). 
Chapter 6   257 
 
 
 
Meanwhile, Experiments 2 and 3 entailed a series of comprehensive 
follow-up analyses on an interesting while relatively under-researched 
economic observation from Experiment 1— i.e. the cheap-rider problem 
(Isaac, Schmidtz, & Walker, 1989). While speculations and theories (e.g. ‘Just 
Deserts’ theories of punishment (Carlsmith et al., 2002)) on why people may 
cheap-ride—instead of free-ride—had been raised, Experiment 2 offered a 
customised and more robust scrutiny over the occurrences and motives behind 
cheap-riding. Experiment 3 further built on that by examining, i) how cheap-
riding could emulate altruistic punishment (Fehr & Gächter, 2002; Fowler, 
2005) as a means to enforce the injunctive fairness norm (i.e. the Norm 
Enforcement Hypothesis (NEH), See Chapter 5 for details), and importantly, ii) 
how gratitude and indebtedness would relate to this particular type of 
defaulting that should make little sense rationality-wise (See Chapter 4 for 
details). Figure 6.1 below—which illustrates an integrated model derived from 
the key observations—could offer insights on how the present thesis would 
add to the gratitude and behavioural economics literature. Detailed discussions 
in relation to the theoretical and practical significance of the current thesis 
will, meanwhile, be featured in Sections 6.1 and 6.2 respectively. 
6.1. Theoretical Contributions 
This section discusses at length how this thesis contributes to both the 
behavioural economics and gratitude literature. Sub-section 6.1.1 features the 
discussion on how the observations from the three lab studies add to the 
existing models (e.g. SCMG, Wood et al., 2008). Sub-section 6.1.2 sheds light 
upon certain novel specific paths generated from the empirical studies (e.g. 
how the helper intent will depend upon the injunctive norm), and the subtleties
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Figure 6.1 Overall Summary Diagram of the Thesis (while incorporating the Social Cognitive Model of Gratitude (Wood et al., 2008)
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as regards some of these paths (e.g. how the use of injunctive norm or the 
Relative Rank Model of Gratitude (i.e. RRMG, Wood et al., 2011) was indeed 
dependent on recipient’s knowledge about helpers’ options). Sub-section 6.1.3 
outlines how the present overall observations of cheap-riding would relate to, 
and therefore builds on, the existing findings on the ‘cheap-rider’ problem in 
the public goods game literature (e.g. Isaac et al., 1989; Marks et al., 2006). 
6.1.1. How do the Model and the Current Findings Add to the Literature? 
While several theories, for example, the Moral Functional Hypotheses 
of Gratitude (McCullough et al., 2001; McCullough et al., 2008) and the Social 
Cognitive Model of Gratitude (SCMG) (Wood et al., 2008), had either hinted or 
overtly stated that gratitude is predictive of prosociality, the present integrated 
model (see Figure 6.1) has outlined a complex that underlies the whole 
gratitude-prosociality association. Particularly, this integrated model 
incorporates the Theory of Reciprocity (or Fairness) (e.g. Falk & Fischbacher, 
2006; Falk et al., 2008) by acknowledging the importance of perceived intent or 
fairness, and importantly, how this fairness attribution could be subjected to 
manipulation of certain parameters (e.g. knowledge about helpers’ behavioural 
alternatives) and thus elicits varying levels of experienced gratitude which is 
ultimately translated into direct reciprocation (or sanctioning) in an economic 
exchange context. All these observations could be mapped onto the results of 
the moderator analyses (i.e. Chapter 2) where gratitude is more strongly linked 
to prosociality when certain parameters were met. These included, (1) state 
rather than trait gratitude being examined; (2) direct reciprocity instead of 
indirect or non-reciprocal outcomes being measured; and (3) benefit-triggered 
instead of generalized gratitude (Lambert et al., 2009) being examined. 
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The present thesis also attempted to shed light upon the well-
documented (e.g. Schaumberg & Flynn, 2009; Watkins et al., 2006; Tsang, 
2006b) divergence in the mechanism via which gratitude and indebtedness 
facilitate prosociality. While the relatively under-sampled (N= 49) Experiment 
1 appeared to replicate such a divergence—whereby gratitude rather than 
indebtedness was found to vary as a function of injunctive (normative) 
fairness, such a pattern was not replicated in either of the larger samples in 
Experiments 2 (N = 87) or 3 (N = 133). In fact, analyses of Experiment 3 even 
showed that both states gratitude and indebtedness would relate directly 
toward injunctive fairness, and both were predictive of subsequent direct 
reciprocal behaviours (in the forms of trustworthiness or generosity). Taken 
together, the results seemed to challenge the prevalent idea in the emotions 
literature where indebtedness is commonly conceptualized as a negatively-
valenced affect that is doomed to haunt cooperation in the long-run (e.g. 
Greenberg, 1980; Greenberg & Westcott, 1983; Hatfield & Sprecher, 1983), 
whereas gratitude is expected to invoke and nurture prosociality via an entirely 
different route (Komter, 2004; Watkins, 2014; Watkins et al., 2006). 
Additionally, these findings would echo my argument in Chapter 2—where in 
direct reciprocal exchanges gratitude may also trigger a sense of indebtedness 
or obligation (Wood et al., 2016), and that both of which should contribute to a 
desire to return other’s prosocial gestures (Schaumberg & Flynn, 2009). 
Furthermore, as addressed in Chapter 1 the current thesis constitutes 
the first ever empirical examination of how indebtedness (both as a state or a 
disposition) as a psychological construct would mould people’s economic 
decisions. While dispositional indebtedness (along with dispositional 
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gratitude) was not shown to be particularly impactful on participants’ current 
cooperative or retaliatory decisions, potentially due to the power issue (Refer 
to Section 6.3 for more details), the present data have consistently 
demonstrated that indebted recipients did not only feel prompted to reciprocate 
(i.e. Experiment 1), but also engaged in direct reciprocal behaviours (i.e. 
Experiment 3) and restrained sanctioning behaviours, even when the helpers 
had stated ‘upfront’  that there was no need to repay (i.e. unconditional offer 
receipts, Experiment 3). All in all, the present thesis suggests that the (state) 
indebtedness- (direct) reciprocity link was robust to a range of experimental 
manipulations (i.e.one-shot vs. iterated, single- vs. multiple- roles, fair vs. 
unfair offers), and hence should serve as a starting point for any future 
analyses on the role of indebtedness in the realm of economic exchanges. 
6.1.2. Subtleties of Specific Paths in the Above Integrated Model (Figure 6.1) 
As suggested above the present integrated model is not without its 
subtleties. This section features a closer scrutiny of the two ‘plot twists’ of the 
model—one being the 1) moderating effect of recipients’ knowledge of 
helpers’ options on the fairness perception and accordingly benefit appraisal 
(i.e. Sub-section 6.1.2.1), with the other being 2) how cheap-riding (which is 
defined and discussed in the following Sub-section 6.1.2.2) would serve its 
fairness-enforcing purpose differently in a one-shot (i.e. Experiment 2) versus 
an iterated, partner-switching (i.e. Experiment 3) interactional context.   
6.1.2.1 Moderating Effect of Recipients’ Knowledge about Helpers’ Options 
on Fairness Attribution, Benefit Appraisal, and Experienced Gratitude   
First, as illustrated in Figure 6.2 the path between ‘Helper Intent 
Attribution’ and ‘Benefit Appraisal’ is dependent upon the recipients’ 
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knowledge about the helpers’ list of alternative options. When such knowledge 
is absent or denied (Experiments 1 and 2) people were inclined to rely on the 
injunctive fairness norm—which delineates what an average fair person is 
expected do in a given situation (Elster, 2006; Paddock, 2005)—to guide their 
helper’s intent attributions (Ma et al., 2014). Analyses in Chapters 3 and 4 
hinted that such a reliance on injunctive normative fairness appeared to drive 
recipients to adopt an all-or-nothing, ‘threshold’ mentality in fairness 
evaluation. Recipients only attended to whether helpers played fair from a 
normative standpoint (i.e. to share their unearned resources equally with others 
(Frey & Bohnet, 1995) by helping unconditionally), and when the helpers 
chose not to do so (i.e. to impose a ‘helping’ fee via donating conditionally) 
the recipients did not show incremental negativity (or decreasing positivity) 
toward a more injunctively unfair arrangement (e.g. a 50%-Interest versus an 
Interest-Free offer). See Chapters 3 and 4 for more in-depth discussions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.2 Extracts of the Present Overall Summary Diagram (Figure 6.1) 
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Consequently, recipients who were helped fairly (i.e. unconditionally) 
tended to evaluate their offers in a more positive fashion, which then led to 
more experienced gratitude and ultimately, increased prosocial intention 
(Experiment 1). In contrast, recipients who were treated unfairly (i.e. helped 
conditionally)—albeit in varying extent (i.e. different ‘taxed’ offers) — did not 
differ in their benefit appraisal, gratitude, or actual repayment (Experiment 2). 
However, analyses of Experiment 3 revealed a very different pattern of 
results once recipients were no longer unaware of how differently their helpers 
could have treated them (i.e. access to helpers’ alternative in-game options). 
Both the psychometric (i.e. survey ratings) and behavioural (i.e. acceptances 
and repayment) evidence were in support of the Gratitude Relativity 
Hypothesis (GRH)—in which Wood et al. (2011) theorised that people’s 
perception of and gratitude towards a favour should be a function of that 
favour’s relative worth : how that favour compares against the others.  
As a result, this knowledge on how helpers could have acted nicer or 
nastier (Experiment 3) should permit the recipients’ computation of how their 
actual receipts would ‘rank’ among those ‘could-have’ receipts (Wood et al., 
2011). These ‘rankings’ were indeed translated into 1) a graded pattern of both 
benefit appraisal and gratitude (so as indebtedness) toward the offers of 
varying conditionalities (or normative fairness), and importantly, 2) fewer 
rejections of and defaulting (i.e. cheap- and free-riding inclusive) on the fairer 
(i.e. the unconditional and those ‘low-tax’ offers) offers (See Chapter 5). 
6.1.2.2. When to Cheap-ride? And How Reliable could Cheap-riding be in 
emulating Altruistic Punishment (i.e. Norm-Enforcement Hypothesis)? 
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Another subtlety of the present integrated model would involve the 
other main focus of this thesis—i.e. cheap-riding, which was operationalized 
at present as a recipient’s partial repayment of an accepted, conditional offer. 
The analyses of cheap-riding became of interest when data of Experiment 1 
revealed that a sizeable (i.e. 38.1%) proportion of conditional offer acceptors 
opted to just under-repay, instead of dodging the repayment in its entirety 
(defined as ‘free-riding’ at present), upon the realisation that the ‘repayment 
clauses’ that they previously agreed to was indeed not binding (See Chapter 3). 
Importantly, while cheap-riding was consistently observed across 
Experiments 1 to 3 it is interesting to notice that people are more likely to 
cheap-ride in an iterated, partner-switching (Experiment 3) than in a one-off 
(Experiment 2) exchange setting (Refer to Sub-section 5.3.1.2, Chapter 5 for 
the detailed analyses). I interpreted this as a partial confirmation of the Norm-
enforcement Hypothesis (NEH), which draws parallels between cheap-riding 
and altruistic punishment in safeguarding cooperation in the long-run.  
I argued throughout this thesis that one principal motivation of cheap-
riding at present should entail the communication of an unfairly treated 
recipient’s ‘fair but firm’, ‘cannot be exploited’ image (Komorita et al., 1992; 
Komorita & Parks, 1999) toward the helper, and in so doing the cheap-rider 
strives to prevent that helper from by being ungenerous to other people, and 
therefore breaching the fairness norm once again (i.e. NEH) (Ma et al., 2014). 
Hence, it makes perfect sense for a fairness-enforcing cheap-rider to cheap-
ride more in a repeated, partner-switching context during which doing so 
should better serve its correctional purpose, as an ungenerous helper in an 
iterated game should have more chances (i.e. the upcoming trials) to continue 
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to treat others unfairly. In contrast, Experiment 2 should be less of a breeding 
ground for any norm-enforcing cheap-riding, as its one-shot nature should put 
any prospective cheap-riders under the impression that those unfair helpers 
could not carry on violating normative fairness even if they wanted to. Thus, 
cheap-riding in Experiment 2 would understandably be less prevalent that of 
Experiment 3, and thereby offering some confirmation to the NEH. 
Nonetheless, analyses of Experiment 3 offered minimal evidence that 
being cheap-rode would give rise to more subsequent fair plays in subsequent 
trials. Overall, the data showed that ‘cheap-rode’ helpers (in Trial 1) were 
more likely to also partially repay the conditional offers that they later on 
accepted. There were, however, neither signs of these ‘cheap-rode’ victims 
being more inclined to1) repay fully (i.e. cooperate), nor 2) to abstain from 
free-riding on others—than helpers whose initial conditional offers (in Trial 1) 
were either fully repaid or not repaid, thus in a way challenging the NEH.  
Taken together, while participants seemed capable of finding the 
‘optimal’ circumstance to cheap-ride (i.e. ‘preference’ to cheap-ride in an 
iterated instead of one-off context), there is, nevertheless, no guarantee of how 
efficacious cheap-riding could be in maintaining normative fairness. I interpret 
these as the epitome of participants’ belief that their decisions may have a 
consequence that did not turn out to be the case. (See Chapter 5 for more 
discussions on how Experiment 3’s partner-switching design may account for 
the lack of norm-enforcing effect by the ‘cheap-riding’ manipulation) 
6.1.3. Cheap-riding at Present and Cheap-riding in the Wider Literature 
Despite being an overall scarcely researched topic cheap-riding has 
been explored in the Public Goods Game (e.g. Bchir & Willinger, 2013; 
Chapter 6   266 
 
 
 
Rondeau, Schulze, & Poe, 1999), and even in the International Relations (e.g. 
Borcherding, 1981; Oneal, 1990; Thompson, 1987) and the Religiosity Study 
(e.g. Olson & Perl, 2005) literature. This implies that cheap-riding is far from 
just an experimental artefact which bears zero ecological validity or 
generalisability across various research domains. It is, therefore, important to 
discuss how the present observations on cheap-riding would relate to those in 
the wider literature. However, since papers which discussed cheap-riding in an 
International Relations context are mostly not experimentally-based (e.g. 
Thompson’s (1987) analysis on how the NATO allies had ‘cheap-rode’ on the 
Americans by contributing significantly less in fending off the military 
aggression of the Soviet Union), therefore this section will highlight how the 
present observations on cheap-riding would compare against, and accordingly 
add to, the existing empirical findings in the Public Goods Game literature.   
6.1.3.1. Operationalizing Cheap-riding in the Public Goods Games literature 
 Several experimental economists (e.g. Bchir & Willinger, 2013; Isaac 
et al., 1989; Rondeau et al., 1999) had adopted a variant of the classic Public 
Goods Game (PG) to investigate cheap-riding. Contrary to classic PG in which 
people who contribute nothing can still claim a share of the resources (as long 
as the provision point is reached), in this modified game players who refused 
to contribute a ‘membership fee’ are prohibited from taking a share (Bchir & 
Willinger, 2013). Thus, the ‘cheap-rider’ problem is defined in this context as 
the ‘unequal distribution of contributions (pp.223)’ (Isaac et al., 1989)—which 
is exemplified by someone contributing merely the ‘membership fee’ with the 
intention to exploit his/her groupmates’ above-average contributions (Asch et 
al., 1993; Bchir & Willinger, 2013; Marks et al., 2006; Thompson, 1987). 
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6.1.3.2. Contrasting Cheap-riding at present and that in the PG Literature 
The above conceptualisation of cheap-riding does not deviate from that 
of several other researchers (e.g. Krishnamurthy, 2000; Olson & Perl, 2005; 
Stigler, 1974), and is indeed not at odds with how cheap-riding was referred to 
at present—both of which concern the exploitations of others’ contributions 
amidst the cheap-riders’ own non-zero contributions. However, how cheap-
riding was examined in the PG literature (e.g. Bchir & Willinger, 2013; Isaac 
et al., 1989) seemed quite different from what I did in the present thesis.  
 First, as addressed above this point-provision PG (Bchir & Willinger, 
2013; Marks et al., 2006) should categorically rule out free-riding, as it is 
stipulated a priori that non-contributors would be ineligible to acquire any 
bonuses even if the group’s contribution exceeds the provision point. As such, 
the only ‘legitimate’ defaulting option in such a context is cheap-riding (i.e. to 
just pay the membership fee). This is clearly different from the set-up of 
Experiments 1 to 3 in which offer acceptors were allowed to decide whether to 
pay up in full (‘cooperate’), partially (‘cheap-ride’), or nothing (‘free-ride’). 
Additionally, there is an element of risk associated with cheap-riding in 
the Point-provision PG. This is particularly true in a ‘No-Refund’ scenario 
(Bchir & Willinger, 2013) in which participants would ‘lose their contributions 
in the event of provision failures (pp.27)’. Indeed, even in a ‘Full-Refund’ 
context a cheap-rider may still incur the risk of his/her ‘success’ to cheap-ride 
on others thanks to the potential provision failures. That is, being able to only 
retrieve his/her membership fee should be indicative of a failed endeavour to 
piggyback on someone else’s high contributions. Needless to say, this risk is 
further complicated by Bchir and Willinger’s (2013) direct manipulations of 
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both 1) the provision thresholds and 2) the membership fees (e.g. ‘Low-’ 
versus ‘Medium-’ versus ‘High-Threshold (Membership Fee)’ conditions).  
In comparison, defaulting in general (cheap- and free-riding inclusive) 
in the present experimental set-up appears highly ‘risk-free’. Offer acceptors in 
Experiment 1 to 3 were aware of their bonus money (i.e. helpers’ conditional 
transfer) prior to deciding whether they would default. Thus there should not 
be any risk in relation to 1) cheap-riders being denied any monetary payoffs at 
the end, or 2) cheap-riding not being impactful at all. Meanwhile, the double-
blinded, one-shot nature of Experiments 1 and 2 should shield both the cheap- 
and free-riders from any retribution. Additionally, the partner-switching nature 
of Experiment 3 should offer assurance to the prospective cheap- and free-
riders in Experiment 3 about the absence of repercussions of under-repayment. 
6.1.3.3. Cheap-riding at Present and Cheap-riding in the PG Literature 
Taken together, the present thesis should offer new perspectives to the 
Point-provision PG literature in relation to cheap-riding in a two crucial 
aspects. First, the present experiments added back the option to ‘free-ride’ (i.e. 
zero contribution) which is essentially forbidden in the abovementioned PGs 
(e.g. Bchir & Willigner, 2013; Marks et al., 2006). Not only would this re-
addition 1) enable a more refined (or possibly less inflated) measure of one’s 
cheap-riding decision—as cheap-riders at present need to also resist the 
temptations to default in its entirety, it also 2) permits the present dissociation 
between the mentality of the cheap-riders, co-operators and the free-riders 
(See Chapter 4). Apart from such a psychological profiling which is, to my 
knowledge, yet to be examined in the literature, analyses of Experiment 3 
further underlined the segregation between cheap- and free-riding in terms of 
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how being ‘cheap- rode’ (in Trial 1), as opposed to being ‘free-rode’ (in Trial 
1), would elicit a different pattern of decisions (i.e. repayment in the Recipient 
Trials and willingness to help in Trial 10) in the later trials (See Chapter 5).  
Furthermore, as addressed above (i.e. Sub-section 6.1.3.2) the present 
investigation (i.e. Experiments 1 to 3) removed the risk element which is 
evident (and even directly manipulated) in Bchir and Willinger (2013). Hence, 
I argue that the cheap-riding examined at present should be more reflective of 
personal preferences rather than a rational decision following one’s ‘risk 
assessment’. As addressed in the Dual-process framework (Dijksterhuis & 
Nordgren, 2006; Kahneman, 2011) System 1 is characterised by susceptibility 
toward emotions, whereas System 2 epitomises rationality and reasoning 
(Kahneman & Frederick, 2007). Considering that the recurrent theme of this 
thesis primarily concerns how economic cooperation is susceptible to emotions 
in gratitude and indebtedness (i.e. System 1), the present cheap-riding measure 
which took away the risk assessment (i.e. System 2) part should on the whole 
add to the legitimacy and validity of the experiments. 
6.2. Practical Contributions  
While there is no denying that the present thesis is predominately 
theoretically driven, there are two main practical implications to be derived 
from the key findings. They included implication on, a) how practitioners of 
Gratitude Interventions (i.e. GIs hereafter) could modify the existing regime to 
boost its efficacy in promoting prosociality (i.e. Sub-section 6.2.1), and b) the 
observed under-contribution of child support by the non-custodial ‘paying’ 
parents (Allbeson, 2016; Savage, 2015) in the UK (i.e. Sub-section 6.2.2). 
6.2.1. The Meta-analysis (Chapter 2) and Gratitude Interventions (GI) 
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The classic, quintessential GI was originated in studies by Emmons and 
McCullough (2003) and Watkins et al. (2003) during which participants (or 
trainees) were instructed to recall and write about a few gratitude-inducing 
events that occurred in their recent past. For example, participants in Watkins 
et al.’s (2003) Gratitude condition were asked to recall and write about things 
that they did over the previous summer that they felt grateful for, whereas 
trainees assigned to the Control condition would simply list things that they 
did not manage to do during that very same designated period.  
Nonetheless, in their recently published meta-analysis Davis et al. 
(2016) had questioned the efficacy of these typical GI practices in enhancing 
trainees’ well-beings. Their results generally failed to confirm that GI could 
consistently outperform either the control (i.e. measurement-only), or the 
alternative activities (e.g. listing of daily hassles, Emmons and McCullough, 
2003) conditions. Meanwhile, via their qualitative review Wood et al. (2010) 
had also weighed in with their scepticism about the effectiveness of the 
existing GI regime. While neither Davis et al. (2016) nor Wood et al. (2010) 
had specifically critiqued the existing GI’s efficacy in promoting prosociality, 
the present suggested modifications—which will be briefly discussed below— 
should still be worth the practitioners’ considerations, thanks to the relative 
ease of implementing such and the theoretical bases behind.   
Building on the key findings of the moderator analyses (See Chapter 2 
for details), I suggested that practitioners of existing GI practices (e.g. 
‘Grateful Essay’ training, Watkins et al., 2003) could have their trainees write 
about an experience of 1) being generously treated by a particular person (i.e. 
benefit-triggered (Lambert et al., 2009) gratitude affect), and 2) how the 
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trainees either actually helped, or intended to help that, that particular 
benefactor back (i.e. direct reciprocity). Trainees could also be instructed to 
think about 3) how their good deeds (e.g. to return others’ benevolence) might 
draw generosity from others when they need help (i.e. ‘downstream’ indirect 
reciprocity, Nowak and Roch, 2007), or 4) how their feelings of gratitude for 
someone’s kindness could propel them to contribute to others’ well-being (i.e. 
‘upstream’ indirect reciprocity, Nowak and Roch, 2007). Overall, the meta-
analysis should serve to inform and advise the GI practitioners on ways to 
optimise its efficacy amidst doubts raised in the research community (e.g. 
Davis et al., 2016; Renshaw & Olinger-Steeves, 2016; Wood et al., 2010). 
6.2.2. The Psychology of those Child Maintenance Under-contributors 
Additionally, the present analyses on the cheap-riders’ unique 
psychological profiling (See Chapter 4) should have implications on the 
phenomenon of non-custodial parents under-contributing (but not outright 
escaping) their child support obligations. Since each paying parent’s 
contribution is, according to the Child Support Agency (i.e. CSA hereafter), 
tailored to his/her financial situation—hence removing any concerns about 
affordability, coupled with the public knowledge on the CSA’s inefficiency in 
retrieving the maintenance arrears (Savage, 2007)—i.e., the absence of 
repercussions for not paying, I, therefore, drew parallel between these child 
support under-payments and the observed cheap-riding in Experiments 1 to 3.  
Particularly, in Chapter 4 I speculated that those under-contributing 
parents may have experienced a similar emotional conundrum just like the 
cheap-riders in Experiment 2. While their deliberate under-repayment may be 
indicative of these paying parents’ intent to show retributions against their 
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exes for their losses of custody (or for the split) (Stahly, 2000), they were 
mindful of not going overboard thus crossed the line of a ‘Just Desert’ (Moore, 
1997; Wenzel & Thielmann, 2006). They may also contribute partially hoping 
to lessen their sense of guilt over their failure to provide their children with a 
loving family (Arditti, 1992; Braver et al., 1993)—whereby guilt aversion is a 
defining attribute of Experienced Warm-Glow (Ferguson & Flynn, 2016). 
Meanwhile, analyses of Experiment 3(i.e. Chapter 5) indicated that 
cheap-riding is more likely resorted to in an iterated rather than a one-off 
exchange context. This could be mapped onto the situation in which a divorced 
or split couple might still continue to interact with one another for their 
children’s sake. Nonetheless, results of Experiment 3 further illustrated that 
despite the more prevalent attempts to cheap-ride in an iterated interactional 
context, there was no evidence suggesting that cheap-riding could be relied on 
to enforce fairness (or subsequent cooperativeness). In other words, the present 
data hinted that any under-contributors who wish to use their partial under-
payment to serve a correctional purpose might wish to think twice about that. 
6.3. Caveats 
While I had outlined—in every preceding empirical chapter—the 
shortcomings or limitations that pertains to each individual chapter, in this 
section I intend to shed light on four recurring methodological concerns of the 
three present experiments. The following sub-sections (i.e. 6.3.1 to 6.3.4) will 
also entail discussions on, (i) what have been done at present to address these 
issues (i.e. Sub-section 6.3.1), or (ii) alternative measures to be taken in the 
future as to properly tackle each of these concerns (i.e. 6.3.2 to 6.3.4).    
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6.3.1. Statistical Power and the Null Findings on the Trait-Prosociality links   
 One major methodological limitation of Experiments 1 to 3 concerns 
the absence of any a-priori power analyses to determine the minimum required 
sample sizes (N) to detect the hypothesised effects (Everitt, 2002). This may 
account for the present list of insignificant findings—throughout Experiments 
2 to 3—as regards the link between dispositional gratitude (and indebtedness) 
and prosociality (or the absence of sanctioning). 
To examine whether insufficient Ns were indeed to blame for the null 
findings I conducted a post-hoc power analysis using the effect estimates of the 
trait gratitude-prosociality link from the meta-analysis (i.e., r (5,988) = 0.248, 
p <.001 (two-tailed); see Chapter 2). G*Power Version 3.1.9.2 (Faul, 
Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009; Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007) 
was used to carry out this analysis. The results revealed that with power equals 
0.80, a total N of 125 would be warranted for the effect (i.e. r = 0.248) to be 
significant at p ≤.05 (two-tailed). While the actual Ns of both Experiments 2 (N 
= 135) and 3 (N = 133) may have exceeded the suggested N of 125, it should 
be noted that in Experiment 2 only 87 data points—thanks to the high rate of 
rejections (N = 48)—were used to examine how dispositional gratitude was 
related to participants’ trustworthiness. As a result, it is conceivable that the 
list of insignificant findings—especially on the trait-prosociality 
associations—of Experiment 2 could be due to the insufficient N; while 
Experiment 3 appeared reasonably powered despite the fact that a similar 
pattern of null findings were still observed (See Chapter 5 for details).  
I also tested if Experiments 1 to 3 were adequately powered to examine 
the state gratitude-prosociality association. A similar power analysis, while 
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adopting the effect estimates of the state gratitude-prosociality link from the 
meta-analysis (i.e., r (14,206) = 0.393, p <.001 (two-tailed); see Chapter 2), 
was carried out using G*Power (Faul et al., 2009; Faul et al., 2007). The 
results showed that with power equals 0.80, a total N of 48 would be warranted 
for the effect (i.e. r = 0.393) to be significant at p ≤.05 (two-tailed). Hence, the 
present three empirical studies (i.e. N = 49 for Experiment 1, N = 87 for 
Experiment 2; and N = 133 for Experiment 3) should be sufficiently powered 
to detect the association between state gratitude and prosociality.  
6.3.2. Over-reliance on Offer Provisions as the Current Gratitude Induction 
Throughout Experiments 1 to 3 I relied solely upon the provision of a 
financial benefit (i.e. conditional or unconditional offers) to induce recipients’ 
momentary feelings of gratitude (or indebtedness). Leung (2011) contended 
the logic behind was that since contributing in an anonymous game setting 
involves i) sacrificing self-interest and ii) running the risk of being taken 
advantage of, hence the recipients would be inclined to think of those 
contributions as a token of benevolence from the givers—which accordingly 
elicits the former’s feeling of appreciation toward the latter (Wood et al., 
2011). However, unlike a classic Public Goods game (i.e. PG hereafter) where 
Leung (2011) based her above argument on, a contribution in the present 
experimental set-ups is clearly different from that in a PG in several aspects. 
 First, a conditional offer (especially the offers with high surcharge, e.g. 
the 25%- or 50%-Interest ones) at present is hardly indicative of the helper’s 
sacrifice of self-gains. Although recipients in Experiments 3 might perceive 
their helpers to have incurred a default risk making an offer, the same could 
barely apply to Experiments 1 and 2. Indeed, I suggested that the implied 
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binding nature may account for why recipients (in particular Experiment 2) 
may have instead utilised their options to accept or reject as the avenue to vent 
out their frustrations toward their helpers (See Chapter 4 for details). Thus, 
there is no reason to believe that a recipient in Experiments 1 or 2 would feel 
that his/her conditional offer giver would have incurred any risk for such a 
quasi-prosocial gesture. All in all, the above suggests that it might be arbitrary, 
or even erroneous, to take it for granted that an offer provision under the 
present gaming parameters would constitute a legitimate gratitude (or 
indebtedness) induction as Leung (2011) did in the context of the PGs.   
 Hence, a future investigation may consider including a specific 
gratitude induction session in the form of a cover task prior to the economic 
game in which prosociality or cooperation is measured (e.g. Bartlett et al., 
2012; Desteno et al., 2010; Tsang et al., 2012). For instance, Desteno et al. 
(2010) had participants undertook a computerized word perception task—
during which they would encounter a ‘technical failure’ only to be then 
‘resolved’ by the confederates (i.e. the ‘Gratitude Manipulation’, Study 1 to 3, 
Bartlett & Desteno, 2006)—prior to partaking in a Give-Some Dilemma Game 
(Nelissen et al., 2007; Parise et al., 1999) in which cooperation was examined.  
6.3.3. Concerns with Playing with Real versus Simulated Counterparts
 Aside from Experiment 1 during which participants actually played 
with one another, participants of Experiments 2 and 3 were indeed interacting 
with a set of pre-programmed responses as opposed to real persons. While it is 
not uncommon to administer trust games with simulated instead of real 
counterparts (e.g. Evans & Revelle, 2008; Johansson-Stenman et al., 2009), 
Mislin and associates (Bottom, Holloway, Miller, Mislin, & Whitford, 2006; 
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Johnson & Mislin, 2011) noted that belief about playing with a computer (vis-
à-vis a real person) should give rise to different in-game decision-making. In 
particular, Johnson and Mislin (2011) underlined that—via their meta-analysis 
over 162 Trust Games—people tended to be more trustful when they were 
convinced that they were playing with real persons, although the authors did 
not examine whether this belief would also  influence people’s trustworthiness. 
While in Experiments 1 to 3 I had not specifically probed into 
participants’ beliefs about whether they were playing with real persons, there 
were indeed occasional post-experiment inquiries or even doubts expressed in 
relation to the ‘authenticity’ of one’s exchange ‘partners’. As such, in any 
future investigations the experimenter may consider adopting Experiment 1’s 
(random) partner-matching design, but meanwhile maintaining the control 
over certain key parameters (e.g. i) whether or not, and ii) what, offers are 
given) just like Experiments 2 and 3. For example, similar to Experiment 1 the 
experimenter might stipulate a recipient to wait his/her turn while the partner is 
taking the time necessary to decide, thus hinting to the former that the whole 
episode is not simulated. In the meantime, while both the partnering and 
waiting may be real, participants may still be shown the indeed pre-determined 
‘partner’s decisions’—just like what was done in Experiments 2 and 3. 
6.3.4. Issues with the Forced-choice Repayment (i.e. Experiments 2 and 3) 
  
Figure 6.3. The Forced-choice Repayment Screen in Experiments 2 and 3
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One additional recurring methodological concern involves the forced-
choice entries of participants’ repayment in Experiments 2 and 3. Offer 
acceptors in these two experiments were cornered into making a selection out 
of whether to 1) repay ‘the whole of the agreed repayment’ (i.e. Cooperation); 
2) repay ‘some of the agreed amount’ (i.e. Cheap-riding), or to 3) repay 
‘nothing at all’ (i.e. Free-riding) (See Figure 6.3).Participants who chose to 
cheap-ride were then instructed to indicate their repayment (See Figure 6.4).  
 
Figure 6.4 Follow-up Entry Screen for Acceptors who Partially Repaid 
 
While such an explicit segregation may have eased the categorization 
based on the participants’ repayment, it may also give rise to the ‘Response 
Effect’: whereby respondents may have relied upon the given response sets to 
guide their preferences or decisions (see Feldman, 1989; Zaller and Feldman, 
1992). In other words, such an explicit mention of the available repayment 
avenues might have inadvertently swayed the participants toward repaying in a 
particular fashion. Therefore, it may be advisable for any future replications to 
replace the current forced-choice entry with a free-entry measure. As illustrated 
in Figure 6.5, the experimenter might just leave it open to the participants to 
freely key in how much they intend to give back to the helpers.  
 
Figure 6.5 The ‘Free-Entry’ Repayment Measure as suggested 
 
6.4. Conclusion 
 The current thesis primarily concerns the scrutiny over the gratitude-
prosociality association in an economic exchange context. Via the meta-
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analysis (i.e. Chapter 2) and three empirical studies (i.e. Chapters 3 to 5) in the 
form of economic games, the results overall confirmed the role of state 
gratitude in facilitating economic cooperation in addition to restraining 
sanctioning. Crucially, the present thesis helped to fill a gap in the literature by 
combining Psychometrics (i.e. measurement of personality and attitudes via 
various surveys) and Experimental Economics (i.e. the use of economic games) 
in the analyses of how gratitude, and a similar benefit-triggered emotion in 
indebtedness, would predict people’s subsequent economic decisions.  Using 
both the single-role, one-shot (Experiments 1 and 2) and multiple-role, iterated 
(Experiment 3) game designs the present thesis also shed light upon an 
economic phenomenon which has both reality and theoretical implications—
that is, cheap-riding. While the present analyses failed to indicate any 
associations between gratitude (or indebtedness) and cheap-riding in particular, 
the results had nonetheless demonstrated the unique psychological profiling of 
people who still chose to cheap-ride when they could have ‘free-rode’ instead. 
The data also partially acknowledged a norm-enforcing, functional aspect of 
cheap-riding, although its efficacy in fairness enforcement would warrant 
confirmation in future related investigations. 
All in all, I sincerely hope that my thesis could inspire any prospective 
investigators to carry on their endeavours to contribute to the understanding of 
the prosocial side of gratitude. I also hope that my thesis could encourage 
further efforts into the study in relation to the role of indebtedness—as a 
psychological construct—in economic exchanges.
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1. Scale Items of the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale 
(Form-C) (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960) 
 
Listed Below are a number of statements concerning personal attitudes. 
Please read each item and decide whether the statement is TRUE or FALSE as it 
pertains to you personally 
 
1. It is sometimes hard for me to go on with my work if I am not encouraged*. 
2. I sometimes feel resentful when I don't get my way*. 
3. On a few occasions I have given up doing something because I thought too 
little of my ability*. 
4. There have been times when I felt like rebelling against people in authority, 
even though I knew they were right*. 
5. No matter who I'm talking to, I'm always a good listener**. 
6. There have been occasions when I took advantage of someone*.  
7. I am always willing to admit when I made a mistake**. 
8. I sometimes try to get even rather than forgive and forget*. 
9. I am always courteous, even to people who are disagreeable**. 
10. I have never been irked when people expressed ideas very different from 
my own**.  
11. There have been times when I was quite jealous of the good fortune of 
others*. 
12. I am sometimes irritated by people who ask favours of me*. 
13. I have never deliberately said something that hurt someone's feelings**. 
 
* Add 1 point if FALSE is marked 
** Add1 point if TRUE is marked. 
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Appendix 2. Scale Items of the Impression Management Scale  
(i.e. IMS, Paulhus, 1991) 
 
Using the scale below as a guide, please indicate how much you agree with the 
following statements. There are no Right or Wrong answers. 
(‘1’= Not True to ‘7’ = Very True)  
1. I sometimes tell lies if I have to*. 
2. I never cover up my mistakes. 
3. There have been occasions when I have taken advantage of someone*.  
4. I never swear (i.e. use foul languages). 
5. I sometimes try to get even rather than ‘forgive and forget’*. 
6. I always obey laws, even if I am unlikely to get caught. 
7. I have said something bad about a friend behind his/her back*. 
8. When I hear people talking privately, I avoid listening. 
9. I have received too much change from a salesperson without telling 
him/her*.  
10. I always declare everything at customs. 
11. When I was young I sometimes stole things*. 
12. I have never dropped litter on the street. 
13. I sometimes drive faster than the speed limit*  
(Please leave this item blank in case you do not drive).  
14. I never read sexy books or magazines. 
15. I have done things I don’t tell other people about*1. 
16. I never take things that don’t belong to me. 
17. I have taken sick-leave from work or school even though I wasn’t really 
sick*.  
18. I have never damaged library book or store merchandise without reporting 
it.  
19. I have some pretty awful habits*.  
20. I don’t gossip about other people’s business. 
 
* Reverse-scored for the computation of the IMS composite score.   
1Item 13 was removed when re-administered in Experiment 3.   
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Appendix 3. Scale Items of the Gratitude-Questionnaire-VI  
(McCullough, Emmons, & Tsang, 2002) 
 
Please indicate, using the scale below, how the following items describe 
yourself. There are no Right or Wrong answers. 
 
(‘1’= Strongly Disagree; ‘2’= Disagree; ‘3’= Slightly Disagree; ‘4’= Neutral; 
‘5’= Slightly agree; ‘6’= Agree; ‘7’= Strongly Agree) 
 
1. I have so much in life to be thankful for. 
 
2. If I had to list everything that I felt thankful for, it would be a very long list. 
 
3. When I looked at the world, I don’t see much to be thankful for  
(reverse scored). 
 
4. I am thankful to a wide variety of people. 
 
5. As I get older I find myself more able to appreciate the people, events, and 
situations that have been part of my life history. 
 
6. Long amounts of time can go by before I feel grateful to something or 
someone (reverse scored). 
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Appendix 4. Scale Items of the Indebtedness-Scales Revised  
(Elster, Maleki, McLeod, & Watkins, 2005) 
Please indicate, using the scale below, how the following items describe 
yourself. There are no Right or Wrong answers. 
(‘1’= Strongly Disagree; ‘2’= Disagree; ‘3’= Slightly Disagree; ‘4’= Neutral; 
‘5’= Slightly agree; ‘6’= Agree; ‘7’= Strongly Agree) 
1. If a friend did me a favour, I would make sure to repay them as quickly as 
possible. 
2. Owing someone a favour makes me uncomfortable. 
3. I would not borrow money from a friend unless it was absolutely necessary. 
4. Asking for another’s help gives them power over your life. 
5. Never a borrower or a lender be. 
6. I’d be embarrassed if someone had to remind me of a debt I owed them. 
7. As a rule, I don’t accept a favour if I can’t return the favour. 
8. If someone paid for my dinner or invited me to eat at their place, I would feel 
obligated to buy the dinner the next time or to invite them to eat at my place. 
9. I would be very upset if I discovered that I had forgotten to return something I 
borrowed. 
10. If someone goes out of their way to help me, I feel as though I should do more for 
them than merely return the favour. 
11. When someone does me a favour it often bothers me because I immediately 
wonder how I will repay them. 
12. I like to make sure I don’t owe anybody anything. 
13. I find myself worrying about whether I have repaid all the favours I have received. 
14. When someone gives me something or provides a favour to me, I usually feel 
somewhat uncomfortable at first. 
15. I’d rather do things myself than have someone help me because I wouldn’t like 
feeling obligated to return their favour. 
16. I don't receive gifts very well. 
17. If someone bought me an expensive gift, I would worry a lot about whether I 
would be able to repay them. 
18. In good friendships you should make sure that you pay back all the favours you 
have received from your friend. 
19. If someone does me a favour, I usually try to pay them back as soon as possible. 
20. I would be uncomfortable right now if someone surprised me with a large or 
expensive gift. 
21. Being able to repay a favour or gift brings me great relief. 
22. I have trouble enjoying gift from others because I am concerned about what I 
would give them in return.  
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Appendix 5. On-screen Instructions for Experiment 1 
Example: A P1 (Potential Helper)-P2 (Potential Recipient) pair in ‘Low-
cost’ condition with P1 making a Conditional Offer and P2 Accepting it 
I. Opening (All participants) 
Each of you is given 150 points at the beginning of this game. In this game 
there is a bonus threshold of 200 points, i.e. you will be entitled to a bonus (in addition 
to your £2-inconvenience allowance) only if you manage to hit 200 points (or above). 
Each point above the threshold (200 points) is worth 1p in addition to the basic 
bonus £2. For example, if your final score is 300 points, the total bonus for you will be: 
Basic bonus for reaching 200 points: £2 + Extra bonus: (300-200)* 1p= £ 1Total £ 3 
The maximum points you can get is 350, meaning that you could at most end up with a 
bonus of £3.50 (£2-basic bonus+150*1p) 
In this game you will be asked to roll a fair die once, and afterwards enter the 
number you get to the computer. The system will then generate a CHANGE in your 
score based on the number you get out of the die-rolling. Dependent on your die-
rolling results, there are SIX possible changes could be brought to your final scores, 
namely: i) -50, ii) Zero change, iii) +50, iv) +100, v) +150, vi) +200. 
Please note that a large number rolled does not necessarily mean a more 
favourable change and vice versa. Instead, the level of your final bonus is jointly 
determined by WHAT YOU AND THE OTHER PARTICIPANTS HAVE GOT; in a 
way that the RARER number you get relative to others, the MORE FAVOURABLE 
change in your score. For instance, If there are 20 players and you roll ‘1’ and five 
others roll ‘2’,  another five people roll ‘3’, four people get a ‘5’  and five others roll 
‘6’, you’ll get the most bonus because you had the rarest number. 
In this game, everyone has a partner. Nevertheless, neither joint effort nor 
competition with your partner will be required to capture the bonus. You and your 
partner are NOT IDENTIFIABLE to each other and will remain anonymous. The 
payoff of yours and your partner’s will be shown on-screen shortly after you key in the 
number you get after rolling the die. 
Please note that in this gaming session partners interact with one another and 
they will at times take turn to make decisions. As a result, you will see a couple of 
waiting screens while your partner is making his/her decision. A few waiting screens 
could last for 5-6 minutes, depending on how many decisions your partner is asked to 
make. Similarly, while you are asked to make a series of decisions, it will be your 
partners' turn to be shown the waiting screen. 
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Appendix 5. On-screen Instructions for Experiment 1 (Cont.) 
II. Die Rolling and Entry of results (All Participants) 
 
III. Display of INITIAL payoffs of players and that of their partners  
Player 1s : Own Payoff Display 
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Appendix 5. On-screen Instructions for Experiment 1 (Cont.) 
Player 2s : Own Payoff Display 
 
Player 1s: Partners’ Die-rolling Score (and Payoff) Display
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Appendix 5. On-screen Instructions for Experiment 1 (Cont.) 
Player 2s: Partners’ Die-rolling Score (and Payoff) Display
 
IV. Pre-offer Ratings: Attributions of partners’ Die-rolling (e.g. Player 2s)
 
 
 
 
Appendices   349 
 
 
 
Appendix 5. On-screen Instructions for Experiment 1 (Cont.) 
V. Waiting Screen (Player 2s) and Helping decisions (Player 1s)  
a. Player 2s’ Waiting Screen (while P1s made helping decisions) 
 
b. Helping Decisions by Player 1s 
bi. Rules of Making an offer (Player 1s) 
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Appendix 5. On-screen Instructions for Experiment 1 (Cont.) 
bii. Understanding Check for the Rules of Transfer 
 
biii. Player 1s’ Decision to Make an Offer (I to III)  
I) Basic Ground Rules and Notification of Partners’ ‘Need for Help’
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Appendix 5. On-screen Instructions for Experiment 1 (Cont.) 
II) To Help or Not to Help
 
III) Conditionality of Offer: Whether to impose a ‘repayment clause’? 
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Appendix 5. On-screen Instructions for Experiment 1 (Cont.) 
biv. Player 1 after agreeing to make a Conditional Offer (I TO III)   
(I) The list of Available ‘Repayment Clauses’   
(II) Picking a Condition : Full vs. Partial vs. Repayment Plus Interest 
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Appendix 5. On-screen Instructions for Experiment 1 (Cont.) 
(III) A Reminder: Rules of Making a Transfer 
(IV) Deciding the Magnitude of Transfer
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Appendix 5. On-screen Instructions for Experiment 1 (Cont.) 
V. Offer Acceptance, Post-offer Ratings, and Repayment for Player 2s 
a. Waiting Screen for Player 1s (while Player 2s made their decisions as regards 
their offers received) 
bi. Offer Display and Acceptance (or Rejection) for Player 2s (1 to 4)  
(1) Partners’ Decisions (To Help or not to have helped) 
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Appendix 5. On-screen Instructions for Experiment 1 (Cont.) 
(2) Understanding Check
(3) Offer Display 
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Appendix 5. On-screen Instructions for Experiment 1 (Cont.) 
(4) Acceptance or Rejection of the Offer
bii). Post-offer Ratings by Player 2s 
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Appendix 5. On-screen Instructions for Experiment 1 (Cont.) 
biii. Repayment Screens for Player 2s who Accepted their Conditional Offers  
(1). A Reminder: ‘Terms’ of the Repayment 
(2) Repayment Decisions: P2s to Freely Decide their Magnitude of Repayment
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Appendix 5. On-screen Instructions for Experiment 1 (Cont.) 
VI. Compensations Display 
Player 1s- CONDITIONAL Helpers whose recipients did not defect 
Player 2s - Recipients of Conditional offers and Repaid Fully  
(i.e. NO ‘breaching of contract’) 
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Appendix 6. On-screen Instructions for Experiment 2 
Example: A Participant who Accepted an ‘Interest-Free’ offer and Partially 
Repaid (i.e. Cheap-ride) 
I. Opening (All participants) 
Each of you is given 150 points at the beginning of this game. In this game 
there is a bonus threshold of 200 points, i.e. you will be entitled to a bonus (in addition 
to your £2-inconvenience allowance) only if you manage to hit 200 points (or above). 
Each point you get will be equivalent to 1p, if and only if your final score is at or 
above the threshold 200 points. For example, if your final score is 300 points, the total 
bonus for you will be 300 Pence, i.e. £3, as you manage to make the threshold. 
However, a final score of 150 (or any scores below 200) would yield you ZERO Bonus 
as you fail to reach the threshold. 
The maximum points you can attain is 350, meaning that you could at most 
end up with a Bonus of 350 Pence, i.e. £3.50. In this game you will be asked to roll a 
fair die once, and afterwards enter the number you get to the computer. The system 
will then generate a CHANGE in your score based on the number you get out of the 
die-rolling. Dependent on your die-rolling results, there are SIX possible changes could 
be brought to your final scores, namely: i) -50, ii) Zero change, iii) +50, iv) +100, v) 
+150, vi) +200. Please note that a large number rolled DOES NOT NECESSARILY 
GUARANTEE a more favourable change and vice versa. Instead, the level of your 
final bonus is the outcome of the system's RANDOM assignment. The system would 
assign at random ONE of the SIX abovementioned outcomes to ONE of the SIX 
numbers on the die. That is, there is an equal opportunity for you to achieve either of 
the six abovementioned possible changes. 
In this game, each of you would play alongside a partner. Please be reminded 
that NEITHER 1. Joint Effort, NOR 2. Competition, with partners will be necessary for 
each of you to secure the bonus. You and your partner are NOT IDENTIFIABLE to 
one another and will remain anonymous throughout this study. Throughout this gaming 
session you and your partner would take turn to make decisions that might influence 
each other's Final Payoffs. 
Owing to the interactive nature of this game, you will see several waiting 
screens as your partner is making his/her decision. Certain waiting screens could at 
most last for FIVE to SIX minutes, depending on how many decisions your partner has 
to make. Likewise, while you are asked to make a series of decisions, it will be your 
partner’s turn to be shown the waiting screens.  
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Appendix 6. On-screen Instructions for Experiment 2 (Cont.) 
II. Die Rolling and Entry of Results – Same as Experiment 1 
III. Display of Initial Payoffs-  
(1) Own Payoff Display 
 
(2) Partner’s Payoff Display 
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Appendix 6. On-screen Instructions for Experiment 2 (Cont.) 
IV. Pre-offer Ratings: Attributions of partners’ Die-rolling (e.g. Player 2s)
 
V. Waiting Screen  
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Appendix 6. On-screen Instructions for Experiment 2 (Cont.) 
VI. Understanding Check 
 
VII. Offer Display (Point Transfer)  
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Appendix 6. On-screen Instructions for Experiment 2 (Cont.) 
VIII. Offer Acceptance (or Rejections) 
 
IX. Pre-repayment Ratings (See Chapter 4 for items)  
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Appendix 6. On-screen Instructions for Experiment 2 (Cont.) 
X. A Reminder: ‘Terms’ of the Repayment  
 
XI. Repayment Stage: Options 
 
 
XII. Cheap-riders’ Repayment Entries 
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Appendix 6. On-screen Instructions for Experiment 2 (Cont.) 
XII. Post-repayment Ratings (Reasons for Repayment or Non-repayment) 
 
XIII. Compensations Display 
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Appendix 7. On-screen Instructions for Experiment 3 
Example: A Participant who i) was ‘Cheap-rode’ (Repayment 
Manipulation) in Trial 1 (First Helper Trial) and ii) had accepted and 
cheap-rode on his/her ‘25%-Interest’ offer in Trial 2 (1st Recipient Trial). 
I. Opening (All participants) 
Aim of the Game 
1) Try to win as many 'bonus points' as you can in each trial. There are multiple trials 
in this experiment;  
2) There will be a lottery draw at the end of the experiment, and one of you will have a 
chance to win a cash prize (at most £35);  
3) One of you will be randomly picked as the winner, and for that person one trial they 
played will be randomly chosen and they will be paid on the basis of that trial;  
4) How big the prize money is will depend on the person's performance on that 
randomly chosen trial, i.e. the 'Jackpot Trial';  
5) Therefore, treat all trials as though they are real. 
Rules of the Game 
1) To begin with each of you will be given 150 'Bonus Points'. There is a bonus 
threshold of 200 points you have to reach to stand a chance to win a cash prize. Only if 
you can attain 200 points or above will you have the chance to be entered into the 
lottery to win. Each point you get is worth 10p, only if your final bonus points are at or 
above the threshold 200 points will you have the chance to be entered into the lottery. 
For instance, if you win the lottery draw, and your final score at the 'Jackpot Trial' 
amounts to 350 points, then you will receive a cash prize of £35. Nevertheless, a final 
score below 200 (e.g. 150 points) at the 'Jackpot Trial' would mean that your cash prize 
would be ZERO even if you win the lottery draw, since you fall short of the threshold.  
2) The maximum Bonus Points you can get in each trial is 350, meaning that you can 
potentially win a cash prize of £35. You will start with 150 points. 
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3) In this game you will be then asked to roll a fair die once in every round (there will 
be multiple rounds), you will be asked to enter the number you rolled on the dice. The 
system will then generate a change in your score (the number of extra points you'll 
receive) based on the number you rolled on the dice.  
Dependent on your die-rolling, there are 6 possible changes that could be 
brought to your final points scores, namely: i. -50 (resulting in you have 100 points); ii.  
Zero change (resulting in 150 points: no change); iii. +50 (resulting in 200 points: you 
just meet the threshold to be entered into the lottery and you could win £20); iv. +100 
(resulting in 250 points: you exceed the threshold to be entered into the lottery and you 
could win £25); v. +150 (resulting in 300 points: you exceed the threshold to be 
entered into the lottery and you could win £30); vi. +200 (resulting in 350 points: you 
exceed the threshold to be entered into the lottery and you could win £35.  
A large number rolled does not necessarily guarantee a more favourable 
change, and vice versa. Instead, the level of your final bonus is the outcome of the 
system's RANDOM assignment. The system would assign at random 1 of the 6 
abovementioned outcomes to 1 of the 6 numbers on the die. That is, there is an equal 
opportunity for you to achieve either of the six abovementioned possible changes. 
Structure of the Game 
In this game each player will play alongside a different partner at each round. 
You and your partners will not be identifiable to one another, and will remain 
anonymous throughout the whole experiment. Throughout this experiment you and 
your partners will take turns to make decisions that might affect each other's possible 
final payoffs at each round. 
Interactions with your Partner 
In this game we allow interactions among the anonymous partners in each 
round following your initial die-rolling. Depending on your (or your partner's) final 
score at each trial, you could be in a position to either help your partner (by giving 
some of your points) or to receive help (i.e. bonus points) from your partner. 
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Helper 
In case your post die-rolling score amounts to 250 or more, you can decide whether 
or not to help by transferring some of your bonus points to your partner in case he/she 
fails to hit the threshold. That way your partner could be eligible to earn a cash prize. 
There are certain basic guidelines, though, if you agree to help: 
A. You could decide whether to request a repayment from your partner; 
B. Your own Post-transfer must not fall below the 200-point threshold. For instance, if 
your post die-rolling point is 350, you cannot give more than 150 to your partner; 
C. Your partner’s Post-transfer score must be at least 200 to render your transfer 
meaningful 
Recipient 
You could potentially receive help (in the form of a point transfer) from your 
partner, in case your Post die-rolling score fall short of the 200-point threshold in any 
trials That way you are still eligible to win a cash prize in case you win the lottery 
draw, and this trial is selected as your 'Jackpot Trial'. Your partner could decide 
whether to transfer some of his/her extra points to you to help you reach the bonus 
threshold. Your partner may decide to impose a repayment condition on his/her 
transfer. You reserve the rights to agree to or to decline your partner's offer at each 
round. Please be reminded that any rejection of partner's transfer will yield you ZERO 
payoff, if you win the lottery draw and that trial being your 'Jackpot Trial'. 
Owing to this interactive nature of the present experiment, you would therefore 
see several waiting screens (at every round) as your partner is making his/her 
decisions. Certain waiting screens can at most last for 5-6 minutes, depending on how 
many decisions your partners have to make. Likewise, your partners will be shown the 
same waiting screens when you are asked to make your decisions. Please once again be 
reminded that you and your different partners will not be identifiable to one another 
throughout the entire experiment 
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Appendix 7. On-screen Instructions for Experiment 3 (Cont.) 
I. Understanding Check (Helper Trials) 
 
II.  Understanding Check (Recipient Trials)  
 
III. Trial 1: Die Rolling and Entry of Results – Same as Experiment 1 
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Appendix 7. On-screen Instructions for Experiment 3 (Cont.) 
IV. Trial 1: Display of Initial Payoffs-  
(1) Own Payoff Display 
 
(2) Partner’s Payoffs 
 
VI. Trial 1: Helping Rules (Information Screen A) 
‘In this game we allow high-scorers to decide whether or not to help their 
low-scoring partner(s) reach threshold by giving away part of their points’ 
‘That is, you can choose to transfer some of your points to your partner, subject 
to the following guidelines if you decide to help’ 
1. You can decide whether to request a repayment from your partner following 
your transfer; 
2. Your own 'Post-Transfer' points must not fall below the threshold, i.e. 200 
points, meaning that you cannot give more than 150 points; 
3. Your partner's 'Post-Transfer' scores must at least hit 200, i.e. the threshold 
for being eligible to win a cash prize in case he/she wins the lottery.’  
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Appendix 7. On-screen Instructions for Experiment 3 (Cont.) 
VII. Trial 1: Helping Rules (Information Screen B) 
‘Knowing your partner's failure to make the threshold,  
Please indicate whether or not you want to help your partner, by transferring 
part of your points to him/her, so that he/she could claim some bonus in case 
he/she wins the lottery.  
You can decide later whether or not to impose any repayment requests on your 
transfer. 
Please be reminded that neither you nor your partner will be able to spot one 
another.’  
VIII. Trial 1: Helping Decision: To Help or Not to Help 
 
IX. Trial 1: Range of Helping Options (For Helpers, Figure 5.4) 
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Appendix 7. On-screen Instructions for Experiment 3 (Cont.) 
X.  Trial 1: Helping Decisions, Conditionality 
‘In the light of the above alternatives 1 to 4, how would you like your partner to 
repay you for your transfer? 
1. NO Repayment; 
2. Full Repayment; 
3. Repayment Plus 25% Interest; 
4. Repayment Plus 50% Interest’ 
XI. Trial 1: Helping Rules: Transfer Magnitude 
‘You have chosen to transfer part of your points to your partner either 
unconditionally or expecting a repayment. 
Please be reminded that your own ‘Post-Transfer final score must not be under 
the 200- Point Mark. 
Thus you are not expected to give away more than 150 Points. 
However, you have to at least give away 100 Points to render your transfer 
meaningful.’ 
XII. Trial 1: Helping Decisions: Transfer Magnitude 
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Appendix 7. On-screen Instructions for Experiment 3 (Cont.) 
XIII. Trial 1: Waiting Screen for Helpers 
 
XIV. Trial 1: Notification of Partner’s Repayment (Cheap-riding) 
 
XV. Trial 2 (1st Recipient Trial):  Die Rolling and Entry– Same as Trial 1 
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Appendix 7. On-screen Instructions for Experiment 3 (Cont.) 
XVI. Trial 2: Display of Initial Payoffs 
(1) Own Payoff Display 
 
(2) Partner’s Payoff Display 
 
XVII. Trial 2: Waiting Screen 
 
 
XVIII. Trial 2: Offer Screen (25%-Interest Offer Given) 
 
 
 
 
Appendices   375 
 
 
 
Appendix 7. On-screen Instructions for Experiment 3 (Cont.) 
XIX. Trial 2: Offer Acceptance 
 
XX. Trial 2: Pre-repayment Ratings  
‘Please consider the following statements, using the following scales, regarding 
your partner’s decision to have given an offer to you.  
1. I feel indebted (i.e. feeling like I owe something) to my partner*. 
2. How much gratitude would you feel towards your partner? (‘1’: No 
Gratitude; ‘7’: A very lot of Gratitude) 
3. I am annoyed by my partner's decision*. 
4. I would have done the same thing were I in my partner's shoes*. 
5. I feel obliged to repay my partner*. 
6. How much do you consider your partner's transfer is motivated by a sincere 
desire to help? (‘1’: Not at all motivated, ‘7’: Completely Motivated) 
7. My partner could have been more generous to me*. 
8. How much do you think it cost your partner to have offered you help?  
(‘1’: Nothing, ‘7’: A Great Deal) 
9. I am eager to help my partner out if he/she is in need in the near future*. 
10. How valuable do you consider that your partner's help is to you? (‘1’: Not 
at all Valuable; ‘7’ Extremely Valuable)’ 
*All items were rated on a 1 (‘Not At All’) to 7 (Completely), seven-point 
Likert scale unless otherwise specified. 
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Appendix 7. On-screen Instructions for Experiment 3 (Cont.) 
XXI. Trial 2: Repayment: Reminder 
 
XXII. Trial 2: Repayment Decisions –Categorical 
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Appendix 7. On-screen Instructions for Experiment 3 (Cont.) 
XXIII. Trial 2: Cheap-rider’s Entry of Repayment 
 
XXIV. Trial 2: Compensations Display 
 
 
 
 
 
